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Abstract 
 This dissertation examines the utility of quality assessment (QA) in higher 
education as a means of measuring and improving qualitative excellence.  It also   
tracks the emergence and development of QA in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Ontario.  I find that QA neither measures nor helps to produce 
anything that could meaningfully be described as being of high “quality”.  Rather, 
QA is effective in helping to reproduce commercially oriented but hardly ground-
breaking research and a more “flexploitable” labour force. 
 The precursors to contemporary forms of QA first appeared in United 
States during the early part of the 20th century. To serve the interests of a 
burgeoning capitalism, corporate America organized independently and under 
the aegis of the American state to develop and control a national system of higher 
education.  To that end, the captains of industry developed an extensive program 
of measurement and evaluation as a basis to rationalize funding for university 
teaching and research. Over time, that system of measurement and assessment 
developed into what today appears as a massive network of procedures and 
metrics that aid in the reproduction of a stratified system of higher education that 
efficiently puts out the kinds of knowledge and workers that can in turn aid in the 
reproduction of neoliberal capitalism.    
 Since 1980, successive governments in both the United Kingdom and 
Ontario have developed systems of QA in the hope of reproducing the kinds of 
results achieved in America. QA has been seen as a way to install a price-type 
signaling system, and thereby a market, in what are subsidized and public 
systems of higher education.  In other words, systems of QA were developed to 
evaluate the exchange-value of new knowledge and graduates within the context 
of neoliberal capitalism.  Accordingly, QA makes it possible for firms and the 
state to rationalize funding in a manner that disciplines  those within and around 
the university – increasingly by consent - to produce a particular form of value, 
namely that which can help corporations to secure larger profits, irrespective of 
the social, political, economic, or ecological consequences. 
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Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.  
–Robert Cox 
The one point that I want to bring out clearly to you is that definite objective tests 
which define the type of ability which you wish to have developed are most 
valuable, not only to yourselves as employers in selecting your help, but also as 
your most powerful means of controlling what is done in the school.  
-Charles Mann 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Whether it be to promote efficiency, social justice, or the creation of jobs 
and a knowledge based economy, the drive to assess and assure quality in higher 
education and research through some kind of bureaucratized 
audit/evaluation/ranking type process is now ubiquitous. Over the last 25 years, 
governments around the world have created new organizations tasked with the 
development and management of processes that allegedly testify to the efficiency 
and effectiveness of public sector “investments” in higher education.  The growth 
of such organizations has been remarkable.  Since its formation in 1991 the 
International Network of Quality Audit Agencies in Higher Education 
(“INQAAHE”) has expanded from a membership of just 8 to over 250 member 
organizations (INQAAHE 2013).  A vast and ever-expanding literature dealing 
exclusively with the elaboration and management of “sound” and “effective” 
quality assessment (QA) processes has similarly developed over the last twenty 
years. Today that literature is a discernible sub-discipline of Comparative and 
International Higher Education with no fewer than three academic journals 
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dedicated to the subject.1  In contrast to those who argue for the possibility of 
such “sound” and “effective” QA processes, I argue that QA holds little potential 
to deliver anything that could meaningfully be described as being of high 
“quality”.  On the contrary, I argue that QA is effective in helping to reproduce 
both commercially oriented but hardly ground-breaking research, as well as a 
more pliant and flexible working class, the members of which are less and less 
able and inclined to question a pattern of accumulation that is linked to growing 
inequality.  I further maintain that QA needs to be understood as more than just a 
mechanism of re-production, but as a means by which to constantly renegotiate 
capital, which I understand as a social relationship.   
 QA does this by breaking the academic enterprise into myriad discrete 
parts, each of which is measured and assigned a relative score or value on a scale 
that ultimately reflects the presumed superiority of units of research or methods 
of teaching that can either/both fetch higher prices at market and/or drive down 
the costs of producing such new research or sufficiently skilled graduates.  In this 
way, QA attempts to effect the transformation of all of the constitutive parts of 
the contemporary university into quantifiable commodities and subjects them to 
measures that approximate the law of value.  Though it is undoubtedly the case 
that different jurisdictions employ different systems and methods of QA and thus 
different evaluative criteria, it is not the case that such differences amount to 
                                                   
1 Quality in Higher Education; Quality Assurance in Education; Journal of Higher 
Education Policy and Management 
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clear qualitative differences in terms of the nature and kinds of research and 
teaching that QA encourages.  Quite the contrary.  QA encourages common 
forms: monopolizable forms of knowledge and readily transferable forms of skill.  
QA, in other words, recreates the ideological and material basis upon which 
capital can assert ownership and/or control over the commodities produced in 
the contemporary university.    
 In making this argument it is first necessary to recognize that, with the 
exception of America, where QA was pioneered, systems of QA have been rolled 
out by governments around the world since the 1980s and as an express means 
by which to increase the productive efficiency of the university (Hugh Willmott 
1995, 1016). QA’s emergence and development since the 1980s is linked, in other 
words, both directly and inextricably to the emergence and hegemony of 
neoliberal capitalism and the American state.  In the Global North, neoliberalism 
has entailed a policy program that has effected the progressive redistribution of 
wealth upwards (Saez and Veall 2005; Fast 2013).  In large part this has 
happened via government policy that has encouraged successive rounds of debt-
based consumption and led to the dismantling and/or reform of the welfare state 
in ways that have left most workers more insecure and sensitive to things like 
interest rate increases and the investment decisions of huge corporations 
(McNally 2011; D. Harvey 2005; Langley 2008).   Governments have undertaken 
such a policy program based on the now hegemonic idea that “markets”, given 
the right forms of subsidy and support, are relatively more effective/efficient at 
4 
allocating scarce capital.  Because of the superior efficiency of markets the 
proponents of neoliberal policy claim that only in a market-based order will the 
best and most skilled workers be able rise to the top, the most outstanding new 
products come to be produced in relatively efficient ways, and the best and most 
revealing new knowledge be produced and mobilized (Mirowski 2011, location 
345–540; Hayek 1945)(Hayek 1945).       
 And so, where government programs were once either provided 
universally or on the basis of more nationalist and/or humanist principles, the 
neoliberal policy program has re-engineered them.  Today government funding is 
linked to private-sector investment priorities, and therein to evaluations of what 
might be the “return on investment” (i.e. profitability) of different investment 
opportunities.  As such, government spending has itself been re-cast as a form of 
investment, where the utility of spending is measured almost singularly in terms 
of economic growth (i.e. increasing rates of private-sector investment) (Altvater 
2002; Fine and Jomo 2006).  In this policy framework, institutions, like 
universities, which are dependent on government funding, have been, like 
workers, forced to bend. Either such institutions adjust to the priorities and 
machinations of the marketplace and the vagaries of private-sector investment, 
or their economic security is compromised (Panitch 1994; Sheila Slaughter and 
Leslie 1997).2  In terms of higher education, QA effects this flexibility and reform 
                                                   
2 Borrowing from Cox (1987), Panitch (Panitch 1994, 69–71) argues that globalization has 
seen the internal re-organization of the capitalist state in response to the emergence of a new 
stage in and form of capitalist development and accumulation.  Accordingly, ‘globalization’ was 
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by providing governments and private-sector “partners”, with a recursive and 
relative measure of value upon which to make funding-cum-investment 
decisions.  Put still another way, by reducing the “output” of higher education to a 
set of prices, or quasi-prices3, QA provides an apparently rational basis upon 
which to make decisions concerning the allocation of resources.  Indeed, QA 
provides a means via which all of the players in and around higher education can 
make the decision to “invest”.  It is according to this logic that: students decide 
whether or not to invest in their higher education; both governments and private 
sector “partners” make decisions concerning the appropriate direction of 
research funding; departmental chairs allocate teaching and research 
responsibilities; individual researchers opt to pursue one or another research 
program.  
 The argument of this dissertation, is not, therefore that QA is the reason 
for the current state of the university, nor is it the only or arguably even the 
primary means by which the contemporary university has come to exist.  But it 
has helped to create it, to reproduce the symbols and sensibilities necessary for 
the rationalization of funding as I have just described.  In this regard, this 
                                                   
linked with the hierarchical re-ordering of the capitalist state – all agencies were made 
subordinate to those bureaucratic centres (ministries of finance etc.) that were more attuned to 
the emergent global political economy. The instrumental and utilitarian logic according to which 
the university has been reformed, and which is laid-out in all manner of documents (ex. The 
Jaratt Report (1985)) is similarly related to this re-ordering of the capitalist state in the era of 
globalization.  
3 Most forms and mechanisms of QA do not produce prices as such, but rather hierarchical 
rankings – what I liken to “quasi-prices” – which are in turn transformed into in more strictly 
monetary terms. 
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dissertation demonstrates that however much QA provides an apparently rational 
basis for the allocation of funding, it is not productive of anything that can readily 
be described as being of high-quality.  On the contrary, in providing a basis for 
the rationalization of funding, QA operates as a kind of veil, effectively hiding the 
fact that the contemporary university is, as Bill Readings put it, “in ruins” 
(Readings 1997).  This process of obfuscation that QA affects is another side of 
the QA coin.  Not only is QA about the rationalization of financial resources, it is 
also, and just as importantly, about the reproductive power that QA imbues by so 
rationalizing such financial resources.   
 In assigning relative values to the research and teaching “outputs” 
produced within systems of higher education, QA effects a disconnect between 
the qualitative aspects of those outputs, while simultaneously reproducing the 
notion that no such disconnect exists.  Put differently, in equating exchange value 
with value, QA makes the actual utility of a commodity relevant only in so far as 
its exchange value is concerned.  This is so because of both the aforementioned 
contention concerning the relative efficiency of markets and because QA 
encourages, indeed rewards, not just gross misconduct and willful blindness, but 
also - and far more frequently - the normalization of capitalist values.  For 
example, and given the positive correlation between positive assessments and 
funding for either/both research and/or teaching, QA rewards actors 
(institutions, scholars, students) for producing positive assessments rather than 
actual quality.  As David Simon’s character in The Wire, Roland Pryzbylewski 
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puts it, QA rewards those who, “juke the stats”.4  Similarly, QA encourages 
researchers to ask certain types of questions and to abandon others.  Research 
that is both patentable and commercially promising is accorded more space and 
funding such that researchers avoid research that cannot be used to profitable 
ends (Krimsky 2004).  In other words, QA does not necessarily eliminate the 
possibility of qualitative excellence even though it does encourage “juking”, but it 
does eliminate the possibility that new knowledge will be non-monopolizable, 
and thus, widely and affordably available (Mirowski 2011, 307; Lexchin 1993).  Of 
course, and as I indicated above, the frequency with which research results are 
manipulated, or “sliced” and “diced”, so as to make new knowledge appear more 
efficacious is startling, so much so, that it suggests that in fact there is a 
necessary, or at least a sufficient, relationship between ‘juking’, and other forms 
of misconduct, and QA (Schafer 2007; Spielmans, Biehn, and Sawrey 2010; 
Avord; Sismondo 2007; Lexchin 2004; Sox 2006; Cohen-Kohler 2007).   
 Indeed, this dissertation asserts a causative link between the output of so much 
junk science and moderately literate graduates and QA.  During the very moment 
                                                   
4 This quotation is pulled from season 4 episode 9 of The Wire, “Know Your Place”.  The exchange 
between Pryzbylewski, a former cop turned junior high-school teacher, and a colleague, takes 
place during a school meeting, where the faculty are being told about the school board’s various 
efforts to press standardized test scores higher.  The exchange goes as follows: 
Roland 'Prezbo' Pryzbylewski: I don't get it. All this so we score higher on 
the state tests? If we're teaching the kids the test questions, what is it assessing in them?  
Grace Sampson: Nothing. It assesses us. The test scores go up, they can say the schools 
are improving. The scores stay down, they can't.  
Roland 'Prezbo' Pryzbylewski: Juking the stats.  
Grace Sampson: Excuse me?  
Roland 'Prezbo' Pryzbylewski: Making robberies into larcenies. Making rapes 
disappear. You juke the stats, and majors become colonels. I've been here before.  
Grace Sampson: Wherever you go, there you are. 
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when neoliberal theory has become “profoundly hegemonic”(Fast 2013), QA has 
emerged and developed as a means of increasing the productive efficiency of the 
contemporary university.  The artifacts of QA testify not to the stellar nature of 
the contemporary university’s output but also, and at best, to its mediocrity. At 
the same time, QA clearly provides a rationale for the rationalization of 
government funding.  If the qualitative value of the university’s outputs are 
disappointing, then the utility of QA must lie somewhere else, namely in the 
efficiency with which it supports the neoliberal program of accumulation in 
general. 
 Notably, most mainstream objections to this characterization of QA focus 
on one issue: the idea that QA has undermined the qualitative excellence of 
research and new knowledge.  As evidence, scholars who take this position tend 
to rely upon the very measures and mechanisms that this dissertation draws into 
question (Carini, Kuh, and Klein 2006a; Mowery and Ziedonis 2002).  
Elsewhere, it is argued that, QA processes have been designed to avoid the pitfalls 
described above.  Through, for example, the application of academically oriented 
standards or educator-owned/peer review assessment processes, excellence is 
allegedly assured (R. Brown 2004).  Again, the facts tell another story.   
 In reviewing the full-slate of QA measures and mechanisms currently in 
vogue, as I do in this dissertation, one finds that the form of quality that QA 
processes seek to – and do – assess/assure is not of a particularly high standard.  
QA tends to verify the presence of, and thereby (re)create, an institutional form 
9 
within which semi-literate graduates and commercializable research can be 
turned out at an ever-lower unit cost and, just as crucially, with the support and 
consent of students, the academy, university administrators, government 
officials, and the public at large.  In fact, the mechanisms and measures that 
underlie all QA processes are almost universally grounded in the same kind and 
form of logic as the neoliberal enterprise in general.  Just as the neoliberals 
assume that, given appropriate corrections for things like informational 
asymmetries, prices will accurately reflect utility (Akerlof 1970; Stiglitz 2000), so 
is it assumed that student engagement correlates with “deep-learning” and that 
the use of bibliometric indices and data on patenting correlates with the elevation 
and publication of the most insightful, cutting edge knowledge (Carini, Kuh, and 
Klein 2006a; Squicciarini, Dernis, and Criscuolo 2013).  But for the simple fact 
that an increasing proportion of graduates are neither illiterate nor highly literate 
(Statistics Canada and OECD 2005; American Institutes for Research et al. 
2006), one could perhaps forgive those who support engagement based forms of 
QA for not testing in any meaningful way the accuracy of the presumed 
correlation between engagement and so-called “deep learning”.  Likewise, but for 
the fact that as much as 30% of the scientific literature is estimated to have been 
ghost-authored (Sismondo 2007), and the fact that corporately co-sponsored 
drug trials tend to produce results indicating the efficacy of the drug under 
investigation more frequently than do drugs tested in publicly funded protocols 
(Lexchin 2003), one could also forgive the champions of peer review.  But, so 
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glaring is the distance between the claims made by the proponents of QA and the 
facts on the ground that it is necessary to both question the entire enterprise, and 
also to wonder how it is anyone could even imagine arguing that QA aims to 
(re)produce qualitative excellence? 
1.1 This Dissertation and the Extant Literature 
In mainstream circles, assessments of QA, both comparative and not, 
abound.5 As I alluded to above, few assessments meaningfully address the 
question, “What is quality in higher education?” (D. M. Green 1994).  When such 
a basic question is asked within the mainstream literature, the answers provided 
are rarely satisfying.  Where quality is not equated to quantity, it is said to be the 
by-product of well-designed customer (student) satisfaction surveys or 
circumscribed forms of peer review or high-level audit processes that effectively 
“steer” higher education in what is presumed to be the “right” direction(Green 
1994).6  As such “quality” is, within the mainstream literature, actually left 
undefined, almost ineffable.  It is as though, in an apparent effort to avoid too 
strict and confining a definition of the term, “quality” has been turned into QA, 
and therein to a process of evaluation and ranking that academics - and not 
                                                   
5 For an overview of the contents of the journal, Quality in Higher Education, see Harvey 
and Williams  (2010a; 2010b) 
6 In the volume referenced above, Diana Green concludes: “The best that can be achieved 
is to define as clearly as possible the criteria that each stakeholder uses when judging quality, and 
for these competing views to be taken into account when assessments of quality are undertaken” 
(D. M. Green 1994, 17). 
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government bean-counters – control.7 In the context of neoliberalism, however, 
the ability to control the definition of either or both standards and evaluative 
procedures is of little consequence.  Whether or not a teacher is terrifically 
engaging and/or effective at using learning-assistive technologies matters little 
when class sizes are pressed beyond a certain point.  And however much 
publication counts in peer-reviewed journals may be pressed up by rationing 
remuneration, long-form, deeply introspective and truly ground-breaking work 
will always take time.  More importantly, academics have hardly been immune to 
the effects of neoliberalism.  Academics are not paragons of intellectual virtue 
who stand above and apart from the rest of society.  On the contrary, academics 
have long been subject to the same reproductive forces that have made students 
into consumers and administrators into institutionally situated entrepreneurs 
(Newson and Buchbinder 1988).   
 In examining the mainstream literature on QA, one finds that it tends to 
be unconsciously reproductive of neoclassical and/or neoliberal nostrums 
concerning the purported efficiency of markets.  This is because the mainstream 
literature tends to operate from an ontological and methodological perspective 
that emphasizes the importance of what are held to be institutionally rooted (and 
                                                   
7 To be fair, Harvey (1999; 1995; 2008), writing both alone and with others, talks about 
the development of a “quality culture” within which “continuous improvement” is undertaken in 
earnest and, more pointedly, outside the kind of pecuniary policies upon which QA is based.  
While it appears that Harvey is cognizant of the degree to which such a ‘culture’ is divorced from 
reality, he persists in arguing for the redefinition of QA processes such that they are effectively 
separated from the purse strings to which they have always been, and were intended to be tied. 
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determined) assessment procedures.  Such mid-level or “meso-level” analyses 
provide no avenue via which to historically situate, contextualize, and thus 
explain the emergence of QA.  Instead, different systems of QA are cast as the by-
product of competition and compromise between sector “stakeholders”, each of 
which has a different conception of quality.  The fact that QA always delivers 
some relative measure of quality (i.e. a price or quasi-price) irrespective of who it 
is that conducts or controls the assessment procedure, is neither raised nor 
problematized.  In other words, mainstream analyses entirely ignore the 
relationship between the quantitative representation of academic outputs and the 
frequency with which such representations tie the university into a larger 
program of accumulation where private interests both dominate and are equated 
with the public good. Neo-classical and neoliberal nostrums that assert the 
relative efficiency of markets in the allocation of research dollars or government 
funding thus remain both central to mainstream policy and unquestioned. For 
those advocates not blind either to the theoretical underpinnings or effects of QA, 
arguments as to the superiority of the market and thus to a “marketplace of 
ideas” (Mirowski 2011, location 59) are themselves rooted in a set of foundational 
“parables” within which it is utterly impossible to locate a theoretically coherent 
notion of power (Samuelson 1962; Milonakis and Fine 2009).  On the contrary, 
as with the mainstream literature on QA, power is evacuated from such analyses.  
Instead, outcomes are said to be determined via the interaction of so many 
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allegedly “rational actors” whose rational reflexes are so plain and automatic as to 
make them robot-like (Philip Mirowski 2002). 
 In more critically minded quarters, QA has been usefully described, 
documented, and linked with neoliberalism. Here, scholars have outlined how 
QA is tied-in with the emergence of new “interstitial organizations” that have 
amassed considerable power within the university and which aim to press 
forward the cause of “academic capitalism”(Sheila Slaughter and Rhodes 2004).  
QA has also been linked with the development of a world market in higher 
education, with policy oriented approaches born of a miserably shallow 
theoretical perspective, and with revanchist neoliberal political and policy 
agendas (Marginson and Mollis 2001; Marginson 2004; Marginson and van der 
Wende 2007; Shore and Wright 1999; Altbach 1998; Arnove 1982; S. Klees 1991; 
Samoff and Bidemi 2004).  QA has also been discussed as a kind of 
“performative” social technology that creates the incentive for those within the 
university to enforce the rules of a market-oriented neoliberalism (Power 2003; 
Shore and Wright 1999).  And QA has been discussed as a kind of ideological 
lever that successive neoliberal governments in the UK have pressed upon in 
order to effect a fundamental shift of the cultural and/or theoretical norms within 
the university (Hugh Willmott 2003; Sandra Harley and Lee 1997).  There have 
also been a number of studies that have focussed more pointedly on particular 
QA processes.  For example, there are those which have dealt with the pioneering 
efforts of Thatcher’s government to restructure higher education via the UK’s 
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Research Assessment Exercise (Rolfe 2003; D. Smith 1986; Harley 2002; Elton 
2000a).  Others have dealt with the poverty of student evaluations of teaching 
(Platt 1993; Shevlin et al. 2000), with league tables and rankings exercises 
(Hazelkorn 2008; Altback 2006; Marginson and van der Wende 2007), with key 
performance indicators (Conlon 2004; Cave 2006), and with bibliometrics 
indices (Roy 1985; Winston 1999).  Most critical contributions to the QA 
literature are not, however, focussed solely on the development, evolution, and 
effect of QA.  On the contrary, notable contributions, such as Slaughter and 
Rhoades (2004) are more accurately situated in the relatively larger literature 
that is roundly critical of the commercialization of the university.   
 Included in the literature that has been critical of commercialization and 
the “neoliberalization” of the university are a number of works that are significant 
to the arguments advanced in this dissertation.  For instance, Slaughter and 
Leslie (1997) like Slaughter and Rhodes (2004), provide an outline of the 
transformed economic, political and juridical environments within which the 
commercialization agenda has taken shape.  They also highlight how the 
university, in responding to these transformations, has embedded the 
commercialization agenda ever more deeply within universities by giving rise to 
an increasingly powerful slate of internal bureaucracies that press and prod the 
academy into neoliberal shape.  Newson and Buchbinder (1988) and Newson 
(Newson 1998a) demonstrate that in the remaking of the contemporary 
university according to the strictures of neoliberalism, academics have been front 
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and centre, at times consciously paving the way and, at other times, choosing 
oppositional tactics that have created unforeseen contradictions.  Noble’s (1977; 
2002) outstanding histories of higher education in America and of digital 
education provide all-important links between past and present, thereby laying 
out the background to and antecedents of contemporary policy.  In a similar vein, 
Sears’ (2003) work, which does also discuss the advent of Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI’s) in Ontario’s system of higher education, is perhaps more 
notable for its rich description of the transition to neoliberalism. Sears 
demonstrates that in “retooling the mind factory”, the university was not placed 
under the thumb of capital, where it had not been before, but retooled in order to 
better fit within a reformed (neoliberal) capitalism.  Klees (1991; 2002) has 
highlighted the need to not only understand the international dimensions of 
neoliberalism, higher education and the university, but has also pointed to the 
significance of economic theory in the shaping of higher education policy.   
 Polster (C. Polster 2001; C. Polster 2007; C. Polster 2003), in describing 
and tracking the effects of the transformation of intellectual property laws and 
the funding priorities of Canada’s research funding councils, has lucidly 
demonstrated how neoliberal policy has re-framed and redirected the kind of 
research that university based researchers undertake.  Krimsky (Krimsky 2004) 
has also usefully talked about the kind of “normative shift” that neoliberal 
policies have had in terms of University based research.  Sismondo (Sismondo 
2007; Sismondo 2009) has indispensably outlined the remarkable extent to 
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which corporate interests through both ghost authorship and “ghost 
management” of research publications have undermined the reliability of the 
science literature.  Lexchin (2004; 2003) has also documented the deleterious 
effect of corporate funding in terms of the reliability of university research.  
Perhaps most comprehensively, Mirowski (2011) has tied together all of these 
loose ends, and, moreover, linked the commercialization of university-based 
research to Hayekian notions of market efficiency and ultimately to the 
production of ignorance.  
 Unfortunately, with some notable exceptions, many of which are listed 
above, the theorization of QA and of neoliberalism in such critical sectors has 
been less spectacular.  Frequently, neoliberalism is only distinguished from 
capitalism in so far as the profit incentive is alleged to have become increasingly 
important in the organization of academic life and enquiry.  As such, the 
university is cast as a site that, at one time, apparently factored less centrally than 
it now does in the reproduction of capitalism.8  In other words, the contemporary 
university is conceived of as being under siege, most often by social forces outside 
                                                   
8 Though there are many other examples, I would highlight the work of Marginson and 
Rhoades (2002), Slaughter and Leslie (1997) and Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) in making this 
claim.  At the risk of painting with too broad a brush, the critical literature in higher education 
flirts with a variety of theoretical currents, from different, and in many cases divergent, critical 
schools, but it does not really engage steadfastly with any.  Slaughter and Leslie, for example, 
draw from Foucault, Mann, and others, without really exploring the tensions in and between 
Marx and Weber, Marx and Foucault, and what those tensions might mean in terms of our 
understanding of and approach to issues around agency and structure. I have highlighted the 
work of Marginson, Rhoades, and Slaughter because they are among the most widely read and 
referenced bits of the critical literature.  To the extent that there is a “cannon” within the critical 
fold, their works are most certainly a part of it.     
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of the university, but in some cases by social forces situated within it as well.  In 
this way, the dense linkages between, for example, the university and early post-
war capitalism are neither meaningfully dissected nor theoretically accessible.  
Similarly, the linkages between a thoroughly restructured capitalism (i.e. 
neoliberal capitalism) and the university are likewise not examined.  In other 
words, the theoretical weakness of many critical accounts feeds back into an 
empirical analysis that does not pay sufficient attention to things like the re-
emergence of global finance, which I argue has been key to governmental and 
popular support for “accountability” and thus QA.  Also missed are the qualitative 
realities of the so-called “knowledge-based economy” and the Global North’s shift 
to a services rather than an industrially-based political economy.   
 This dissertation therefore is intended to be both additive to this critical 
literature, and also suggestive of some theoretical directions that might deepen 
and broaden the explanatory power of that literature.  Thus, while this 
dissertation makes an original contribution, there are important theoretical 
efforts on which it builds.  In fact, some scholarship has sought to bridge 
precisely the same gaps as I do in this dissertation.  For example, De Angelis and 
Harvie (2009a) use a value theoretic to both describe and understand the nature 
and operation of QA in the UK.  Glenn Rikowski (2001; 2002a) has also 
attempted to develop a value-theoretic as a means by which to understand 
“capitalist education” and to develop a “Marxist theory of education”.  Though 
Rikowski does not talk specifically about QA, his work does address the way in 
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which the “special commodity” is produced, partly in response to industry’s 
expressions of demand, which he documents by way of reference to corporate QA 
processes. Hugh Willmott (1995) also uses a value-theoretic to outline the 
emergence of managerialism, and of QA in the UK.  Subsequently, Willmott 
(2003) has offered a more focussed examination of the UK’s Research 
Assessment Exercise, again through a value-theoretic, albeit one that he spends 
decidedly less time in developing than in the 1995 piece referenced above. None 
of these works, however, provide a cross-national comparison of QA and its 
development, as I do below.  Similarly, the links between neoclassical and 
neoliberal economics and QA, though ripe within these other analyses are not 
discussed systematically or in any great detail.  Also, neither Rikowski nor Harvie 
and De Angelis link QA to the reproduction of mediocrity and a debased form of 
science and literacy, as I also do below.     
 This dissertation is not, however, only intended as a contribution to the 
critical literature in higher education.  This dissertation also draws from, and 
attempts to add to, a rich tradition in Marxist political economy, and particularly 
that part of the Marxist literature which has sought to account for and theorize 
the emergence of neoliberalism and the pattern(s) of accumulation by which it is 
described (Gindin and Panitch 2012; Dumenil and Levy 2005; D. Harvey 2005; 
McNally 2012; Wood 2005).   
 There are several aspects of that literature to which this dissertation adds.  
One of the main axes of debate within contemporary Marxist circles has to do 
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with the role of the state, and therein of key states, in authoring the development 
of neoliberalism.  At issue is not so much the fact of the state’s central role in the 
development of neoliberal globalization.  Rather, debate has centred on both the 
apparent pre-eminence of the American state in first constructing and then 
managing (on an on-going basis) contemporary global capitalism and on the 
durability of that arrangement.  For some, the imperial ambition and position of 
the American state has been triangulated in respect of: the political ambitions of 
American power-brokers; a domestic bourgeoisie with a truly global reach and 
orientation; the need to manage a hierarchy of subordinate states; and, the need 
to secure the legal, political and economic foundations for global  capitalist 
accumulation (Gindin and Panitch 2012).  Seeing no immediate successor whose 
economic fate is not critically tied into the American imperium, Panitch and 
Gindin see no significant diminution of that imperium. For others, the one-time 
centrality of the American state and of American capitalism has given way to an 
economic order within which a transnational managerial ruling class itself holds 
the imperial centre (Robinson 2004).  Underscored by the ability to rapidly 
invest/divest into or out of any jurisdiction, this ruling class is allegedly able to 
set the rhythms of accumulation to which every state must adjust.  Elsewhere, it 
is argued that capital itself has become the “Empire” (Hardt and Negri 2000). 
Accordingly, the exigencies of capitalist accumulation compel ruling and working 
classes alike to perform (in different ways, to different effects) almost 
ceremoniously, in accordance to the exigencies of global capitalism. For still 
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others, neoliberal globalization is less about the dominance of the American state 
in the context of so many sub-ordinate capitalist states (McNally 2011; McNally 
2008).  Instead, neoliberal globalization is understood to be the by-product of 
competition and cooperation between the American imperial centre and multiple, 
but junior-imperial poles, all of which collectively share an interest in 
maintaining the foundations for capitalist accumulation in the global capitalist 
political economy.   
 This dissertation does not take-up these issues directly.  However, there 
are important ways in which this dissertation nonetheless contributes to the 
debates just outlined.  First, in examining the systems of QA that have developed 
in the US, the UK, and Ontario, I necessarily highlight the pioneering role played 
by American capital and the American state in the development of QA.  At the 
same time, it is decidedly less clear that the American state was so active in the 
design and development of QA in either the UK or Ontario.  On the contrary, 
governments in both the UK and Ontario appear to have undertaken QA as a 
means of adjusting their systems of higher education to the alleged realities of the 
new global economic order.  That said, American firms, like, for instance, the 
Educational Testing Service, as well as American philanthropic organizations, 
like the Pew Charitable Trusts, continue to play important roles outside the US, if 
only as the suppliers of testing and assessment technologies.  It is also of some 
significance that American firms launched the first of what became a veritable 
on-rush of private-sector efforts to rank universities and colleges both nationally 
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and around the world.  Furthermore, it is at least notable that American 
“research intensive” universities have long dominated on that first, and every 
other subsequent, international ranking exercise.  At a minimum, this 
dissertation suggests that QA effects the application of standards and values that 
benchmark against and seek to emulate American institutions as well as a 
program of accumulation that has not obviously weakened the power and 
centrality of the American state to, at minimum, dictate the juridical foundations 
for the global trade in intellectual property and human capital.  In fact, if QA has 
not been consciously undertaken as an exercise in securing the “New American 
Century”, and this dissertation suggests that it has not been so undertaken, it is 
nonetheless the case that QA appears to reinforce/recreate patterns and 
processes that reproduce American centrality, if not American dominance.   
 Second, this dissertation adds some dimension to discussions about the 
centrality of global finance in the (re)making of neoliberalism. Despite vigorous 
debate within the Marxian literature over the precise nature of neoliberalism, 
there is more or less universal agreement concerning the significance of broader 
and deeper financial markets and their penetration into everyday life in the 
remaking of global capitalism after 1980. In fact, the obvious importance of 
finance to the neoliberal order has prompted Marxists to take-up more focused 
studies of global finance and the issue of “financialization”.  Here the goal has 
been to understand the relationship between global flows of capital and the 
contours of the neoliberal order (Lapavitsas 2011; Bryan 2006).  For current 
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purposes, the most relevant pieces of that literature come from thinkers such as 
Langley (2008), Krippner (2005), and Montgomerie (2007; 2006) who explore 
the relationship between global financial flows, patterns of securitization, 
consumer debt, and the realities of everyday life.  In a similar vein, thinkers such 
as Pryke and du Gay (2007) and others, have begun to theorize the social 
construction of both financial markets and “homo-economicus”.  In so doing, 
their work draws generously from Foucauldian, Gramscian and Regulation 
school currents to emphasize the significance of global finance and the financial 
form to new forms of “governmentality”.  In turn, they argue that such forms of 
‘governmentality’ have been fundamental to, among other things, the reform of 
public policy in the neoliberal era.   
 In highlighting the many links between neo-classical and neoliberal 
economics, higher education policy and QA, and the degree to which QA 
functions to commodify higher education, this dissertation tracks how global 
finance and neoliberal policy are densely related.  Indeed, this dissertation 
suggests that the strict definition of financialization offered by Lapavitsas (2011), 
needs to be broadened. For Lapavitsas, financialization has involved three 
parallel processes:  
…first, large non-financial corporations have reduced their reliance on 
bank loans and have acquired financial capacities; second, banks have 
expanded their mediating activities in financial markets as well as lending 
to households; third, households have become increasingly involved in the 
realm of finance both as debtors and as asset holders. (Lapavitsas 2011, 
612) 
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Here Lapavitsas captures some of what can be linked with the transformation of 
higher education.  As states have progressively withdrawn funding from higher 
education, universities and colleges have become increasingly large players in 
financial markets (Wolinsky 2009).  Similarly, households have become players 
in financial markets, taking on billions in debt to finance ever-rising tuition fees.  
As with mortgage and credit card debt, student debt has been packaged into 
securities (asset backed securities) that are cycled over and over through global 
networks of finance (Kramer 2012). More than this, government programs like 
Canada’s registered education savings programs (RESPs), and the US’s “529s”, in 
providing households with the option of saving for higher education through a 
tax-deferred investment vehicles, have similarly meant that households are more 
plugged into global finance than they were before.  Myriad government and 
private-sector initiatives aimed at increasing the “financial literacy” of 
households has both helped to create what Harmes (2001) has called a, “mass 
investment culture”.  Indeed, in the US, the Federal Reserve has made numerous 
interventions at the secondary school level precisely so as to “educate” students 
about the world of global finance (Newstadt 2008). 
 As this dissertation makes clear, the normalization of global finance and 
the apparent realities of neoliberal capitalism has also happened via government 
policies that press public services, knowledge, and skill into the commodity - and 
thus the financial – form.  In so doing, government policy extends the logic of 
global finance and investment to what emerge as new fields for accumulation and 
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new avenues of reproduction.  Again, QA operates to create so many higher 
education “commodities” the “quality” or “utility” of which are putatively 
represented numerically, as prices or quasi-prices.  Not only does QA therefore 
enable the outputs of higher education to be tied into international-cum-global 
circuits of capital, investment, and migration, and therein into flows that are at 
the very core of neoliberal capitalism, it also effects the normalization of those 
processes.  Put differently, this dissertation suggests that measurement via QA 
has been critical to the creation of identities and subjectivities that both reflect 
and preserve the pattern of accumulation that has described the neoliberal era.  
And yet, with but a few exceptions (ex. Leys 2001), Marxists have hardly touched 
on the issue of QA in terms that relate the increasing ubiquity of such programs 
– both in and outside of higher education – to the transition to neoliberalism, 
the re-emergence of global finance, as well as to the nature and roots of the 
neoliberal capitalist state.  
1.2 A Word on Method 
 In examining the systems of QA that have developed in three jurisdictions, 
the US, the UK, and Ontario, I demonstrate that despite significant institutional 
differences, those jurisdictions share a common program with effects that are 
broadly similar.  In other words, procedural and/or institutional differences 
appear to matter less than does the substantive drift of such institutions towards 
a common set of policies and approaches.  Though this fact would tend to render 
those analyses that fetishize institutional variation irrelevant, it hardly means 
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that institutional variation does not matter.  On the contrary, the fact that the US, 
the UK, and Ontario have each pursued QA in different ways and at different 
times speaks to the need to embed our analyses of institutions in an historical 
approach that is sensitive to both the particularities of each jurisdiction and the 
socio-political and economic forces that nonetheless tie them together.   
In aiming to tie together so many seemingly loose historical and institutional 
ends, this dissertation begins with the centrality of production-relations.   I assert 
that the primacy of production in the determination of social, political, and 
economic outcomes, enables us to access, in an ontologically and 
epistemologically coherent manner, the primary motive forces and tendencies at 
play in each of the jurisdictions under investigation, namely those having to do 
with capitalism.  This should not be taken to mean that I either employ or 
advocate for any kind of crudely structural account.  On the contrary, in 
examining the expression of capitalist production relations as tendencies, I 
suggest that the particularities of time and place are utterly decisive to the 
manner in which such tendencies find expression.  Thus, despite the fact that 
there are myriad and obvious indications that the political economies of each the 
US, the UK, and Ontario have developed along common, and what I assert are 
usefully described as neoliberal lines, such developments have been animated by 
myriad differences that require attention if we are to really understand their 
apparent convergence around a neoliberal pole.   
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 This analysis is by no means exhaustive, and indeed has various 
limitations.  Perhaps the most glaring limitation of this dissertation has to do 
with the relationship between the US system/model of QA and the advent of QA 
in both the UK and Ontario.  While the apparent vigor and dynamism of the 
American system has played a fundamentally important role in other 
jurisdictions’ drives to develop systems of what I argue are essentially price-type 
signaling systems (i.e. QA), this dissertation does little more than suggest what 
might have been the links between the American system and that in either/both 
the UK and Ontario.  While I do certainly point to the influence of organizations 
like the Ford and Carnegie Foundations in acting as emissaries of American-style 
higher education around the world, I do not provide clear evidence that such was 
effective and/or even partially determinative of outcomes in either the UK or 
Ontario.  Precisely the same could be said of the role played by organizations like 
the Educational Testing Service (ETS), or the Pew Charitable Trusts, or 
Thompson ISI, all private-sector organizations that have left the confines of the 
American higher education marketplace to become key players in higher 
education around the world.  Also, though I discuss the role played by American 
economists in the process of “economics imperialism”, which I argue has been 
key to reconfiguring the social-sciences in both the UK and Ontario so as to make 
them more amenable to QA, that role is something that deserves more attention 
and focus.  And there is likewise no clear-cut evidence that rankings exercises, the 
first of which was pioneered in the US, by the US News and World Report, 
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effectively pressed other jurisdictions into action.  Finally, I do not highlight to 
the extent that I might have, the degree to which the American model was 
actually at the forefront of policy-markers’ minds when they set about addressing 
the apparent shortcomings of higher education in the UK and Ontario.  
 A second limitation of this study has to do with the circumscribed manner 
in which I deal with the methodological approaches taken-up and advocated for 
in the critical literature on higher education.  While it remains my contention that 
the critical literature in and around higher education (considered as a whole) 
suffers from either/both the kind of a-historicism that describes the mainstream 
literature and/or too shallow an engagement with any one theoretical approach, 
such a description cannot be applied uniformly and without notable exceptions.  I 
do of course make mention of some such exceptional examples of work that 
provides a more thorough-going engagement with critical theories and therein 
with Marxism, but there are still others.  I would however suggest that where I 
have sought to provide a sustained focus on mainstream approaches to and 
analyses of higher education, a worthwhile task would be to take-up the same 
program in terms of critical approaches to higher education.  
 The third limitation has to do with my selection of cases.  In a comparative 
study such as this, selection bias is almost unavoidable.  There are, however, good 
reasons to suggest that a comparative study of QA could benefit from the 
inclusion of, if not several others, then, at minimum, New Zealand and Australia.  
Because both jurisdictions were relatively early adopters and practitioners of QA, 
28 
they provide important counterpoints to the British case, which I position as the 
key to understanding the post-1980 ubiquity of QA.  That QA spread early and 
rapidly to two rich Commonwealth countries is significant, not least because it 
suggests lines of proliferation that are not explored in what follows.       
1.3 Structure of the Argument 
 This dissertation proceeds in three broad sections.  In Chapter 2, I begin 
the first section with a thorough analysis of neo-classical and neo-liberal 
economics, the New Institutionalisms, and the other social-scientific theories that 
have been central to the development of mainstream approaches to higher 
education and QA.   Aside from outlining the myriad deficiencies and 
obfuscations that one finds with such theories, my intent in this analysis is to 
highlight the centrality of Hayek’s re-formulation of the central problematic of 
economics in the reform of higher education and the advent of QA.  By redefining 
the central problematic of economics in terms of the mobilization and integration 
of knowledge in the allocation of scarce resources, Hayek laid the foundation for 
his conception of the market as an information-processing machine par 
excellence.  Thus, Hayek pitted the hubris of self-interested bureaucrats and their 
five-year plans against the creative and destructive power of the market.  Vacant 
any meaningful notion of power, but for that associated with some entirely unreal 
notion of ‘the market’, Hayek’s theorization provided the perfect theoretical 
accomplice to the kind of right-wing populist narratives that became hegemonic 
from the late 1970s on, and therein an important counterpoint to 
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Keynesian/humanist arguments that allegedly entailed the never-ending 
expansion of the “nanny state”.  As such, Hayek’s theorization of markets became 
the “common sense” and therein the basis for all contemporary mainstream 
approaches to higher education and QA.  As such, QA is most fundamentally 
about the creation of price-type signalling systems – quasi-markets – that 
ostensibly empower ‘the market’ to filter between high- and low-quality research 
and graduates.   
 In Chapter 3 I add some empirical evidence to the theoretical analysis I 
provide in Chapter 2.  In so doing I examine most of the contemporary modes 
and mechanisms of QA, all with an eye to testing the truth-claims made by those 
who advocate QA as an effective means of assessing the qualitative aspects of 
both research and students/graduates.  In finding as I do, that the “outputs” of 
higher education are, at best, mediocre, and furthermore that QA does not 
effectively enable the qualitative assessment of such outputs, I suggest that the 
functional significance of QA lies elsewhere. Indeed, I argue that QA is effective at 
reproducing that which is functional to the neoliberal program of accumulation – 
flexible forms of human capital and monopolizable forms of new knowledge.     
 Chapter 4 marks both the beginning and the end of the second section of 
this dissertation. In that chapter I lay-out the theoretical approach that I take in 
seeking to understand the nature and significance of QA.  To do this I first 
examine the theoretical lenses used by those critically minded scholars who have 
sought to study either/both QA or, more broadly, the remaking of higher 
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education through the era of neoliberalism.  In finding much of that literature 
wanting, I draw heavily from contemporary Marxian political economy to lay-out, 
as much as is possible, how it is I believe insightful social analysis necessarily 
blends a keen sensitivity to history and contingency with a structural account of 
(neoliberal) capitalism.  In following what I assert is a kind of immanent critique 
of QA (the first movement), I believe I avoid the pitfalls of crudely structural 
accounts of capitalism, which, like mainstream analyses, tend to read theory into 
history.       
 Chapters 5 through 7 collectively comprise the third section of this 
dissertation.  In that section I examine QA in situ by looking in turn at the history 
and development of QA in each of my three major cases, the US, the UK, and 
Ontario.  In Chapter 5, I outline the long history of QA in the United States.  
Although, “quality assessment” has not, as such, enjoyed a history in the US that 
is much longer than anywhere else, the history of measurement and assessment 
as a means of direction and reproduction is decidedly longer.  At the start of the 
second industrial revolution, higher education in the US was made and/or 
remade “by design”, and therein according to the specifications of an emergent 
industrial managerial class (Noble 1977).  Before the turn of the last century, 
America’s system of higher education was small.  At the time, higher education 
was a means for the sons of upper class families to become educated in the 
classical mold.  Disciplinary boundaries did not then exist, at least not in any 
approximation of the way in which the academy would be divided and subdivided 
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in the decades that followed.  Students were thus exposed to both the natural and 
social sciences, which were also not so neatly divided. Metaphysics, philosophy, 
biology, chemistry, physics, were all densely interpolated as part of the 
undergraduate curriculum.  With the emergence of huge agglomerations of 
industrial capital, however, things began to change.  The first changes relevant to 
the issue at hand happened within the largest industrial firms.  In an effort to 
develop and train a cadre of technically knowledgeable managers, industrial 
firms – led primarily by a network of engineers - formed in-house corporation 
schools within which the earliest forms of quality assessment took shape. 
Intended as systems of personnel management, the earliest precursors to 
standardized testing were devised as a means by which to assess and shape young 
engineers as they prepared for entrance into the managerial ranks of corporate 
America.  At the same time, the same engineers undertook efforts to develop 
curricula for elementary and secondary schools that would perform the same 
function: shape both would-be workers and their would-be managers for life 
within what was then an emergent industrial capitalist powerhouse.  With 
surprising speed, the practices and programs of the corporation schools were 
transposed to America’s universities, which had begun to adapt to the new 
political economic landscape.  At the same time, the professoriate began to 
organize, not so much in unions, but in associations that began to mark the 
disciplinary boundaries that describe the contemporary academy.  Such 
associations quickly looked to establish their dominion over their respective 
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disciplines, and, in so doing, to provide a platform from which to “serve power” 
and obtain status (Noble 1977; E. Silva and Slaughter 1984).   
 Because a college or university education was initially only accessible to 
the wealthy in America, those who were subject to the early forms of QA, 
generally in the form of standardized testing, were seldom prevented from 
actually obtaining a degree. Rather, the tests functioned as a way to help 
determine at what managerial level and in what managerial role a given 
individual would be placed (Noble 1977).  Through the 1930s and 40s this 
changed considerably.  With the massification of American higher education in 
the immediate post-war moment, testing became an all-important filter that was 
intended to aid in efforts to reproduce an American meritocracy.  To the extent 
that access to higher education was ever conceived of as a universal right, only 
America’s junior and community colleges were accessible without participating in 
the SAT.  It was not any higher education that the masses could access during the 
“golden age” of American capitalism.  Rather, the SAT supported a program of 
institutional “differentiation” which, to borrow the words of the one-time 
president of the Educational Testing Service, which owns and administers the 
SAT, the Test was a means by which to keep hope, “within reasonable bounds 
(ETS 1950 as quoted in; A. Nairn 1980, 4)”.   
 Though it was only in the 1980s that state and federal authorities began to 
more clearly articulate how it was the quality of university based research was to 
be evaluated,  university-based researchers and their output had nonetheless 
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been subject to similar forms of quality evaluation since the 1920s, when the 
National Research Council was first formed (Noble 1977; Kravchuk and Schack 
1996).    Long before the development of more bureaucratized forms of 
management came into widespread use, corporate America organized under the 
state’s umbrella to manage and channel funding to particular quadrants of 
America’s research and development enterprise.  When the state assumed fuller 
control of that managerial process, it developed an immense bureaucratic 
machinery dedicated to the evaluation of research. And although the state did – 
to a relatively limited extent – champion so-called “basic” research, as well as 
force researchers in both corporate and university based labs to place significant 
amounts of new knowledge into the commons, it did so as a kind of industrial 
policy by stealth.9  Furthermore, it built-out the distinction between “basic” and 
“applied” research that was itself a convention of corporate America. (Mirowski 
2011, 110)   
 The longstanding history of QA in the American system meant that with 
the arrival of neoliberalism, which grew out of the crisis of Keynesianism in the 
1970s, there was already in-place a system of assessment that was ripe and ready 
to be tweaked and accentuated in the service of the new mode of accumulation.  
                                                   
9 As Mirowski (2011)  outlines, the US Department of Defense (DoD), generously 
supported both university-based and private-sector research with an eye towards leveraging 
public dollars to support industrial development and growth.  Though it is undoubtedly the case 
that the lion’s share of DoD funded research was kept secret, it is also the case that the DoD 
forced huge amounts of new knowledge into the commons.  In fact, DoD funds were tied to 
agreements that forced non-secret research to be made publicly available at no cost.  
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Whereas, until the 1980s QA had operated alongside and within dominant 
discourses concerning the appropriate role of the university, which was in turn 
tied to notions of citizenship and what Slaughter and Rhoades identify as a 
“public goods learning/knowledge regime”(Sheila Slaughter and Rhodes 2004), 
QA was, in the 1980s, situated within what Ben Fine refers to as the 
“developmental market model”(Fine and Jomo 2006).  Herein, the university 
was “retooled”(Sears 2003) within the context of an agenda that conflated the 
public good with economic growth and the untrammeled logic of the market.  
Arguably, because the American system had long operated according to the kind 
of instrumental logic associated with neoliberalism and with QA, the 
“neoliberalization” of America’s universities since 1980 has hardly kicked up 
much of a storm and has in fact found many avid supporters already active in the 
sector.10 
 In the UK, QA emerged shortly after the election of Margaret Thatcher in 
1979.  Although there were clearly some antecedents, nothing so sophisticated 
and organized as what would develop under first Thatcher and then Blair are 
present in the much longer history of British higher education (R. Brown 2004).  
                                                   
1010 I should qualify this statement.  To be sure, the neoliberal drift of America’s colleges 
and universities has met with some opposition.  But that opposition has failed to coalesce into any 
kind of powerful social movement.  Indeed, since the 1960s and 1970s, when student activism 
crested, progressive social forces have appeared unable to even mildly mitigate the effects of 
revanchist and neoliberal policy.  When contrasted against the very qualified success of, for 
example, the students’ movement in Ontario, which successfully lobbied for a temporary freeze to 
tuition-fees between 2003 and 2005, the “success” of American students in lobbying for a lower – 
but still relatively high – interest rate on federal student loans seems like an endorsement of the 
status-quo. 
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One of the reasons why this was the case has to do with the history of British 
capitalism, and the relative absence of an organized and cohesive capitalist block, 
at least until Thatcher arrived on-scene and placed British capital firmly under 
the thumb of finance capital (Leys 1985).  Two other factors are relevant to the 
relatively late arrival of QA in the United Kingdom.  First, the massification of 
higher education did not occur in Britain until comparatively late, and as such 
did not provide the same kind of socio-political economic opportunity for capital 
as did the universities in America.  Second, the nature and depth of the British 
welfare state also forestalled any sizeable effort to corral the academy for the 
purposes of reproducing more flexible labour markets and thereby a particular 
program of accumulation.  The massification of Britain’s system of higher 
education was driven, at least initially, by a relatively more militant working class 
(Leys 1996; Leys 1986; Anderson 1987).  Third, the traditions of academic 
enquiry in the UK also posed something of a challenge to the narrow and 
instrumental logic of Thatcher.  Simply, the kind of instrumentalism and social 
scientism that had long dominated in the US were less visible in the UK (John A. 
Douglass 2003; Ryan 1998).  Nonetheless, what emerged after 1980 in the UK 
was a system of QA that was then arguably unparalleled for its byzantine 
complexity.  And so it remains today.  As such, the UK’s system of QA is a 
paragon of virtue much admired in jurisdictions, like Ontario, where higher 
education is, as is the case in the UK, also dominated by publicly funded 
universities and colleges.    
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 Ontario’s system of QA is of a still more recent vintage than is the case 
with the UK and most certainly the US.  In Ontario, the instruments of QA are 
clearly the result of “policy borrowing” from other jurisdictions, particularly the 
US and the UK.  Indeed, outside of program assessment, which emerged earlier 
on in the history of higher education in Ontario, things like Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) have almost no history in the Province prior to the 1990s, when 
their arrival coincided with the election of first Third Way social democrats and 
then Thatcher-inspired neo-conservatives.  But, “policy borrowing” hardly 
captures the process through which QA gained traction in Ontario.  Nor does it 
explain the relative absence of measurement from the Province prior to the 
1990s.   
 The relatively late arrival of QA to Ontario is related to a host of issues.  As 
a branch-plant economy, Ontario’s export-oriented manufacturers did little R&D 
in Canada.  And as much as the Canadian state grew decidedly larger in the post-
war era, such growth hardly bore the indelible marks of the Cold War like the 
American system.  Therefore, although Ontario’s universities were 
organizationally similar to their American and British counterparts they were far 
less involved in either corporate or military research than was the case in the US.  
Right up until the end of the post-war era, Ontario’s government simply did not 
have the incentive to develop the apparatus necessary to evaluate and direct 
university R&D.   
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 Because Ontario – and indeed the country as a whole – never really 
pursued the kind of aggressive developmental program as did other dependent, 
albeit less developed states, the consequences of Canada’s “staples” economy 
were difficult to ignore.  As a result, the social sciences in Canada and in Ontario, 
given the history of branch-planting and Canada’s position as a rich dependency, 
were more sensitive to the nature of American-cum-global capitalism than were 
American counterparts, at least until the neoliberal era.  Intellectual traditions 
like those associated with Macpherson and Innis mirrored the reality that 
workers and the government in Canada faced every day, namely the degree to 
which the fate of Ontario’s economic fortunes were rooted elsewhere.  This 
translated into more than just a tolerance for a more nuanced and radical form of 
social scientific analysis, it also meant that Ontario`s labour movement remained 
militant and mobilized long after labour in America had been domesticated.  
 In fact, such militancy both slowed and outlasted the restructuring of 
Ontario`s political economy, which became increasingly dependent on both the 
provision of services and the vagaries of American finance through the 1980s and 
1990s.  Such militancy was undoubtedly aided by favourable exchange rates, 
which acted as temporary boon to Ontario’s manufacturing sector. Ontario’s 
ruling class was also not as organized as was the corporate power-bloc in the US 
or in the UK; while in the 1980s corporate Canada did organize politically and 
also rapidly divest itself of the kind of “Red Toryism” that had bank-rolled the 
massive expansion of Ontario’s university system, it was nonetheless somewhat 
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slower in arriving to the neoliberal party, only partly because of the opposition 
organized labour was able to mount.  By the mid-1990s, however, the tide turned 
more definitively.  First, in 1992, the Government, then controlled by the New 
Democrats, kowtowed to pressure from corporate Canada and delivered an 
austere budget (that cut up-front grants for university students, and raised 
tuition-fees), restricted bargaining rights, and ploughed additional funds into 
Ontario’s then budding commercialization infrastructure. In 1995, Ontario’s 
Progressive Conservatives carried the mantle of neoliberalism further still.  On a 
platform that aped Thatcher’s own brand of neoliberalism, the Progressive 
Conservative (PC) government pared-back government expenditures (and 
revenues) via waves of cuts that were described as Draconian.  In terms of higher 
education, the PCs raised tuition-fees unremittingly, deregulated tuition-fees 
entirely for most professional programs, opened the door to private for-profit 
higher education, subjected the colleges to a regime of QA that  signalled how the 
universities were to be managed, and further expanded the suite of programs that 
aimed to support the commercialization of university-based research (Cohen 
2001; Herd 2002).  But the PCs were largely unable to impose as thorough-going 
a restructuring of Ontario’s university system as they had perhaps hoped.  The 
PCs hardline approach to education and the public-sector in general, excited 
tensions between the government and public-sector workers and triggered the 
mass mobilization of organized labour.  Of course, if the PCs did ultimately prove 
unable to completely overhaul Ontario’s universities in the same way as Thatcher 
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had in the UK, they were nonetheless able to spur the sector in action on the QA 
front: it was during the tenure of the Harris/Eves Tories that the COU began 
expanding and extending is system of program review. Harris’s far-right program 
also left the electorate hungry for a more palatable sounding alternative: the 
“roll-out neoliberalism” that has been associated with Ontario’s Liberal Party, 
since it was elected in 2003 (Evans 2007).   
 Since then, Ontario’s government has aggressively pushed the neoliberal 
program- and QA - with an unexpected adroitness.  The Liberals have also 
benefitted from both the NDP’s tenure in office, which eliminated the NDP as a 
credible left-wing alternative, and the subsequent split between organized labour 
and the NDP.  In other words, where shrewd calculation has been lacking, the 
Liberals have benefitted by being the lesser of right-leaning evils.  As a result, the 
Liberals were able to leverage the transient political commitments of former NDP 
Premier-cum-federal Liberal party leader, Bob Rae, to impose year-over-year 
tuition-fee increases well ahead of the rate of inflation since the 2006/2007 
academic year.  As well, the on-going and generous support for the 
commercialization of university-based research, which has fit seamlessly with the 
policy direction of successive federal governments, along with the periodic threat 
of direct forms of intervention in the management of the universities has enabled 
the provincial government to press the university sector into a predictable dance.  
Accordingly, sabre-rattling by the government leads to new self-regulatory QA 
efforts by the universities.  Of course, less and less sabre-rattling is necessary, as 
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key segments of the universities in Ontario now avidly support the neoliberal 
program.  Overtime, academics have acclimated to the competition for research 
funding and the programmatic conditions that effective competition requires (C. 
Polster 2007).  And given that the fortunes of both individual departments and 
whole institutions increasingly relate to either/both their ability to put-out new, 
more pliant workers, and/or “useful”, “policy relevant” or commercializable 
research, university administrations have similarly become avid proponents of 
neoliberal policy.   
1.4 Prospects for quality in the neoliberal university 
 The concluding chapter of this dissertation is, unfortunately, no less 
disheartening than what precedes it.  Like Mirowski in his recent book, Science-
mart, upon which sections of this dissertation rely heavily, it is inescapable that 
we consider the “production of ignorance” in wondering about the future of the 
neoliberal university and of QA within it (Mirowski 2011).  While QA aids in the 
reproduction of a university system that is ever-more bankrupt and narrow, it 
does so in a manner that leaves the electorate either blind to or tolerant of such 
processes.  Many of those who are central to the endeavor – the academics 
themselves – seem hardly aware of or concerned with the degradation of their 
profession, so long, that is, as they are not reduced to proletarian status.  And 
where a large and growing number within the academy have already been so 
reduced, they currently face a level of precariousness that imposes its own 
disciplinary constraints.  The force and forces of measurement make it difficult 
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for those who do not “measure-up” to both object and survive.  Measurement 
thus becomes both Satan and Saviour.   
 QA therefore operates a kind of psychic fix, a “false want”, that satisfies 
and pacifies, if only temporarily.  Viewed within the context of the march of 
commodification under neoliberalism and the centrality to that process of 
financialization, QA appears as a kind of perfected and hegemonic discourse. 
What better alternative to ranking and assessment is available that would enable, 
on the one hand, the on-going massification of the university, and, on the other 
hand, fill-in for the affirming effects of measurement?  
 Fortunately, hegemony is never absolute.   
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Chapter 2 – The Imperial Roots of Mainstream 
Education Policy: From Neo-classical, to Neoliberal, 
to Quality Assessment 
 It has now become somewhat old hat for scholars on the left of the political 
spectrum to liken the neoliberal vision of higher education and the university to 
an industrial enterprise. The critical literature on higher education is replete with 
industrial type metaphors: “sausage factory”; “degree-mill”; and, “McUniversity” 
to name but a few (N. Smith 2000; Noble 2002; Parker and Jary 1995).  Critical 
scholars have also been rather adept at dissecting much of what is an expansive 
and convoluted discourse within the mainstream of both policy-making and 
academic circles around higher education. Indeed, critical scholars have been 
adept at reading between the lines in order to demonstrate that mainstream 
rhetoric envisioning higher education as a means by which to instill students with 
a love of learning and an appreciation for liberal democracy is really concerned to 
ensure that the university serves as a fount of human capital “inputs” and 
research “outputs” all of which are available for purchase by well-healed 
corporate interests at stable bargain basement prices (De Angelis and Harvie 
2009a; Sears 2003; Sheila Slaughter and Leslie 1997).11  
                                                   
11 It is something of an open question, as to what the university might look like were it freed from 
the instrumental rationalities that have remade it into its current form.  Outside of any utopian 
vision of the university, it is not difficult to imagine an institution that encourages freedom of 
thought in ways that do not happen today. The remaking of the university, for instance, might 
begin with efforts to re-establish recently lost traditions of collegial self-governance, or better yet, 
to build-upon such by including students in a far more meaningful manner than has ever been 
done before.  The artificial separation between the university’s senate and its board of governors, 
in so far as such structures disingenuously split “academic matters” from those considered more 
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 In fact, there was once a time when mainstream scholarship was itself 
somewhat less convoluted than it has become when it comes to outlining a vision 
for the modern neoliberal university.  For instance, in its 1977 report of the Crisis 
of Democracy, the Trilateral Commission offered the following:  
 The 1960’s saw a tremendous expansion in higher education throughout 
the Trilateral societies.  This expansion was the product of increasing 
affluence, a demographic bulge in the college-age group, and the 
increasingly widespread assumption that the types of higher education 
open formerly in most societies (with the notable exception of the United 
States) only to a small elite group should “by right” be made available 
generally.  The result of this expansion, however, can be the 
overproduction of people with university education in relation to the jobs 
available for them, the expenditure of substantial sums of scarce public 
monies and the imposition on the lower classes of taxes to pay for the free 
public education of the children of the middle and upper classes.  The 
expansion of higher education can create frustrations and psychological 
hardships among university graduates who are unable to secure the types 
of jobs to which they believe their education entitles them, and it can also 
create frustrations and material hardships for nongraduates who are 
unable to secure jobs which were previously open to them…Should a 
college education be provided generally because of its possible relation to 
the constructive discharge of the responsibilities of citizenship?  If this 
question is answered in the affirmative, a program is then necessary to 
lower the job expectations of those who receive a college education.  If the 
question is answered in the negative, then higher educational institutions 
should be induced to redesign their programs so as to be geared to the 
patterns of economic development and future job opportunities. (Crozier 
et al. 1975, 184)  
 
Less than a decade later, the landmark Jarratt Report, picked up more or less 
where the Trilateral Commission left off.  Clearly concerned to gear universities 
                                                   
mundanely “financial”, would also help to rebuild badly needed democratic capacities that would 
be key to running an institution more committed to learning than to economic growth and labour 
market flexibility.  Of course, such is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg: I have not touched-
upon levels of resource support, faculty-to-student ratios, and the myriad other ways in which 
universities could be re-focussed around matters more germane to Marx’s conception of an 
emancipated human.    
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to “the patterns of economic development and future job growth opportunities”, 
Jarratt recommended a sweeping series of changes: university Vice Chancellors 
and Provosts were to become Chief Executive Officers; faculty were to be subject 
to new forms of review and accountability; and various means were to be 
established so as to ensure that the university’s “clientele” (which does itself 
indicate a re-imagining of the university’s purpose) were well served, academic 
freedom be damned: 
 So far as the universities are concerned, we share their conviction that 
academic excellence is crucially dependent on academic freedom. But they 
should be on their guard against confusing freedom with license.  Our 
recommendations are constructed as a package to provide the foundations 
of policy, resource allocation, delegated responsibility and accountability 
which must underpin academic judgments.  Quite apart from the fact that 
it is in their own interests to use their resources to the best effect they have 
a duty to the general public.  Only a minority of the population has 
benefited directly from a university education or can expect their children 
to do so, yet society as a whole contributes significantly to the cost of 
universities through taxation. Society needs to be assured that its money is 
spent to the satisfaction of the authorities which represent it and of the 
clients the universities serve directly.  The requirements of these clients, 
industry and commerce, the local Education Authorities, the professions, 
the schools and, not least, present and prospective university students, are 
undergoing sweeping changes, as are the preoccupations of those 
authorities – the Government and the UGC – in response to the 
opportunities and the problems thrown up by social shifts and rapid 
technological advances.  The universities need to show that they are 
making the appropriate adjustments to their outlook and priorities.(CVCP 
and Jarratt 1985, 31)   
 
 By the turn of the century, a prettier turn of phrase had become the norm, as had 
a tendency to equivocate along humanist lines.  In his 2005 report on higher 
education in Ontario, the former premier and self-described practitioner of 
“third-way” social democracy had this to say about higher education: 
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 People have a right to develop to their full potential. Learning is a value in 
itself. The capacity to be curious and reflective is what allows us to grow as 
individuals. To be moved by an eloquent passage or poem, to be 
relentlessly inventive in solving the riddles of natural science, to be 
learned and practised in a body of knowledge or a skill, to understand the 
time and discipline it takes to do something well: these are indispensable 
cultural values that need to be championed. To this we must add the 
practical fact that education, research and innovation lie at the heart of our 
economy. This is not new. Every society has relied for its survival on the 
transfer of skills and abilities from generation to generation. What is new 
is the level and breadth of knowledge and skill required to make our way in 
the world. The wealth of Ontario now depends much more on the power of 
our brains. Today our standard of living, and consequently our quality of 
life, depend on people having access to education that is on a par with the 
best in the world. (Rae 2005) 
 
 Whatever the rhetoric of love and learning, the “heart” of the 
programmatic agendas that devolve from such reports as these has been concern 
over, on the one hand, economic growth, and on the other hand, public 
expenditures on higher education and research. Such concern for driving 
economic growth is emblematic of another important sea change that factors very 
prominently in this dissertation.  The sea change to which I am referring is that 
involving the decline and abandonment of reform liberalism and the ascendancy 
of neoliberalism (both in terms of theory and policy). 
 In this chapter I chart the theoretical development of mainstream – and 
hegemonic - higher education policy. In so doing, I argue that policy debates in 
and around higher education are based upon analyses that are derivative in that 
they are built upon ontological and methodological positions first staked out by 
neo-classical economists and which later found support both outside of the 
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mainstream in economics and within many other social scientific disciplines. I 
will also argue that most of the mainstream debates in and around higher 
education have taken-up the mantle of neoliberal theory unknowingly, 
sometimes in response to the dictates and demands of a transformed state, and, 
more frequently, because of the nature of Anglo-American traditions within the 
social sciences, which have long borne the mark of classical liberalism.12  In the 
concluding section of this chapter I will turn again to the issue of quality 
assessment.  Viewed within the context of neoliberal theory in and around higher 
education, quality assessment must be seen as both 1) an instrument designed to 
train rather than educate; 2) a necessary evil undertaken by administrators and 
educators concerned to preserve public funding; 3) an attempt by researchers 
and students to garner either more research funding or a better return on 
investment (ROI). 
2.1 The Neoliberal Take on Higher Education 
 In a way, Bob Rae, Ontario’s former Premier, who charted, both as 
Premier and subsequently as a government appointed investigator reporting on 
higher education, a decidedly neo-liberal course for the Province, alluded to most 
if not all of the theoretical underpinnings of contemporary, hegemonic, theory 
                                                   
12 I discuss this in detail in Chapter 2.  For present purposes, Classical Liberalism is 
described by an ontology that establishes firm theoretical and empirical boundaries between 
apparent spheres of activity; within each sphere of activity, historical events are explained 
deductively, generally with reference to some null-time, where actors’ actions are explained as a 
by-product of rational self-interest.    
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and policy within and around higher education.13   In writing his review of 
Ontario’s post-secondary system, Rae outlines a policy agenda that is born of, on 
the one hand, a clear belief in the relative and potential efficiency of markets, 
and, on the other hand, a series of mild equivocations.  Accordingly, markets are 
described as necessary but not perfect, and the state is therefore said to most 
appropriately be used as a means through which to deal with such market 
imperfections. Notably, Rae’s Report begins as do many others like it, with the 
declaration that higher education is a “value in itself”(Rae 2005, 6).  But this 
should not be taken to mean that Rae in any way questions or rejects the logic of 
the neoliberal policy paradigm. In fact, after simply asserting that education has 
an inherent value, Rae outlines why it is that Ontario’s system needs to be 
reformed: higher education, he declares, is at the “heart” of Ontario’s economy, 
and reform must be undertaken not so as to ensure a broad-based love of 
learning, or an informed citizenry, but as a competitive response to what is 
                                                   
13 This “decidedly neoliberal” course is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.  Following Peck 
and Tickell (2002), and for present purposes, I conceive of a ‘decidedly neoliberal’ policy program 
in two senses: 1) a program of cuts to social spending programs, like healthcare and education, 
and therein the general “roll-back” of the institutions and social services that are identified with 
the Keynesian Welfare State; and, 2) the imposition of new programs and a new regulatory 
agenda (which might involve substantial new spending by the state), that are designed to support 
the power of capital to make investment decisions in areas once closed off to the market (and thus 
to capital).  Often, such programs will come equipped with means-tested supports for the most 
disenfranchised and insecure members of a population.  At the same time, such support marks a 
move away from the principles of universality that were often associated with public expenditure 
during the era of the Keynesian Welfare State.  For example, during his tenure as Premier of 
Ontario, Rae cut all up-front grants and bursaries to Ontario students and massively expanded 
Ontario’s student loans program.  While Rae argued – much as he still does - that such was 
necessary to weather a nasty global economic storm, his government also opted to continue to 
support the previous government’s efforts to commercialize university based research.  In fact, his 
government expanded the Ontario Centre’s for Excellence program.(Peck and Tickell 2002) 
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happening in other jurisdictions.  Indeed, the need for reform in Ontario, is being 
driven from outside Ontario: 
 The world is not standing still.  Neither should Ontario.  A commitment to 
change by the province, the Canadian government, students, faculty, the 
private sector and the wider public would send a clear signal that Ontario 
is a place that values higher education, research and innovation and wants 
to be a leader in North America and the world.  It will be our competitive 
advantage. (Rae 2005, 7)  
  
 Rae also argues that higher education is, “important enough that we need 
to encourage students and parents to save and invest in it themselves” (Rae 2005, 
7).  Instead of high flying rhetoric about Ontario’s fate lying in a collective effort 
to learn and innovate, Rae’s readers are provided with a vision of intense 
competition that will, it seems, be won or lost on the basis of how many people 
understand sufficiently well the value of higher education, such that they will opt 
to purchase some kind of higher education commodity. At the same time, Rae is 
careful to set-out that the state has a role to play in helping students and parents 
come to such an understanding, thereby indicating that markets, by themselves, 
are not the answer.  Among Rae’s various recommendations is a call for the 
regulated (phased) deregulation of tuition-fees alongside “educational” 
campaigns designed to help students and parents understand the value of their 
investment.  In other words, if perfectly competitive markets replete with 
perfectly informed and rational agents do not exist, then the state’s resources 
must be leveraged in order to bring such markets into existence (Rae 2005, 7).14   
                                                   
14 Rae’s report is unmistakably neoliberal in its orientation.  Among other things, Rae 
calls for the staged de-regulation of tuition-fees and the imposition of an income indexed loan 
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 Such assertions are the hallmarks of mainstream theory in and around 
higher education and of neoliberalism in general, and they are born directly of 
the following assertions: 
1) Individuals are inherently - but not perfectly -  rational, self-serving, and 
utility-cum-profit maximizing; 
2) Markets are both imperfectly competitive and relatively efficient 
processors of information and mechanisms of resource allocation, (i.e. 
“non-market practices” restrict the kind of free and competitive action 
necessary for markets to operate “more” perfectly/optimally)  
3) Prices are market-based signals of mostly rational action that enable 
further such mostly rational action (i.e. marginal productivity theory of 
distribution); 
4) The state is fundamental to the progressive perfection of individual 
rationality and market competition. 
Ontologically these assertions map into a particular form of analysis, one which is 
herein described as “neoliberal”.  Neoliberal analyses are both multivariate and 
                                                   
repayment program, both of which are policies long advocated by, among others, Rose and Milton 
Friedman, both of whom saw such moves as a means by which to eliminate public funding for 
higher education.  Rae also indicates a terrific fondness for the type of “differentiation” that 
describes the American system, which is highly deregulated.  One wonders what Rae would have 
recommended had the efforts of the Province’s previous government to introduce new forms of 
private post-secondary education proved successful.  Either way, Rae’s call for an injection of $6.6 
billion over the following four years, was then clearly not going to make-up for the terrific funding 
shortfall that then plagued (and continues to plague) Ontario’s system.  For example, today, 
Ontario’s students pay the highest tuition-fees in Canada, and levels of per student funding is the 
lowest in Canada (Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario 2012).  Rae also recommended 
means-tests that would have made it impossible for a dual income household, where both parents 
worked full-time and minimum wage jobs to qualify for any provincial subsidy!  
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indeterminate. Outcomes within the political economy are said to result from the 
complex interaction of rational agents who strategically pursue their own 
interests.  However, because the rationality of such agents is said to be 
“bounded”, by which the neoliberals mean rational action is contained or 
directed, outcomes vary from what is predicted by simplistic models that assume 
perfect rationality and/or perfect competition.15 What limits the rationality of 
otherwise rational agents is, for the neoliberals, all manner of “institutions”, 
which they define as, “systems of established and embedded social rules that 
structure social interaction (Hodgson 2006)”.  For the neoliberals, society is 
described by the presence of a multiplicity of institutions, each of which is said to 
be embedded within discrete social, political, or economic contexts. In other 
words, ‘institutions’ are ‘social’ or ‘political’ or ‘economic’, but they are never 
socio-political and economic simultaneously; however much one institution 
within a discrete “sphere of activity” might impact decisively on outcomes within 
                                                   
15 It is absolutely vital to note that notions of “bounded rationality” bear a striking 
resemblance to, but are not the same thing as conceptions of “imperfect information” and 
“imperfect competition” one finds being proffered by mainstream, New Keynesian economists.  It 
is also vital to note that the ‘striking resemblance’ is not coincidental.  Not only are there common 
theoretical roots to these different ideas, they all share a common ontology, wherein reality is 
carved into so many different – and autonomous - spheres of activity.  This issue of autonomy is 
key: in seeing outcomes in any one sphere as the result of either/both the internal nature of that 
sphere and/or one sphere’s inter-relationship with some other sphere, such forms of thought, 
which I have labelled as neoliberal, preclude any notions of a totality, theoretical or otherwise.  
This use of institutions is, in other words, much more than just an analytical tool.  In Chapter 4, I 
discuss the theoretical alternative: a “totalizing holism” that understands the non-autonomous 
nature of the different logics and institutions that describe society.  Though, following Marx, I 
would assert the centrality of production relations in accessing/understanding/analyzing this 
totality, I would hardly see this as some liberals might, and therein as mode of thought that sees 
all institutions as inevitably reflective of economic conditions.  Simply, there are no strictly 
“economic” conditions.  
51 
another such “sphere”, they are not one and the same. As such, it is not possible 
to directly correlate a single institution with particular behaviours, especially 
when seeking to understand the rational action of multiple agents.  As much as 
behaviours are held to be patterned and regular, they nonetheless are the result 
of the complex and indeterminate interaction of several institutions.  Such 
complexity means that it is not possible to rank-order the relative impact had by 
a multiplicity of institutions on the determination of any one or a number of 
outcomes.  Again, causality is indeterminate and complex (Mirowski 2009; Fine 
and Milonakis 2009; Fine and Jomo 2006).   
 The stark distinction between institutions that are ‘political’ or ‘social’ or 
‘cultural’ bears close resemblance to the classical liberal distinctions between 
“states” and “markets” or “politics” and “economics”.  That said, such distinctions 
also stem from the way in which “markets”, as institutions in their own right, are 
treated by the neoliberals.  Simply, for the neoliberals markets are conceived of as 
ever-present meeting places for the exchange of goods and services.  The 
mechanisms that make markets work – prices – are said to potentially be a-
political and a-social.  Non-market institutions are however said to be inherently 
either “political” or “social” or “cultural”, and historically particular.16 Real-lived 
markets may operate sub-optimally, therefore, but only because rational action is 
bounded by virtue of the other historically particular institutions at play.  The end 
                                                   
16 The essential logic of markets is not a-historical, but rather trans-historical and ever-
present.   
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result is that prices are augmented and skewed.  For example, a widespread 
entrepreneurial spirit or a lack of familiarity with the principles of private 
property, may enable agents to compete in either near-perfect or entirely 
imperfect ways, but not because of the essential nature of markets.17  Again, by 
distinguishing between non-market conditions that block “free” market behavior 
the neoliberals argue for an allegedly more complex account of causation.  Just as 
the conditions that impose upon the proper operation of markets cannot be 
explained by reference to the essential nature of markets and prices, so too is it 
not possible to collapse “political” or “social” or “cultural” institutions into a 
single category. (Fine and Milonakis 2009; Argent 2007)   
 It follows then that such analyses must - and do - marshal “facts” from all 
of the social sciences, for within each disciplinary and sub-disciplinary field lies 
some greater understanding of the non-market institutions that impact, 
positively or negatively, on the performance of individuals and/or firms 
interacting in markets (in regular and patterned ways over time).  This 
explanatory method carries two theoretical consequences of note.  First, if 
behavior is said to be stable and patterned over time, then it is necessary to hold 
that non-market institutions are also stable, else behavior would be the result of 
anarchic and fluid conditions, which would make explanation impossible.  This 
stability is explained as a by-product of “path dependence”, wherein historically 
particular patterns emerge, “harden”, and become “institutionalized”.  
                                                   
17 See for instance, Hernando De Soto’s, The Mystery of Capital (De Soto 2000) 
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Institutions are thus said to initially take shape during catalytic moments, 
generally in the midst of crises, when the purpose, character, and operational 
culture of such institutions are determined.  This kind of temporal weight, means 
that the (re)formation of an institution is said to happen only occasionally, even 
though there may be significant flux in other areas. (Kitschelt et al 1999, Soskice 
1999, Thelen 1999, Ikenberry 1988).   
 Second, in as much as institutions are seen as essentially social or political 
or cultural or economic, their impact on individual rationality is generally proved 
– and measured – with reference to outcomes in the market.  In other words, 
non-market institutions are ultimately given a price!  This has everything to do 
with the differences between neoliberal conceptions of markets and neoliberal 
conceptions of the non-market discussed above. The consequence is that 
neoliberals tend to do precisely that which Rae does in his Report: 
simultaneously assert some kind of ineffable value to higher learning and then 
offer some indirect quantification of that ineffable value.  Again, Rae provides a 
clear example: he indicates that participation rates in Ontario are lower amongst 
students from lower-income backgrounds because such students have not been 
provided with the appropriate information at the secondary school level.  In 
saying this, Rae relies upon a literature that – without explanation or justification 
– classifies such informational asymmetries as extra-economic.18  We see that in 
Rae’s world income is correlated with all manner of other variables, (health, 
                                                   
18 See for instance (Looker 2002) 
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literacy, engagement in learning etc.), but in a manner that makes it impossible 
to see income as indicative of a larger, structural patterning that speaks to the 
real nature of capitalist markets. In fact, such an argument would be (and has 
been) labeled as “reductive”, apparently because it explains (reduces) ‘cultural’ 
norms and patterns of behavior to the logic of markets.  Thus does this allegedly 
“non-reductive” approach lead to policy that attempts to correct for the apparent 
“informational deficiencies” from which poor people suffer for reasons that are 
related to, but not causatively linked with, their poverty (i.e. concern over cost, 
must not “overshadow a shared understanding of the value of higher 
education…we need to encourage students and parents to save and invest in it 
[higher education] themselves” (emphasis in original)).  But clearly what Rae 
here means by “value” is not that ineffable form of value he associates with that 
which higher education is “in itself”.19  Rather, what Rae here means is the value 
to individuals and society in terms of their income and, in this case, the 
Province’s overall economic competitiveness.  Again, the “value” to be derived is 
in terms of high post-graduation income and GDP growth (i.e. to some quantum 
of capital – a price)! (Fine and Milonakis 2009; Fine and Jomo 2006; Fine 2000) 
                                                   
19 When drafting his Report, Rae well understood the difference between “use-value” and 
“exchange-value”, such that his use of the word in both senses was hardly unintentional. As an 
aside, during and immediately following the Review, Rae was found referring to Marx with some 
frequency.  Rae asserted that calls for lower or no tuition-fees were but calls for larger subsidies 
for the rich, who as Marx pointed out (in 1861), were the ones who attended university most 
frequently.  
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 This second issue suggests that which has frequently been over-looked 
within the entirety of the literature on higher education: the hegemony of 
neoliberal theory. As was alluded to above, there is a subtle, but profound 
difference in the way in which both the market and the state have been and are 
now conceived of within mainstream and hegemonic liberal accounts. Post-war 
liberalism was rooted in a more plainly international political economy that 
operated under the auspices of US leadership and in the context of the Cold War.  
As such, liberal distinctions between states and markets precluded the possibility 
of total commodification, for the national value of social or political or cultural 
institutions often superseded notions of economic value.  However much states 
have authored globalization, or participated in the making of a global capitalism, 
the post-Bretton Woods order has entailed a fundamental conflation of 
nationalist ideals with the logic of global and ever-more intensely competitive 
markets. Liberals may still make distinctions between national cultural or social 
institutions but they must now be parsed in terms of their effect on economic 
competitiveness.  Accordingly, a value is given to even that which is said to have 
value “in itself”. (Sears 2003; Fine and Milonakis 2009; Milonakis and Fine 
2009)   
 Analyses of higher education that reject this logic but nonetheless cling to 
the ideals of post-war reform liberalism, or classical liberalism (i.e. they make the 
theoretical/analytical distinction between different ‘spheres of activity’) are, I 
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would argue, but silent boosters of the neoliberal agenda.20  The reason for this is 
straightforward: the reform liberal critics have no consistent theoretical basis 
upon which to disagree with their neoliberal brethren because in the complex and 
indeterminate world of liberal theory, “values” and “value” operate alongside 
each other, in precisely the way that they do in Rae’s analysis.  In other words, 
assertions as to the importance of higher education in creating a sense of civic 
mindedness and in helping to develop a skilled workforce can both, and 
simultaneously, be right. But this comes to naught when decisions are made with 
respect to the allocation of resources, particularly in the growth-obsessed world 
of neoliberalism.  Rather, the law of value is necessarily applied to all of the 
justifications given as to why scarce resources should be applied to one or 
another “form of investment”, which is how public programs are re-defined.  Put 
another way, there is a fundamental conflation of the “public good” with 
economic growth and fiscal prudence. Once civic-mindedness is subject to the 
law of value, there is no turning back, and those who would cling to the ideals of 
post-war liberalism have never suggested a means by which to avoid this turn.   
 At its core, neoliberalism is about the socio-political and economic 
construction of “homo-economicus”(MacKenzie and Millo 2001), not about 
austerity or fiscal prudence.  And while there has always been a contradiction 
                                                   
20 There are many scholars whose work I would place in this category.  Among those who 
have written on quality assessment, I would highlight Robert Brown (R. Brown 2004), and Lee 
Harvey(L. Harvey 2005).  George Fallis’s work on the “multiversity” wreaks of a kind of liberal 
“practicality” that has made the neoliberal university what it is today (Fallis 2007).   
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between liberal notions of “free markets” and “market forces” that contradiction 
is today arguably more pronounced than at any other time (Wood 2005).  
Government funding for higher education or any other social program may either 
rise or fall, but so long as such injections or cutbacks are made, even partially, 
according to a logic that conflates national welfare with the ability of individual 
citizens to compete and win in ever-more competitive global markets, there will 
be little room for humanist ideals.  Once there has been an acceptance that policy 
must respond to the exigencies of markets, humanism is made into a kind of 
idealistic unrealism.  One can perhaps still make an appeal to the interests of the 
state “in itself”, or to some basic notion of “humanity”.  In a world where the state 
is generally conceived of as a kind of uber-capitalist firm, however, such appeals 
signify precisely that which they seek to transcend: the market.  Either way, when 
analysis is born of liberal dichotomies, more self-consciously neoliberal scholars 
and policy-makers who currently control the primary levers of power inside key 
agencies of the state are able to pick at will those observational pearls that deepen 
and broaden the neoliberal program (Phillip Mirowski 2011; Sears 2003; Sheila 
Slaughter and Rhodes 2004).   
 This is the point at which it makes sense to consider mainstream theories 
in and around higher education.  
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2.2 The Hegemony of the Neoliberal Form in Higher 
Education  
 To the extent that it is possible to speak of a literature on “higher 
education”, that literature falls under the banner of “comparative and 
international higher education (CIHE), which is best conceived of as a 
theoretically eclectic field dominated by a concern for public policy.21 Within the 
CIHE literature one finds sub-fields organized around topical and policy-related 
issues, such as quality assessment or evaluation or university research.  I argue 
that the CIHE literature, both in terms of its mainstream and some of its more 
critical elements, is either dominated by the kind of neoliberal scholarship 
described above, or else is born of a logic that is sufficiently similar as to offer 
little by way of a meaningful challenge.22  In this regard, the distance between 
“qualitative” and “quantitative” work is almost non-existent. “Thick” descriptions 
of cultural or political or social “institutions” or practices are no antidote to more 
strictly quantitative exercises that seek to “prove” the existence of a relationship 
between one or another variable.  In fact, the opposite is true: from the 
behaviouralists to those who employed structural functional forms of analysis to 
                                                   
21 There are notable and well-published critical elements to this literature.  The work of 
thinkers like Simon Marginson, Phillip Altbach, Sheila Slaughter, Gary Rhoades, and others is 
worth mentioning here (these works are all referenced throughout this dissertation and are cited 
in the bibliography.  I intentionally exclude this section of the CIHE literature because: a) it 
occupies a relatively small space within the overall CIHE literature; and, b) because the key agents 
involved in the maintenance of the CIHE, and the establishment of its disciplinary boundaries 
totally and completely ignore, even while they sometimes finance (ex. Marginson and Mollis 
2001) such critical analyses. 
22 Here I am thinking of the aforementioned work by thinkers like Lee Harvey and George 
Fallis. 
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both the early and “new” institutionalists on both the apparently “left” and “right” 
of the political spectrum, all such analyses depend upon theoretical distinctions 
between different spheres of activity, and therein upon a logical form that lends 
itself quite readily to more plainly neoliberal and/or economics type quantitative 
analysis.  Though some critical work has moved beyond crude structural accounts 
similar to the most polemical writings of World Systems theorists like Gunder-
Frank, much of the critical literature within CIHE still operates under the banner 
of “conflict theory”, and, as such, relies upon a kind of mechanistic and 
deterministic logic that is the obverse of more mainstream analyses.23  And post-
structural and post-modern accounts far from moving beyond the facile accounts 
of neoliberal scholars, simply obscure from view the hegemony of neoliberal 
scholarship (Harker 1995).    
 Of course, what the foregoing assumes is that it is possible to speak of an 
extant literature when referring to CIHE.  For Bray et al (2007), however, it is 
simply not possible to delineate any clear disciplinary boundaries or even a core 
literature  of that field.  In fact, they argue that to the extent it is possible to speak 
of a “field” of CIHE, it is a mish mash of scholarship covering a huge array of 
topics generated by academics from a variety of different disciplinary 
                                                   
23 Altbach’s work falls victim to this particularly American reading of Marx and of 
Marxism (Altbach, Arnove, and Kelly 1982); here that absence of inter-class conflict is often taken 
to imply a level of consent that may or may not be present.  As such the particularities of capitalist 
accumulation at any conjuncture are all but ignored (i.e. the complex ways in which the neoliberal 
program of accumulation, for instance, manufactures consent; reproduces complex feelings of 
alienation; remakes the ideational field within the academy. This is a gross oversight. 
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backgrounds. This said, they do suggest that there are indeed some general 
parameters around which it is possible to speak of a kind of “quasi” field.  At the 
most basic level, the subject, education, and the method, a comparison of 
educational ‘systems’ in different jurisdictions, are common to work in the field.   
Whatever the epistemological or ontological leanings of the analyst, therefore, 
there is a general tendency to accept a common definition of the object to be 
studied – an educational system - and thereby the legitimacy of the jurisdictional 
boundaries that de facto define each “system” as such.  This issue of jurisdiction 
in turn means that analysts also tend to accept both the validity and 
comparability of whatever data is used.  Bray et al also suggest a common 
philosophical subjectivity amongst scholars in the field.  Quoting another survey 
of the field, Bray et al note that scholars in the field,  
 …tend to rely on similar philosophical assumptions. Concerning the nature 
of reality, comparative educators would tend to see reality as somewhat 
subjective and multiple, rather than objective and singular. 
Epistemologically, comparative educators would tend to interact with that 
being researched rather than acting independently and in a detached 
manner from the content. Axiologically, comparative educators would 
tend not to see research as value free and unbiased; rather, they would 
accept the notion that their research is value laden and includes the biases 
of the researcher. (Rust et al. 1999 as quoted in; Bray 2007, 350) 
 
For Bray et al such eclecticism should not, however, be mistaken for anything 
other than topical diversity.  In their opinion, there is no indication of the field 
generating interdisciplinary insights at the level of methodology or epistemology.  
On the contrary, the “field” as they see it is home to scholars from various 
disciplinary backgrounds that employ apparently discipline-specific 
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methodologies without attempting to develop a common disciplinary discursive 
terrain. Likening CIHE to the situation commonly found in “multi-disciplinary 
universities”, they write,  
 As in multidisciplinary universities where the Faculties of Law, Science, 
Architecture, Dentistry and Education do not usually have much 
intellectual interflow, and instead tend to inhabit separate intellectual 
territories within the same geographic space, the field of comparative 
education is also compartmentalised. Positivists and neo-Marxists do 
occasionally clash, and even more occasionally do learn from each other, 
but in general they ignore each other. Similar remarks may be made about 
psychologists and anthropologists, and, moving to area specialisms, 
Africanists and Sinologists, for example.(Bray 2007, 359) 
 
Such assertions tend to obscure more than they actually illustrate.  Underlying 
the kind of methodological and disciplinary diversity Bray et al describe, there are 
other, less frequently discussed, commonalities and themes.  Writing in 1982, 
before the neoliberal onslaught had reached the other social sciences to the 
degree it would in the 1990’s, Philip Altbach, Gail Kelly, and Robert Arnove 
(1982) paint a picture of a slightly more coherent disciplinary terrain than that 
set-out by Bray et al. In describing the orientation of much of the work in the 
field, Altbach et al describe a decidedly practical and policy-oriented bent: 
 Comparative education has traditionally served educational planners, 
policy makers, and others involved with the applied aspects of education 
policy making.  Much of the data base in the field has been developed with 
the interests of such groups in mind.  Comparative education serves as a 
means to provide information on policy options in planning educational 
reform and a bench-mark to compare the effectiveness of educational 
practice.  Planners and administrators who use comparative knowledge 
are for the most part in ministries of education, international agencies, aid 
organizations, and to some extent in school systems.  Although relatively 
few of these individuals are “producers” of knowledge in the field, they are 
important in applying research, sponsoring studies, and determining the 
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shape of comparative education through their funding of 
research.(Altbach, Arnove, and Kelly 1982, 508) 
 
 In terms of methodology, Kelly et al outline a field traditionally dominated 
by modernization theory, but which began to open-up to other theoretical strands 
in the mid-1970s when a theoretical vacuum emerged in the wake of so many 
policy failures in the 1960s and 1970s.  Apparently because policy rooted in 
modernization theory had failed to deliver the kind of results that had been 
anticipated and predicted, an urgent need to find epistemological tools that could 
better explain what had taken place rapidly emerged.  That said, before the crisis 
of modernization theory, Altbach et al suggest the development of distinct 
American and British traditions within the field. Herein the American tradition 
was linked to increasingly quantitative forms of analysis focused on revealing the 
law-like rules that allegedly govern educational outcomes (in-school), while the 
British variant was more rooted in structural-functional forms of analysis that 
looked more qualitatively at so called “school-society relations”, and how the re-
shaping of such relations might, in a more indeterminate fashion, yield better 
developmental outcomes. (Altbach, Arnove, and Kelly 1982)   
 With the on-set of crisis (of modernization theory) in the mid-1970s, 
Altbach et al note the development of distinctive “macro” and “micro” 
approaches, the former rooted in World Systems Theory and the latter being 
more concerned to examine the particular context of the classroom in what were 
conceived of as unique local, regional, and national settings.  By the end of the 
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1970s the beginning of a synthesis between these macro- and micro- analyses 
began.  What emerged was a form of analysis that questioned how structural 
factors such as social class relations, or the degree to which control over state 
education was centralized, or the effect of the importing textbooks and curricula 
from the West, could affect who learns what from whom. (Altbach, Arnove, and 
Kelly 1982, 523)  
 This description of a more synthetic approach is illustrative of the nature 
of so much critical and/or Marxian scholarship at the time.  Such apparently 
“synthetic” forms of analysis saw the lines of causation flow from the top-down 
wherein the capitalist world system encounters unique and particular local 
conditions, thereby producing myriad different forms of “under-development”.  
In the same book, Robert Arnove (1982), this time writing alone, outlines the 
World Systems approach to the study of comparative and international higher 
education.  While his article is indispensable in so far as it makes clear how 
fundamental have been American philanthropic institutions such as the Ford and 
Carnegie Foundations, the developmental agencies of the American state, as well 
as American-backed international organizations like the World Bank, in 
delivering an impoverished and misguided form of educational policy, his 
critique fails entirely to complicate or discuss such factors dialectically. Arnove 
reduces the under-developed “South” to an impoverished receptor of Western 
theory and policy intended only to recreate the centrality of the “metropole” 
(Arnove 1982).  This kind of structural determinism is also common to other neo-
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Marxian strands within the field, ones that are more typically identified in the 
field as “conflict theory”, and which account for most of the space taken up by 
apparently more radical scholarship, which amounts to a small fraction of the 
total amount of “space” occupied by the CIHE literature.24  Of course, at the time 
they were writing, Altbach et al could be forgiven for seeing these apparently 
synthetic and critical tendencies as becoming more a part of the mainstream of 
the CIHE literature than they ever did become.  Less forgivable, however, is the 
degree to which they mistake a crude, structural, and mechanistic account of 
capitalist accumulation for a meaningful analytical step forward.  Still, their clear 
outline of the degree to which the bulk of work within the field was policy-focused 
and related to the articulation of American power and Anglo-American schools of 
thought is indispensable not least because it highlights precisely that which Bray 
et al miss.  For all the topical diversity within the field, and despite the apparently 
impregnable disciplinary boundaries of those working within it, the bulk of work 
in CIHE is of a “problem-solving”, and policy-oriented nature, where the primary 
problems that need solving relate to both the expression and preservation of 
American interest and hegemony.25  
                                                   
24 In fact, in their otherwise useful overview, Bray et al, use this unfortunate term, and do 
not really look to see whether such analyses track the development of Marxian theory, which they 
do not.   
25 In not identifying the specific national interests involved in the CIHE literature, Bray et 
al miss many aspects of what describes the mainstream, (for instance the political economy of 
economics imperialism, which is so crucial to understanding the present state of the social 
sciences).  They also do not identify the proximity of dominant modes of thought to dominant 
interests and their particular mode of expression.  As I outline in Chapter 4, I see the connections 
between the globalization of everyday finance, (a process authored by states (and therein by key 
states)) and QA as fundamental to the normalization of QA.  So the expression of dominant states 
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 In this regard, Simon Marginson’s and Marcela Mollis’s (2001) overview of 
the CIHE literature is equally indispensible.  Writing some 22 years after Altbach 
et al, they make clear that the “dominant strand” within CIHE hardly became less 
instrumental and policy-focused from the 1980s on.  On the contrary, what they 
suggest is that through the 1980s and 1990s work within the field became more 
rooted in positivist and quantitative methods. They begin their review with an 
abstract discussion of the comparative methodology and therein of how 
comparativists of all stripes necessarily attempt to both describe and explain 
“sameness” and “difference” between whatever objects are being compared.  
“When we observe the field [CIHE],” they write, 
 as it has evolved in practice, we find a tendency for the work to push in the 
direction of one side of the dyad or the other, either towards sameness 
(universalism) or difference (ultrarelativism). A universalist method 
imposes uniform models on all cases, while ultrarelativist approaches treat 
each case as completely different. (Marginson and Mollis 2001, 586) 
 
Accordingly, Marginson and Mollis argue that, “the dominant strand in 
comparative education” has always tended to the universalist side of this dyad. 
They explain that the close articulation between comparativists and organizations 
such as the World Bank and the OECD, along with a host of American aid 
agencies linked to the American state and the articulation of the State’s 
geopolitical interests, meant that analyses have tended to understand difference 
as a degree of departure from what was held to be the paradigmatic and virtuous 
                                                   
interests, in so far as they are obscured by method, are important, at least if we are to identify 
and/or hierarchically organize the “causative variables” involved in the construction of actual 
lived neoliberalism.    
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model: the American system of higher education.  Although they indicate that 
such tendencies were present within the field from the turn of the 19th century, 
when comparative education was more closely linked to Victorian anthropology 
and the British Empire, Marginson and Mollis, like Altbach et al, highlight the 
degree to which the dominant strand was, from the 1960s on, “colonized” by what 
they term “instrumental positivism”.  So it was that the dominant strand’s long-
term fascination with the discovery and adumbration of the rules and laws that 
were said to govern the way in which always national systems of higher education 
operated become wedded to quantitative methodology.  In identifying governing 
“laws”, comparativists were in turn able to measure and compare different 
“systems” based on the relative presence or absence of those variables that were 
held to be causatively - and universally - linked to “success”.  Of course, the key 
causative variables were (and still are), as Marginson and Mollis also make clear, 
artifacts of power, and of American dominance.  For example, participation rates 
(which were highest in the US) could be linked to particular patterns or forms of 
finance or of secondary education, such that the presence or absence of such 
patterns and forms in other jurisdictions could be evinced as explanation for 
lower participation rates in other jurisdictions. Marginson and Mollis point-out 
that such methods equate difference with inequality, or more pointedly with the 
relative deficiency of other jurisdictions.  By way of illustration, they quickly turn 
to the subject of this dissertation: 
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 By providing computable data attributable to “performance,” it [the 
dominant strand/methodology] enables the allocation of deficiency, 
failure, and blame.  It creates data-based hierarchies among national 
systems to follow a common blueprint for education reform, a single path 
to “success.”  Of course, when success is measured in a hierarchical table 
of comparative performance, only a minority of national can fully success.  
The journey is universalized; the destination is not.  De facto global 
homogenization, rather than universal educational achievement, becomes 
the horizon of policy…When using singular global comparisons, the 
potential for national variation in system-level criteria is lost. When 
national systems focus on performance as measured in the common 
comparison, a homogenizing logic is installed. Over time, all systems tend 
to become the same. The same homogenizing logic entered university 
evaluation and quality assurance around the world in the 1990s. 
(Marginson and Mollis 2001, 594) 
 
In saying this, what Marginson and Mollis fail to highlight is the degree to which 
scholarship within the ‘dominant strand’ has appeared to move away from pure 
and axiomatic forms of analyses.  The work of Noah and Eckstein (1969) (which 
they highlight and describe) notwithstanding, the current hegemony enjoyed by 
the kind of neoliberal analyses outlined in the previous section have moved away 
from analyses that assert simple, uni-linear, and law-like relationships between 
whatever variables may be under consideration.  Indeed, today the ‘dominant 
strand’ tends to favour a “looser” kind of universalism, one within which causality 
is held to be complex and indeterminate. Of course, such multivariate forms of 
analyses are hardly very different from those more straightforward expressions of 
modernization theory that Marginson and Mollis do highlight.  Both forms of 
analysis are rooted in stalwartly liberal distinctions between different spheres of 
activity and decidedly a-historical and Weberian accounts of the market (see 
above).  As such, both modernization theory and its newer multivariate forms are 
68 
ultimately wedded to a logic that champions the market as an inherently more 
efficient means by which to organize society. Nonetheless, the difference is 
profound if only because it has enabled the ‘dominant strand’ to colonize the 
other social sciences, or within CIHE, to encompass and use the insights of 
allegedly more critically minded scholarship (see my outline above and (Fine and 
Milonakis 2009).      
 Notably, Marginson and Mollis also outline how the “ultrarelativist” 
counter-tendency, in responding to the dominant strand, bends the stick too far 
in the opposite direction:  
 Ultrarelativist forms of ‘‘comparative’’ education obscure what is common 
to national systems and deny the mutual effects in international 
relationships. This not only blocks comparison but also handicaps 
understandings of the dynamics of each system, in which national, 
international, and global elements are intermeshed. Like homogenization, 
ultrarelativism ultimately precludes sympathetic engagement with the 
object of research. It cannot interpret difference.(Marginson and Mollis 
2001, 587) 
 
Generally speaking, ultrarelativist analyses tend to focus on themes that are 
common to post-modern and post-structural thought, namely to the construction 
of “otherness” through dominant discursive modes.  This thematic focus is 
derived in part by what Harvey describes as a tendency to highlight, “the 
ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic (D. Harvey 1990, 
45),” of late (read post) modernity.  The key point here is not that the ultra-
relativist position makes it impossible to see and interpret difference, but rather 
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that, in so doing, the role played by the very factors and players that have 
backstopped the neo-liberal program is completely obscured.     
 While it would appear that post-structural notions of ephemerality stand 
in stark contrast to the “totalizing” theories – both critical and not – of the 
enlightenment (which make-up the ‘dominant strand’), such is not really the 
case.  In privileging the ephemeral and the particular, causality becomes simply 
unknowable such that any attempt to identify and understand a particular 
context is itself a kind of historical excision and a distortion of reality that 
allegedly obscures the complex, ephemeral, and particular nature of causality.  
Not coincidentally, such arguments bear a striking resemblance to neoliberal 
arguments concerning the complex and indeterminate nature of causality.  
Coupled with a focus on discourse, to the exclusion of either or both material 
realities or structural tendencies, post-structural or ‘ultrarelativist’ analyses have 
often proved a fecund source of new – and politically expedient - language for the 
boosters of neoliberalism. (Rodgers 2012)      
 In summary then, the field of CIHE is dominated by particular logical 
forms. The designation of work as “qualitative” or “quantitative” frequently 
brushes over the basic epistemological and ontological similarities that inform 
both the dominant tendency and a good portion of that which rejects it.  The 
dominant strand in CIHE is descendant of work within the mainstream of 
American social sciences and therein of neo-classical and New Keynesian 
economics; however far from neo-classical economics, new- or neo-institutional 
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analyses might appear, they are hardly very different.  As such, it is imperative 
that an analysis of the dominant strand begin with, and move outward from, the 
manner in which economists have treated the issue of higher education.  Neo-
classical and New Keynesian economics is very simply the most straightforward 
expression of the dominant strand and most of the work within the field of CIHE 
is usefully understood as falling under the aegis of that most dismal of the 
“sciences”.  
2.3 From Human Capital to the “New” Social Sciences and 
Higher Education 
 The purest expression of neo-liberal theory within the field of higher 
education is Human Capital Theory (HCT).  The first articulations of HCT, first 
by Schultz (1961) and immediately thereafter by Becker (1962), were strictly neo-
classical interpretations of labour markets that, according to Botwinick (1993), 
attempted to address the repeated failure of neo-classical economics to explain 
persistent wage differentials in the First World on the basis of assumptions about 
perfect competition and perfect information, the marginal productivity theory of 
distribution.  As such, these initial theorizations of human capital allowed the 
neo-classicals to describe income differentials as the result of rational choice on 
the part of workers or on so-called “externalities”, like welfare programs, which 
skewed the operation of the market.  Thus, human capital theories,  
 …essentially blamed the glaring inequities in the distribution of income 
not on the system, but on the victims themselves.  The argument 
maintained that if workers really wanted to improve their economic status 
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within the system, all they had to do was to make the rational choice to 
“invest” in more education and skill training.  This investment in human 
capital would improve their marginal productivity, and competitive capital 
mechanisms within the labour market would guarantee their rightful 
rewards.  It was clearly up to them.(Botwinick 1993) 
 
Accordingly, the ability of individual workers to perform different forms of work 
took on the very same qualities as any other form of capital: it was malleable and 
subject to growth through investment.  And as with other forms of capital, the 
decision to invest (in things like education) was said to depend on each 
individual’s estimation of and tolerance for risk and reward.  Keynesian criticisms 
of HCT merely set-up the neo-classical version of HCT as an ideal case to be 
strived for/realized via wise government policy.  In other words, workers were 
partly, but not wholly to blame, for persistent wage differentials.  As was outlined 
earlier, this line of argument attributed income differentials to myriad factors, 
such as informational deficits or the presence/absence of peak level coordinated 
bargaining, things that augmented rational action in correctable ways.  The 
apparent problem, it was argued, was not with the ‘market’ per se, but with the 
way in which particular markets had evolved in particular places.  The state 
therefore was appropriately used to support the operation of real-lived markets 
by removing or compensating for whatever was said to have caused their 
divergence from ideal-typical comparator.  
72 
2.3.1 The Neo-classical Roots of New Keynesian Human Capital 
Theory 
 In this way, the Keynesian response to the neo-classical articulations of 
HCT set-up human capital as a quasi-public, quasi-private good.  Accordingly, 
individuals were responsible for their capacity to labour only to the extent that 
the real-lived markets in which they attempted to sell their labour operated in 
ideal typical terms.  But to the extent that rational action was based upon 
imperfect information because of particular, long-standing, and 
“institutionalized” practices, the state bore some responsibility. This articulation 
of HCT emerged following the Keynesian response to the failure of Friedman’s 
monetarism in and around 1980. Having suffered momentous defeats through 
the 1970s when stagflation, a theoretical impossibility within the Keynesian 
frame (until it happened), the Keynesians had anxiously jumped at the 
opportunity for redemption when the US Federal Reserve began targeting the 
growth rate of the money supply.  Friedman, who had causatively linked 
accommodative monetary policy (and therein the growth rate of the money 
supply) to inflation via assumptions of perfect competition and perfect 
information, was apparently wrong (M. Friedman 1977).  But as Fine and 
Milonakis make clear, the Keynesian reaction was couched in terms that 
effectively ceded the field in their long-standing dispute with the neo-classicals.  
By holding that the growth rate of the money supply had outstripped the Fed’s 
targets because of rational behavior under imperfect conditions, the Keynesians 
hardly provided a revolutionary corrective: 
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 …quite apart from continuing and reinforcing the traditional 
unworldliness and technicism of economics as a discipline, neoliberalism 
(and the new classical economics as its academic orthodox counterpart) 
had the effect of prompting an alternative analytical agenda.  It served by 
way of a reaction against neoliberalism in terms of asking why individuals 
might not appear to behave rationally, why markets might not work, and 
why non-market relations exist and might even be desirable beyond 
minimal provision of secure property rights, defence, etc.(Fine and 
Milonakis 2009: p.62) 
 
In other words, the Keynesian reaction to Friedman’s monetarism, in so far as it 
was premised upon notions of information asymmetries (i.e. imperfect 
information) and imperfect competition, simultaneously signaled the Keynesian 
abandonment of macro-economic considerations, particularly those related to 
full-employment and aggregate demand. And in abandoning such considerations 
the Keynesians accepted the parameters of methodological individualism as it 
had been articulated by the neo-classicals from Hayek on.  Crucially, this involved 
a restatement and reframing of the economic problem.   
 For the classical and neo-classical economists before Hayek, markets were 
held to automatically lead to the proper allocation of resources through the 
simple reconciliation of supply and demand.  But, as Mirowski points out, Hayek 
took this a step further: 
  The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to 
allocate “given” resources…It is rather a problem of how to secure the best 
use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose 
relative importance only those individuals know…it is a problem of the 
integration of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. 
(Hayek 1945 as quoted in Mirowski 2011) 
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For Mirowski, Hayek’s refinement was crucial, as it meant that markets worked 
to, “reconcile participants’ mental states through the computation of prices 
(Mirowski 2011, 26 italics in original).” In other words, markets and prices were 
elevated by the Hayek and the neo-classicals after him.  Markets and prices were 
more than just an indication of supply and demand, but were a means by which 
to comparatively evaluate the issues that impact on any one or set of choices that 
needs to be made.  As Hayek puts it, 
 We must look at the price system as such a mechanism for communicating 
information if we want to understand its real function—a function which, 
of course, it fulfills less perfectly as prices grow more rigid. (Even when 
quoted prices have become quite rigid, however, the forces which would 
operate through changes in price still operate to a considerable extent 
through changes in the other terms of the contract.) The most significant 
fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which it operates, 
or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be able to 
take the right action. In abbreviated form, by a kind of symbol, only the 
most essential information is passed on and passed on only to those 
concerned. It is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a 
kind of machinery for registering change, or a system of 
telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch merely 
the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might watch the hands of a 
few dials, in order to adjust their activities to changes of which they may 
never know more than is reflected in the price movement. (Hayek 1945) 
 
The market is thus turned into the “mother of all computers (Mirowski 2011, 
26)”, in so far as it functions to turn an individual’s rational estimation of self-
interest into a price based on: 1) his unique knowledge; and, 2) other prices, 
which of course signify other peoples’ unique knowledge.   In the anarchy of the 
free market therefore, prices become the basis for: 1) exchange; and, 2) the on-
going re-evaluation of individual self-interest.  Of course, it is vital to note that 
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the computational power of markets is ineluctably related to competition.  As 
such, the anarchy of the free-market also leads to: 3) the ranking of commodities, 
(relative prices), in terms of quality and quantity.26  Herein, Hayek’s redefinition 
amounted to more than just the acceptance of markets as relatively efficient (the 
efficient market hypothesis is made into law), but also into the revival and the 
law-like acceptance of marginal utility and the marginal productivity theory of 
distribution.   
 Again, the Keynesian corrective to Hayekian neo-classicism asserted that 
markets were imperfect because rational agents were asymmetrically informed.  
However, because such asymmetries were said to be the result of so many extra-
economic (i.e. social or political or cultural) factors that were endemic to - but 
removable from – markets, they implied that the computational power of the 
market could operate if only it were properly supported.  Put differently, the 
Keynesians argued that if the irrationality of agents could be dealt with or 
                                                   
26 Hayek’s pronouncements as to the limits of human rationality relative to the computational power of the 
market, were and remain complicated by the fact that he did not offer a reasonable explanation of either 
market-failure or of the emergence of collective and/or individual attempts to control/subvert markets, 
which are seen as the exclusive causes of sub-optimal outcomes.  Hayak, of course, repeatedly made clear 
that humans often tended to suffer what he called a “fatal conceit”, namely the irrational notion that human 
interaction could be rendered less anarchic and painful through the regulation of markets, but he simply 
never clarified how this squared with his notion of individual rationality or with his own ability to discern the 
gestational/computational power of markets.  Much the same is true of Public Choice Theory, and therein 
the work of James Buchanan.  Though Buchanan rejected Hayek’s notion of a “spontaneous order”, and 
provided a far more prescriptive program for the capitalist state, he too placed ultimate faith in the relative 
efficiency of markets.  In fact, whatever the internal disagreements as to the evolutionary nature of the 
market (or not), neoliberals have consistently asserted an ontological claim for the relative efficiency of 
markets.  What follows is an ontological claim that much of the literature has failed to emphasize 
sufficiently, namely the ontological claim made for prices: for the neoliberals, prices take on a kind of 
ontological pre-eminence that has been utterly central to the neoliberal program; because prices signal the 
gestational and computational power of markets, they are ontologically significant in their own right as 
artifacts of the “natural” efficiency of markets (Buchanan 1999; Mirowski 2011; Milonakis and Fine 2009) .     
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compensated for, the cold computational logic of the market could do its job.  As 
such, economic growth and prosperity depended upon forms of state intervention 
that could unleash the power of the market from the fetters of man-made extra-
economic institutions.  In this way, considerations related to full-employment 
faded from the policy agenda of the Keynesians; in trying to effect full-
employment states would attempt to rationalize and control the logic and power 
of the market, which they had accepted was the “fatal conceit”, the result of which 
was allegedly stagflation.  Instead, by focusing on economic growth as a measure 
of success, state policy could focus on the right things: on the barriers that 
prevented markets from operating as the neo-classicals had predicted (Fine and 
Jomo 2006; Fine 2000).  
 By the late 1980s human capital was therefore cast as a key variable within 
the frame of what came to be called, New Growth Theory (NGT). Through the 
1970s and 1980s as governments’ commitments to full employment and 
aggregate demand stabilization withered in the face of a persistent strike of 
capital27, it became necessary to outline how, if not through direct transfers, the 
state was to intervene so as to build human capital and provide a basis for 
continued economic growth.  The shift in focus away from full-employment and 
                                                   
27 Though the argument is factually baseless, mainstream economists have, since the 1970’s continuously 
blamed the economic turbulence of that decade on the “stickyness” of wages, the idea that stagflation in the 
1970’s occurred as a result of the unreasonable demands of labour.  Shaikh has responded to such 
arguments definitively.  See, Shaikh and Tonak, The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Welfare State, in Political 
Economy and Contemporary Capitalism, Ron Baiman, Heather Boushey, and Dawn Saunders, (eds.), M.E. 
Sharpe, Armonk, New York. 2002 
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towards growth, which occurred both in and outside state agencies and the 
academy, was the new frame within which government intervention needed to be 
justified.  Of course, this was, in the 1980s, much more a theoretical question 
than a policy debate, at least in key institutions like the US Federal Reserve, the 
World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD.  There, the 80s and the 90s were more 
closely associated with the outright rejection of anything even mildly Keynesian 
and a more thoroughgoing acceptance of ‘laissez faire’ Hayekian principles 
(Newstadt 2008).   
 As its label implies, NGT is primarily concerned with economic growth, 
not with human capital formation, however much it sees the two issues as being 
interlinked.  And the impetus that led to NGT did not come from Keynesian 
efforts to deal with neo-classical articulations of HCT, but rather with the neo-
classical take on technological development. In the neo-classical frame, 
technological development and the overall stock of human capital are held to be 
given exogenously, at some assumed rate.  In every sector, competitive firms are 
said to innovate in order to stay alive.  Price taking firms act rationally, and the 
rate of growth remains seamless.  In the absence of any “externalities”, 
competition therefore drives not just innovation, but also the efficient allocation 
of resources throughout the economy.  But following Arrow (1962), the neo-
classicals recognized that R&D had “positive externalities”.  Because technology 
was a non-rivalrous good (i.e. could be used and re-used by multiple agents in the 
economy), the argument was made that generalized industrial subsidy could 
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produce higher rates of growth; undifferentiated injections of capital for the 
purposes of R&D would produce returns above the rate at which the market 
would, by itself, generate.  This argument posed a significant challenge to neo-
classical theory and a rationale for state involvement, which the neo-classicals 
had roundly rejected. Indeed, outside of the perfection of property rights and 
generalized industrial subsidy, the neo-classical approach left policy-makers 
impotent to do anything in order to promote economic growth.  Moreover, the 
neo-classical take on technological change provided no plausible way to explain 
both the increased rate of innovation evident through the last two centuries, and 
the fact that both during and following WWII, much private innovation was 
clearly the result of spillover from often very directed state subsidy and research 
(military R&D factoring perhaps most prominently).  And then there was the 
obviously foolish assumption that innovation happened at a constant rate and 
that the generalized effects on the overall rate of productivity growth were equally 
constant (Fine 2000; Lipsey 2000). 
 In 1986, Romer (1986) and, shortly thereafter, Lucas (1988) provided the 
corrective to these problems by developing a model in which technological 
change was made endogenous, variable, and subject to manipulation (Lucas 
1988; Romer 1990).  Romer made these arguments based on two assertions: first, 
Arrow’s observation concerning the non-rivalrous and appropriable nature of 
knowledge was largely correct; and, second, the historically uneven rate of private 
investment in research and development suggested that the type, nature, and 
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speed of technological change happened because of prevailing economic 
conditions.  Romer further argued that the post-war experience was also directive 
in terms of how and under what conditions the rate of technological change could 
be optimized: First, NGT stresses the importance of perfecting property rights.  
But getting property rights perfect doesn’t mean, in the context of NGT, making 
them perfectly absolute: 
 If we give perfect property rights to inventors, we allow them to act as 
monopolists.  They will extract rents, slowing the diffusion of the 
knowledge of their inventions.  If we give no property rights, we maximize 
diffusion of existing inventions but provide little incentive for inventors to 
risk their time and money on discovering new applied knowledge. (Lipsey 
2000, 53)  
 
What generally follows is the contention that so-called “basic” or “curiousity-
driven” research needs to be both publicly funded, at least in part, and 
maintained within the public domain.  However, knowledge that builds upon 
what sits in public knowledge repositories should be readily appropriable.  It is in 
this context that calls for more public research to be oriented towards the 
production of readily “commercializable” research have emerged.  Such debates 
are also in large part the context within which champions of various Open Source 
and Open Access initiatives have emerged within surprisingly mainstream if not 
conservative places.  New forms of contract are now being used to set-up a 
domain of “public” knowledge that can subsequently be appropriated privately 
with only mild modifications.28   
                                                   
28 Drawing obviously from Karl Popper’s concept of “open science” the new “free culture” 
movement is finding allies in some unlikely places.  For instance, Sun Microsystems maintains a 
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 Second, since all firms use human capital, and since large stocks of human 
capital will, by virtue of the increasing returns and efficiencies it generates, in 
turn generate an overall public advantage, it too is to be produced within a 
publicly subsidized sphere (Lipsey 2000).  However, because human capital is 
human, and because humans are like mini-firms in that they are able to invest in 
and grow their individual stores of capital (rational agents), it only makes sense 
that human capital invest in itself (i.e. bears some portion of the cost of 
producing human capital). Finally, because different economies have different 
competitive advantages (i.e. are endowed in specific, but not all economic 
sectors), public subsidy should aim at re-producing and growing such advantages 
through specific and directed programs.  In other words, Ontario’s competitive 
advantage in the auto-sector should be exploited via public subsidy directed at 
producing more engineers, designers, machinists. Because every industrial sector 
can become knowledge intensive, it does not follow that historical advantages 
should be abandoned by seeking to build competitive advantages where none 
have existed historically, particularly not in the context of a global market based 
on “free trade”. (Fine 2000; Lipsey 2000) 
 This issue of comparative advantage is largely identical to the work of 
other New Keynesians, which highlighted the relevance of institutions in 
discussing informational asymmetries and the imperfect nature of competition in 
                                                   
massive infrastructure for “open source” software initiatives, many of which have been 
fundamental to the development of “downstream” and patentable technologies.   
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“real-lived” markets.  Within the NGT, subsidy is necessarily targeted, like all 
government policy, so as to make up for the historical particularities and 
deficiencies of markets. In this way, scholars have sought to extend NGT by 
focusing on any and every “causative variable” that would undermine the 
virtuous circle of economic growth as Romer envisioned it.  This has meant a 
kind of theoretical intensification by extension.  Without surrendering a focus on 
the need to subsidize both “innovation”, as it is referred to in the hegemonic 
parlance, and “human capital formation”, the NGT has been prodded and pressed 
into every nook and cranny of the social sciences, for any “institution” at all can – 
and often is – held up as the key to unleashing human – and thereby – economic 
potential. (Fine and Milonakis 2009) 
 In sectors, like higher education, where the state already played a 
significant role, NGT emerged as a kind of theoretical saviour. NGT allowed those 
agencies of the state that were involved in the management and funding of higher 
education to speak the lingua franca of the neoliberal state and make demands 
for additional funding.  The same was true for other players within the sector, 
particularly the universities themselves.  In fact, NGT advanced the cause of the 
universities both in terms of their role as “producers” of human capital, but also, 
and just as crucially, as producers of new “knowledge”, which has also played a 
central role in economic growth according to NGT.29   
                                                   
29 A primary example of this is (Rubenson et al. 2000) 
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2.3.2 The New Social Sciences 
 In so far as NGT now functions very centrally in neo-liberal policy, the 
paradigm is, as was mentioned at the outset, more theoretically extensive than 
either HCT or NGT, than neo-Keynesian and neo-institutional revisions of neo-
classical economics.  Indeed, though Romer, Lucas, and the army of economists 
that have followed behind them opened the door to a kind of context-specific 
multi-variate analysis, the neo-liberal paradigm has also drawn significantly from 
comparative politics where neo-institutionalist thinkers, often in relation to NGT, 
had, by the mid-1990’s, begun to present a relatively more nuanced and 
sophisticated picture of the capitalist state, also grounded in neo-weberian ideal 
types, than had their more economically oriented counterparts.  In other words, 
the “varieties of capitalism” literature provided the neoliberals with a means by 
which to distinguish between different national contexts in a manner that was 
usefully circumscribed.  Although NGT and HCT had already evolved to the point 
where the managerial capacity of the state was recognized and stressed, it was 
still missing a means by which to avoid the kind of endless particularisms that 
would make the development of a transposable policy program possible. The 
categorization of different “capitalisms” was indispensable.  Without too much 
effort or theoretical hand-wringing, generic policy could be fit into seemingly 
well-tailored programs (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
 At the most general level, the work of neo-institutional comparativists 
argues that nationally rooted economic structures/institutions effect and contain 
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a distinct program of accumulation – “economic growth” and “development” in 
the language used in the literature.  Each nationally rooted development program 
is in turn compared to an essentialized and idealized model of capitalist 
accumulation.  On this basis policy can then be directed to facilitating a 
convergence between national reality and ideal type.  The ideal-types used in this 
frame have indelible overtones of Parsonian structural-functionalism in that the 
variables identified as causative of economic growth within the idealizations used 
are seen to be mutually reinforcing and constitutive.  Though scholars working 
within the VOC frame have recently outlined a slightly more extensive list of 
different varieties of capitalism, they have traditionally distinguished between 
only two: Liberal Market Economies (LME’s) and Coordinated Market 
Economies (CME’s).  The former is said to be exemplary of Anglo-American 
capitalism and the latter exemplary of German and Scandinavian capitalism.  
Within both LME’s and CME’s institutions are said to be “path dependent” to 
have an “historical trajectory”.  In other words, national economies and 
institutional structures are held to have a kind of temporal weight, wherein 
institutions are structured and then restructured only occasionally, even though 
the social formations underneath and above them are often acknowledged to 
have changed substantially.  As such, path-dependency in the 
institutionalist/models frame functions to provide a kind of theoretical distance, 
a closed political economic system, within which things such as firm behaviour 
and social activity can be readily explained as an ongoing response to dominant 
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institutional structures or as responses to wholly “exogenous” variables, the 
sources of which are seldom identified.  Path dependency, therefore, operates as 
the theoretical basis upon which all other variables are thought to depend, 
creating a recursive form of analysis within which the roots of institutional 
change are always either among the list of variables identified as significant to the 
creation of path dependence in the first instance, or are understood as 
“exogenous” variables, interminably outside the analytic frame. (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Kitschelt 1999)  
 The last theoretical element of neo-liberalism is drawn from the domain of 
American sociology: social capital.  Contemporary theorizations of social capital 
have roots that are in reality not so distinct from those of neo-institutionalism in 
so far as it too is a theoretical extension of Weber and Parsonian structural 
functionalism again pitched at the level of the individual.  This time, however, 
Durkheimian and Tocquevillian sociology are also thrown into the mix.  Social 
capital first emerged with the work of Marxian sociologist Pierre Bourdieu 
(Bourdieu 1986).  However, the entire thrust of Bourdieu’s arguments have been 
all but lost in more recent theorizations.  Contra Bourdieu’s theorization of social 
capital as a fungible form of capital in turn understood as accumulated labour, 
American sociologists starting with the work of James Coleman (1988) have 
presented a cleansed theorization within which, as Alejandro Portes has noted, 
the distinction between the resources obtained through the use of ‘social capital’ 
and the accumulation of social capital itself is completely obscured (Portes 
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2000).  In other words, mainstream theorizations maintain in rather circular 
fashion that the presence of social structures that help to (re)create a kind of civic 
mindedness and community sees certain political territories (always defined 
relative to the state, which is set apart from world order) succeed where others, 
lacking the presence of both such structures and accordant civic mindedness, fail.  
From where such social structures come and how they translate into “good” (i.e. 
democratic, egalitarian etc.) forms of civic mindedness/social capital is, in the 
end, something of an open question which is only infrequently addressed.   
Instead, this persistent inability to see the historical development and roots of 
social structures and the significance of capitalism as the defining contextual 
element of those structures is recreated by scholars who, following Coleman, look 
to find only more historically proximate structures that might have plausibly 
conditioned individuals to act in particular ways. In would appear that the desire 
to preserve and extend methodological individualism obscures the need to 
outline a theoretically and historically consistent narrative. (Portes 2000)    
 Most exemplary of more recent work in the frame of Coleman, is that of 
Robert Putnam (1993; 1996), whose comparison of Italian regions and essay on 
the decline of ‘associational ties’ in the US has been influential of a massive host 
of American social scientists, not to mention the OECD and the World Bank.30  In 
                                                   
30 Though less obviously an endeavor to extend methodological individualism than is 
Coleman’s work, Putnam’s various studies generally rely upon models of individual choice under 
certain conditions, and are therefore clearly in the same vein.  This is exemplified in his work on 
education with economist John Helliwell (see Helliwell and Putnam 1999). 
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general, social capital within this frame is defined as a kind of aggregate ‘civic 
mindedness’, and therein as a set of norms and conventions within society at 
large that in turn impel individuals to work cooperatively so as to achieve more 
just and socially beneficial ends (Putnam 1996).  Again, though such analyses are 
always rooted in some important historical moment from which all subsequent 
forms of civic mindedness flows, there is never a clear indication of why it is that 
the historical moment chosen is most reasonably cited as generative of what 
follows.  For example, in his work on Italy, Putnam argues that the development 
of Norman feudalism in the South and of Republican communalism in the North, 
both during the middle ages, set both regions upon a path dependent trajectory 
wherein the North became rich in social capital and subsequently in 
governmental capacity and civic solidarity, while the South became mired in a 
kind of civic mistrust that continues to hamper efforts intended to create civic 
solidarity and governmental effectiveness. (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993)   
 On education, Putnam has written with noted Canadian economist and 
former president of the Canadian Economics Association, John Helliwell.  In that 
work, plainly called, “Education and Social Capital”, Helliwell and Putnam find a 
positive, if mild, correlation between levels of education and community 
involvement, political participation, and trust, albeit outside of unions, church 
groups, and farm organizations, which are held to be forms of political 
engagement in which only the uneducated participate.  Interestingly, this 
negative correlation between union membership and education is explained also 
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as a by-product of education: “…with lower average education providing the 
greater critical mass needed for successful working-class organization (Helliwell 
and Putnam 1999, 12),” union membership has fallen off with rising levels of 
participation and completion of post-secondary education.  The upshot here is 
that for theorists of social capital, participation and completion rates relate not 
only to economic well-being, but to variables that are essentially extra-economic.  
Participation and completion rates, in other words, are linked not to increasing 
tuition-fees, but to the absence of good information about the benefits of higher 
education, an issue that itself stems from the absence of adequate stores of social 
capital in certain segments of a population.  Coupled with rate of return analyses 
this, therefore, has been at the core of a plethora of initiatives taken at both the 
national and international level to focus on “basic education”.  Indeed, ‘basic 
education’ becomes the key to transmitting awareness which is foundational is 
having children from low-income backgrounds begin to look forward to tertiary 
levels of education.31   
 In summary then, neo-liberal education policy is born of an amalgam of 
neo-classical, neo-liberal, neo-institutional, and neo-weberian elements drawn 
variously from the domains of economics, sociology, and political science.  
Underlying this rather mixed theoretical bag are commitments to private 
property, free trade, economic growth and, more fundamentally, to 
                                                   
31 This is clearly part of Rae’s message in his report on higher education in Ontario 
(2005).  During the consultations that presaged the release of the final report, Rae also released a 
consultation paper in which he highlighted such research: (Looker 2002). 
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methodological individualism.  This marriage of theoretical eclecticism, on the 
one hand, and methodological and epistemological myopia on the other hand 
translates into a policy paradigm that is both extensive and convergent, without 
necessarily appearing as such. The precepts and principles of neoliberalism are 
carried forward via analyses that are putatively “sociological”, or “historical”, but 
which are, in actual fact, but so many neo-classical economic neologisms.    
2.4 Quality Assessment in the context of Neoliberal Theory 
and Policy 
 As I outlined in the introduction to this dissertation, it is simply not 
possible to understand the current state of the academy without considering the 
role played by QA in the creation and re-production or the current state of affairs. 
Simply, QA has been the basis upon which governments have leveraged funding 
in order to press colleges and universities into particular forms of research and 
modes of instruction.  As such, QA has been an instrument of restructuring. 
Before outlining the theory underlying QA and how even the most “radical” of the 
mainstream approaches to QA have acted in the manner just described, it is first 
necessary to outline something of the condition of the science base – both social 
and natural – throughout the developed world. 
 Recall, the assertions made at the outset of this chapter related to the 
degree to which government policy reflected an underlying commitment to 
neoclassical and new classical theory and thereby to the dominant models 
advocated by the mainstream of economics and the social sciences.  It should 
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come as little of a surprise then, that the literature on QA, which is a subset of 
CIHE, is ambiguous: QA is described as both curse and cure, and there is no 
discussion of epistemological or ontological underpinnings.  This ambiguity 
makes it difficult to characterize the literature as such, or to easily hone in on and 
describe epistemological and methodological roots.  In fact, in reviewing the first 
fifteen years of the INQAAHE’s journal, Quality in Higher Education, Lee Harvey 
and James Williams - the journal’s editors, and highly regarded experts in the 
field - manage only to categorize the some 320 articles published since 1995 into 
one of 17 topical categories, many of which they then subdivide further (Harvey 
and Williams 2010a; Harvey and Williams 2010b).  The review is also troubling 
in that it is largely constructed from article abstracts, which they re-print without 
attribution and then subject to the aforementioned categorization. Outside of 
sometimes re-phrasing the conclusions of some of the journal’s articles, Harvey 
and Williams, offer only this pithy insight:  
 So what has quality assurance done for us? The review suggests that it has 
resulted in clear documentation and transparency, although external 
processes could be better aligned to everyday academic activity. Internal 
processes are still developing and the link between external processes, 
internal processes and improvements in teaching and learning seem to be 
tenuous and patchy. What is remarkable is the internationalisation of 
quality assurance and the standardisation of procedures, even though they 
leave a lot to be desired. Attempts to push a consumerist approach to 
higher education have met with indifference and while there are increasing 
social demands being placed on higher education there remains a strong 
commitment to autonomy, independence and academic freedom, which 
quality assurance procedures sometimes rub up against. It has been 15 
years with lots of enthusiasm and ideas, as exemplified in the articles in 
Quality in Higher Education, but also 15 years of inertia and compliant 
indifference among a substantial section of the academic and 
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administrative community. It begs the question: could the quality of 
higher education have been enhanced more efficiently and effectively 
without elaborate quality assurance systems? (L. Harvey and Williams 
2010b, 107) 
 
 At a level of abstraction somewhat higher than that used by Harvey and 
Williams in their categorization, one finds within the QA literature there is a 
tendency to focus on two issues: 1) the fact that an apparent diversity of different 
definitions of and opinions about quality entails a basic challenge to any QA 
system; and, 2) the mechanics of measurement (i.e. discussion of the processes 
and policies needed to support an effective system of QA).  The two issues are 
obviously related.  How one measures and provides for quality depends 
fundamentally on how it is defined and what one seeks to assure through the use 
of such a definition.  Because it is generally accepted in the literature that there 
are different – and equally legitimate - definitions of quality, the literature tends 
to deal with both issues in one fell swoop, and in one of two ways: 1) by 
discussing the utility of different (but equal?) evaluative/assurance 
systems/mechanisms for different segments of the “productive process” (i.e. one 
system for the assessment of “basic or curiosity driven research”, and another for 
“practical and applied research”, or different forms of assessment for different 
kinds of taught courses); or, 2) by distinguishing between different assessment 
methodologies (accountability; improvement; total quality management; 
continuous improvement), the way in which each methodology reflects a different 
definition of quality, and how such assessment methodologies may be folded into 
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an overarching system of QA.  Here one sees the logic in Harvey’s and William’s 
categorization: by dividing the literature by topic Harvey and Williams highlight 
the tendency of scholars working in the area to focus on different segments of one 
or multiple QA systems, and/or different stakeholders, again within one or 
several different QA systems; some work discusses QA systems that are internal 
(Coyle 2003; Horsburgh 1999; Meade 1995), while other focuses on those that 
are external (Middlehurst and Woodhouse 1995; Thune 1996; Danø and 
Stensaker 2007; Leeuw 2002); some work discuses audits (Dill 2000; Cheng 
2009), while other work discusses accreditation programs (Haakstad 2001; 
Westerheijden 2001; Faber and Huisman 2003; Scheele 2004); there are 
analyses that look at how transnational programs are to be evaluated and 
assessed (Craft 2004; Walker 1999; Dixon and Scott 2003), and those that look at 
how national systems have evolved (Franke 2002; Tomusk 2000; Szanto 2004); 
some work focuses on teaching and learning(Douglas and Douglas 2006; 
McMillan and Parker 2005; Lomas and Nicholls 2005), and other work which 
discusses the validity and reliability of student feedback questionnaires (Bean 
2005; Popli 2005), and so on ad infinitum.32 
 In sum then, we may say that with the exception of a few articles which are 
absolutely critical of QA (discussed below), Harvey’s and William’s “review” and 
categorization suggests that which a more detailed examination of the literature 
                                                   
32 For this reason, the present examination of the QA literature is conducted at a high 
level of analysis; it is neither possible within a reasonable amount of space, nor particularly useful 
to examine the minutiae of this literature. 
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reveals: it is focused firmly on providing “mid-” or “meso-level” analyses of 
different and apparently discrete areas of QA, and therein on the development of 
mechanisms that can aid in the assessment of quality, variously defined.  
Whether or not QA may be reproductive of a particular kind of logic or program 
of capital accumulation is simply not addressed, even if some articles do 
recognize that the pressures to develop QA have emerged since the 1980’s and in 
the context of Reagan(ism) and Thatcher(ism).33  
 On the other hand, many mainstream analyses do begin by acknowledging 
that governmental drives for efficiency may potentially jeopardize quality (R. 
Brown 2004; Franke 2002).  Also, scholars frequently highlight the difficultly 
associated with finding the operative definition of quality, given what is claimed 
to be a diversity of equally legitimate opinions about what constitutes that 
apparently ineffable thing.34   Thus, the literature is undergirded by a kind of 
liberal pluralism that is not so easily described as neoliberal.  Because there is no 
obvious assumption that market based definitions of quality are applicable to 
                                                   
33 See for example, Roger Brown’s (2004) book on the subject, as well as that of Diane 
Green (D. M. Green 1994) 
34 For example, William Stubbs, the former Chief Executive of the PCFC and the FEFC, in his essay, “Quality 
in Higher Education: A Funding Council Perspective,” ends his piece with this quote, which he borrows from 
Philip Reynolds, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Lancaster: 
To the committed scholar the quality of higher education is likely to be determined by its ability to 
produce a steady flow of people with high intelligence and commitment to learning who will 
continue the process of transmission and advancement of knowledge.  To a Secretary of State a high 
quality system may be one that produces trained scientists, engineers, architects, doctors and so on 
in numbers judged to be required by society.  To an industrialist in the British tradition a high 
quality educational institution may be one that turns out graduates with wide-ranging, flexible 
minds, readily able to acquire skills and adapt to new methods and needs.  The measurements 
required, and thus the standards to be applied will be different for each of these notions of 
quality.(Stubbs 1994, 26) 
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higher education, not an outright rejection of that logic either, the literature on 
QA appears “non-ideological”.  Indeed, the QA literature tends to be equivocal:   
 Given the difficulties in defining quality in higher education, some have 
opted out of trying to find an underlying theory or definition. 
Vroeijenstigjn (1991) says ‘it is a waste of time to try to define quality’.  The 
basis of this argument is that quality is a relative concept, that different 
interest groups or ‘stakeholders’ in higher education have different 
priorities and their focus of attention may be different…It is not possible, 
therefore, to talk about quality as a unitary concept, quality must be 
defined in terms of qualities, with recognition that an institution may be of 
high quality in relation to one factor but low quality in relation to another.  
The best that can be achieved is to define as clearly as possible the criteria 
that each stakeholder uses when judging quality, and for these competing 
views to be taken into account when assessments of quality are 
undertaken.(D. M. Green 1994, 17) 
 
 Borrowing from Cox, the QA literature is perhaps best conceived of as a 
kind of “transmission belt”(Cox 1992): in standing between governmental and 
private sector drives for efficiency and an apparent plurality of opinions around 
what constitutes quality in higher education, mainstream scholarship attempts to 
provide a means by which to ensure both economy and quality, without 
collapsing one into the other. Of course, what this has meant is that the 
mainstream literature plays a kind of rear-guard action.  In the face of 
government pressures to turn higher education and research into 
‘commercializable’ products, the literature attempts to refine – and segment – 
the QA process and to thereby navigate between “accountability” and 
“improvement”.  The “fix” in other words, is always institutional/procedural.35  
                                                   
35 In discussing the mechanics of measurement, the literature has thus tended to focus on 
the development of such ‘nuanced’ approaches, as well as the way in which processes can 
themselves be subject to QA (who will assess the assessors, after-all?).  The literature hardly 
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 In this regard, it bears highlighting that the literature is totally unable to 
track or comment on the degree to which the global science base has been 
completely transformed under the aegis of neoliberal policy.  The re-direction of 
the science base away from basic and curiosity driven research and the accordant 
conflation of the public interest with private-sector led economic growth, have 
entailed a general convergence around what constitutes “quality” or, within that 
vessel, “fitness for purpose” or “excellence” or however one would like to label it.  
Moreover, neither students nor the academy have been immune to this 
transformation. As Bob Rae would have it, there is now a general acceptance that 
higher education, however much it might be a ‘value-in-itself’, is primarily a 
practical necessity euphemistically referred to as a form of ‘investment’.   
  The QA literature therefore is ultimately mimetic of the neoliberal tropes 
outlined above, albeit at a lower level of analysis.  The a-theoretical kind of 
institutionalism that makes-up the bulk of the mainstream literature, however 
pluralist its intent, is vacant notions of power, but not simply because it obviously 
advances a world-view within which causation is complex and indeterminate.  
The mainstream literature does not meaningfully discuss power because it simply 
                                                   
approaches this question sarcastically, however, for it sees in this question the issue of relevance 
and durability: processes of quality assessment must not only serve the diversity of interests to 
which the university apparently caters, but it must also be careful to assist in the production of 
meaningful results.   
95 
does not attempt to address the sources of stakeholder views on the elements of 
quality!36,37 
  
                                                   
36 In this way, it may also be said that the literature defines quality as a set of use-values, as defined 
by different stakeholders.  Accordingly, a QA system must be equipped to assess quality without focusing too 
narrowly on the exchange-values that different use-values might garner in the market. As such the question 
of resources is, apparently, set-aside; so long as systems of QA function to assess and assure the quality of 
different and sometimes competing use-values, we can avoid the tendency to rely exclusively or even 
primarily on assessments that conflate use-value with exchange value.  But this merely begs the question: are 
the humanities generally less excellent than the natural sciences? 
37 Some analyses even flirt with radical theory and therein with trenchant critiques of 
contemporary capitalism.  But even such “radical” scholarship seems most concerned with 
moderating the effects of what is described as flawed policy, generally through the 
implementation of QA processes based upon reflexive – and “locally owned” – efforts at quality 
improvement (i.e. institutional fixes).  As such, even the most critical of the mainstream literature 
ultimately proposes a solution that does not so much reject the logic of measurement, as it does 
seek to funnel it through a reflexive, democratic and dialectical framework that, we are told, 
would pay “transformational” dividends.  Indeed, the most radical tropes within the mainstream 
literature maintain that useful and effective mechanisms at QA can be established within the 
context of a neoliberal world order.  Where the proverbial rubber hits the road, however, is in the 
way such critical strands engage with the mainstream: in the attempt to consciously eschew and 
subvert neoliberal directives whilst at the same time “optimize” quality, we find simply another 
managerial strategy; rather than impose strict QA processes, the most radical proponents of QA 
seek to “steer not row”, and thereby to establish “grass roots buy-in” in the quest to build an 
enduring “quality culture”.   
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Chapter 3 - Assessing the Methods of Assessment  
 In this chapter I examine in turn all of the measures used to assess and 
evaluate quality in higher education.  The following sub-sections indicate my own 
efforts to distinguish between and categorize the various measures and 
assessment tools in use today.  In most of these sub-sections I have made some 
effort to examine all of the measures usefully slotted in each category.  However, 
in sub-sections where an exhaustive analysis would be too voluminous and 
redundant I have chosen to examine seminal examples of each category.  For 
those measures which I do not examine, I have referenced key sources and given 
a brief overview of key debates and which side(s) in those debates I believe to be 
the most convincing. In all, what I demonstrate again and again through each 
sub-section is the way in which contemporary efforts to assess quality enable the 
reproduction of the neo-liberal university and therein the production of labour-
power and forms of knowledge best suited for the contemporary advanced- 
and/or post-industrial economy.   
3.1 Quality as Returns to Investment in Higher Education 
 Although not generally a part of governmental or quasi-governmental QA 
programs, private sector rankings frequently make use of data on post-
graduation incomes as an indication of excellence and thus quality.  And many 
institutions, in many jurisdictions, do in fact compile and make public such data 
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on a routine basis.38  As well, virtually every recent governmental report on 
higher education attests to both the private and social returns on investment 
(ROI) realized through investment in higher education.  Indeed, even the OECD 
gets in on this action, most notably in its annual “Education at a Glance” series. 
The argument for the use of such data is simple enough: it demonstrates that 
investment in higher education makes sense, both for individuals and for 
governments (thus the “private” (read “individuals”) and “social” (read “public”) 
ROIs).  For present purposes, it is both the alleged ROI on higher education and 
the basis upon which that measure is calculated/derived, that are key.  The wage 
premium (and thus tax-revenue premium) generated by investment in higher 
education is generally said to indicate that one obtains something of qualitative 
value/significance through higher education.  The OECD, and many 
governments, generally parse this in terms of the so-called “knowledge based 
economy”, the emergence and evolution of which has allegedly involved an 
endless thirst for highly skilled individuals.   The OECD puts it succinctly: 
 Over the past decade across OECD countries, the percentage of adults who 
have attained higher education has grown at a rapid clip, from 22% in 
2000 to 31% in 2010. Yet despite this burgeoning supply of well-educated 
individuals – as well as the faltering market conditions from 2008 forward 
– most people with higher education have continued to reap very good 
economic benefits. This signals that, overall, the demand for highly-skilled 
employees to meet the needs of the knowledge economy in OECD 
countries has continued to grow, even during the crisis. (OECD 2012) 
 
                                                   
38 For example, the University of California at Berkeley compiles data on post-graduation 
incomes by program.  This data is available via their “Career Center” website at  
https://career.berkeley.edu/default.stm.  Program specific data is presented under the heading, 
“What can I do with a degree in…?”. 
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On the basis of this data the OECD subsequently reasons that higher education 
bestows upon individuals a level of skill necessary to succeed in the knowledge 
economy.  As the logic goes, because individuals who “invest” in higher education 
meet the continually expanding needs of the knowledge economy, they must be 
learning the requisite skills necessary to participate in that economy.  Therefore, 
the wage premium (ROI) that such smart “investors” realize reflects their 
qualitative advance (i.e. the acquisition of new skills).  In this way, the OECD - 
and governments everywhere - conflate knowledge and prices.  While this is a 
subject to which I will return in greater detail is the next chapter, it is important 
to note here that the significance of QA lies in this conflation.   It is therefore 
necessary to begin with the core of that conflation: the literature that attempts to 
describe and measure the ROI in higher education.  
 Measuring with any precision the ROI in higher education is a complicated 
affair. As with all ROI calculations, calculating the ROI on, for example, a 
bachelor’s degree must be done relative to all other forms of investment available 
(like a college rather than a university education) such that the economic value of 
any one kind of investment can be judged relative to the size of both the initial 
investment (i.e. tuition-fees, living expenses etc.), and also relative to the value, 
or potential value, of other alternative forms of “investment”.  Again, “value” is 
taken to mean some estimation of post-graduation income over some express 
period of time, generally the entirety of a person’s working life.  As such, the 
calculation of the ROI on higher education for use today is a matter of delivering 
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a reasonable projection of the “present future value” of that investment.39 In 
developing this kind of projection historical data, while potentially useful for 
comparative and historical analysis, are not necessarily so useful in calculating 
the “present future value” of investment in higher education.  And so, in order to 
understand the ROI on different forms of investment, analyses take historical 
data and make a series of assumptions around how and whether or not any 
discernable historical patterns will change over time.40 Within the mainstream, 
this involves first, the “explanation” (via a series of assumptions) of historical 
patterns. By putatively explaining the nature of historical patterns, mainstream 
analysts claim an ability to test theoretical nostrums, like those recounted above 
about the apparent utility of investment in higher education (by virtue of its 
transformative effects).  In other words, if the present future value of a university 
degree has historically been significant, mainstream scholars “explain” this 
significance as a by-product of a worker’s increased skill and of the markets 
unquenchable thirst for such workers; the wage premium is said to demonstrate, 
at least historically, the apparent validity of Say’s Law, at least with respect to the 
so-called “knowledge based economy”.  But as the quote from the OECD above 
                                                   
39 i.e. a 17 year-old deciding in 2013 between university and college needs to know how 
much they are likely to earn as a) a university graduate over the course of the rest of their lives; 
and, b) a college graduate over the course of the rest of their lives.  The present future value of a 
university degree is the difference between those two numbers. 
40 The historical spread is simply a by-product of cross tabulating data on average regular 
weekly earnings with levels of education attained, something which is either derived from census 
data (where both data are compiled), or through the use of industry survey data gathered by 
national statistical agencies, which also compiles both data-sets. At no point do such calculations 
constitute explanations.   
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suggests, this kind of explanation and proof (of Say’s Law) is in turn used as a 
justification for assuming that the present future value of a university degree will 
either hold constant or grow (i.e. given that the knowledge based economy has 
always soaked up highly skilled labour, we can assume, given our assumptions of 
how the knowledge based economy works, that the same pattern will continue ad 
infinitum).       
 One seminal example of how mainstream analysts calculate the present 
future value of investment in higher education is an award-winning paper 
produced under the umbrella of the Canadian Labour Market and Skills 
Researcher Network, “The Evolution of Returns to Human Capital in Canada: 
1980 -2006”.  In that paper, Boudarbat, Lemieux, and Riddell find that although 
other studies of the wage premium earned by university grads have found that 
the wage premium for university grads has been stable (or decreasing) since 
1980, their latest study indicates the opposite: the wage premium for university 
grads has accelerated since 1980 (Bourdarbat, Lemieux, and Riddell 2010).  On 
this basis, they then argue for additional, private, investment in higher education.  
Boudarbat et al attribute the difference between their findings and others to two 
things: 1) the use of mean over median income levels; and, 2) their decision to 
control for work experience.  In choosing to use mean income data instead of 
median data Bourdarbat et al note: 
 A potential problem with the use of the median is that it is relatively 
unaffected by increases in the returns to education that take place in the 
top part of the wage distribution. Since highly educated workers are 
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mainly located in the top half of the earnings distribution, this is a 
potentially important limitation of median-based measures. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that much of the growth in wage inequality during these 
two decades occurred in the very top of the earnings distribution (Saez and 
Veall, 2005). Such changes may have little effect on the median earnings 
of high and low educated workers. (Bourdarbat, Lemieux, and Riddell 
2010, 9) 
 
In fact, Bourdarbat et al are right in arguing that the use of “median-based 
measures” excludes the “top part of the wage distribution”.  Upon investigation, 
however, one finds that what is technically correct, is analytically dishonest, a 
manipulation necessary to prove an ideological position, but not a point of fact. 
Presumably, Bourdarbat et al recognize this fact.  In the Saez and Veall article 
that they reference, Saez and Veall (2005) note that the share of national income 
earned by the top percentile exploded in both Canada and the United States after 
around 1980.  Stunningly, the top 0.01% of the top percentile out-performed 
everyone else in terms of income growth.  More than this, Saez and Veall suggest 
that this outstanding performance had much more to do with changes to the tax 
code and to family background than to an individual’s level of education (Saez 
and Veall 2005).  By opting to include this portion of the population from their 
dataset Bourdarbat et al are able to paint a rosier picture of the private returns to 
education than has is in fact been the case for most “investors”. Because 
participation rates jumped through the 1980s and 1990s, this rosier revisioning is 
functional in that it proves the wisdom of investment in higher education even 
during a period when labour markets are increasingly chock-full of “skilled” 
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graduates.  Thus, Bourdarbat et al essentially apply Say’s Law to the calculation 
of the present future value of investment in higher education.41  
 In “controlling” for experience, Bourdarbat et al, attempt to “gild the lily” 
still further.  Because the rate of participation in post-secondary education has 
been increasing for some time, the income/wage gap between older un-educated 
workers (with a high school diploma) and those with a baccalaureate degree, is 
said to be smaller than Bourdarbat et al assume they will become.  In other 
words, given high-levels of participation in higher education, they assume that as 
the population ages, relatively less educated, but more experienced, older 
workers will be replaced by increasingly experienced and more educated workers 
at the top and then the middle rungs of the labour market.  Therefore, the wage 
premium will increase as more and more jobs are closed off to less educated 
workers (i.e. less educated workers will be ghettoized).  In theory, and possibly 
even in reality, this stands to reason.  The BA is arguably becoming a requisite for 
most jobs.  But this hardly says anything about the degree to which a BA confers 
skill, knowledge or ability.  Instead, the fact that employers are increasingly apt to 
require an undergraduate degree, more straightforwardly reflects what is today 
socially necessary to access the average wage.42     
                                                   
41 In the US, where the growth of inequality has been more pronounced than in Canada, 
the use of median over mean data would make the apparent ROI to higher education appear even 
more appealing than in Canada).        
42 It may well be that graduates do obtain significant skills and knowledge while at 
university.  It is not clear, however, that a more rigorous curriculum at the secondary school level 
could not impart the same level of skill, or that it did not, once upon a time, do so.  Regardless, 
the point is that employers’ decision to replace less educated and retiring workers with more 
educated workers, and to set entrance requirements at a higher level does not indicate anything 
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 All this belies the degree to which the calculation of both the private and 
social ROI is more a political calculation than anything else.43, 44  In all three of 
the jurisdictions under investigation, average wages have remained largely stable 
since at least 1980, if not well before then (Sharpe, Arsenault, and Harrison 
2008).  Meanwhile, productivity growth rates have been impressive, again in 
each of the three jurisdictions under investigation (Sharpe, Arsenault, and 
Harrison 2008).  This would indicate that workers – including those more highly 
educated ones – have not enjoyed the rewards of such productivity increases as 
much as has capital.  This is borne out in multiple measures, including the 
relative shares of labour and capital of value added.  Whatever is the 
transformative value of higher education, it has not been the generalization of 
                                                   
very vigorous about the qualitative advances that students/workers make/obtain in attending 
college or university. Even if survey data indicates that employers are more satisfied with more 
highly educated employees, we would still have pause to ask questions about the skills and 
knowledge gained through a university education; to say anything conclusive about what one 
learns, we would need to examine the nature of “knowledge work”, rates of literacy, and the like.  I 
consider these things immediately. 
43 The difference, or spread, in wages between those who have a university degree and 
those that do not is said to be the current “wage premium”; the total lifetime gap, less associated 
expenses, is the overall premium, or private ROI today; and, the social ROI is a calculation of both 
the increased tax revenues generated by high-income earners (i.e. university grads) alongside 
some approximation of the relative costs associated with the provision/use of government 
services, given that better educated people have tended to use relatively fewer such services.    
44 Historically, the wage premium may have reflected the relative availability of university 
grads, not their relative abilities.  Overtime, and as a larger portion of the population has come to 
participate in higher education, employers may have simply begin using a degree or a diploma as 
a way of narrowing down the pool of applicants, given a relatively large standing reserve army of 
labour.  Also, in becoming a requisite for most forms of employment, the wage premium paid to 
university graduates may reflect the ghettoization of less educated workers, rather than an overall 
improvement in the prosperity of the average worker.  This might also explain the relative health 
of university graduates, whose jobs in the burgeoning services sector may be less taxing and toxic 
than those available to less educated individuals.  Of course, such possibilities are never raised in 
the mainstream literature.  Instead, the transformative effect of higher education (i.e. its quality”) 
is said to bestow on individuals the advantages necessary to earn the wage premium.   
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greater prosperity.  This does not mean that a higher education is not of great 
economic value.  There is unquestionably a wage premium paid to/earned by 
university graduates, and for many - though by no means all - this premium is 
decidedly larger than the investments made (OECD 2012).  None of this says 
anything about “quality”, however, unless we assume, as is done within the 
mainstream literature, that the premium earned (i.e. access to the average wage), 
is made accessible by virtue of an individual’s participation in higher education.  
Is there a demonstrable connection between the skills one learns at university 
and the types of jobs available in the “New”, “knowledge based” economy?   
3.2: Direct measures of literacy, knowledge, and other 
aptitudes  
3.2.1 Testing Literacy 
 While there has been heated debate over the utility of standardized tests 
such as the SAT and the GRE, which are said to directly measure literacy as well 
as other aptitudes such as problem-solving ability45, this section is focused more 
                                                   
45 Criticism of standardized tests such as the Graduate Record Exam (the GRE) have 
tended to focus on three sets of issues: 1) the degree to which such tests are ‘in-direct’ and therein 
no more useful or insightful than grades ; 2) the degree to which such rely upon mainstream 
social and cultural norms, making it difficult for individuals from certain groups to score high 
even despite high levels of proficiency; and, 3) the fact that direct measures tend to assess 
students relative to low and minimum standards, and as a result indicate nothing very meaningful 
about general levels of literacy, numeracy, problem solving ability and the like. To the extent that 
the mainstream has considered these criticisms, little has been done to meaningfully address 
them; the private corporations that write and administer many of the most commonly used forms 
of standardized tests have gone to great pains to demonstrate the utility of their tests, to create 
more gender and class neutral questions, and to build some consensus around the idea that they 
are in fact useful, at least in so far as they are said to accurately predict future performance.  But 
these efforts have been rather superficial and ultimately meaningless, save as evidence of the 
degree to which corporate interests can be productive of bad science. (see for instance Nairn 
1980; Lehman 1999; Sacks 1997; Radhika 2006; Sacks 1999) 
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myopically on the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) and its 
descendants, the Adult Literacy and Life skills Survey (ALL), and more recently 
the Programme for International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC).  
Though both of these tests have become important in public policy debates, 
arguably more so than other such direct tests, they have not been subject to very 
much, if any, critical analysis.  Upon examination, what we find is that the IALS 
and the ALL, are only useful in so far as they function to recreate capital through 
the development of a standard form of literacy that is both functional to capitalist 
production and to which individuals, schools, and entire jurisdictions can be held 
to account.46 The IALS was first piloted in 1994, ostensibly by the OECD and 
Statistics Canada in conjunction with eight other member countries (Germany, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US). 
However, and as with the subsequent tests, the management of the process – and 
much of the research published in the subject of the surveys, has been performed 
by the Educational Testing Service (ETS), a not-for-profit testing juggernaut 
owned by specific institutions and interests in America’s higher education sector 
(discussed in Chapter 5). The first survey (IALS), like every subsequent one, 
sought to measure levels of adult literacy relative to levels of economic and social 
success such that the international community could develop a clearer picture of 
                                                   
46 The “form of literacy” to which I am referring here, and which I elucidate immediately, 
is what a representative of the OECD during a presentation on the IALS, described as, “road-sign 
literacy”, that is an ability to read and follow directions.  I would submit that were the dominant 
form of literacy able to impart an ability to dissect and understand the capitalist mode of 
production, the future of capitalism would be in most immediate jeopardy. 
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the degree to which literacy functions as a key causative variable in improving a 
person’s life chances.  In so far as the surveys have sought to complicate 
definitions of literacy by distinguishing different constituent elements/skills and 
thus levels of literacy, they were intended to “permit policy makers…to 
concentrate resources in areas that may be amenable to intervention by 
individuals, employers and governments (Statistics Canada 1997).” Ultimately, 
and more plainly, the surveys measure the degree to which economic and social 
success can be correlated with an individual’s ability to perform specific types of 
tasks so as to offer policy-makers insight into which areas governments needed to 
focus energy and resources.47 Though the definition of literacy has expanded over 
time, the IALS identified seven “domains” of literacy: 1) prose literacy; 2) 
document literacy; 3) numeracy; 4) problem solving; 5) practical cognition; 6) 
teamwork; 7) information and communication technology. For practical reasons 
the IALS, ultimately measured only the first three areas, which were defined in 
the following way: 
 Prose Literacy: The knowledge and skills needed to perform prose tasks, 
that is, to search, comprehend, and use information from continuous texts. 
Prose examples include editorials, news stories, brochures, and 
instructional materials. 
 
                                                   
47 According to the OECD, “…previous studies treated literacy as a condition that adults 
either have or do not have. The IALS no longer defines literacy in terms of an arbitrary standard 
of reading performance, distinguishing the few who completely fail the test (the "illiterates") from 
nearly all those growing up in OECD countries who reach a minimum threshold (those who are 
"literate"). Rather, proficiency levels along a continuum denote how well adults use information 
to function in society and the economy. Thus, literacy is defined as a particular capacity and mode 
of behaviour: the ability to understand and employ printed information in daily activities, at 
home, at work and in the community - to achieve one's goals, and to develop one's knowledge and 
potential. (OECD and Statistics Canada 2000, x) 
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 Document Literacy: The knowledge and skills needed to perform 
document tasks, that is, to search, comprehend, and use information from 
noncontinuous texts in various formats. Document examples include job 
applications, payroll forms, transportation schedules, maps, tables, and 
drug or food labels. 
 
 Quantitative Literacy: The knowledge and skills required to perform 
quantitative literacy tasks, that is, to identify and perform computations, 
either alone or sequentially, using numbers embedded in printed 
materials. Quantitative examples include balancing a checkbook, figuring 
out a tip, completing an order form, or determining the amount of interest 
on a loan from an advertisement. (OECD and Statistics Canada 2000, x) 
 
The IALS scored participants on a 500 point scale and total scores were in turn 
translated to a 5 point scale, where each point is associated with some gross or 
aggregate level of skill and/or competency in the three areas just described.  The 
first level, obtained by anyone scoring between 0 and 225 points on the IALS is 
associated with an extremely low level of skill/competence and thus functional 
illiteracy.  Level five, at the other extreme, denotes a level of skill/competence 
defined as a, “… command of higher-order information processing skills.” (OECD 
and Statistics Canada 2000, xi).  
 Subsequently, the IALS was administered in 1996 and 1998, each time in a 
different set of member states.  Ultimately 22 states participated in the IALS and 
with such success that the OECD, again in conjunction with several member 
states revised and updated the IALS with the aim of extending and improving the 
survey.  In 2002, six states (Bermuda, Canada, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, and 
the United States) participated in a beefed up IALS, this time labeled the, “Adult 
Literacy and Life Skills Survey” or “ALL”. In addition to the three domains of 
108 
literacy just described the ALL added a fourth problem solving domain, which 
was defined as follows:  
 Problem solving involves goal-directed thinking and action in situations 
for which no routine solution procedure is available. The problem solver 
has a more or less well defined goal, but does not immediately know how 
to reach it. The incongruence of goals and admissible operators constitutes 
a problem. The understanding of the problem situation and its step-by-
step transformation, based on planning and reasoning, constitute the 
process of problem solving. (Statistics Canada and OECD 2005, 16) 
 
The PIAAC, which will report on literacy levels in the OECD’s 33 member states 
in late 2013, thereby massively increasing the scope of either the IALS or the 
ALL, is based upon identical definitions and premises.  The primary objectives in 
performing such a massive survey are decidedly clearer, however: 
Data from the Survey of Adult Skills will allow investigation of the links 
between key information-processing skills and a range of variables, 
constituting a rich evidence base for policy-relevant analysis. In particular, 
data from this survey will facilitate a better understanding of: 
 
•Performance of education and training systems 
•The extent and dimensions of illiteracy and poor literacy 
•Gaps between labour markets and education and training 
•Equity levels in access to education and intergenerational mobility 
•Young people’s transition from education to work 
•Identification of at-risk populations 
•Links between key cognitive skills and variables, such as demographics, 
educational background, health, etc. (OECD 2013) 
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3.2.2 Results: Literacy in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 
States 
 Since the mid-1990s, the results of first the IALS and subsequently of the 
ALL have been parsed in myriad ways and published under rather telling titles: 
“Literacy, Economy and Society: Results of the First International Adult Literacy 
Survey (OECD and Statistics Canada 1995)”;  “The Value of Words: Literacy and 
Economic Security in Canada (Statistics Canada 1998a)” ; “Literacy Utilization in 
Canadian Workplaces (Statistics Canada 1998b)”; “Schooling, Literacy and 
Individual Earnings (Statistics Canada 2000)” ; “Learning a Living: First Results 
of the Adult Literacy and Life Skills Survey (Statistics Canada and OECD 
2005)”.48   As tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 make clear the results, viewed comparatively 
suggest broadly similar levels of literacy in each of the three jurisdictions under 
investigation in this dissertation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
48 Reports that were less directly concerned with the intersection of economic success and 
literacy were also put-out. 
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Table 2. 149 
 
Table 2. 2 
 
  
 
                                                   
49 All data were taken from OECD and Statistics Canada, ODESI database on IALS study 
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Table 2. 3 
 
Comparative data between the IALS and the ALL, though available, was not used 
here because the format in which it was reported changed, thereby making it 
impossible to reproduce a percentage frequency distribution as above.  
Nonetheless, the OECD and Statistics Canada report on the results of the ALL, 
the aforementioned, “Learning a Living” report (Statistics Canada and OECD 
2005) note a lower level of “inequality”, which, as the quotation below indicates, 
means that during the emergence and maturation of the neoliberal university, 
literacy scores amongst university graduates and the general population have 
tended to group around the middle: 
 The results also show that in a few countries or regions the performance of 
the top five per cent is somewhat lower in ALL than in IALS. The 95th 
percentile scores are significantly lower in Canada (-10 points), Italian 
speaking Switzerland (-16 points) and the United States (-23 points) on 
the prose scale; and Canada (-18 points), French speaking Switzerland (-9 
points), Italian speaking Switzerland (-14 points) and the United States (-
15 points) on the document scale… Moreover, improvements in 
performance at the lower end and reductions at the upper ends of 
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distributions imply less inequality in the distribution of prose and 
document skills. Reductions in the range of scores from the 5th to the 95th 
percentiles are substantial in all countries and regions, except in Norway, 
which already had a low level of inequality in 1998.(Statistics Canada and 
OECD 2005, 39) 
 
The American Institutes for Research also conducted a more focused study of 
university graduates, though only in the United States.  With money from the 
Pew Charitable Trusts, which also funded the National Survey of Student 
Engagement (NSSE – discussed below), the American Institutes for Research 
conducted and released its National Survey of America’s College Students, which 
openly built upon the IALS and the ALL, thereby affirming the latter’s place as 
the standard of literacy assessment in the world.  The results of that study 
confirmed what is set out above in terms of the distribution of scores.  More 
interestingly, the results of that study also tested the relationship between 
literacy scores and certain measures of “student engagement” (discussed below), 
and found that, in a statistically relevant number of cases, more engaged students 
under-performed relative to their less engaged counterparts (American Institutes 
for Research et al. 2006, 50).  Although this was not always the case (in some 
instances, more engaged students did better), what is perhaps even more telling 
as to the overall level of literacy amongst university and college graduates is that 
mean scores never topped 350 on the same 500 point scale used in the IALS!  
3.2.3 Literacy and Value 
 Given the level of literacy at which most university graduates are able to 
operate in each of the three jurisdictions under investigation it is useful to 
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consider the nature of the IALS and the ALL in more detail.  The ALL, like its 
precursor, does purport to see literacy as key to both ‘economic and social 
success’, but it does not, again like the IALS, indicate in any terrific detail what 
defines such success.  Drawing from the OECD’s “DeSeCo project”50, which 
revolved around the development and definition of literacy scales, the OECD and 
Statistics Canada indicate that literacy will help individuals to function in a 
society described by a respect for human rights, environmental sustainability; 
equality; productivity; and social cohesion.  Little if anything further is said on 
these issues in any of the OECD or Statistics Canada reports related to the IALS 
or the ALL, and the idea that literacy is fundamental to democracy does not 
receive mention anywhere.  In fact, the report overtly supports the idea of, “a 
                                                   
50 The “Definition and Selection of Competencies (DeSeCo)” project, was an extensive 
effort undertaken by the OECD and some leading member states to build consensus and support 
for the newest version of the IALS.  Accordingly the DeSeCo project, “was carried out under the 
leadership of Switzerland and linked to PISA, brought together experts in a wide range of 
disciplines to work with stakeholders and policy analysts to produce a policy-relevant framework. 
Individual OECD countries were able to contribute their own views to inform the process. The 
project acknowledged diversity in values and priorities across countries and cultures, yet also 
identified universal challenges of the global economy and culture, as well as common values that 
inform the selection of the most important competencies.” These ‘universal challenges’ are 
outlined first as strictly economic: the need to boost productivity and market competitiveness; the 
challenge of developing an adaptive and qualified labor force; and the challenge of being 
innovative in the midst of an intensely competitive global market.  Immediately thereafter there is 
some consideration other challenges “outside the domain of economics and work”: challenges of 
democratic participation of social cohesion and justice; and of increasing global inequality of 
opportunities and increasing individual marginalization.  There is, however, no consideration 
how the development of competencies in respect of one set of challenges – the economic – might 
be inimical to the other set of challenges – the non-economic.  This is in fact the central position 
articulated in this chapter. See 
http://www.oecd.org/document/17/0,3343,en_2649_39263238_2669073_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
and the link available on that page to the executive summary of the report that resulted from the 
Project.         
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demand-oriented approach to competence” (and thus to literacy), which it 
subsequently goes on to define as,  
the ability to successfully meet complex demands in a particular context 
through the mobilization of knowledge, cognitive skills, but also practice 
skills, as well as social and behaviour components such as attitudes, 
emotions, and values and motivations (Murray et al. 2005, 36).   
 
Even a cursory examination of the test, however, reveals that the survey only tests 
participants’ “functional literacy” in a single context, that of contemporary 
capitalism and the modern corporation.  Indeed, the questions asked on the 
survey collectively indicate that “success” is defined as an ability to navigate the 
market, both as a consumer and as a worker. The degree to which literacy is a 
constituent part of democracy and civic participation is never measured. The 
examples listed below of actual survey questions are drawn from a statistics 
Canada report that describes the questions as the hardest ones found on the ALL 
in each of the three primary categories mentioned above.  As concerns prose 
literacy, the OECD and Statistics Canada report details that the hardest question, 
…directs the reader to use the information from a pamphlet about hiring 
interviews to, ‘write in your own words one difference between the panel 
and the group interview.’  Here the difficulty does not come from locating 
the information in the text.  Rather than merely locating a fact about each 
type of interview, readers need to integrate what they have read to infer a 
characteristic on which the two types of interviews differ. (Statistics 
Canada and OECD 2005, annex a)51  
                                                   
51 Many OECD and Statistics Canada publications are compilations of work by individual 
authors.  In many cases the work published under the OECD and/or Statistics Canada banner is 
remarkably similar to work published in other venues and by other organizations.  For instance, 
one of the authors of the ALL report, Irwin Kirsch, is a senior research who works out of ETS’s 
well-appointed campus in Princeton New Jersey.  Dr. Kirsch’s publications under the ETS banner 
include a report on the IALS which bears notable similarities to the annex cited here.  Obviously, 
the conventions associated with academic honesty do not apply in industry/private sector type 
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The question that is rated most difficult within the document literacy category,  
 …asks the reader to identify the average advertised price for the basic clock 
radio receiving the highest overall score.   This task was made more 
difficult because the reader had to match four rather than three features; 
the reader also had to process conditional information, and there was a 
highly plausible distractor in the same node as the correct answer. 
(Statistics Canada and OECD 2011, 114) 
 
And finally, in what the report describes as among the most difficult questions 
testing quantitative literacy, we find that the test  
 …directs the reader to look at a table providing nutritional analysis of food 
and then, using the information given determine the percentage of calories 
in a Big Mac that comes from total fat…To answer this question, readers 
first must cycle through a long table with lots of distracters to identify the 
correct numbers needed for this task.  Next, they must recognize that the 
information about total fat is provided in grams.  Therefore, they must 
convert the number of fat grams to calories before calculating this number 
of calories as a percentage of the total calories given for a Big Mac. 
(Statistics Canada and OECD 2011, 119) 
 
The test’s authors would no doubt disagree with my characterization of the test as 
myopically focused on a single context, likely by maintaining that in so far as the 
test does measure individuals’ ability to track, manage, and use information, 
which are skills fundamental to civic participation, it does in fact operate as a 
reasonably good predictor of an individual’s ability to participate in democracy.  
Or else, they might talk about the fact that the test effectively positions people 
outside of the workplace and in different contexts (like the home, or as a reader of 
a newspaper).  But this actually belies the point: the survey does not complicate 
                                                   
settings.  But it is interesting that “slicing and dicing” (discussed below) is very much a part of the 
OECD’s and Statistics Canada’s operational norms.  See (Kirsch 2001) 
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these contexts at all by asking people to, for instance, question the way in which 
the news are themselves produced, or the fact that so much of what happens in 
the home revolves around a near constant intersection with commodities.  
Statistics that attempt to correlate high levels of education with high levels of 
‘participation’  (i.e. voter participation), also miss the mark, as civic participation 
requires much more than the ability to track, manage and use information, that is 
unless participation is conceived of in the context of capitalist liberal democracy, 
and therein as an individual’s proclivity to occasionally vote.   Regardless, it is 
perhaps more notable that on a set of tests where the highest levels of literacy 
indicate an ability to “compare viewpoints in two editorials” (it is never 
mentioned of what kind of comparison a “highly literate” person is supposed to 
be capable relative to a less literate person), “interpret a table about blood 
pressure, age, and physical activity”, and “compute and compare the cost per 
ounce of food items”, one would expect that more than just 38% of US college 
graduates from 4-year programs would be able to demonstrate a high level of 
prose literacy, 40% a high level in document literacy, and 36% a high level in 
quantitative literacy, but this is not the case.  The bulk of US college graduates 
from four year programs (56%, 55%, and 46% respectively for each of the three 
categories), are at best only able to “consult reference materials [which are given] 
to determine which foods contain a particular vitamin”, “identify a specific 
location on a map,” and, “calculate the total cost of ordering specific office 
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supplies from a catalogue” (American Institutes for Research et al. 2006, 19).52    
Again, these results are hardly different in Canada and the United Kingdom (see 
above).  This means that more adults can ‘consult reference materials to 
determine which foods contain a particular vitamin’, than can ‘compare 
viewpoints in two editorials’.  Even if we imagine that university and college 
graduates could uniformly achieve the highest scores on the ALL, indicating the 
presence of a “highly literate” population, this would leave us with little about 
which to be hopeful.  Given the degree to which the ALL measures literacy in a 
functional and utilitarian way, where functionality can only be taken to mean the 
ability to work and consume effectively within capitalist liberal democracy, we 
must wonder about the actual ‘utility’ of this test (i.e. for whom it is functional?).  
 By establishing both a conception and a standard of knowledge against 
which university and college students (and graduates) can be measured, direct 
tests hold very clear consequences for curricula design and the management of 
the university.  The boundary of academic freedom becomes the ability of 
university teachers to reproduce the most important capacities within the 
contemporary context, namely the ability of graduates to do work, consume, and 
not upset whatever ‘social cohesiveness’ (read labour unrest) exists or might be 
created.  Moreover, the development of standards, which is a political exercise, 
albeit one that was totally depoliticized, as was the case with the DeSeCo, means 
                                                   
52 These results tend also to skew by race, with African Americans and Hispanic 
Americans tending to score lower than their White, male and female counterparts.  (American 
Institutes for Research et al. 2006) 
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that popular ambitions for the university are transformed and managed, as is the 
capacity of the university to produce anything other than a pliant working-class 
and/or able managers.  Indeed, once relative levels of literacy are correlated - as 
is the express purpose of the test - with rates of productivity and output (at any 
level), nothing else of significance can be said to remain.  This is so because the 
operative definition of ‘prosperity’ is linked first and foremost with gross output 
and secondly, because the inequitable distribution of goods and services, given a 
high level of output, is effectively cast as a different kind of policy question, one 
best resolved through means other than education policy.  Thus, the real 
significance of the results of tests like the ALL are as follows: on an individual 
basis, the test assesses an individual’s potential and willingness to work and/or 
manage, and thus their value as a worker/manager of workers; at the level of the 
university, results indicate the degree to which a particular kind of labour-power 
is being produced (either managers and/or subordinate workers or some 
combination thereof).  Given the ability – and the tendency (discussed below) - to 
correlate this data with such things as total per-student expenditures, we are 
given insight into the rate of productivity of labour-power of a particular 
university.  Nationally and internationally, the results of the ALL establish a basis 
for comparison that is in turn indicative of overall labour market flexibility. 
Viewed in conjunction with other data (such as gross output or influx of foreign 
direct investment or the rate of investment in research and development), states 
may find in the IALS/ALL an excuse to borrow policy from other states.  For the 
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private sector, tests like the IALS/ALL are key to making investment decisions, as 
it offers an indication of the degree to which firms are likely to find a ready 
supply of labour, of particular concrete forms, with an attendant willingness, in 
any particular jurisdiction.53    
3.2.4 Learning outcomes/objectives54  
 Unlike all of the other methods of QA described in this chapter, there are 
no numeric artifacts, no “metrics”, associated with the practice of producing 
learning objectives and outcomes.  Instead, learning outcomes are intended as a 
means by which to ensure that some of the other metrics discussed in this 
chapter (ex. graduation rates, expenditures per student) are reliable.  In other 
words, learning objectives are quality assurance mechanisms for QA.  Perhaps 
because of the apparent need for this greater degree of assurance, (gross 
measures of “output”, such as graduation rates are obviously not indicators of 
learning quality), the development of learning outcomes have been mandated in 
an increasingly large number of jurisdictions, including those under study in this 
dissertation.  In short, “learning objectives” are statements that outline in relative 
degrees of detail what and how much a student should know upon finishing a 
                                                   
53 As is discussed in more detail below, there is no reason to expect that investment will 
necessarily flow to jurisdictions associated with high levels of literacy, however it is measured.  
However, where higher levels of literacy are required to perform job tasks, evidence of such 
combined with assessments of regional/jurisdictional wage differentials for the same work, and 
relatively high levels of state support for the production of such labour-power can obviously be 
rather convincing.   
54 Learning objectives are also frequently referred to as “learning outcomes”.  However, 
because ‘learning outcomes’ are also used to refer to things like graduation and employment 
rates, I have stuck with “learning objectives” exclusively. 
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particular course or program. In different jurisdictions, learning outcomes are 
required at different levels of the educational enterprise.  In Ontario, for instance, 
governmental legislation requires that community college instructors provide 
students with detailed statements about a course’s content, the nature of 
evaluation for the course, and also what students will be expected to know upon 
completing that course (Ministry of Training, Colleges, and Universities 2003).  
Many universities in Ontario also require instructors to prepare such outlines, 
though not by virtue of any formal provincial legislative requirements.55   In the 
UK, learning outcomes are required both for individual courses and for programs 
of study; under the auspices of the Quality Audit Agency (QAA) (discussed in 
Chapter 6), all universities in the UK are expected to uphold standards of 
knowledge and understanding outlined in its “frameworks for higher education” 
manual – a periodically updated compendium of discipline specific statements 
regarding what graduates should know, and be able to demonstrate knowing, 
upon finishing some form of post-secondary education.    
 According to Smith and Hussey (2002) the intent in developing learning 
outcomes is “to distinguish between generic, specific, basic, transferable and non-
transferable skills; different kinds of knowledge and understanding and so on: all 
specifiable as outcomes and hence available for objective assessment (Hussey and 
Smith 2002)”. Indeed, by enabling assessment, outcomes are intended to 
                                                   
55 At York University, for example, the University’s policy on Quality Assurance mandates 
the preparation of learning outcomes for taught courses.  (Senate, York University 2010) 
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facilitate a greater degree of accountability.  They are said to operate as clear, 
concise, and objective qualitative measures of achievement against which 
students, faculty, and administrators can evaluate success or failure.  As a 
professor at one of Ontario’s community colleges put it: 
 Learning outcomes that accurately assess learner achievement are 
essential in order to demonstrate accountability to practitioners, learners, 
employers, and provincial funding agencies. Clearly stated and measurable 
learning outcomes support equity for all learners by verifying all learners 
have met the same outcomes. Ultimately, learning outcomes serve as 
reliable indicators and tangible proof of the quality of education provided 
by Ontario’s community colleges.(Sheridan 1999) 
 
Within the literature, discussion of learning outcomes has hardly paid attention 
to whether or not they might pervert or undermine the learning process.  On the 
contrary, discussion has tended to focus on how best to establish learning 
outcomes that reflect the estimations of competence of all “stakeholders”, most 
frequently identified as faculty, students, and business/industry (Palomba and 
Banta 2001), or how to most effectively organize learning outcome statements 
and subsequently supervise their imposition (Pennington and O’Neil 1994).  In so 
far as some scholars have indicated that high-quality outcomes “must be 
underpinned by an effective and comprehensive approach to human resource 
management,” which would include such things as “mandatory induction and 
continuing development programmes which stress professional proficiency in, 
and skill acquisition for, teaching,” as well as “reward structures and promotion 
criteria which acknowledge excellence in teaching, (Pennington and O’Neil 1994, 
13–18)” discussion has tended to revolve around how interventionist regulatory 
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measures should and can be given conventions of academic freedom. Resolution 
to such questions has often come by way of research that, through survey and 
interview, has constructed some form of popular consensus, a sense of 
overarching agreement about relatively general competencies and guidelines (see 
National Postsecondary Education Cooperative 1999).  Accordingly, a 
competency, which is what should be present upon completion of a course of 
study, is a “combination of skills, abilities, and knowledge needed to accomplish a 
specific task (National Postsecondary Education Cooperative 1999)”.  
 As Hussey and Smith assert however, learning objectives and outcomes 
can never be either very clear or precise. While it may be possible to specify with 
precision that students should be able to demonstrate a fluency with facts or 
particular and discrete processes (particular dates or the ability to solve a 
quadratic equation), an ability to explain, understand, and negotiate increasingly 
abstract concepts cannot be so easily defined, unless by an instructor’s 
preconceived understanding of what that means.  Hussey and Smith write: 
 Since understanding can be profound or superficial, sophisticated or 
naïve, the descriptors, and hence the learning outcomes in which they are 
used, can only be interpreted in a precise way if we already know what 
they must signify at each level or grade. Again our claim is that this 
knowledge cannot be made explicit however careful we are with a 
prescribed vocabulary of descriptors. The same arguments apply to the 
specification of analytical and evaluative skills. If the learning outcome for 
a third-year teaching session on an English Literature degree specified 
that students will be able to evaluate critically Thomas Hardy’s At Castle 
Boterel, we might be impressed by a student who made an elaborate 
attempt to employ Heidegger’s notion of Dasein and a feminist 
interpretation of guilt, but would fail a student who simply said that the 
poem was old fashioned rubbish. However, both are critical evaluations 
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and we praise one and dismiss the other only because we know roughly 
what is to count as a critical evaluation at this level: the descriptors 
themselves do not tell us this. (Hussey and Smith 2002, 226) 
 
Hussey and Smith add that learning outcomes cannot be useful as a guide or a 
general indication of what is to be learned.  This is so because learning outcomes 
need to be specific to each discipline, course, and lesson, a set of prescribed 
descriptors is not really of much use to teachers because objectives must be set 
and re-evaluated on an on-going basis.  Moreover, learning does not follow a 
strict hierarchy, one where ‘understanding’ and a students’ ability to critique 
follow one upon the other. Any attempt to distinguish different levels of 
understanding will invariably exclude consideration of crucial steps that can 
happen simultaneously or in an entirely different order.  As well, students can 
only parse the degree to which they must understand a subject through the 
teaching process.  It is useless for them to have some vague or general outline 
presented to them beforehand.  Students and teachers also need to set and 
inform objectives in light of previous experiences, at a pace dictated by the 
success or failure of the learning process itself, not by a prescribed set of 
objectives.  Indeed, the prescription of objectives may prevent teachers from 
being able to explore issues that arise more spontaneously.  More than this, 
prescribed objectives and outcomes provide an incentive for students to meet, but 
not exceed specified standards.  Hussey and Smith note that, “although this is 
rational behaviour in a market place it is not a sensible or proper approach to 
education (Hussey and Smith 2002, 228)”. 
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 Accounting for the criticisms above need not mean that teachers and 
students should avoid discussions about course content and learning objectives 
as such can indeed be a useful pedagogical device.  However, learning outcomes 
are hardly being used as a pedagogical device.  Rather they are intended as a form 
of supervision and assessment, and therein a means through which to achieve a 
greater level of accountability inside the university. Learning outcomes cannot be 
uncoupled from the other instruments of assessment under discussion, nor can 
they be divorced from the historical context in which they have emerged and are 
practiced.   
 Not surprisingly faculty and teachers have already found a plethora of 
effective means by which to subvert and sabotage requirements that they prepare 
and submit learning objectives at the outset of a course.  Faculty pass-on and 
inherit learning outcomes from year-to-year, they find discursive tricks that 
indicate a rhetorical compliance but little else and then simply ignore the 
objectives once they have been handed in and approved.  Of course, though such 
forms of resistance are telling of the degree to which learning objectives and/or 
outcomes have been successfully imposed, they are nonetheless additive to 
already heavy administrative loads instructors face, and are also evidence of the 
degree to which teaching is being remade as a highly “routinized” process of 
commodity production.  Indeed, as David Harvie (2006) has outlined, learning 
outcomes are in part what makes it possible to liken teaching to commodity 
production. By attempting to break entire courses or degrees into a series of 
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discrete outcomes and pieces of knowledge, learning outcomes remake students 
as specific set of capacities and teachers as labourers that are productive of those 
capacities.  Thus, in much the same way as factory workers are alienated from the 
products of their labour, university and college teachers are alienated from the 
product of their efforts too.56  For Harvie things such as learning outcomes also 
facilitate “…first, the commensuration of teaching labour vis-à-vis other teaching 
labour and completely different concrete labour; and second, the driving-down of 
these socially necessary labour times. (D. Harvie 2006, 14 emphasis in original)”.  
Though learning outcomes are clearly implicated, Harvie writes that,  
 If class contact hours and assessment methods are standardised across 
courses for students, then this standardisation frames workload 
calculations for teachers too (the other key variable is the number of 
students taught). Managers can (and do) construct workload models on 
this basis, from which emerges a ‘norm’ for the ‘average’ number of hours 
required to teach a course unit or module to a certain number of students. 
It is easy to ridicule such norms, and the workload models through which 
they are constituted, as ‘made-up’ or ‘abstract’. Of course, they are 
ridiculous, but they are also real: ‘inefficient’ teachers—those unable to 
meet or beat the ‘norm’—are usually required to justify their need for 
additional time and may be pressurised to reduce it or else work in their 
‘own time’. Thus, a consequence of standardisation and the use of 
workload models is the emergence of definitions for socially necessary 
labour time. (Harvie 2006, 14–15) 
 
                                                   
56 Under the capitalist mode of production, workers become alienated from (i) the act of 
production, i.e. from their activity; (ii) the product of their labour; (iii) their own species being; 
and (iv) their fellow workers. 
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3.3 Key Performance Indicators 
3.3.1 Metrics of Productivity 
 Key performance indicators (KPIs) have become almost synonymous with 
institutional and governmental efforts to ensure quality, and are also typically the 
foundation of the litany of newspaper and magazine rankings now widely 
available. This is so despite the fact that the vast majority of KPIs have been 
subject to often rather devastating critique.  Governments, institutions, and the 
private sector more generally have been unwilling to forgo the use of KPIs, no 
doubt because of their real utility, which is outlined in this sub-section.  In 
Ontario, for instance, the government has mandated that all publicly funded 
community colleges gather and publicly release the following 5 KPIs: 1) Graduate 
Employment; 2) Graduate Satisfaction Rate; 3) Employer Satisfaction Rate; 4) 
Student Satisfaction Rate; 5) Graduation Rate.  And Ontario’s universities, under 
pressure from the government, now routinely gather and report similar such 
performance data via their websites.  As well, the Ministry of Training Colleges 
and Universities compiles performance data on both the colleges and universities 
which it too publishes on its website.  In the US, many state governments, which 
provide considerable support for higher education, have required institutions to 
provide KPI data for many years (OCUFA 2006).  Though the federal government 
has not established any formal requirements regarding the dissemination of KPIs 
in the US, the US’s six privately owned accrediting agencies have developed the 
Voluntary System of Accountability (VSA) in response to the federal 
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government’s threats that KPIs were on the horizon (if they did not start 
reporting them) (Lederman 2013).  As well, the number of private-sector 
rankings exercises that publish KPI data, and the willingness of most universities 
to provide it, is both dizzying and awe-inspiring.  In the UK, the use of KPIs is a 
fundamental part of self-assessment exercises that are at the core of that 
countries QA exercise.  Since 1998, the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE), the UK’s arm’s length higher education regulatory body, has, 
through its “Performance Indicator Steering Group,” set out an ever-increasing 
list of KPIs that universities publish regularly (HEFCE 2013).   
 Crucially, KPIs are intended to be used in a correlative fashion.  “Quality” 
is generally understood to be evidenced when high rates of student satisfaction 
are found in the presence of high post-graduation employment rates, high rates 
of research output, high graduation/retention rates and expenditure per unit (i.e. 
expenditure on a per-student or per unit of research output).  In short, KPIs help 
to establish a relationship between productivity, expenditure and institution and 
or sector design/management. By establishing benchmark standards of 
“excellence” (i.e. those schools that realize high rates of productivity and 
satisfaction at a relatively low rate of expenditure), KPIs reduce all aspects of 
higher education to the money form, and thus subject them to the law of value.  
Of course, this is hardly what the authorities claim.  For them, KPIs, when used 
correctly, can denote the achievement of excellence and enable accountability for 
public expenditure.  It is vital therefore that we enquire as to the validity of each 
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and every KPI in use today.  If KPIs do not indicate anything very meaningful 
about quality, but are instead only indicative of the degree to which value is being 
generated, then we can only conclude as I just have: that they must serve another 
purpose.      
 For present purposes I have categorized KPIs into two subsidiary groups: 
satisfaction indices and research related indices.  I do not deal at all with 
graduation rates, completion/retention rates or measures of research output 
(only where the latter are not judged relative to the results of peer review 
processes, which I do examine below) because such KPIs denote nothing about 
the qualitative aspects of  teaching methods, of graduates, or of research (unless, 
of course, “quality” is conflated with “quantity” (which it often is) or else viewed 
in conjunction with other measures, such as, for example research grants 
earned/awarded).57     
3.3.2 Satisfaction-related KPIs 
 Though there are a wide variety of what I have labeled “satisfaction-related 
KPIs”, (I would, and do, include measures of student engagement in this 
category), they are all largely descendent of the same form: customer satisfaction 
surveys (Guolla 1999; Trout 2000).  Purportedly, customer satisfaction surveys 
                                                   
57 A relatively productive researcher (i.e. a researcher who puts-out a larger number of 
research “outputs”  that her peers (peer reviewed research papers being the most prized for of 
such research output),and who is also awarded significant amounts of financial support for the 
conduct of such research, is generally assumed to be a kind of “research star”.   The coincidence of 
productivity and support are held to denote qualitative and quantitative excellence by virtue of 
the fact that grant-funds are generally subject to peer review. 
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are used by the producers of goods and/or services to track the degree to which 
their customers are satisfied in purchasing whatever it is they are selling.  In this 
way, satisfaction surveys are said to ensure that the great mass of consumers 
determine what gets produced and in what quantities (or in the case of 
universities and colleges, who teaches what and how).58   Of course, satisfaction 
surveys track more than just general feelings of satisfaction, they seek to 
determine more precisely what aspects of a commodity a consumer finds 
satisfying or useful or better than what is on offer elsewhere.  In this way, 
satisfaction surveys are said to still more accurately reflect what the marketing 
literature refers to as “consumer sovereignty”, or the proposition that consumers 
– not producers (i.e. the owners of the means of production) – make productive 
decisions by their consumptive habits.  By tracking the particularities of customer 
satisfaction, firms develop a sense of whether there is no demand for a particular 
good or service, or simply a distaste for certain aspects of a good or service.59   
This argument is, however, something of a mystification. In so far as satisfaction 
                                                   
58 The alleged utility of customer satisfaction surveys is also identical to the arguments 
offered in support of graduate, and employer satisfaction surveys 
59 In this way satisfaction surveys function in a manner that the price mechanism, cannot 
(despite what neo-classical economists might argue.  Simply, satisfaction surveys give firms 
(universities) a deeper sense of their competitive advantages and disadvantages than they could 
otherwise get (i.e. without consulting their customers and instead relying upon the degree to 
which consumers voted with their feet. Of course, as is explained below, this is not the same thing 
as sovereignty, consumer or otherwise.  Rather satisfaction surveys are  recursive mechanisms 
through which commodity production can be reproduced; by enabling firms (universities) to 
strategically change their products in response to survey results, firms (universities) offer their 
customers (students), the appearance of sovereignty (which facilitates buy-in) without actually 
surrendering any meaningful amount of control. The more vigorous and granular are the survey 
results, the better able will be a firm to make changes that can, in turn, generate deeper buy-in 
and/or out-compete other firms.  Of course, any survey frames the alternatives as a choice 
between suggested options; choice is always constrained. 
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surveys enable firms to better understand and thus respond to consumer 
preferences (which are fluid) customer satisfaction surveys function excellently to 
re-create the impression that consumers are sovereign, and, therein that 
competitive markets are both efficient and just.  But unless different groups of 
individuals have more or less identical preferences it is not possible that 
consumers could be sovereign within a system of mass production, for in such a 
system choices are necessarily limited. Instead, what we find is that customer 
satisfaction surveys are productive only of value.60     
 To understand this point it is necessary first to locate notions of customer 
satisfaction and consumer sovereignty within their correct historical and 
ideational context, and therein as solutions to the problems thrown up by 
mainstream economists’ focus on exchange as the source of profit. From Jevons 
on the Marginalists had assumed that individual preferences were simply given, 
that is, in the language of neo-classical economics, preferences were held to be 
“exogenous”.  This assumption was utterly crucial for the neo-classical exercise 
primarily, though by no means exclusively, because the endogeneity of 
                                                   
60 Were individuals’ preferences either similar or identical this would need to be 
explained.  The mainstream literature (i.e. neo-classical economics) says nothing very substantive 
about consumer preferences.  In fact, mainstream economists decompose and gloss over this 
issue in myriad ways.  For instance, some economists maintain that preferences are simply 
exogenous. Others claim that preferences are endogenous and utilitarian.  This second answer 
merely dresses the same problem differently; after all what constitutes ‘usefulness’ for different 
individuals?  Other economists merely purport that preferences are entirely subjective (subjective 
notions of value), but this would therefore have to mean that either markets are entirely 
inefficient, that people, through time, share a common subjectivity, or that different people find 
the same things satisfying for subtly different reasons, which makes the whole study of 
preferences useless. (Benton 1987)   
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preferences is an intensely complicating notion which makes it impossible  to 
preserve neo-classical price theory and, even more significantly, the principle of 
methodological individualism upon which the whole neo-classical (and new 
institutional) program is built. If peoples’ preferences are formed, even in part, 
within and by, for instance, the allocative system in which they exist, it is in turn 
necessary to explain both theoretically and empirically the causal relationships 
that condition individuals’ preferences (i.e. we actually have to explain, not just 
assume from whence demand and supply, and therein prices, do come).  Put 
another way, if preferences are shaped by identifiable and structural forces (such 
as institutionalized agglomerations of power) it makes little sense to argue, as the 
neo-classicals nonetheless do argue, that preferences are subjective.  Thus, even a 
short jaunt down the theoretical road of preference endogeneity leads to the most 
un-neo-classical of ideas: 1) prices can only be explained with any theoretical 
consistency at all via a labour theory of value; and, 2) preferences are thus social 
issues!61  This empirical reality is one which the neo-classicals and their “new” 
                                                   
61 According to the neo-classicals, prices reflect the conditions of supply and demand.  
And the amount of effective demand is, in turn, related to individuals perceptions of utility.  But 
the only way to explain why and how an individual can evaluate the marginal utility gained from 
one additional unit of any product at a given price is via reference to another product available at 
another price.  In other words, neo-classical price theory is tautological and circular, in that all 
prices can only be derived theoretically and empirically from other prices.  By understanding that 
the common element of all commodities is labour (i.e. that some amount of labour time was 
required to produce any and all commodities) then one not only escapes the neo-classical 
tautology, but discovers, as did the classicals and Marx, a means by which to explain much about 
our social/political/economic condition.  But this also means that labour is the ultimate source of 
value, which the neo-classicals would rather just ignore.    
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brethren have always avoided assiduously. (Benton 1987; Milonakis and Fine 
2009)  
 Indeed, in the opening stages of the 20th century and in the context of an 
emerging corporate capitalism defined by obvious agglomerations of economic 
and political power, the “marketing concept” as it was referred to at the time, 
provided a means by which to both understand consumer preferences and to 
justify, in utilitarian terms, the distributional rhythms of a contemporary 
capitalism.  As Benton details, the study of “marketing”, which grew out of 
applied economics, developed both as “…an effort to compensate for the 
omissions of existing theory (Bartels 1976 as quoted in; Benton 1987, 419),” and 
as a means by which to justify “…the emerging distributive practices and 
institutions (Benton 1987, 419)”. Since then, as Benton also points out, the 
primary thrust of modern marketing has been to develop and refine “a set of 
techniques employed by organizations (mostly businesses but increasingly non-
business and social cause organizations as well) to elicit desired responses from 
the other organizations or individuals within the employing organization’s 
‘environment’ (Benton 1987, 419–420)”.  
 Customer satisfaction surveys, in other words, help to bridge the gap 
between mainstream economics, which would otherwise be largely silent on the 
issue of preferences, and the reality that firms must produce and respond to 
consumer demands if they are to compete successfully.  Of course, this logic is 
central to the capitalist mode of production. In pursuit of profit firms must 
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constantly remake their commodities and the means through which they are 
produced.  Only by offering a commodity that is obviously superior to that 
produced by competitive firms can businesses avoid being taken to the proverbial 
wall.  And so, in as much as there is some truth to the idea that firms do usefully 
respond to the results of satisfaction surveys, this does not mean anything about 
the presumed validity or utility of consumer sovereignty.  Rather it indicates that 
what is being (re)produced is the value relationship itself.     
3.3.2 Student Evaluations of Teaching 
 We are now better equipped to examine particular examples of satisfaction 
survey based KPIs. Though they hardly deserve particular attention given that 
employer satisfaction surveys quite obviously ask employers to evaluate workers 
as producers of value (as the commodity labour-power), it is nonetheless useful 
to examine at least a single example of such, if only to see the degree to which 
such surveys are in fact focused on the commodity and not the human.     
As was mentioned, Ontario’s colleges track employer satisfaction through a 
privately designed and administered survey that asks employers to rate on a 5-
point scale their feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction regarding employee 
performance in 18 different areas.  Of those 18 areas, two deal with specific job 
related skills or knowledge, two deal with the degree to which employees 
demonstrate an acceptable level of literacy, three deal each with computer skills, 
numeracy, and comprehension, two deal with what can best be defined as 
analytical thinking and data management/manipulation skills, and the remaining 
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eight ask employers to rate issues most easily categorized as personality, 
motivation and attitude (Gov. of Ontario, MTCU 2013a).62,63 Leaving aside for a 
moment the degree to which a five point scale, not augmented by any critical 
remarks could ever be very useful but as a measure of value, what should stand 
out is the degree to which questions related to skills comprise such a small 
proportion of the survey. The bulk of the survey relates to an employee’s 
willingness to work, that is their willingness to, absent constant supervision, 
eagerly employ their skills in value producing activities.  In this regard, the 
survey’s definition of “critical thinking” is instructive, particularly given that we 
have not categorized it as a measure of personality, motivation and attitude.  
Critical thinking is defined as “evaluates his/her own thinking throughout the 
steps and processes used in problem solving and decision making (Gov. of 
Ontario, MTCU 2013a)”. In other words, workers are said to think critically when 
they perform self-assessments and evaluations, not when they subject 
management or the organization of the firm to the same critical eye. Graduate 
satisfaction surveys are hardly any different.  Rather than have employers rate an 
employee’s ability to produce value, graduate satisfaction surveys ask recent and 
slightly less recent college and university graduates to ranks themselves and their 
                                                   
62 http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/document/serials/eprofile04-05/pdfs/appendixb.pdf 
63 Such attitudinal measures, like an employee’s ability to work well in a team, his/her 
punctuality, his/her adaptability or attention to detail, are all behavioural characteristics than can 
certainly be learned and/or taught in colleges and universities, but which have little to do with 
high-level skills and knowledge. The degree to which so-called “knowledge intensive” work relies 
upon such characteristics is explored in more detail below.   
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learning experiences only in light of their experience in the workforce and therein 
their ability to perform as required.  In other words, graduates rate their capacity 
to work, their labour-power.  This becomes abundantly clear both because it is 
explained on the survey, because employers are asked to consent to have their 
employees participate in the survey, and because “graduates” in the course of the 
survey discursively become “employees”(Gov. of Ontario, MTCU 2013b).64    
 When it comes to student satisfaction surveys, generally referred to as 
student evaluations of teaching (SETs), the relationship between them and value 
production is slightly more obscure.  SETs first emerged en masse in the 1960s as 
part of the students’ movement in the United States (Gray and Bergmann 
2003).65,66 Subsequently, starting in 1970s, but really ramping up in the 1980s 
and 1990s, university administrations throughout the US, Canada, and the UK, 
began using student evaluations more formally, as a routine part of faculty 
                                                   
64 In Section C of the survey, graduates are asked to rate the program from which they 
graduated along the same 18 axes as are used in the employer satisfaction survey.  The directions 
in this regard read: “There are a number of skills and abilities that may be required of employees. 
For each skill and ability, please identify how important that skill and ability is to performing your 
own work. Please indicate if the skill is extremely important, important, neither important nor 
unimportant, unimportant or not at all important.”(Gov. of Ontario, MTCU 2013b) 
65 As such, students' student evaluations carry a fundamentally different significance than 
they did in the 1960’s, when the students’ movement championed them; students’ student 
evaluations were initially a kind of repudiation of the elitist and nationalist university that was 
created in the early post-war era, when the strictures of liberal and institutionalist thought were 
shown to be wanting.  Administrations’ student evaluations, on the other hand, are, as is shown 
below, functional only in the reproduction of labour power.  That said, it is not mildly ironic and 
quite illustrative, that students’ oppositional tactics would and did take the form of customer 
satisfaction surveys. 
66 Prior to the 60’s student evaluation surveys (or proximate forms of them) were used at 
some institutions in the US; According to Centra, student evaluations of teaching first emerged at 
Purdue University (Centra 1993).  Seldin, on the other hand, argues that such surveys were first 
used at the University of Washington in the 1920’s (Seldin 1993) 
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evaluation.67   The timing of this development coincides, therefore, with the 
significant transformations within and around the University discussed above 
(i.e. massification, growth of the services sector, managerialism, 
commercialization, rise of neo-liberalism in and outside of the university).  In 
other words, SETs became an all but compulsory and formalized institution with 
the emergence of the neo-liberal university.  By creating the appearance of a 
‘student centred’ and responsive faculty and administration while radically 
reshaping the teacher-student relationship and the relative power of the 
administration to determine the conditions of work, SETs operate in precisely the 
way customer satisfaction surveys operate to reproduce the mythology of 
consumer sovereignty.   
 According to a report prepared for the HEQCO by the Education Policy 
Institute, a right-of-centre think-tank, research indicates that student evaluation 
surveys are valid in so far as students are said to be good judges of how much 
they have learned, of how well information is presented, (clarity, organization 
etc.), the degree to which active learning techniques are used, the ease or 
difficulty of their learning experience, the workload in a course, and the value of 
the assessment used in the course (Gravestock and Gregor-Greenleaf 2008). 
Though these claims are, in and of themselves, dubious (research also indicates 
that students are greatly influenced by age, sex, color, the enthusiasm of the 
                                                   
67 Seldin (1993), reports that the number of institutions in the United States using student 
evaluations climbed from 29% in 1973, to 68% in 1983 to 86% in 1993. 
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instructor in presenting the information) the Report also details that students 
cannot dependably asses the accuracy of course content, an instructors 
knowledge of or competency in his/her discipline, grading practices and methods 
of delivery, the appropriateness of selected readings, and whether instructors 
indicate bias (Gravestock and Gregor-Greenleaf 2008). Furthermore, the Report 
notes that “global” or overall indicators of teacher performance are highly 
questionable in terms of their accuracy and usefulness.  When one considers that 
“valid” results are only obtained when researchers control for a variety of 
variables (age, sex, race, grade expectations), that students’ ability to evaluate 
how much they have learned is unquestioned even though there is the clear 
recognition that students cannot assess the degree to which a particular course 
covers key issues within a discipline/sub-discipline, the fact that overall rates of 
literacy, even amongst university and college graduates are appalling (see above), 
and the fact that there are precious few academics well enough trained to 
understand and correctly use the results from such teaching evaluations, we must 
not only give pause to consider the utility of the entire endeavor, but also to why 
it remains so central a part of the contemporary university (Gravestock and 
Gregor-Greenleaf 2008).    
 One indication, brilliantly outlined by Michael Platt (Platt, 1993), is that 
teaching evaluations teach students some very disturbing things. Without room 
for students to seriously contemplate the forms’ evaluative criteria, SETs indicate 
that the evaluation of teachers is easy and can be usefully completed in a short 
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period of time. The awkward use of language and grammatically 
incorrect/incomplete sentences coupled with short one or two word check-
marked answers, indicates that writing – which remains fundamental to 
contemplative thought – is largely unimportant. Quality becomes quantity in the 
context of surveys that translate qualitative evaluation to a 5 or 10 point scale, 
which in turn is held to reflect some value-free ‘truth’ about a particular teacher 
or his/her course. Questions which focus on the degree to which a teacher sticks 
to the syllabus, teach students to be upset instead of engaged when teachers 
pursue leads that may potentially be transformative. Questions which ask 
students to evaluate a teacher’s knowledge of a subject indicate that students 
could in fact be teachers and thereby upset the relationship between students and 
teachers. In filling out SETs anonymously, students learn that it is OK to levy 
criticism without offering room for a response...Platt goes on quite exhaustively 
(Platt 1993).  But perhaps most illuminating for present purposes is the following 
passage: 
 At the heart of evaluations is a confusion of opinion and knowledge that 
teaches students to be indifferent to knowledge.  The ‘lowest-common-
denominator’ prose in which these forms are written, their performed 
answers, and the inarticulate responses that they are satisfied with, all 
abstract from the differences of intellect, soul, and heart among the 
students.  Where the difference in quality among students makes no 
difference, every student is being taught that quality makes no difference.  
Moreover, with no checks in these forms against inaccurate statements, 
there is no encouragement for students to be scrupulous.  Before the jury 
in an American court files out to judge the accursed, the judge instructs 
them in the law and in their duty.  Before students judge their teachers, 
they receive no such instructions; the forms themselves teach that none 
are needed.  Their easy-smudge, easy-scan mode signals “opinions wanted 
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here.” What they teach is: “Opinion is knowledge.”  Fortunately, the 
student may be taught elsewhere in college that opinion is not 
knowledge…Will students feel the contrast between these experiences of 
knowledge and the opinionated indifference to knowledge inculcated by 
evaluations?  It is safe to say that no teacher who trained reason upon the 
forms, so as to bring out that contrast, would have much of a chance of 
succeeding.  Merely by allowing the forms, the teacher loses half or more 
of the authority to teach.  Suggestions about the intellectual nullity of the 
forms might be resented by some students, reported to the administration, 
and placed in the teacher’s file.  Thus is the worldly interest, or the 
academic ambition, of the teacher set against both his intellectual integrity 
and his teacherly care. (Platt 1993) 
 
Platt, of course, does not attempt to outline the way in which SETs subject 
students and teachers to the law of value.  But his analysis does point in such a 
direction. Those things which SETs teach students, which have little or nothing to 
do with the development of concrete skills, are fundamentally important 
attributes of labour-power, particularly within the context of the contemporary 
corporation. The point here need not be taken to the extreme conclusion, namely 
that SETs are used by governments and university administrators to intentionally 
teach/train complacent and under-skilled students.  It is perhaps useful to think 
of SETs as being held in place by a kind of digestive process.  Stakeholders 
(instructors, students, governments, university administrators, the public at 
large) in their thirst for “accountability” and “quality” adhere to conventions 
without subjecting such conventions to much critical analysis.  Given the ubiquity 
of such satisfaction related forms and of notions of consumer sovereignty, SETs 
are made an operative mechanism in this recreation of neoliberal education.  
Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” (Lemke 2002) is also usefully raised 
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here, as is the work of Lukacs (see Chapter 4).  Both would point to a fetishism of 
measurement by governing authorities as a means of management.  In asserting 
the relevance of a value theoretic my point is to highlight that the effect of SETs is 
to condition complacency, which I maintain is functional to the recreation of 
neoliberal capitalism and therein of flexible labour markets (which describe 
neoliberal capitalism).  The point here is that the “value” of SETs is realized in the 
constant renegotiation of capital, which is necessarily understood as a social 
relationship (Wood 1981). 
3.3.3 Surveys of Student Engagement 
 Of course, SETs are rapidly becoming rather secondary to other, seemingly 
different, forms of student evaluation. The latest and most fashionable trend in 
satisfaction-survey based KPIs is student engagement surveys.  Indeed, in each of 
the jurisdictions under review, student engagement surveys are seen as what the 
HEQCO describes as a, “a useful baseline for research on learning quality (Higher 
Education Quality Council of Ontario 2007, 27)”. In North America the National 
Survey of Student Engagement (NSSE) is now the engagement survey of choice 
among higher education institutions.  Indeed, a massive number of American 
colleges and universities participate annually in NSSE, as do all of the 18 
universities in Ontario (Jones 2007).68   The NSSE emerged in 1999 out of an 
                                                   
68 As Jones (2007) outlines, all of the publicly assisted universities in Ontario have been 
administering the NSSE since 2004/5.  Annual results are available via each university’s website 
or by conducting a web-search.  I was the President of the York University Graduate Students’ 
Association at the time that York administered the NSSE for the first time.  In speaking with the 
University’s then Director of Research, Ted Spence, I learned that the administration was initially 
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effort sponsored by the Pew Charitable Trusts to find a low-cost and relatively 
dependable alternative to the plethora of high-profile measures that, as the 
organization that now coordinates and reports on the test outlines, “centered on 
the wrong things.” Accordingly, 
   …institutional accreditation processes, despite their recent emphasis on 
assessing student learning and development, deal largely with resource 
and process measures. Government oversight as manifested in license 
requirements and program review mechanisms, in turn, continues to 
emphasize regulation and procedural compliance. Third-party judgments 
of "quality" such as media rankings continue to focus on such matters as 
student selectivity and faculty credentials. None of these gets at the heart 
of the matter: the investments that institutions make to foster proven 
instructional practices and the kinds of activities, experiences, and 
outcomes that their students receive as a result. (NSSE Foundation 2013)  
 
To focus on the “right things”, the NSSE builds upon Chickering’s and Gamson's 
(1987) “Seven Principles for Good Practice in Undergraduate Education”.  In that 
work, Chickering and Gamson maintain that “deep learning” and high-quality 
outcomes are related to: 1) the level of contact between students and faculty; 2) 
the amount of work that students perform together; 3) the frequency with which 
“active learning” techniques are used; 4) the frequency and immediacy of 
                                                   
quite reluctant to submit to the same kind of test that was to be administered elsewhere.  York 
was concerned that the test would not highlight those things that made it ‘special’.  I also learned 
that many institutions voiced similar concerns.  Any reluctance was, however, short-lived.  To the 
NSSE each institution was provided an opportunity to add a limited number of custom-made 
questions.  Furthermore, resistance was seen as futile – though the Government did not formally 
mandate participation, Rae (2005), did recommend Ontario’s participation, and the HEQCO, 
shortly after being created apparently signalled to the universities that participation was 
mandatory.  In response, the COU, in 2006, and likely as another attempt to forestall 
governmental action, mandated that members participate.  The NSSE is administered by a project 
team consisting of outside consultants and institution-based employees.  Freshman and seniors 
are the only students who participate.  Surveys are conducted online.  Each university emails 
requests and reminders to all students beginning in the winter semester.  
http://nsse.iub.edu/html/origins.cfm 
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feedback; 5) the degree to which projects are temporally delimited; 6) the level at 
which expectations are set and communicated; and, 7) the degree that teachers 
and students foster a healthy respect for different talents and ways of learning 
(Chickering and Gamson 1987).  To do this, the NSSE asks students to indicate 
the frequency with which they engage in a series of activities, such as the amount 
of reading and writing they have done over the past year or the amount of time 
they have spent with faculty.  Students are also asked about their involvement in 
study abroad and volunteer programs, as well as the kind of institutional 
supports that are available to help them succeed.  And finally, students are asked 
to comment on their own development and growth.  This last set of questions is 
what the survey in turn builds into its primary correlative argument concerning 
the relationship between “engagement” and “achievement”.  In other words, the 
survey looks to associate the degree to which students profess satisfaction and 
growth with the degree of academic challenge, the amount of time they spend 
with faculty (and how they spend that time), the presence and kind of 
institutional support etc.  And more recent efforts have been to extend the utility 
and accuracy of NSSE by establishing additional links between NSSE results and 
other data, such as the degree to which a university can be said to be “research 
intensive” (NSSE Foundation 2013). The NSSE thus provides a dataset that is 
used in analyses that are strictly correlative, where the primary correlation is 
assumed, rarely tested, and never proven.  Again, ‘deep learning’ is assumed to 
have taken place when students self-report high levels of engagement and 
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satisfaction with their intellectual and academic experiences. (NSSE; NSSE 
Foundation 2013a)   
 Obviously, the goal for institutions is to ensure high levels of both 
engagement and satisfaction at low (and ever lower) unit costs.  If students self-
report being engaged and satisfied in 1000 person classes then presumably 
everybody wins.   The NSSE is thus held out as the Holy Grail in QA: in helping 
institutions to correlate high levels of student engagement with particular and 
‘proven instructional practices and kinds of activities,’ the NSSE is a veritable 
‘how-to’ for faculty, administrators, and bureaucrats.  Allegedly, the NSSE side-
steps the problems with SETs (i.e. the reliability of students’ judgments about a 
course or an instructor), and does not forestall on-going experimentation with 
mass classes and high-tech education. (NSSE Foundation 2013)69,70   Of course,  
the apparent utility of the NSSE only holds if the presumed correlation between 
student engagement and ‘deep learning’ holds in fact and not just in theory.  As a 
means of assessing the factual nature of the primary correlation (i.e. between 
engagement and deep learning) NSSE results have been cross tabulated with 
                                                   
69 NSSE surveys, in reporting high levels of engagement and satisfaction with large 
classes taught with the aid of hi-tech audio and video equipment has highlighted that large classes 
are not a barrier to high-quality education.  Thus the effectiveness of the, ‘instructional practices 
and kinds of activities’ to which the NSSE testifies have been relatively low-cost.   
70 Or as the HEQCO puts it, “insights from these surveys,” are to be used, “as a starting 
point for assessing value-added, working backward to examine input indicators and forward to 
examine final output measures.” In other words, various proxies for levels of student engagement 
are in turn correlated with different inputs (teaching methods and approaches, levels of finance, 
student to teacher ratios) and in turn to outputs, like the results of program reviews and audits, as 
well as to labour market conditions, employer satisfaction surveys, or still more macro-indicators 
like economic growth. (Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario 2007, 27) 
144 
grades.  In other words, in finding a correlation between high NSSE scores (high 
feelings of engagement) and high grades (even when correcting for widespread 
grade inflation), the NSSE’s authors have argued that their assumption 
concerning the presence of deep learning has been proven (NSSE Foundation 
2010).  The NSSE’s authors have not routinely attempted to correlate NSSE data 
with that of the IALS, the ALL, or any other such test.  Given the literacy data 
discussed above however, it would appear that such would be a useful, if not 
absolutely vital exercise.  The average literacy scores of both Canadian and 
American university graduates would suggest that the correlation between deep 
learning and engagement is not so tight at the NSSE’s authors have suggested.71    
 Indeed, the relatively impoverished rates of literacy amongst university 
and colleges graduates in both Canada and the US would seem to suggest that 
there is no reliable correlation between engagement and so-called ‘deep-
learning’.  In fact, I would argue that to the extent that students find some 
courses or programs more engaging that others, such is merely metonymic of the 
political economy in general. Students’ self-assessments will tend to reflect and 
mimic dominant trends, they will tend to express a greater sense of engagement 
with vocationally oriented curricula or with curricula that is merely entertaining,  
                                                   
71 Shockingly, the NSSE is now trying to develop “information literacy” measures that are 
based upon the presumed correlation between literacy and things like a student’s attendance at 
the library. In other words, the NSSE will attest to the presence of “information literacy” if 
students self-report having, “a. Asked a librarian for help (in person, email, chat, etc.); b. Went to 
a campus library to do academic research  c. Used your institution’s Web ¬based library resources 
in completing class assignments. (Gratch-Lindauer 2007, 433)” 
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they will tend to cast critical thinking as problem-solving, and they will tend to be  
less engaged by subjects that challenge the utility of the kinds of conventions to 
which they are increasingly wedded.  
3.3.4 Research Related KPIs 
 One generally finds four different types of research related KPIs: those 
which measure the research dollars earned (from different sources), on average, 
by an institution, by a particular department, or by a particular faculty member; 
those which examine a faculty member’s record of publication; those which track 
an institutions’ ability to attract private research money; and, those which track 
an institutions success at producing intellectual property, patents, or at more 
directly leveraging commercializable research in the marketplace (i.e. income 
from licensing, tech transfer etc.).  On the face of it, each of these measures only 
obtains meaning as a kind of “value-for-money / return on investment” 
assessment.  Even in the absence of lower-level data detailing the productivity of 
individual faculty, which is nonetheless routinely done and often used to set 
levels of remuneration, gross measures of research productivity are intended to 
indicate excellence so as to attract additional investment from governments, from 
private sector sponsors/donors (i.e. as either/both research partners or as 
donors), and in the form of students who pay tuition-fees (i.e. investment dollars 
are well-spent at institution x).  As was discussed in the preceding chapter, 
governments and universities do not produce such measures in the context of 
straightforward efforts to ensure that public monies are well-spent and that they 
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are thus productive of public goods.  Rather, governments continue to make 
efforts to leverage their publicly funded university research infrastructures to 
produce ‘commercializable’ outputs in the stalwart belief that such will in turn 
generate widespread prosperity (i.e. economic growth is cast as a public good 
irrespective of how such wealth is distributed).  What this means is that research-
related KPIs, when linked to the neo-liberal agenda are in turn intended to be 
read as an indication of overall profitability.  And in so far as such KPIs facilitate 
comparative assessments of research productivity and profitability, they enable 
the reduction of concrete skills, those of university researchers, to socially 
necessary labour time (discussed in the following chapter). Moreover, research 
KPIs, in so far as they are used as inducements to undertake corporately co-
sponsored research and/or research with a commercial application, ultimately 
manifest as what Sheldon Krimsky has usefully called a “normative shift”, that is 
an overall shift in the way in which both the general public and the scientific 
community thinks about research and the public good (Krimsky 2004). In other 
words, KPIs are not just indicative of where value lies, but are also productive of 
the value form itself.     
3.3.5 Bibliometrics 
 One data-set that purports to transcend the neo-liberal equation of 
productivity and quality is that of bibliometric indices. Such indices track the 
frequency with which the work of any particular researcher is referred to by other 
researchers within a delimited set of journals. Accordingly, knowledge is said to 
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be of higher quality if it is used more frequently in the generation of other 
knowledge. Arguably the most widely used source of such data is Thompson 
Scientific, (formerly Thompson ISI), a subsidiary of global news giant and 
publishing juggernaut, Thompson-Reuters.72   Notably, the Thompson ISI 
citation (“bibliometric”) indices cannot be subject to any kind of substantive 
scrutiny as the corporation maintains the basis of its selection process and 
criteria as a trade secret. What this means is that it is simply not possible to test 
Thomson’s claims that its indices are based upon a selection of journals that 
represent the “highest quality, most relevant materials (Testa 2003: p.210).”  In 
considering Testa’s claim as to the quality of the journals tracked within 
Thompson’s indices, it is useful to consider that: 1) Thompson in fact publishes 
many of the journals that are listed on its own index; and, 2) as a multinational 
publishing house that owns myriad academic journals, Thompson has a vested 
interest in preserving those arrangements that would enable private benefactors 
to maintain ownership of publicly funded research.  In other words, any effort to 
make the results of publicly funded research freely available, for instance, via the 
huge number of open-source electronic journals now in operation, would 
fundamentally undermine Thompson’s business model!  
                                                   
72 As Mirowski (2011) outlines, Thompson is no longer the only for-profit organization 
that sells bibliometric data.  In fact, several competitors now offer customers up-to-date data 
drawn from a significantly larger journal-set than does Thompson.  However, Thompson’s 
dominant position remains. 
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 Testa has also clarified that Thompson works hard to select those “core” 
journals that contain the most frequently cited articles.  As such, Thompson’s 
data-set reflects what academics and experts indicate by their citation practices 
are the most important journals (Testa 2003). In the current context, where the 
most frequently cited journals are also the most generously rewarded, this merely 
means that Thompson helps to create and disseminate the view that particular 
journals are relatively more important.  Even if this were not the case, 
bibliometric indices could not usefully act as a measure of quality. Again, context 
is everything: bibliometric indices merely act as a reflection of the dominant 
tendencies within both the natural and social sciences. As with peer review, the 
degree to which one academic’s work is cited by other academics could hardly 
offer a meaningful indication of quality, unless we buy into the assumed 
correlation (Shore and Wright 1999: p.568-570; Roberts 2007: p.358; Krimsky 
2004). As is suggested below, we have ample reason to question the quality of the 
academic “outputs” produced under the current regime. 
 These problems are compounded by a host of others.  For instance, it is 
difficult to gauge either productivity or quality when both multi-authored (in 
many cases over 50 authors) as well as ghost-authored works now occupy a 
sizeable proportion of what is published within the natural sciences (Sismondo 
2007).  In both cases, bibliometric indices become decidedly less meaningful or 
dependable as an indication of any one researcher’s contribution.  More 
significantly, different journals expand and contract at different times and at 
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different rates; arguably less a function of quality than of funding, this on-going 
movement is not caught in bibliometric measurements, which thereby act as a 
kind of obfuscation of what is happening within a particular discipline.  And 
within some disciplines, different journals are hardly representative of the 
discipline, but instead tend to operate more as a kind of political project with the 
aim of reproducing extending and/or preserving particular traditions or schools 
of thought (Mirowski 2009; Mirowski 2011: p.259-287; Silva and Slaughter 1984; 
Lee and Harley 1998: p.26-30; Harley 2002).   
3.3.6 Patents and Licensing Revenue 
 There is a considerable literature that deals with the utility of patent data 
and licensing revenue as a means by which to prove the efficacy of investment in 
university R&D (Mowery and Ziedonis 2002; Rasmussen 2008; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman 2004; Jensen and Thursby 2001; J. Thursby and Thursby 2000). 
Unfortunately, the bulk of this literature is of questionable value. Any apparent 
decline in patent quality is explained-away as a by-product of such things as 
truncated data-sets or inexperienced market participants (i.e. universities that 
initially sought to license low-quality IP, only to be disciplined by the market into 
producing high quality IP).  Over time, in other words, market based incentives 
will drive necessary adjustments and thereby the production of high-quality 
research (Mowery and Ziedonis 2002). In other words, the champions of 
“evidenced based policy” maintain that if the data says things are bad we need to 
just wait awhile, until it says something different.    
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 Evidence from other sources seems to suggest that the quality of patents 
has indeed declined since the 1980s.  For instance, experts in the field estimate 
that as many as 30% of new patents are redundant and overlap existing patents 
(Glass 2011). Reports by the US's Food and Drug Administration indicate that 
only about 15% of new drug patents are for truly original compounds (Mirowski 
2011: p.214-215).  Moreover, increased licensing revenue may only be an 
indication of the increased costs associated with conducting research.  For 
instance, universities now extensively use Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) 
as a means to earn licensing revenue by charging each other for the use of 
patented materials necessary for research (Mirowski 2011: p.152-160).  Also of 
note is the fact that the Association of University Technology Managers only 
publishes data detailing the amount of gross revenue earned by universities 
through licensing. No organization or university publishes net revenue, which 
would offer some indication of how much is being spent to develop and manage 
(litigate) IP, relative to how much is earned licensing IP. What data is available 
seems to corroborate what I have just suggested, that licensing revenue, 
evaluated on a net basis, makes the whole enterprise appear decidedly less 
lucrative.73  In Canada, for example, despite a marked increase in the number of 
patents being both applied for and granted, patent approvals as a percent of 
                                                   
73 Data from a now cancelled survey by Canada’s national statistical agency, Statistics 
Canada, made clear that the costs for universities of administering IP have been rising 
consistently since 1998.  Other data suggests that university IP is receiving patent approval less 
and less frequently, again since 1998.(Statistics Canada 2008)   
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applications are trending downward. And universities are spending ever more to 
administer this IP (Statistics Canada 2008). 
 Universities have also become upstream providers of IP to a new breed of 
downstream “user”, so-called, “Non-Practicing Entities” or NPEs.  Such NPEs, 
which are most prevalent in the US, but are present in other jurisdictions too, are 
firms that simply buy-up as much IP as possible for the sole purpose of 
establishing monopoly rights.  Productive firms wishing to avoid IP and patent 
infringement litigation, which has become an important competitive tool, pay 
huge rents to license these patent arsenals, all so as to position themselves to 
threaten IP and patent infringement litigation when competitors do the same.  
Although NPEs purport to act as the protectors of scientists lacking business 
savvy, they appear more so to be the benefactors of the venture capitalists who 
provide the seed capital for their patent libraries. (Mirowski 2011: p.148; Glass 
2011).  Indeed, so immense is the cost associated with the kind of protracted 
litigation one commonly finds around IP that many tech-based firms have found 
it more economically sensible to pay licensing fees when they are demanded in 
order to access patent libraries.  Or else firms simply opt to amass their own 
arsenal of patents, most of which they never intend to use.  Rather than prove the 
originality of whatever technologies they have developed or brought in-house or 
demonstrate the frivolity of claims about encroachment, firms pay to access 
patent libraries as a kind of insurance (Arthur 2011; Mirowski 2011: p.148; Glass 
2011).   
152 
 Patenting and licensing, in other words, have become precious hostages 
worth a healthy ransom at least as much as they have mechanisms to ensure that 
dedicated scientists and inventors receive well-earned rewards for new ideas.  We 
also have yet to mention the influence peddled by powerful institutional forms 
that only emerged in the neo-liberal era. Aside from the aforementioned NPEs, 
huge swathes of the universities' institutional apparatus, new forms of arms-
length government bodies, private consultants that provide “innovation 
expertise,” and venture capitalists all exercise considerable power within the 
neoliberal program and their survival simply depends upon their ability to 
leverage that power to recreate it (Finder 2008; Glass 2011; Slaughter and Leslie 
1997; Slaughter and Rhodes 2004; Pisano 2006).  The upshot is simple enough: 
the “evidence” used to support the neo-liberal program fails utterly to recognize 
that patents,  
 ...bear economic value for all sorts of reasons unrelated to the progress of 
science: they may be used to block rivals from entering your market or to 
frustrate anyone the holder wishes to prevent from further researching the 
area; they may be used as defensive devices against other big holders or 
patent portfolios; they can be used as defences in antitrust action; they can 
be pretexts for parasitical litigation by patent trolls.  Thus it would almost 
always be a travesty to try and “impute backward” the scientific 
significance of a discovery from some market indicator like license 
revenue, or patent renewal fees, or the extent of litigation. Value need not 
reliably map into significance or importance from a scientific perspective. 
(Mirowski 2011: p.307) 
 
3.4 Accreditation, Assessment and Peer Review 
 The distinction between accreditation, assessment, and peer review 
program evaluation processes is difficult to discern.  Generally, accreditation 
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refers to an evaluation by an independent body that is recognized as the 
governing/accrediting body for some kind of professional and/or disciplinary 
association, as with the Canadian and American Medical Associations, which 
accredit and license instructional programs in medicine.  Assessment tends, on 
the other hand, to refer to evaluative procedures that are not operated by a 
recognized accrediting agency, but rather in accordance with governmental 
regulations.  Indeed, the distinction is often times purely the result of a technical 
distinction between institutional type and governance structure.  In most cases, 
audits, assessments, and the evaluative procedures that lead to formal 
accreditation by a recognized accrediting agency, involve a review by an outside 
panel of experts.  The expertise of such panelists is generally determined 
according to a set of selection criteria established by the body that oversees the 
evaluative process or else by the institution or program that is to be the subject of 
a given review.  In most cases, panelists are outside academics and 
administrators who are provided some specialized training in program and/or 
institutional evaluation.  “Lay-people” (generally high-powered businessmen), 
governmental officials, and students are, however, becoming mandatory 
members of evaluative panels in an ever larger number of jurisdictions.  Either 
way, evaluations generally involve a series of site-visits during which panelists are 
provided with both select documentary evidence testifying to programmatic 
quality and an opportunity to interview some of the people involved in all aspects 
154 
of program delivery or, in the case of institutional audits, an institution’s internal 
QA processes.   
 Accreditation first appeared in the US around the turn of the 20th century.  
As I discuss in Chapter 5, the history of accreditation in the US is linked to the 
particular nature of the second industrial revolution in the US and to the 
concerted efforts of a small group of industrialists, engineers, and educationalists 
intent on designing a national educational system that could efficiently train 
skilled and pliant labour.  Outside of the US, accreditation emerged more 
recently, generally during the 1960s and 1970s, when state-funded higher 
education was massively expanded throughout the developed world.  In Ontario, 
for example, program assessment first emerged during the expansion of the 
1970s, when long-established universities sought to preserve some level of 
control over graduate degree granting authority.  However, the real push towards 
large-scale and system-wide programs of accreditation, assessment, and peer 
review did not come until after 1980. Indeed, since that time, the pace of 
development in this area has been break-neck.  Most states that have developed 
QA regimes – and many have - have done so through the creation of arms-length 
government agencies dedicated to the management and design of QA processes, 
such as those which factor centrally in this thesis.74   In doing so, states have 
                                                   
74 In 1998 the EU adopted legislation recommending that all member states, “introduce 
quality-assessment and quality-assurance mechanisms into their higher education systems… 
(Council Recommendation (EC) No 561/98 of 24 September 1998 on European cooperation in 
quality assurance in higher education [Official Journal L 270 of 7.10.1998]).”  The same 
recommendation outlines the autonomy and independence of QA agencies as key.  Accordingly, 
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sought to maintain the appearance that academic freedom and university 
independence remain secure and unthreatened.  In other words, by having 
evaluation performed by arms-length institutions, the government is able to 
maintain some level of distance from evaluative procedures  which are intended 
to “help” universities fulfill their responsibilities as public institutions (i.e. to 
meet government established priorities).   
 Paradigmatic examples of such agencies are the Quality Audit Agency 
(QAA) in the UK, which was the first such agency in the world, and the Australian 
University Quality Agency in Australia (AUQA).  The QAA and the AUQA rely 
heavily on lengthy and often detailed review and assessment exercises within 
which quality is conceived of in two parts: 1) as a reflection of a university’s own 
goals and agenda; and, 2) in terms of a broad set of over-arching national goals 
and standards (generally, a certain - and readily measurable - amount of 
research, or number of graduates, specifically for the purpose of building a larger 
stock of human capital or commercializable knowledge).  Over time, most 
jurisdictions have tended to refine their programs of assessment and evalution, 
making them more detailed and subject to efforts that aim to further standardize 
the processes to be followed during assessment.  Such developments have, 
generally speaking, entailed the constant renegotiation of institutional and 
                                                   
virtually every jurisdiction in the EU has either established a QA agency or is in the process of 
doing so.  Multiple jurisdictions in Eastern Europe have followed suit, as have many in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America.  There is, however, no such agency in the US, nor any immediate plans 
to create one.  That said, the American higher education market is arguably more subject to 
market type assessments than any other in the world.   
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programmatic autonomy.  In fleshing out evaluative procedures and criteria 
institutional autonomy and academic freedom have been circumscribed to an 
ever greater extent, not least through the imposition of new procedural 
requirements that entail larger workloads and thus less time for actual course 
development or meaningful forms of student evaluation. In Ontario, the 
development of assessment entailed first its extension.  Review procedures 
originally pioneered at the graduate level were extended to the undergraduate 
and college level. More recently, and in response to governmental pressure (i.e. 
so as to stave-off government legislation) the sector through its representative 
body, the Council of Ontario Universities (COU) has outlined an entirely new 
quality assurance framework which specifies in more detail than has historically 
been the case, standards, learning outcomes and the like, for both program 
review procedures and institutions’ internal QA processes.  In the UK, 
institutional audits have been refined via such things as the addition of students 
to review panels and the adumbration of evaluative criteria and standards, more 
detailed outlines of review procedures, the collection and publication of program 
level learning outcomes requirements/expectations etc.  Always, the particular 
developments and refinements undertaken in a given jurisdiction are closely 
watched and commented on, not least by the OECD, whose annual “education at 
a glance” reports analyze these and other trends.  Similarly the “International 
Network of Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education” (INQAAHE) also 
monitors and reports on the evolution of assessment practices around the world. 
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Governments have also been apt to watch and mimic the development of 
accreditation, assessment, and peer review programs in other jurisdictions, both 
through the INQAAHE and via other links, such as international conferences in 
Comparative and International Higher Education.  By way of example, Ontario 
chose to follow the UK in naming its QA agency the Higher Education Quality 
Council of Ontario (HEQCO), albeit sometime after the UK government had 
renamed and completely reconstituted its Higher Education Quality Council.  Not 
surprisingly then, the processes and procedures around accreditation, 
assessment, and peer review bear marked similarities (I outline many aspects of 
the particular processes in place in the US, the UK and Ontario in Chapters 5-8) 
such that the generalizations I make both above and below are possible.      
 It is perhaps most useful to think of most jurisdictional assessment and 
audit programs as a hierarchy of QA processes, that begin, in some cases, with 
the assessment of individual researchers, but in most cases, with department or 
program level assessments.  As one moves up through the audit/assessment 
hierarchy, the data collected and used at each subsequent level becomes less 
granular and specific, and instead becomes a hierarchy of documents mimetic of 
the whole process.  The simple presence (and not the content) of reviews of 
individual researchers and their performance serve as evidence of “high quality” 
in the reports prepared by outside consultants during departmental or program 
review.  Likewise, institutional reviews are based on the presence of documentary 
evidence indicating the administration of regular and “vigorous” department or 
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program level reviews (that meet prescribed “best-practices” established by arms-
length bodies).  And system-wide assessments, which are generally undertaken as 
a kind of self-assessment by the QA agencies, tend to rely on the presence of 
detailed procedures clearly outlining best practices for reviews and assesments 
down the line.  It bears noting that that the workload involved in this hierarchy of 
evaluative exercises is significant, and that the most granular and specific 
information is generally provided by individual teachers/researchers, whose 
research and/or teaching workload is almost never adjusted to reflect such new 
responsibilities.  Outside of the time and cost associated with such procedures, it 
is also worth pointing out that whatever the rhetoric coming from QA agencies, 
the fact that institutions are empowered to evaluate programs or departments in 
respect of the over-arching institutional mission, which is generally rather vague, 
must be understood as a kind of stick that can be used to discipline individual 
academics or rogue departments.  Indeed, at least a couple of academics have 
likened the UK’s system of QA (and therein institutional audit, program review, 
and the like) to the system of incentives involved in the operation of COCOM.75     
3.4.1 Program Review and Assessment 
 Though, as I have said, the specific procedural details are different from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, program review and assessment generally operates on 
the basis of both self-assessment and peer-review.  In Ontario, for instance, the 
                                                   
75 See for example (Amann 2003; Radice 2008) 
159 
sub-division of the COU that is now responsible for the sector’s QA processes, 
provides the COU’s, Ontario Council of Academic Vice-Presidents (OCAV), with a 
list of potential auditors that is based entirely on nominations made by the 
institutions themselves. The OCAV then whittles down the list of potential 
auditors depending on the number of audits/assessments that are to be 
performed in a given period.  The auditors, normally a group of academics, then 
set about preparing a report reviewing the performance of a particular program 
that is in turn, based upon, first and foremost, the set of criteria set-out by the 
COU, and, secondarily, a series of site visits during which the auditors are 
provided with curricular outlines, writing samples, documentary evidence of self-
study, and other internal QA processes.  Site visits also enable the auditors to 
conduct interviews with researchers and teachers, as well as a collection of 
graduate or undergraduate students.  The evaluative processes followed, and the 
standards against which the auditors evaluate a program’s performance are 
prescribed, not by the Province, but by the COU, which has administered and 
refined assessment procedures in a constant bid to keep the government at bay 
(i.e. while the COU’s standards and procedures are perhaps slightly less 
prescriptive than the Governments might be, they have been designed so as to 
satisfy the Government such that it feels sufficiently comfortable with the COU’s 
assessments.  (Council of Ontario Universities 2010) 
 In other jurisdictions, program reviews and/or institutional audits involve 
auditors over whose selection the institutions have less control than is the case in 
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Ontario.  In the UK, for example, the QAA – an agency of the Government - 
appoints auditors based on a set of established criteria, which includes, “a 
continuing and meaningful engagement with the assurance of academic 
standards and quality beyond any involvement they may have/have had with 
QAA; previous experience in managing and assuring academic standards and the 
quality of higher education provision in a senior academic or professional 
support capacity at organisational and/or faculty or school level” (QAA 2013).  Of 
course, whether or not the auditors that conduct program and/or institutional 
reviews are picked by the institutions themselves or by an agency of the 
Government likely does not matter – evaluations are performed relative to a set 
of externally determined standards.  Indeed, given both the degree to which most 
assessment program operate in respect of externally determined priorities and 
standards, and the degree to which such assessments are but a small piece of the 
larger QA puzzle, it is reasonable to suggest that such assessments are rarely, if 
ever, revelatory, or, more to the point, potentially able to unsettle the qualitative 
(i.e. neoliberal) bent of the larger QA enterprise.  On the contrary, program 
assessments appear to operate as a kind of disciplinary mechanism designed to 
reinforce the QA program.    
3.4.2 Institutional Assessments and Accreditation 
 Institutional assessments and accreditation processes are meta-
assessments performed by sector-level governmental or quasi-governmental 
organizations and/or discipline specific regulatory bodies, as with engineering, 
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medicine, architecture and the like.  Such meta-assessments rely largely upon the 
documentary evidence developed via lower-level assessments and KPIs.  One 
significant exception here is the tendency for institutional assessments and 
accreditation reviews to also involve stand-alone assessments of an institution’s 
managerial practices and finances, generally with an eye towards commenting on 
and rating on some kind of scale, an institution’s strategic and competitive plan 
(i.e. how is an institution going to respond to the exigencies of public policy 
and/or anticipated declines in public funding).  For instance, the UK’s Committee 
of University Chairmen has identified ten of what are described as “top-level” 
indicators of institutional performance (Committee of University Chairmen 
2006).  The first two, which are described as summary indicators or “super 
KPIs”, are measures of institutional sustainability and market position, that is, 
gross measures of the financial health of an institution and of its reputation and 
attractiveness to prospective students and faculty (2006, 5).  The eight additional  
measures, which inform the top two, are themselves based upon other, lower-
level KPIs (such as those discussed above) and are intended to be used by 
governing boards in conjunction with a series of self-assessment questions so as 
to enable the board to better steer and direct their institution (2006, 5–8).  Thus, 
the results of student satisfaction and engagement surveys are combined with the 
results of KPIs measuring research performance (i.e. research dollars 
earned/awarded, # of publications etc.) as well as the presence/absence and 
relative size of what are referred to as, “knowledge transfer relationships” 
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(Committee of University Chairmen 2006, 3), that is, private research contracts 
or other mechanisms for the commercialization of publicly funded research.  All 
of this information is also reviewed alongside details of an institution’s financial 
health, as well as that of its physical infrastructure.  Staff and human resource 
development programs are similarly assessed, as are governance structures and 
an institution’s leadership and management.  Again, all of this is intended to 
inform the two super-KPIs listed above: institutional sustainability and academic 
profile and market position.  Of course, outside of an institution’s financial 
health, which is not necessarily tied to its academic profile and market position, 
the first of the two super-KPIs is reducible to the second – the solipsism of 
quality through this kind of institutional assessment is that nothing of value 
exists outside the market (i.e. if an institution is highly regarded academically 
and well positioned in the market, such will attract faculty, students as  well as 
private-sector investment and charitable support which will in turn make an 
institution sustainable).  As a result, governing boards are encouraged to steer 
their institutions as they would any kind of competitive firm. (Committee of 
University Chairmen 2006) 
 Meta-assessment and reviews thus attempt to impose a degree of 
coherence in terms of an institutions internal QA processes and the results 
thereof, and an institution’s over-arching and strategic direction.  In other words, 
institutional assessments permit system level authorities to ensure that the QA 
regimes used by individual universities are used to direct outcomes that reflect 
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rationally determined goals and standards.  This kind of approach, sometimes 
called “steering not rowing”, is intended to marshal the cooperation of university 
administrators and academics without appearing to encroach on institutional 
autonomy or academic freedom.  
 In so far as institutional assessments and accreditation procedures purport 
to measure institutional performance relative to an institution’s own mission 
statement and broader, system-wide, governmentally determined criteria, it is 
notable that most Universities around the world have similar mission statements.  
Again, speaking generally, university mission statements tend to discuss the 
advancement of knowledge, the importance of serving the public good, or 
democracy, or some such ensemble of important, but vaguely defined things.76   
University mission statements are, to put it another way, so broad as to be 
meaningless.  The structure of statements provides space for autonomy and 
academic freedom.  At the same time, system wide goals and needs tend to be far 
more specific: there is the need for greater efficiency and greater productivity, 
both understood in terms of both graduates:costs and research-
outputs:expenditures.  Indeed, the KPIs that are used in institutional 
assessments provide the veritable “meat” on the proverbial assessment bone.  
What this means is that institutional assessment is in fact rather directive, both 
                                                   
76 See for instance the different mission statements of Oxford University 
(http://www.ox.ac.uk/aboutoxford/annualreview/mission.shtml) and that of York University in 
Toronto (http://www.yorku.ca/ycom/yms/) 
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in terms of what constitutes “quality” and in terms of understanding/defining 
more narrowly, a university’s mission statement.    
 Of course, by working to ensure that a university’s mission statement is 
part of an evaluative exercise, QA agencies are able to leverage broad based and 
popular support for the QA enterprise. Again, the directive nature of QA is 
sufficiently disguised as to seem unthreatening to many academics who see more 
carrots than they do sticks for their cooperation in audits.  This is particularly so 
given the fact that highly ranked and rated institutions tend also to receive more 
in terms of both governmental and private-sector support. The point here is that 
the QA agencies must necessarily be conceived of as mediating agencies that help 
reconcile the seemingly disparate logics of highly autonomous institutions with 
the logic of capitalist accumulation.  The QA agencies are therefore aptly 
understood as, to borrow Robert Cox’s term, “transmission belts” (Cox 1992)77 or 
perhaps, more simply, “translation belts” between increasingly global capital and 
everyday life.   
3.4.3 Research Assessment 
 Government programs designed to evaluate and assess quality in a more 
thorough manner than is possible with the more simplistic quantitative measures 
listed above are also seriously flawed.  Pioneering among the various research 
                                                   
77 Cox was roundly criticized for his use of this term generally because it failed to identify 
the agents involved in the process of restructuring.  In fact, Cox used the term ‘nebuleuse’ to 
describe the agents of global capitalism.  Here the term is used differently, to indicate the degree 
to which governments are responding to the exigencies of both national and international 
capitalists who look very favourably upon ‘flexible’ labour markets 
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quality assessment programs undertaken by governments around the world has 
been the UK’s Research Assessment Exercise (RAE).  The RAE or Research 
Excellence Framework (REF), as it is now called, was first introduced in 1986 and 
followed hotly on the heels of legislation that effectively ended tenure in the 
United Kingdom (Willmott 2003, 132).  Every 4-6 years since that time, faculty 
that have been designated by their departments as “active researchers” have had 
to submit one paper from each of the preceding years which they or their 
department feel is representative of their best work.  Though the evaluative 
criteria were initially kept secret, the government has, since the third round of the 
RAE, progressively opened things up.  Currently, submitted works are subject to 
evaluation by panels of academics and experts who have in turn been guided in 
their evaluations by criteria established through consultation with the 
government’s Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE).  In this 
way, peer review, which is problematic for the reasons outlined above, has also 
been effectively confined and directed via a process that is ultimately decided 
upon by an agency that has long established its support for commercialization 
(Shore and Wright 1999: p.569-570).  The results of panel evaluations are 
compiled and turned into an overall score on a five-point scale.  Government 
research money has then been apportioned to each department or program based 
on both that department’s score and the number of researchers to which the 
department is home (Willmott 2003; Lee and Harley 1998; Harley 2002; Morgan 
2004; Baimbridge; Elton 2000; Rolfe 2003).  
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 As much as the evaluative criteria used in the initial rounds of the RAE 
were kept secret, it was nonetheless made clear that higher grades would be given 
to research that was, “of direct relevance to the needs of commerce and industry” 
(Higher Education Funding Council for England 2011, 48).78    To this statement, 
the HEFCE has recently added other, less instrumental descriptors.  Still, this 
expanded notion of excellence is now placed within a new evaluative category – 
“impact” (Higher Education Funding Council for England 2011) – which will 
hardly help to prevent the on-going conflation of ‘excellent’ research with that 
which is ‘useful’ (I discuss the inclusion of “impact” further in Chapter 6). 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that in as much as the RAE/REF has 
provoked researchers to be more “productive”, at least in terms of the number of 
articles generated, the quality of such research remains an open question.  Not 
only have publishers indicated feeling pressured to publish the work of their 
British colleagues before it is sufficiently refined, lest their colleagues become un-
employed or still more poorly paid, scholars themselves admit to “slicing and 
dicing” their work, dividing one paper into several so as to meet publication 
schedules and productivity requirements (Smith 2000).  Many academics in the 
UK have also raised concern over the fact the RAE/REF has undermined their 
ability to undertake long-form work or to take significant amounts of time to 
                                                   
78 Recently, this phrase, which first appeared in 1995, has been used in conjunction with 
other statements which are ostensibly intended to broaden the definition of “excellence”.  In a 
way, this change reflects both the efforts of oppositional groups and some of the deleterious 
consequences that the RAE has had.  It is also worth mentioning that recent pronouncements 
from the Government in the UK have demonstrated that the drive to press universities 
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properly gather and reflect on data (Harley 2002, 323–333; Smith 2000; Lee and 
Harley 1998).  The RAE/REF, in other words, has helped to reproduce as normal 
the kind of ‘just-in-time’ science that has not been demonstrably linked with 
meaningful forms of economic growth or innovation (Smith 2000; Willmott 
2003; Harley 2002).79   Others have found that the RAE has worked to create and 
reinforce a divide between research winners and losers that both undermines the 
potential expansion of cutting-edge scientific inquiry and punishes those 
academics and students who work at and attend less resourced institutions (Rolfe 
2003; Elton 2000; Morgan 2004). Of course, the results of the REF are most 
useful when linked to other data, specifically to measures of the apparent utility 
of the knowledge being generated under the auspices of the RAE/REF regime.  
Thus, outside of efforts like the RAE/REF, governments and other NGOs have 
also been apt to want to “prove” the efficacy of the neo-liberal research enterprise 
by looking at the tendency of universities to produce IP, which is tracked either 
through patent applications and grants or through the income generated by 
licensing such IP.  Here again, “more” is always and everywhere construed as 
“better” – more patents and more revenues are held up as evidence of more 
quality, more innovation, or so the logic goes.  As was demonstrated (see section 
                                                   
79 Recent policy pronouncements from the British government also suggest that there are 
other ways to skin this proverbial cat.  The conservative government has announced plans to 
make student support available to students so long as their programs are evaluated as fit-for-
their-purpose, which is then defined as practically applicable in labour markets (Great Britain. 
2011).  Thus, by both rewarding particular kinds of research and by funding particular kinds of 
taught programs will the government be able to fundamentally affect the direction of scientific 
research in the UK. 
168 
3.3.2 above), whatever the logic, it simply does not reflect the facts on the 
ground: the tendency to patent has neither generated much in the way of income, 
nor innovation.  It goes without saying that the RAE/REF is but one example of 
how peer review is not so easily linked to “quality”, even when one defines such in 
strictly utilitarian terms.  Though the US lacks a similar system, “accreditation”, 
in so far as it too relies on peer review, would be subject to the same critique, as 
would the US’s and Canada’s system for distributing research funding.   
3.5 Conclusion 
Before preceding to flesh-out the theoretical foundations of this dissertation, 
which I do in the next chapter, it is useful to pause momentarily and summarize 
to this point.  In Chapter 2, I sought to link the development of QA to the 
emergence of neoliberalism and therein to the neo-classical theories of economics 
in which I maintain the neoliberal policy program is rooted.  In so doing what I 
highlighted was the degree to which QA is inextricably linked to theories that see 
virtue in the protection of intellectual property, in labour market flexibility, in 
theories of distribution that are supported more by “parables”, to borrow from 
Paul Samuelson (1962), than by anything founded in historically informed 
analysis of the facts on the ground.  In other words, QA is an ideological and a 
political exercise. 
 Since proof is better in pudding, I looked in Chapter 3 to extend the 
argument made in Chapter 2 by examining many of the primary measures and 
mechanisms of quality and quality assessment in higher education.  In so doing, I 
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looked to test whether governmental and scholarly claims as to the reliability of 
QA hold water.  I looked to ask whether QA provides any valid indication of 
quality, which I defined in the manner that the neoliberals define it, in strictly 
utilitarian terms.  Through this imminent critique my intent was to examine 
precisely what, if not quality, is measured through QA processes and what such 
processes in fact allow us to say about the qualitative aspects of graduates, 
research, instructional programs, and systems of institutional management.  
What I demonstrated was that QA allows us to say very little about the qualitative 
aspects of the contemporary university, save perhaps for that fact.  This is no 
small thing.  As I made clear at the outset of this dissertation, QA is today a 
notable preoccupation of the university and of governments around the world.  
That the enterprise assures little in the way of quality, understood as real 
innovation, highly literate graduates etc. is stunning.  That the entire enterprise 
relies upon a dense web of self-referential research80 to produce such vacuous 
measures at great expense is similarly significant.  Such significance is what now 
needs to be explained.   
                                                   
80 Here I mean “self-referential” in several senses.  First, the mainstream literature tends 
to equate quality with prices (i.e. with research dollars earned, grants awarded etc.).  In so doing, 
quality is rendered entirely relative: the relative quality of different research is the price it fetches 
either at market or through systems of peer review that have been pressed into the production of 
commercializable research. The mainstream literature and the QA enterprise is also self-
referential in a more straightforward manner: not only is policy constantly borrowed between 
jurisdictions via tight national and international policy networks, but the research that 
underscores that policy is borne of decidedly closed theoretical programs (like the behaviouralism 
that underlies the NSSE), that maintain almost no visible relationship with what could reasonably 
be described as a open and pluralist discussion. 
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 In Chapter 2, I suggested what might be this significance.  In linking 
neoclassical economics with New Growth Theory and in turn with QA, I asserted 
that QA was derivative of theory that was self-consciously imperial and a 
projection of power.  Ironically enough, the theory underlying such imperial 
exercises has no coherent way to access power because the claims it makes 
around causal complexity vitiates our ability to rank-order causal variables and to 
thereby obtain some indication of who’s interests QA serves.  In Chapter 4, I take-
up the issue of power directly, and provide a theoretical outline of capitalist 
accumulation within which we can understand QA more completely and more 
coherently.  In so doing, I seek to avoid two things: 1) an overly reductive 
conceptualization of power that militates against more systemic and structural 
account of power and its location within contemporary capitalism; and, 2) the 
reverse.  In other words, the theoretical outline that follows attempts to navigate 
a line that permits us to see and understand the systematic features of 
contemporary capitalism that facilitate the recreation of QA while also 
maintaining a bead on the particular players (individuals and institutions) that 
consciously re-create and support neoliberal patterns of accumulation in an 
unending effort to secure their own positions of power.  Obviously, this 
theoretical approach is but a recasting of the structure-agency dilemma that has 
long plagued the social sciences and which is putatively and frequently answered 
with reference to Marx (i.e. “men make their own history, but they do not make it 
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just as they please”).  Still, such a theoretical take is sorely lacking from both 
mainstream and heterodox accounts of QA.   
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Chapter 4: Theorizing QA and Neo-liberal 
University: the law of value and its measurement 
  
 Capitalism has become universal. It has totalized itself both intensively 
and extensively. It’s global in reach, and it penetrates to the heart and soul 
of social life and nature.  
  -Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Empire of Capital 
 
 Understanding the significance of QA from a critical perspective is hardly 
the exclusive domain of this dissertation.  In fact, a small, but notable literature 
does exist which is usefully critical of QA and which, furthermore, attempts to 
theorize the emergence and evolution of the neoliberal university.  Unfortunately, 
only a select few have raised the issue of value as I have and will continue to do in 
this dissertation wherein QA is conceived of as a managerial strategy that 
attempts to attach exchange value to work done in the university, and to thereby 
render all such work as a commodity and thus commensurable (De Angelis and 
Harvie 2009; Harvie 2006).  I argue that the omission of value from 
considerations of QA is a serious one, for it prevents us from seeing the essential 
nature of QA and, in turn, prevents us from being able to accurately evaluate its 
potential (within the current context) to improve quality, meaningfully defined.  
Put still another way, what I am arguing for is an approach to the study of QA and 
the university that, at the level of ontology, begins by recognizing: a) the 
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centrality of production to the organization of human affairs; b) understands the 
historic specificity and structural tendencies of capitalist 
production/accumulation in general; c) understands the historic specificity of 
neoliberalism both conjuncturally and spatially (i.e. as a particular program of 
capitalist production/accumulation within which certain structural tendencies 
evident in capitalism more generally are either relatively more evident or muted 
than at other times/in other places) because; d) the, “objective determinations of 
class do not impose themselves on blank and passive raw material but on active 
and conscious historical beings.”  In other words, the structural and tendential 
movements of capitalism in general manifest in particular ways in particular 
places and at particular times because of the way, “men and women live their 
productive relations and experience their determinate situations, within 'the 
ensemble of the social relations,' with their inherited culture and expectations, 
and as they handle these experiences in cultural ways."(Wood 1982, 49)  
 Such analysis, like any analysis can never be exhaustive.  Not only does 
higher education play a number of cultural, ideological, and political functions, 
which can be usefully analyzed more discretely, but the task just set-out is 
necessarily stylized.  This is because the analytical lens for which I advocate, in as 
much as it seeks a totalizing and holistic picture of the world in which the 
university is today situated, is inescapably partial.  Moreover, it is not just 
neoliberal theory that is ‘for someone or some purpose’.  My theoretical lens is 
rooted in an underlying sense of morality, that is defined, first and foremost, in 
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opposition to the savagery of capitalism and to the manner in which such 
savagery is obfuscated and thereby condoned within both mainstream and even 
some critical writings. More than this, since neoliberalism centrally involves the 
commodification of all domains of social life, particularly those that revolve 
around the production of knowledge, I would argue that we are rendered 
theoretically disabled and empirically blinded when it comes to the current 
conjuncture if we do not pay at least some attention to the issue of value. (De 
Angelis and Harvie 2009; Harvey 2005)   
 As I outlined in Chapter 2, the mainstream literature operates with a 
fundamentally different ontology.  The amalgam of neo-weberian and liberal 
tropes within the mainstream literature makes it impossible to discern the 
historic specificity of either neoliberalism or capitalism and also reduces reality to 
a series of discrete black boxes (“causative variables”) that interact in a complex, 
indeterminate and ultimately, inexplicable way (in terms of power).  The upshot 
is that the rational estimations of individuals is likewise never explained, or, in 
the worst case, reduced to the point where individuals become quite unhuman 
(Mirowski 2002).  In terms of QA, little of anything is delivered or achieved, save 
for a misplaced faith in the measures reviewed in Chapter 3.   
 The critical literature within CIHE tends to employ – but not discuss or 
openly develop - a more nuanced ontology (though the issue of methodology is 
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taken-up frequently).81   To differing degrees, the scholarship that makes up this 
critical literature – and it is a small body of work – tends to employ an ontology 
that is only shades different from that used in the mainstream literature. Rather 
than posit a strict separation between different institutions operating in different 
non-reducible spheres of activity, the critical scholars tend to see more fluidity in 
the connections between what are still conceived of as, to borrow from Marxian 
debates, “relatively autonomous” spheres of activity (see for instance, Marginson 
and Rhoades 2002; Sheila Slaughter 2001; Klees 1991; Altback 2006).  Though 
there is a clear sense that “the market” is a historically novel social formation, the 
conception of that space nonetheless bears a striking resemblance to the 
Weberian understanding of it (see chapter 2).   More than this, there is an 
overarching tendency to conflate capitalism with neoliberalism, wherein the 
university is from the 1980s on - both from without and from within - 
increasingly subject to the logic of profit seeking behavior.  It is as though: 1) such 
behavior is what defines neoliberalism in toto; and, 2) during the immediate 
post-war era the university was not just sheltered from such patterns but to a 
large extent somehow non-capitalist; and, 3) there remain areas of the university 
that reside in spaces that are “relatively far from the market”(Marginson and 
Rhoades 2002, 287).       
                                                   
81 For instance, the 2001 special edition of “Higher Education”, in which a series of more 
critically minded scholars, including some of those referred to here, have pieces.  Vol. 41, No. 4, 
2001 
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 In many respects, this approach and this historiography is appealing, 
certainly more so than what is on offer in the mainstream of that literature.  On 
the one hand, there is a willingness to see neoliberalism as historically novel, and 
within that, to similarly complicate the institutions, social forces, and everyday 
practices that support and promote neoliberal forms of accumulation (Sheila 
Slaughter and Rhodes 2004).  In many respects this provides for a theory that is 
“good enough”.  For example, on a whole, the literature is able to obtain a good 
picture of the increasing relevance of key constituencies: biotech firms, so-called 
“interstitial organizations” such as departments of tech transfer, or the phalanx of 
lawyers that now populate ever larger in-house legal departments etc. (Sheila 
Slaughter and Rhodes 2004; S. Slaughter and Rhoades 1996; Marginson and 
Rhoades 2002; Marginson and van der Wende 2007).  They are also able to 
prompt a series of useful questions, as with those around the development and 
normalization of new practices and conventions around university based research 
(Krimsky 2004).  Herein, agency is also usefully complicated.  The re-making of 
the university is described from the inside-out, the outside-in, as well as from the 
top-down and the bottom-up too.  Thus, while the desire to see outcomes as the 
result of the complex interplay of agents and agency at the global, national, and 
local levels has been rooted in an often unfortunate turn of phrase (such as 
Marginson’s and Rhoades’ (2002) “glonacal agency heuristic”), the degree to 
which such approaches capture the dynamism and interconnectedness of events 
both in and outside the university is indispensable.  
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`On the other hand, without a totalizing theory of capitalism that begins as I 
maintain it must, with the social relations of production, the literature does a less 
spectacular job of pin-pointing what in fact makes neoliberalism so special (hint: 
it is not just the spread of profit/rent seeking behaviour).  In turn, the increasing 
centrality of the university to capital accumulation under neoliberalism is 
sometimes over-stated, at least relative to the centrality of the university in the 
reproduction of post-war capitalism (particularly in the jurisdictions under 
investigation).  Indeed, the conflation of neoliberalism with capitalism, and 
therein the use of what can only be read as an ideal-typical model of capitalism, 
betrays a kind of a-historicism that in turn speaks to the ontological weaknesses 
that are arguably at root in these problems.  Put differently, the structural 
tendencies within capitalist accumulation are not usefully read as simply the 
incursion of the market or of profit seeking behaviour into otherwise non-
capitalist areas.82   Rather, real-lived capitalism is about the particular and 
contingent conflicts and contradictions that inevitably arise in the context of 
capitalism, and the particular and contingent ways in which such conflicts and 
contradictions are resolved.  Anti-capitalist or ‘far from the market fields,’ are 
today very much rooted in capitalism, and their potential to uproot rather than 
                                                   
82 In the introduction, I pointed to the work of Sears (2003) as an example of what I am 
talking about.  Sears usefully complicates our understanding of the university in the immediate 
post-war period such that we can see how the university was fundamental to the reproduction of 
what was a different program of capitalist accumulation. Such an understanding is also available 
in Noble’s work (1977), albeit of an earlier era.  Mirowski (2011) also describes how the university 
was key to the reproduction of post-war capitalism in the US, and I have repeatedly referred to his 
analysis of the DOD’s “developmental program by stealth”.    
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preserve such, can only be evaluated from a perspective that considers this 
rootedness. (Fine and Milonakis 2009)  In as much as nothing within the 
university can be understood merely with reference to the so-called “economy”, 
so too is a full understanding made impossible without reference to it.  But even 
this is not quite good enough.  A totalizing holism requires that production 
relations be privileged, for the alternative is what was described in Chapter 2, a 
flat ontology that obscures the power-relations that describe capitalism in general 
and neoliberal capitalism in particular.83   The apparent complexity of the critical 
literature is, in other words, reductive along multiple vectors, and thereby 
provides little guidance as to how to access any particular object of inquiry.84  
Thus, there is neither the ability to obtain the essential nature of things like QA, 
or to usefully assess and strategically inform oppositional social forces and 
movements.          
 By way of a more concrete example, and so as to more fully contextualize 
and understand the neoliberal university, it is necessary to understand the 
centrality of global finance to neoliberal accumulation (i.e. it is necessary to 
                                                   
83 Again, in privileging production relations, I call for an ontology that sees reality as 
stratified and production as the only non-reducible domain of human relations (i.e. not reducible 
to any other causative variable or group of such).  This is in contrast to mainstream and some 
critical work that does not assert the stratification of reducibility of different domains, but instead 
maintains their autonomy.   
84 When “causative variables” are reduced to the cultural, political, or social phenomena, 
such classification is rarely explained, at least historically.  An object of analysis, must then be 
taken up because of its immediate appearance instead of because of its location within the 
political economy.  The difference is this: the university either becomes an object of interest 
because it has become an object of interest or because it occupies a particular position within 
neoliberal capitalist accumulation. 
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understand the role played by global finance in the determination of investment 
decisions and production).  Not only does this highlight some of the principal 
levers through which working class movements have been defeated and 
dissembled, it also helps to provide some insight into the broader 
ideological/ideational backdrop that has informed the shift towards 
neoliberalism both in and outside of the university.  Within this context, the 
numerical representation of qualitative phenomena takes on a different 
significance: it is inescapably about the commodification of both research and 
teaching. If the preceding chapter were not convincing enough, this chapter lends 
theoretical weight to the argument that there cannot be, within the current 
context, “clean” measures of quality, where cleanliness is defined by the degree to 
which measures are generative of outcomes that de-commodify and/or recreate a 
university that can function in service of human emancipation.  Simply, the 
processes of capitalist accumulation under neoliberalism (i.e. global finance) are 
so deeply inscribed within the logic of everyday life and the organization of the 
contemporary university, that it is all but impossible to imagine measurement 
being used progressively and in a manner that does not at the same time serve to 
reproduce less benign forms of measurement.85   In making this point I also mean 
to highlight the need to account for (more deeply than is the norm) the kind of 
autonomy that Western academics did enjoy during the era of the New Left as, in 
                                                   
85 Marginson and Van de Wende (2007) imagine “clean” rankings as being useful and 
productive of a less instrumental approach to higher education than they admit global rankings 
exercises currently encourage. 
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part, a by-product of the American states’ pursuit of an industrial policy by 
stealth (Mirowski 2011).  Just as it is not possible to imagine “clean” forms of QA, 
it is also necessary to explain how critically minded scholars have done precisely 
that, and, in the process extended forms of thought that are thoroughly 
imbricated by liberal humanist ideals that, in the 1960s, arguably forestalled 
more fundamental change.  
4.1 Towards a Totalizing Holism: The Social Relations of 
Production 
 As I have signaled throughout, chief among the fundamental ontological 
differences that separate the neoliberal analyses described in the previous 
chapter from the kind of Marxian lens used here is what I have referred to above 
as a “totalizing holism”.  Recall that in as much as the neoliberals have argued for 
concepts of endogenous causation (as with technological change), they 
nonetheless maintain strict distinctions – both theoretical and empirical – 
between the institutions that comprise whatever conception of a larger political 
economy they claim exists.  In other words, the logics that compel individual 
behavior within the larger political economy are conceived of as being 
autonomous from other such institutionally rooted logics.  So it is that causation 
is seen as being multiple and complex, without being conceived of as part of 
unifying and totalizing logic.86   So it is that power relations are obscured: in the 
                                                   
86 As David McNally usefully pointed out to me, Marx referred to this totality of complex 
and multiple causality, where each “causative variable” appears to operate according to an 
autonomous logic as,  “the unity of the diverse”. (Grundrisse)    
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complex world of competing or mutual reinforcing but nonetheless autonomous 
institutionalized logics, power is seen as being, at best, diffused, and at worst, 
totally unassailable.87      
 In opposition to this Marxists have argued for a more totalizing ontology, 
one within which the constitutive elements of the larger political economy are 
inextricably tied together, even in instances where different elements might 
appear to be in direct opposition to one another (Wood 1981; Ollman 2003; 
Lebowitz 2003). This contention, in turn feeds into the equally important notion 
that reality is stratified. The fabric that stitches together the non-autonomous 
elements within the political economy constitutes the essential characteristic of 
the/a political economic system.  For Marx, ontological primacy must be given to 
the social relations of (re)production only because human beings must organize 
in some manner to produce (and reproduce) the necessities of life.  Put another 
way, the social relations of production are irreducible to any other set of social 
relations such that they are necessarily given analytical privilege.  This neither 
means that everything is so reducible to the social relations of production, or that 
the ontological primacy given to the social relations of production is conceived of 
in static terms.88   On the contrary, it is precisely the social characteristic of any 
                                                   
87 For instance, in the neo-classical world, the relationship between workers and 
owners/managers is one totally absent of any notion of power, save for the ridiculous notion that 
workers enter into negotiations with their employers on an equal footing (i.e. with the power to 
walk away and find another job). 
88 Though this is discussed in more detail below, it is necessary to say something about 
this idea that not everything is reducible to the social relations of production.  First, to the extent 
that some phenomena cannot be usefully explained with reference to the social relations of 
production, the question raised by given the ontological primacy to the social relations of 
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mode of production that makes it dynamic – the socio-historical processes 
through which a dominant mode of production is constituted are precisely the 
subject matter with which Marx and Marxists are most concerned. (Ollman 
2003)89   
  Far too frequently, this notion of ontological primacy has been read as 
cause to distinguish an apparent “base” from some over-arching “super-
structure”, or, in more liberal quarters, to level the accusation of “economic 
reductionism”.  Ironically, this is precisely the tendency against which Marx was 
writing:  
 Marx’s purpose, then, is to stress not the dualism of the ‘material’ and the 
‘social’ but the definition of the material by the social; to define the 
material process of production not in opposition to the social process of 
production but as a social process; to focus attention not on ‘abstract 
matter’ but on the social form that gives it reality; to indicate not the 
usefulness but the emptiness of this abstraction; and insofar as he draws 
our attention to the abstraction of material production from its particular 
social form, he does so to stress not what the abstraction reveals but what 
it conceals.(Wood 1981, 72) 
                                                   
production, is how it is that some non-capitalist phenomenon exists within a world where, for 
example, capitalist social relations are all but universally present.  It is also vital to examine how 
the prevailing social relations of production might have been transformed within the context of 
prevailing social relations of production.  To choose an example that is germane to the subject of 
this thesis, while it is true that many of the social relations of knowledge production in the 
university pre-date the emergence of capitalism (say conventions around departmental 
hierarchies) is it really the case that they remain, within capitalism, qualitatively and functionally, 
non-capitalist?   
89 Marx put it this way: 
 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, 
which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given 
stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, 
on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite 
forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the 
general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their 
consciousness. (Marx 1977, 06/20/2013) 
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 Here Wood is alluding to Marx’s totalizing ontology while also raising the specter 
of Marx’s analysis of capitalism as a distinct and historically novel mode of 
production within which the “social” appears separated from the ‘political’ and 
the ‘economic’.  Against the charge of “economic reductionism”, Marxists simply 
reply that production is not “economic”!   
4.1.1 The Capital-Labour Relationship 
 It hardly needs repeating that in analyzing the capitalist mode of 
production via an analytical lens that privileges the social relations of production, 
Marx begins with the relationship between capital and labour.  In this section, 
and the two sections that follow, I set out what I see as the relevant structural 
motive forces at play in the making and remaking of QA and the neoliberal 
university.  In describing these structural tendencies I would highlight a few 
things for the reader.  This chapter follows my examination of the methods of QA 
and precedes my examination of the particular histories of QA in the US, the UK 
and Ontario intentionally, and as an indication of the method I have used in 
coming to understand the essential nature of QA.  Recall, I began by setting out 
the parameters of neoliberal thought and its role in the determination of 
education policy and in the emergence and evolution of QA.  I then proceeded to 
demonstrate how the dominant modes and measures of QA are reproducing both 
a common and low level of literacy and the rate at which new, but instrumentally 
weak, IP/knowledge is put-out, precisely the opposite of what neoliberal analyses 
claim QA will help to accomplish. I have, therefore, highlighted the need for a 
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different analytical lens than that used in the mainstream and some critical 
circles.   
 Necessarily, this was much more than a theoretical exercise.  On the 
contrary, it was an empirical and historical exercise that tested – and refuted - 
the truth-claims made in the mainstream.  The subsequent three chapters will 
take-up the particular cases in turn and thereby present an alternative historical 
narrative to that available in mainstream debates, and which will thereby enable 
us to understand the essential nature of QA in situ.  In outlining the structural 
tendencies that form the backdrop to this narrative in between the two tasks just 
outlined, I am therefore able to avoid reading theory into history.  In saying this I 
mean to briefly raise the fact that Marxists have long argued about how – and 
whether or not – any part of the history of capitalism can be read via a strictly 
structural dissection of capitalist accumulation, whether such must somehow be 
combined with an analysis that highlights the particular and the conjunctural, or 
whether the particular and conjunctural is really all that we have to consult in 
constructing an historical narrative. (Wood 1982)  While in the introduction of 
this chapter I signaled where in this debate I would situate myself, QA and the 
university do present something of a special case, particularly in so far as the 
apparent emergence of the “knowledge-based economy”, which some Marxists 
have referred to as “cognitive capitalism”, indicates a new stage of development 
and evolution in both the capitalist mode of production and the social relations of 
that process (Vercellone 2007; Hardt and Negri 2000).  While I do agree that we 
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have witnessed the emergence of a services-based economy that is based, in 
increasingly large part, on the commodification of immaterial objects, and on the 
psycho-social and intellectual capacities of some workers, I would argue that the 
basic structural motive forces at play are the same as they were/are in more 
materially based productive processes.  Whether we are talking about the mass 
production of widgets under capitalist social relations or about the mass 
production of commercializable research or a skilled workforce, both are 
fundamentally capitalist in nature.  Indeed, both productive processes are 
premised upon the social division of labour between those that own the means of 
production and those that do not.  I would further maintain that some Marxists 
have perhaps made too much of the degree to which some workers are putatively 
tasked with the conception of immaterial commodities and are thereby able to 
enjoy relatively more freedom and power than are those workers that produce 
tangible things.  Indeed, the apparent weakness of managerial efforts to control 
“knowledge-based production” or, more plainly, knowledge production, is the 
very obfuscation with which this dissertation is most concerned.  Taylor’s time 
and motion studies are but a hair’s breadth from modes and methods of QA that 
are today leveraged by capital in the pursuit of profit.90  As David Harvey puts it, 
 The concrete forms of technology, organization and authority can vary 
greatly from one place to another, from one firm to another, as long as 
such variations do not challenge the accumulation process.  There are, 
evidently, more ways to make a profit than there are to skin a cat.  And if 
the value productivity of labour can be better secured by some reasonable 
                                                   
90 This issue is discussed in greater detail below. I would, however, point to some work 
that helps to clarify these points.  (Huws 2003; Harvey 2005; Harvey 1999 esp. p. 116) 
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level of worker autonomy, then so be it.  Capital is, presumably, indifferent 
to how the value productivity of labour is preserved and enhanced. 
(Harvey 1999, 116) 
 
To get at the centrality of the capital-labour relationship within capitalism Marx 
begins with an analysis of the commodity, and commodity production.  While it is 
not my intent to run through his analysis in any detail, there are two aspects of 
Marx’s analysis that are central to this dissertation and which are therefore 
usefully reviewed below.  The first has to do with the nature and production of 
value within capitalism and the associated need for capital to constantly measure.  
The second issue concerns – in very broad terms – the nature of class relations 
and the social relations of production that lead to the normalization and 
internalization of capital’s efforts at measurement.   
4.1.2 Managing Value Production & the Drive to Measure 
 Arguably, Marx’s signal contribution to political economy was the idea that 
the exchange value of any commodity is determined by the amount of socially 
necessary labour time required to produce it.  Indeed, it is this idea, in turn built 
upon Marx’s distinction between use-value, exchange-value, and value from 
which the rest of his analysis flows.  Marx’s argument is simple: under conditions 
of commodity production and exchange in competitive markets (i.e. capitalism), 
different use-values are rendered commensurable (and thus exchangeable) not 
because their use-values are quantitatively equivalent, which is impossible to 
know, but because each commodity both has a specific ‘social use-value’ and has 
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been produced by some amount of socially necessary labour time.  In other 
words, for Marx, prices are correlated to “the labour required to produce an 
article under the normal conditions of production and with the average degree of 
skill and intensity prevalent at the time.”(Marx 1887, 6/15/2013)  Accordingly, 
money acts as a kind of yardstick, reducing all socially necessary use-values to a 
numerical representation of the socially necessary labour time required to 
produce them (i.e. to commensurable exchange-values).   
 Several issues stem from this dissection. First, we see that value, according 
to Marx, is a social relationship, which is developed through capitalist production 
and exchange.  ‘Value’ is that process which renders different forms of concrete 
labour commensurable by reducing them to socially necessary labour time. 
Second, the process through which value is created and exchanged, renders the 
conditions of production invisible:  
 The exchange of commodities for money is real enough, yet it conceals our 
social relationships with others behind a mere thing - the money form 
itself.  The act of exchange tells us nothing about the conditions of labour 
of the producers, for example, and keeps us in a state of ignorance 
concerning our social relations as these are mediated by the market 
system. We respond solely to the prices of quantities of use values. But this 
also suggests that, when we exchange things, ‘we imply the existence of 
value…without being aware of it.’ The existence of money – the form of 
value – conceals the social meaning of value itself. ‘Value does not stalk 
about with a label describing what it is.” (Marx 1887 as quoted in; Harvey 
1999, 17) 
 
Third, the relationship between values and prices is never constant.  Rather, 
prices are correlated to value in the aggregate only, and are otherwise rather 
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fluid.  This is because, exchange-values are themselves built upon two very fluid 
things: socially necessary use-values and socially necessary labour time.  As such 
and because “the price system permits the formation of values at the same time 
as it conceals the social basis of values from view, the magnitude of relative prices 
does not necessarily have to correspond to the magnitude of relative 
values”(Harvey 1999, 18).   Fourth, capitalist production and exchange requires a 
particular juridical foundation: private property and the capitalist state: 
 Exchange of commodities presupposes the right of private proprietors to 
dispose freely of the products of their labour. This juridical relations is ‘but 
the reflection of the real economic relations of exchange (Capital, vol. 1 
p.84).  If exchange ratios are to be established and accurately reflect social 
requirements, then producers must ‘treat each other as private owners of 
alienable objects and by implication as independent individuals’.  This 
meant that the ‘juridical individuals’ (persons, corporations, etc.) must be 
able to approach each other on an equal footing in exchange, as sole and 
exclusive owners of commodities with the freedom to buy from and sell to 
whomsoever they please.  For such a condition to exist supposes not only a 
solid legal foundation to exchange but also the power to sustain private 
property rights and enforce contract.  This power, of course, reside in the 
‘the state’. The state in some form of another is a necessary precondition to 
the establishment of value. (Harvey 1999, 19) 
 
Of course, none of this gives us a direct link to the source of profit, which is the 
goal to which every capitalist does – and must – strive.  It does, however, give us 
a clue: because exchange is between equivalents, the source of excess or ‘surplus 
value’ must be found in the productive process.  In so far as labour sells its 
capacity to do labour (labour-power) to the capitalist for a wage, Marx makes 
clear that this ‘special commodity’ is necessarily reproduced.  And as with all 
commodities, labour-power is reproduced when socially necessary labour time is 
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expended.  But it does not follow that the amount of socially necessary labour 
time required to reproduce labour-power is the same as the capacity of labour to 
produce value.  On the contrary, as Marx makes clear, these are simply different 
magnitudes.   
 What this means is that capitalists realize profit when the amount paid in 
wages, materials, and overhead, is less than the exchange value of the 
commodities produced.  Having said this, it is vital to recall that all of the costs 
involved in production are either reducible to socially necessary labour time or 
are effectively fixed.  This is because inputs (raw materials) trade at prices that 
correlate to socially necessary labour time (i.e. they are produced as 
commodities), and, because overhead and management costs are not very fluid.91   
The upshot is that in order to increase the rate of profit, capitalists necessarily 
have to press down wages, the only truly variable costs on the capitalist’s ledger.92   
                                                   
91 Overhead costs may change with the scale of production, but once incurred are 
effectively sunk, at least for the short-to-medium term; factories cannot be replaced overnight, 
and fixed capital machinery, particularly in increasingly hi-tech industries, is remarkably 
expensive; the cost of fixed capital investment may be amortized (and thereby apportioned on a 
per-unit basis to the costs of production) but it cannot be incurred every day. Thus, although 
things like energy prices might change, and thus appear on the capitalist’s ledger as variable, the 
rate of consumption of energy for the machines used in production does not.  As concerns 
management expenses, capitalists do have some room to reduce management expenses to 
increase profitability – but there is a strict limit to this, namely the point at which reductions in 
worker productivity begin to occur given low levels of supervision.   
  Marx notes that the tendency to press-wages down is moderated, both by class conflict, 
and, in the absence of such, by the need to reproduce the basis for on-going accumulation.  So it 
was that Marx talked about the tendency of capital to constitute itself as a class, partly in order to 
ensure that labour-power is not absolutely destroyed or immiserated by the too fevered 
competition between capitalists.   
92 Marx notes that the tendency to press-wages down is moderated, both by class conflict, 
and, in the absence of such, by the need to reproduce the basis for on-going accumulation.  So it 
was that Marx talked about the tendency of capital to constitute itself as a class, partly in order to 
ensure that labour-power is not absolutely destroyed or immiserated by the too fevered 
competition between capitalists.   
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Capitalists do this in one, and generally all, of three ways: 1) they seek to lengthen 
and/or intensify the work day and drive down wages relative to the rate of 
production; 2) they may act cooperatively (and generally with help from the 
state) to reduce the cost of wage goods, thereby making room to press wages 
lower; and, 3) they may look to drive down their costs of production by 
introducing labour- and materials-saving technologies, thereby reducing their 
overall wage bill.93  In each case, the effect is to create conflict between the 
working and the ruling classes. Capitalists’ attempts to lengthen and/or intensify 
the workday will tend to engender a reaction, a concerted effort on the part of 
labour to organize and regulate the working day.  Workers will look to realize the 
benefits of reductions to the cost of wage goods, just as capitalists will.  And 
workers will look to either control the introduction of new technologies, the 
application of such, or else maintain production guarantees and/or employment 
levels.  Both the opposition of labour and the tendency for individual capitals to 
destroy labour, in turn pushes capital to constitute itself as a class, and to find 
ways in which to limit the ability of workers to combine, the effect that they may 
have once they do combine, and to mitigate against the damaging impact of 
                                                   
93 It is possible for capitalists to increase profits without decreasing wages, namely by 
growing the size of the market for a particular commodity.  This may increase profits overall, but 
will not generally effect an increase to the rate of profit.  To the extent that the growth of a market 
segment is large, capitalists may be able to ramp-up production and introduce labour- and 
materials-saving technologies without actually lowering their wage bill.  In as much as this may 
mean that that the wage bill in absolute terms may remain the same or even increase, particularly 
given the need for additional raw materials, we must recognize that the productivity increase is in 
effect a wage reduction.  And moreover, this method of growth has strict limits, ones that are 
reached quickly in competitive markets. 
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errant capitalists or of unremitting competition between them.  This means that 
capitalist production is an anarchic balancing act.  We find competing capitalists 
looking for ways in which to reduce wages, and ameliorate class conflict and 
tension (both inter- and intra-).  As such, capitalists have interests that are at 
once the same and inimical.  We also find wage labour as not just the object of 
capitalists’ often competing and often concerted efforts, but as a class sometimes 
constituted as a disparate group of individual workers, more or less subject to the 
effects of capitalist competition on both a macro- and a micro-level, at other 
times as a cohesive class able to effect and contain the program of capitalist 
accumulation, and at still other times, as a divided and structurally separated 
class wherein some groups are able to leverage high levels of organization at the 
expense of more disorganized workers.  And of course we also find the capitalist 
state, effectively the institutionalization of capitalist social relations in the shape 
of so many bureaucratic agencies, each with different and sometimes competing 
interests, generally tied to specific class groups, but structurally reliant upon 
capital to invest in and grow the economy.  Whatever the relative power of key 
agencies within the state, or the nature of their competing interests, the state is, 
overall, bound to ensure that the conditions for growth and investment are 
always in place.   
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4.2 The Social Relations of Production: Consciousness, 
Alienation, and Reification 
4.2.1 Consciousness and the Labour Process: Marx and Lukacs 
 To an extent I have already anticipated some of what is discussed in more 
detail immediately: how and why it is that class conflict will tend to be resolved in 
a manner most beneficial to capital.  On the one hand, the objective conditions of 
capitalist production and exchange, and the history of how such came to exist, 
favour capital. Capital’s dominion over the state, pose significant obstacles to the 
ability of workers to combine.  Of course, for Marx, the objective conditions of 
capitalist production, are but one side of the story. The other side has to do with 
the way in which the objective conditions of capitalist production are linked to a 
hegemonic – but far from absolute - form of consciousness that compromises 
workers’ willingness and ability to organize in opposition to capital so as to create 
a more egalitarian social order.  That ‘form of consciousness’ was described by 
Marx as a sense of internal (subjective) division and sub-division, whereby a 
worker was alienated from their work, from the products of their work, from each 
other, and from their basic humanity. In other words, commodity production 
affects a form of consciousness that mitigates workers’ (and capitalist’s) ability to 
see and understand the complex of social relationships and power structures that 
constitute and reproduce their social whole (Ollman 1976, 06/25/2013).  So it is 
that Ollman talks about, in describing Marx’s concept of alienation, someone so 
cleaved into separate parts that they are, “isolated from the social whole (Ollman 
1976, 06/23/2013)”.  The ramifications for worker’s ability to successfully oppose 
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capital are obvious and severe. Without an ability to stitch together a complete 
and holistic picture of the way in which capitalism works, the efforts of workers to 
resist and oppose capital’s unending drive to squeeze ever more surplus value out 
of them, are, at best, also partial and incomplete.    
 In describing the mechanisms by which capitalist production affects the 
kind of consciousness just described, Marx was referring to the realities of 
capitalist production that workers in the North then faced: increasingly large-
scale forms of commodity production.  Accordingly, workers’ consciousness was 
transformed in a manner that roughly corresponded to such processes.  First, 
because workers no longer participated directly in communal processes that 
yielded the necessities of life, but were instead forced to trade at market for the 
commodities necessary to survive, the relationship between workers, like the 
conditions under which such commodities were produced, appeared, as, 
“material relations between persons and social relations between things (Marx 
1887, 06/20/2013)”. Such “social relations between things” Marx identified as 
leading to “commodity fetishism”, wherein workers would ascribe to 
commodities an inherent value separate and apart from the value that workers 
created by their efforts.  Workers’ willingness to combine in opposition to the 
conditions of production was undermined because they were at once blind to the 
conditions faced by most workers and simultaneously conditioned to covet 
commodities.  Second, workers were alienated both from their work and from the 
products of their work in so far as they no longer enjoyed control over the 
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productive process.  On the contrary, workers played either no or an increasingly 
minor role in envisioning the end result of their efforts, and they were thereby 
divested of any concern for the overall product of their work, (save of course, for 
that level of concern the capitalist was able to purchase, given the willingness of 
other workers to so apply themselves). (Ollman 1976, 6/20/2013)   
 Similarly, and third, workers were alienated from other human beings in 
so far as the product of their work was owned by the capitalist, whose interests 
were directly opposite to that of the worker.  Because the workers efforts are 
disposed of in a manner that preserves her life but which serves the interests of 
capital, the worker is alienated from her fellow human beings (i.e. in the same 
manner that capitalists see labourers as but labour power, and thus as akin to 
mere machines, workers are alienated from capitalists). Ollman puts it this way: 
 The worker faces the capitalist with the very same attitudes, but whereas 
his employer is able to act toward him with the callous and reckless 
abandon of the strong, the worker shows his weakness only too clearly 
through sullen and hateful acquiescence. Their social alienation is a two-
way street. Pulling in opposite directions, at the command of competing 
interests, their relations are necessarily antagonistic. (Ollman 1976, 
6/20/2013) 
 
Likewise, workers confront capital not as ‘workers’ per se, but as different 
concrete capacities, with different tolerances for hard-work and abuse, all 
coordinated by the capitalist in a competitive market (i.e. with a standing army of 
reserve labour).  As such, even the co-location of workers (on, for instance, an 
assembly line), does not necessarily lead to the recognition of their common 
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humanity.  On the contrary, for Marx, the manner in which workers confront 
other workers manifests as a different aspect of the alienated worker (i.e. the 
alienation of workers from other workers).  In follows then that Marx also saw 
commodity production as a process of separating workers from their own 
humanity. In being rendered as labour-power, a worker’s capacity to work (and 
any associated skills) were separated from her and objectified as commodities 
possessed outside themselves. (Ollman 1976, 06/20/2013; Lukacs 1967, 
06/20/2013)   
 Marx’s commentary on consciousness and alienation was scattered 
throughout his work.  A more sustained and focused analysis of this process was 
subsequently delivered by Lukacs (1967). Instead of alienation, however, Lukacs 
was most concerned with “reification”, which he described as a process of 
objectification, or “thingification” that is correctly understood as deepening of 
particular aspects of Marx’s larger theory of alienation (May 2006). Lukacs draws 
from both Marx and Weber and focuses much of his attention on the ever 
evolving division of labour under capitalism. For Lukacs capitalist production 
entailed the extension of Taylorist techniques and the triumph of what Weber 
described as “formal” (bureaucratic) rationality.  Like Marx, Lukacs argued that 
such Taylorist processes (Marx, of course, did not refer to Taylor) led to the 
segmentation and division of reality (i.e. the productive process, and the workers 
that work within it) into myriad constitutive and machine-like parts, each of 
which was manipulated in the never-ending drive to increase productivity.  As 
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such, and again like Marx, Lukacs argued that “our vision of the social whole” 
(Lukacs 1967a, 6/20/2013) was thereby fragmented, obscured, made all but 
invisible.  To the extent that Lukacs departed at all from Marx, it was with respect 
to the degree to which he conceived of this process of segmenting reality as more 
than just a subjective perspective that corresponded to the capitalist mode of 
production, but rather as an increasingly objective and thus real force. Lukacs 
describes this process:   
The commodity character of the commodity, the abstract, quantitative 
mode of calculability shows itself here in its purest form: the reified mind 
necessarily sees it as the form in which its own authentic immediacy 
becomes manifest and - as reified consciousness - does not even attempt to 
transcend it. On the contrary, it is concerned to make it permanent by 
‘scientifically deepening’ the laws at work. Just as the capitalist system 
continuously produces and reproduces itself economically on higher and 
higher levels, the structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, 
more fatefully and more definitively into the consciousness of man. 
(Lukacs 1967, 6/20/2013) 
 
Lukacs was abundantly clear with respect to what this meant for the primary 
focus of capitalists.  In a passage that is germane to the subject at hand, Lukacs 
quotes Marx:  
 Through the subordination of man to the machine the situation arises in 
which men are effaced by their labour; in which the pendulum of the clock 
has become as accurate a measure of the relative activity of two workers as 
it is of the speed of two locomotives. Therefore we should not say that one 
man's hour is worth another man's hour, but rather that one man during 
an hour is worth as much as another man during an hour. Time is 
everything, man is nothing; he is at most the incarnation of time. Quality 
no longer matters. Quantity is everything. (Marx 1999 as quoted in; 
Lukacs 1967) 
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Immediately thereafter Lukacs continues, making clear the process of reification 
just described: 
 Thus time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into an 
exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable ‘things’ 
(the reified, mechanically objectified ‘performance’ of the worker, wholly 
separated from his total human personality: in short, it becomes space. In 
this environment where time is transformed into abstract, exactly 
measurable, physical space, an environment at once the cause and effect of 
the scientifically and mechanically fragmented and specialised production 
of the object of labour, the subjects of labour must likewise be rationally 
fragmented. On the one hand, the objectification of their labour-power 
into something opposed to their total personality (a process already 
accomplished with the sale of that labour-power as a commodity) is now 
made into the permanent ineluctable reality of their daily life. Here, too, 
the personality can do no more than look on helplessly while its own 
existence is reduced to an isolated particle and fed into an alien system. 
On the other hand, the mechanical disintegration of the process of 
production into its components also destroys those bonds that had bound 
individuals to a community in the days when production was still ‘organic’. 
In this respect, too, makes them isolated abstract atoms whose work no 
longer brings them together directly and organically; it becomes mediated 
to an increasing extent exclusively by the abstract laws of the mechanism 
which imprisons them. (Lukacs 1967, 6/20/2013) 
 
4.2.2 From Industrial Production to Knowledge Production 
 It goes almost without saying that Marx’s theory of alienation and its 
subsequent interpretation by Marxists, not least by Lukacs, has generated a great 
deal of debate within Marxian circles.94  While I did touch on some of the aspects 
of this debate earlier in this chapter, when I discussed the advent of ‘cognitive 
capitalism’, it is necessary to, at this point, deepen that discussion somewhat, if 
                                                   
94 David Harvey (1999) provides an outstanding overview of these debates. See (Harvey 
1999 see esp. p. 106-119) 
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only to make clear the linkages I am asserting exist between the process of 
alienation and the advent of QA in and around the university.   
 Marx’s analysis of the objective and subjective manifestations of capitalist 
production (i.e. the division of labour, the drive to increase productivity, and the 
process of alienation to which both workers and capitalists are subject), has 
obvious implications for how we conceive of agency.  In short, there would appear 
to be some antimony between Marx’s conception of the alienated worker and his 
call for workers to emancipate themselves from the bondages of capitalism.  This 
is so in in that Marx’s theorization seems to suggest that workers will be rendered 
incapable of challenging the power of capital both because capitalist production 
entails the progressive “de-skilling” of workers and the transformation of their 
subjectivity (i.e. the form of consciousness just described).  What is problematic 
about this theorization of capitalist production is the degree to which it appears 
to depart from the history of capitalism, which is rife with example after example 
of workers combining and opposing, with varying degrees of success, the efforts 
of capitalists to transform the workplace- and the workers in it – as Marx 
described.  Indeed, the history of capitalism is what many of Marx’s critics, and 
particularly those more trained on Braverman’s seminal, “Labour and Monopoly 
Capital” (1998), have leveraged in seeking to demonstrate the weakness of Marx’s 
analysis and his revolutionary aims.  Rather than the secular and terminal de-
skilling of workers and the complete subjugation of workers’ consciousness, 
capitalist history is full of examples where workers have creatively organized in 
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opposition to capital, thereby seizing some greater measure of control over the 
productive process than they may otherwise have had.  Accordingly, Marx’s 
critics highlight that the push and pull between workers and capitalists is not 
only constant, but also the driving force behind the evolution of capitalist 
technologies and methods of production.  Instead of emerging as a result of 
capitalists’ responses to the exigencies created by market-based competition, 
capitalists and workers, by their opposition and/or cooperation, create and 
amend the capitalist mode of production. (Burawoy 1979; Friedman 1977; Harvey 
1999) 
 As Harvey notes, in mounting these criticisms,  
 “it is as if, having got inside the labour process in a most instructive way, 
they [the critics of Marx’s theorization of the capitalist labour process and 
its consequences] then forget there is a whole world out there of 
competitive pricing, disinvestment and reinvestment, mobility of money 
capital, etc.” (Harvey 1999, 136)  
 
In other words, and as Harvey also makes clear, in focusing so closely as they do 
on the particularities of a labour process, critics of Marx’s theorization ignore the 
broader, structural tendencies of capitalist accumulation.  Again, what Marx 
enables us to obtain is a sense of capitalism’s totality. Of course, this theoretical 
stick can be bent too far, for, as Thompson famously put it,  
 …no worker known to historians ever had surplus-value taken out if his 
hide without finding some way of fighting back (there are plenty of ways of 
going slow); and, paradoxically, by his fighting back the tendencies were 
diverted and the “forms of development” were themselves developed in 
unexpected ways (Thompson 1978, 346 as quoted in; Harvey 1999, 115)  
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Thankfully, Harvey proposes a way out, a means by which to preserve Marx’s 
theoretical insights and holism, which goes beyond simply describing Marx’s 
work as a description of so many “structural tendencies”.  For Harvey, 
commodity production both obscures from view the conditions of production and 
entails a technical division of labour that transforms the nature and type of skills 
workers possess:   
 We should note in this how the word ‘skill’ undergoes a subtle 
transformation of meaning.  On the one hand, there is the traditional craft 
and artisan skill which confers a certain power upon whoever possesses it 
because it is, to some degree, monopolizable.  Such skills are anathema to 
capital.  They can act as a barrier to the accumulation of capital (wage 
rates are sensitive to their scarcity) and prevent the penetration of 
capitalist social relations of domination and subordination within 
production.  These are the skills that have to be eliminated if capitalism is 
to survive. On the other hand, it is important for capital that new skills 
emerge: skills which allow for flexibility and adaptability and, above all, 
substitutability – that are non-monopolizable.  The ‘de-skilling’ of which 
Marx writes often entails a direct transformation from monopolizable to 
non-monopolizable skills. But the former kind of skill can never disappear 
totally.  The skills of the engineers, the scientists, managers, designers and 
so on often become monopolizable. The only question is, then, whether the 
monopoly powers that attach to such skills are totally absorbed as a power 
of capital, through the formation of a distinctive faction of the bourgeoisie 
(the managers and scientists), or whether they can be captured as part of 
the collective powers of labour. (Harvey 1999, 109) 
 
What Harvey suggests, in other words, is that the “de-skilling” hypothesis 
proposed by Marx and taken to the extreme by Braverman is perhaps the by-
product of, “too facile a transition from the abstraction to the very concrete 
strategies of deskilling” (Harvey 1999, 115).  Instead the expression of this 
tendency is best seen as a battle over skill, its definition, and the control thereof, 
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which Harvey conceives of as the tendency to replace “monopolizable” skill, with 
“non-monopolizable skills” or highly reproducible and/or substitutable skills.  On 
this score, the tendency is abundantly clear: 
 All of the evidence suggests that this has been the direction in which 
capitalism has been moving, with substantial islands of resistance here 
and innumerable pockets of resistance there.  To the extent that the 
reduction of skilled to simple labour is still in the course of being 
accomplished, we have to conclude that capitalism is in the course of 
becoming more true to the law of value implied in its dominant mode of 
production.  From this standpoint, at least, there seems to be little ground 
for disputing Marx’s or Braverman’s basic line of argumentation. (Harvey 
1999, 119) 
 
We are now at the point at which we can consider QA as a managerial strategy 
designed to increase the productivity of universities in putting-out sufficiently 
well skilled/trained workers and/or commercializable research.  First, it bears 
keeping in mind that, as was demonstrated in Chapter 2, mainstream neoliberal 
theory is clearly the by-product of the kind of battle over and re-definition of skill 
just described.  Recall that in the mainstream literature, reality is seen to be 
made-up of so many discrete and autonomous spheres of activity.  In turn, 
causation is held to be a matter of correlation between events in one or multiple 
such spheres, where “events” are conceived of in terms of rational individual 
action under conditions of bounded rationality.  As such, reality is rendered into 
a kind model that can be reproduced and used to predict behaviour in similar 
such conditions such that wise public policy can be developed.  Thus, to the 
criticisms that I have already leveled against such modes of thought we must add 
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the degree to which it is not just a-historic, but also, and by both its design and 
intent, formulaic.  In other words, mainstream theory seeks to obtain a kind of 
universality of form and of content (i.e. rational actors are plugged into 
autonomous institutional milieu such that human behaviour can thus be at once 
“gamed-out” and explained).  Recall too that such modes of thought have 
developed and been extended to all of the social sciences within the context of a 
politically charged process - economics imperialism.  Omitted in such imperial 
exercises has been the history of such imperial activities (for instance, the 
Cambridge Capital Controversy, like so many courses on the history of 
economics, has simply been cut from both undergraduate and graduate 
economics curricula).95   As such, many contemporary practitioners of 
mainstream theories are not conscious of their disciplinary history, or of the 
degree to which the practice of social science has been transformed into a readily 
reproducible and scientistic exercise.  This was, of course, part of the basic thrust 
of Marx’s critique of political economy. 
 The point here is to highlight that to which Harvey draws our attention in 
his discussion of skill and its redefinition under capitalism.  The instrumental 
rationalities (i.e. the skills) that QA both represents and aims to reproduce are 
precisely those which are non-monopolizable and thus substitutable.  In this 
regard, it may be helpful to quickly recall some of the evidence that was examined 
                                                   
95 It stands to reason that, in introducing students to the discipline of economics, 
Mankiw’s (2012) textbook would introduce students to the history of economic thought and 
therein to things like the Cambridge Capital Controversy.  It does no such thing. (Mankiw 2012) 
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in Chapter 3. During the era when QA has become ubiquitous in the jurisdictions 
under investigation (and indeed throughout the world), literacy levels among 
college graduates have tended to solidify at a low level. Similarly, on the research 
front, less and less IP is hitting the commons, and the rate at which sound science 
is being produced appears to have declined markedly.  And in both cases, the 
methods and mechanisms of QA demonstrably encourage such trends and 
tendencies.   
 In discussing Marx’s concept of ‘value’ and the capitalist’s obsession with 
measurement, what I necessarily highlighted was the way in which ‘value’ was 
determined via a constant process of negotiation between labour and capital over, 
on the one hand, socially necessary labour time, and, on the other hand, surplus 
value.  Irrespective of the (im)materiality of the manufacture, QA is, in multiple 
respects, an effective tool in the regulation of socially necessary labour time.  
First, it is, as Shore and Wright (1999) have highlighted, an effective social 
technology, a kind of “panopticon”, that can be used to establish a benchmark set 
of expectations against which workers (in this case students, academics and 
university administrators) will tend regulate and/or police their own behavior, 
specifically around the “productivity” of their various efforts (research dollars 
earned, levels of student satisfaction, patents generated, awards won, publication 
counts etc.).  Relatedly, and second, in so far as QA is consistently linked with 
both levels of resource and remuneration, it operates as both a direct measure of 
efficiency and as disciplinary mechanism, establishing and then enforcing a 
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benchmark of socially necessary labour time (De Angelis and Harvie 2009). 
Further, as resources are tightened, QA operates as a means by which to impose 
greater productivity requirements, and thereby as a mechanism to reduce the 
socially necessary labour time involved in the production of graduates and 
commercializable research (De Angelis and Harvie 2009). Third, and finally, QA 
affects a transformation in the forms of inquiry and thought that take place 
within the university.  This goes well beyond the kind of transformation affected 
by the QA “panopticon”, where departmental chairs and program directors, or 
quality assessment officers seek to “incentivize” around particular output targets, 
or colleagues compete for acclaim, remuneration, and job security.  Indeed, QA 
affects the shape of thought in the same way that economics imperialism has and 
continues to transform the social sciences: QA presses academe into the 
commodity form, into non-monopolizable and ever more easily substitutable 
forms of knowledge and inquiry.  Mirowski, drawing on the work of others, 
conceives of this as the intentional “production of ignorance”(agnotoly) 
(Mirowski 2011).  But this is a subsidiary effect of QA, the larger, more important 
being the reproduction of conventions of manipulation around the negotiation of 
socially necessary labour time.96          
                                                   
96 As Huws notes in her immensely useful examination of “knowledge work”,  
 
The skills required to operate a computer and its various communications accessories 
should not, of course, be mistaken for the totality of the requirements of any given job.  
They are often ancillary to other “core” skills – the skills required to do “the job itself.”  
However, these too may be undergoing a process of modification (which could take the 
form of routinization, of full commodification) that is changing their nature.  Social 
workers, for instance, may find themselves filling out standard forms on-screen instead of 
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4.3 The Social Relations of Capitalist Production and the 
University 
 To this point I have argued for a “totalizing holism,” wherein we begin an 
analysis of social phenomena (in this case the university and QA) by first 
enquiring as to the primary and irreducible social relationships of production so 
as to illuminate the constitutive logic of secondary, tertiary (and so on) social 
relationships.  The question taken up in this section is necessarily posed at a 
slightly lower level of analysis (in terms of the stratification just mentioned): how 
are we to conceive of the university within capitalism in general?   In some 
measure I have already provided something of an answer to this question. My 
critique of thinkers like Marginson, Rhoades, and Slaughter, was centred around 
their willingness to conceive of certain phenomena within the university as 
somehow non-capitalist because such phenomena did not appear to be directly 
                                                   
writing or delivering in person more nuanced and qualitative professional reports on 
their clients; teachers may find themselves administering standard tests; insurance loss 
adjusters may have lost the discretion to decide what compensation a claimant should 
receive; Internet journalists may be required to write tightly defined standard formats; 
and architects may be reduced to recombining standard components.(Huws 2003, 167)  
 
Much the same could be said of other forms of “knowledge work” too: software designers 
increasingly rely upon standard “linguistic” forms in the design of similarly standardized user-
interfaces; physicians are increasingly taught to rely on a variety of diagnostic technologies 
instead of their own diagnostic skills; and indeed, engineers and architects are taught to use 
increasingly conventional and standardized forms in the generation of designs and technologies.  
The same is true of work in jobs that some scholars have argued require specific “managerial” 
skills: retail store managers rely on computer generated sales and productivity reports, on human 
resources management manuals that detail how workers are to be managed, spoken too, and 
disciplined.  Even body language and linguistic form are increasingly directed.  Not only does this 
add an interesting fold to the extent to which “knowledge work” in fact requires the “production 
of knowledge,” or the use of, “problem solving skills, communication skills, organizational skills, 
and the ability to work in teams…,”  it thereby indicates the extent to which mere, “problem 
solving skills,” exercised within remarkably structured and directive contexts, have been cast as 
“creative” and “inventive.” 
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reproductive of capitalist social relations.  However direct or indirect are the 
reproductive functions of the university, the development and universality of 
capitalism prior to the neoliberal era, suggests that the university was 
nonetheless implicated in the reproduction of post-war capitalism, in ways that 
transcended the university’s nonetheless crucial role as the source of new 
knowledge for the military industrial complex.  
 Again, my point is that the university must be conceived of as having some 
function/role within capitalism and, further, that such a function can only be 
discerned historically.  It may well be that the university, either in part or in 
whole, historically or presently, operates far from the apex of capitalist 
production and reproduction.  Some within the university may even work in the 
university to undermine capitalist social relations.  However, the residue or 
reflection of capitalist social relations, whether those relations are more or less 
proximate to the operation of the university, is nonetheless fundamentally 
inscribed therein.  When the function of the university has appeared to be 
relatively far from capitalist production, we must account for this apparent 
distance, first and foremost, by reference to the history of capitalism and of 
capital.  And we must do this in three senses: 1) with regard to the historical 
moment when the commodity-form and thus capitalist social relations became 
universal within any particular political economy (i.e. the moment when the 
social division of labour between workers and capital became central to the 
productive activities in a given society); 2) with regard to the way in which 
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capitalist social relations are reflected in both dominant and heterodox modes of 
thought, which will bear indelibly the marks of capital (i.e. we must understand 
the way in which the kind and level of consciousness promoted within all sectors 
of the university reflect capital, even where the intent of developing a particular 
kind of consciousness seeks to undo capital); and, 3) with regard to the way in 
which and the degree to which the university is the fount of new knowledge and 
“human capital” for capitalist production.        
 In other words, the university has long reproduced/reflected a form of 
consciousness fundamental to capitalist production (Noble 1977).  More recently, 
the university has become increasingly central to both the ideological 
reproduction of capitalist social relations and the forms of consciousness such 
entails, as well as to the production of commodities (including labour-power).   
The university has thus taken on a significance that it did not always have: as an 
industrial enterprise all its own.  Where the ideological reproductive function that 
the university once played did not require close management by capital or the 
capitalist state, the commodity- and ideology- reproducing roles that it now plays 
do require more and better forms of management.  Because this functional 
repositioning of the university has happened in the context of an increasingly 
global capitalist political economy described by the re-emergence and hegemony 
of global finance, the managerial strategies employed by and in the contemporary 
university have appeared more natural and necessary than might have otherwise 
been the case.  Indeed, the ubiquity of QA speaks to both the functional 
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repositioning of the university within capitalism and to the extent to which 
dominant modes of thought /consciousness reflect the apparently natural logic of 
global finance, which is built entirely on the numerical representation of 
qualitative phenomena.   
4.4 The Social Relations of Neoliberal Capitalist Production 
and the University 
 Given the historical accounts that follow immediately, I will conclude this 
chapter with only a brief outline of the broad brush-strokes of the real-lived 
history from which the theorization just provided stems.  As the political 
economies of the advanced capitalist states have matured, capitalism has 
expanded both in terms of breadth and depth; the large-scale deindustrialization 
of the Global North has involved parallel processes of intensive commodification 
(i.e. the commodification of “immaterial objects”), and the emergence of new 
sites for the production of material commodities (Gindin and Panitch 2012).  
Thus, the rise of the so-called “weightless economy”(Quah 1999) has by no means 
entailed a diminution of material production (quite the opposite) but it has seen 
the progressive commodification of immaterial ‘objects’, like futures contracts, 
insurance policies, as well as of different forms of labour-power, as the fount of 
growth in, among others, those jurisdictions under investigation.  Whether  
productive of surplus value or not, to the extent that the production of such 
immaterial manufacture does have costs and is critical to the earning of profit, it 
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is simply vital that those costs be quantified and measured relative to the returns 
they help to generate.   
 Not coincidentally, mainstream economists have, since 1973, been puzzled 
by the so-called “productivity paradox” (Gordon 2000).  In essence the ‘paradox’ 
has to do with the fact that despite massive investments in high-tech fixed capital, 
productivity growth rates in the OECD dropped rather suddenly and 
precipitously and have remained historically low since then.  It is generally 
agreed that the issue remains one of measurement: how do you measure output 
in a services based economy, where ‘products’ are immaterial?  This actually 
elides another problem: the measurement of inputs (i.e. how to measure the 
value of the cognitive skills necessary to produce immaterial products).  Without 
getting into the details of how economists are inventing ways to apportion value 
to things such as computers that replace slightly older, but generally just as 
functional computers, the “knowledge economy” requires that there be an ability 
to measure the value that “knowledge workers” add to a productive process that 
results in immaterial commodities (Scarpetta and OECD 2003; Sharpe, 
Arsenault, and Harrison 2008; OECD 1996).   
 At the same time (the 1970s), higher rates of participation in post-
secondary education sector, which had taken shape within the context of the 
Keynesian compromise, posed significant challenges to the existing order. Not 
only did the sector itself require additional support, but, as the Trilateral 
Commission clearly acknowledged (see intro to Chapter 2), traditionally high 
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post-graduation incomes could not be provided to the average graduate, given the 
expanded size of the sector, without a massive transfer of wealth (from rich to 
poor) also taking place.  Of course, this recognition took place in the context of 
larger concerns about, on the one hand, the strength of organized labour, which 
had been identified as a key driver of historically high-rates of inflation, and, on 
the other hand, declining corporate profit rates. (Crozier et al. 1975)  In the US, 
the sense of crisis was further augmented by the catch-up of Germany and Japan, 
and its emerging balance of payments deficit, most clearly manifest in the 
inability of the US to maintain the Gold Standard (Gindin and Panitch 2012).  As 
was discussed, the resolution to this crisis was offered in direct opposition to its 
apparent cause: “over-loaded” government, itself a by-product of Keynesian 
macro-economic policy and the “nanny state”, rising wages (relative to capital’s 
portion of value-added), and the apparent inflexibility of labour-markets (Gindin 
and Panitch 2012; Fine and Milonakis 2009; Dumenil and Levy 2005).  As was 
outlined at the outset of this chapter, other, more derivative, transformations 
were at play here too.  In the US, for example, increasingly focused military 
spending upset the US government’s ability to finance the huge amount of 
industry and university based R&D in the manner that it had throughout the Cold 
War (Mirowski 2011).  And, the concerted interests of Big Pharma, agri-business, 
health-care, and the military-industrial cum consumer goods industry, all came 
in the 1970s and 1980s to see the resurrection – and indeed massive 
improvement – of their corporate profitability in outsourcing and offshoring, to, 
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among other sites, publicly funded universities (Mirowski 2011; S. Slaughter and 
Rhoades 1996).  This of course, gelled perfectly with the modus operandi then 
being pursued by finance capital and an increasingly large portion of American 
productive capital, which had itself either/both fallen under the thumb of finance 
or merged with/morphed into powerful amalgams of both fractions (Gindin and 
Panitch 2012; Leys 1985).   
 The “capital strike” that began in the US in 1980, not only had global 
ramifications, it was but one salvo (albeit a key one) in an historic attack on the 
working class, and a thorough re-engineering of the capitalist state and the 
international cum global political economy according to the strictures and logic of 
global finance (Gindin and Panitch 2012; Newstadt 2008).  In this context, 
universities throughout the world, and most certainly in the three jurisdictions 
under investigation, first faced massive cut-backs and then escalating pressure to 
increase their productive efficiency in terms of graduates (trained workers) and 
commercializable research.  Such pressure entailed a re-engineering of the 
university itself: the transformation of the governance and administrative 
apparatus, the imposition of the “publish or perish” orthodoxy, an increased 
reliance on non-tenured and contract faculty, and QA (Sheila Slaughter and 
Rhodes 2004; Marginson and Rhoades 2002; Rajagopal 2002; Walker 1999).  
The university, in other words, emerged as an increasingly important site in the 
reproduction of capitalism along multiple vectors.  The imposition of QA, in as 
much as it was and remains a political project and a social technology, was also a 
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structural requirement.  Capital needed to be, and was, negotiated in new ways.  
New forms of value therefore also needed to be found, measured, and managed 
(De Angelis and Harvie 2009; Harvie 2006; Shore and Wright 1999). 
 We find four mutually reinforcing phenomena which have and continue to 
be causative in both states’ and the capitals’ drive to develop and enhance 
mechanisms of QA: 1) a process of commodity production (which includes 
commodification) as a structural element within capitalist accumulation; 2) the 
political necessity to commodify labour-power in the services sector; 3) the drive 
to extend the domain of mainstream neo- and new-classical economics, and the 
relative success of that project; and, 4) capital’s reaction to the massification of 
the university which happened in part as a result of popular demands for such 
(and the simultaneous attack on organized labour).  We must, of course, remain 
cognizant of the degree to which there have been and still are popular calls for 
governments to develop QA, as well as for private sector initiatives that do the 
same.  As the foregoing has made clear, part of the neoliberal experiment has 
been the drive to (re)produce labour market flexibility by building popular 
support for such.  And the consequences for “everyday life” of global finance and 
the unfolding of American led neo-liberalism can hardly be under-estimated 
(Langley 2008).  That the consciousness of workers would, in part, reflect the 
interests of capital, particularly given the emergence of increasingly competitive 
and global labour markets, which force workers to find ways to differentiate 
themselves, should come as no surprise. 
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Chapter 5: The Long History of QA in America and 
the Political Economy of American Higher 
Education 
 The “system” of quality assessment at play in American higher education is 
heavily decentred, arguably more so than in any other jurisdiction.  Indeed, the 
American system is not operated according to the dictates of any central 
governmental agency, there is no central repository of information about the 
system, and no single set of standards are applied in the assessment of even 
similar institutions across the country. Far from create any kind of informational 
deficit however, the availability of QA related information in the US is 
astounding.  Through various media, and often via aggressive marketing 
campaigns undertaken by the institutions themselves, rankings and league tables 
that ostensibly describe America’s institutions of higher education are 
everywhere.  For the proponents of America’s system of QA the decentred nature 
of that system is touted as a strength.  It is said that the sheer density and variety 
of different measures and approaches to QA is indicative of the variety and 
alleged dynamism of institutions that make-up American higher education. Such 
proponents argue that because the higher education landscape in America is so 
dynamic and variegated it is necessary to assess different institutions differently 
(Brittingham 2009; Lombardi et al. 2001).  More than this, for the champions of 
America’s system of QA, the ability to assure quality in a dynamic and highly 
differentiated system means that American institutions put out a high-quality, 
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highly differentiated, and flexible labour force. In other words, every labour 
market demand can be met with a ready supply of highly skilled/trained workers.      
 As I make clear below, the arguments offered in support of America’s 
system of QA leave much to be desired.  America’s system of higher education is 
not so highly “differentiated” as it is stratified, and America’s system of QA 
recreates that stratification.97  Moreover, all of the apparently diverse 
mechanisms of QA are uniformly rooted in the logic of value, which, as I also 
make clear, was the logic that has shaped, both immediately and historically, the 
design of America’s system of QA.  Importantly, the heavily decentred nature of 
                                                   
97 Those institutions that are generally designated as making up America’s system of 
higher education tend to be accredited through one of six regional accrediting agencies, which in 
turn operate under a single national banner.  The accrediting agencies are also subject to 
evaluative procedures, which, since the 1950s, have net them recognition by the federal 
government’s Department of Education (U.S. Dept. of Education 2013). Such recognition of the 
accrediting agencies is critical to the institutions that are, in turn, accredited by such accreditors, 
for it provides them access to federal funding arrangements, including the federal government’s 
long-standing system of portable student grants and loans.  Though the specifics of how the 
accrediting agencies review and assess institutions is something of a mystery, it is nonetheless 
clear that all of the agencies rely heavily on some form peer review, which operates in respect of a 
specified set of evaluative areas and criteria, the relative import/weight of which is not publicly 
available.  Professional programs are also accredited by whatever professional association self-
regulates a given profession, as with the American Medical Association (CHEA 2013).  Outside of 
such accreditation evaluations, institutions – and the programs/departments within them – are 
also assessed by a large number of non-governmental and often private-sector organizations that 
rank institutions and programs according to a set number of evaluative criteria that are weighted 
differently for different institution types, disciplines etc. Beneath the program level, students are 
subject to various forms of mass evaluation, generally via standardized tests.  But such 
standardized forms of student evaluation are read-up through the larger system of QA.  For 
example, measures of student engagement are sometimes reflected in institution and/or program 
level rankings exercises and evaluations.  Similarly, SAT entrance scores are understood to be 
artifacts of “peer quality”, which is also used commonly as an evaluative criteria in the assessment 
and ranking of institutional and/or program quality (see for instance Morse and Flanigan 2012).  
Other forms of evaluation track the performance of both institutions and faculty in terms of 
research, as with data on things like “research dollars earned”.  And as with the mass evaluations 
of students, evaluations of faculty also get rolled into the myriad private-sector rankings exercises 
mentioned above.  Also, the eligibility to participate in federally funded research programs relies 
on assessments of past performance, which has increasingly included measures of the number 
and value of private-sector partnership and co-sponsorship deals (Mervis 2012). 
215 
America’s system of QA does make that system appear far more chaotic that it is 
in fact.  Such chaos does seem to support the conventional argument around 
differentiation, however, for it appears unlikely that hierarchical order could 
result from so many seemingly discrete and disorganized assessments.  Indeed, 
America’s system of QA is described by a terrific number of private- and public-
sector actors, whose dense inter-connections are not well-known or highly 
publicized, such that it is difficult to account for and track, at least at first blush, 
the relative importance of any single actor, or to assert any kind of direct 
causative logic that has driven the stratification of the American system. In fact, 
QA was pioneered in the US specifically as a means by which to discipline the 
academy, leverage the university in the service of corporate America, and 
dispense with those institutional alternatives/competitors that might have 
heralded a different order.  Since its earliest articulations through the early part 
of the last century, QA has always been about capital and the law of value.  
Indeed, looked at through an historical lens attuned to the rhythms of America’s 
political economy, the chaos of America’s system of QA is turned into a logical 
and well-tuned program that has become ever more formalized and fundamental, 
not just to the operation of American higher education, but, as we shall see, to the 
operation of higher education throughout the world.   
 Having already reviewed the standardized tests and rankings exercises 
that are ubiquitous in the American system, this chapter begins with an 
examination of accreditation within the American system.  Necessarily, this 
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review is short because America’s system of accreditation is somewhat 
mysterious and the intricacies of that system are not well publicized (Harvey 
2004).  In the sections that follow this examination of accreditation I explore a 
more detailed political economy of American higher education with an eye to 
explaining the degree to which measurement has long played an absolutely 
critical role in the development and functioning of American higher education.  I 
conclude by outlining the significance of the American case in terms of other 
national and sub-national systems of higher education.     
5.1 Quality Assessment and Accreditation 
 Higher education institutions in the United States must be accredited by 
one of six regional accrediting agencies in order to qualify for participation in 
federal student grant and loan programs (CHEA 2013).  Both the Pell Grants and 
the National Student Loan Program make up a significant proportion of 
institutional revenues, and as such are the backbone of America’s system of 
higher education (Moody’s Investor Service 2013; College Board 2012).  Were 
accreditation not also a valuable reputational commodity in and of itself, the 
relative importance of federal student grant and loan programs would make it 
absolutely vital for institutions to be accredited.98   As is discussed in greater 
                                                   
98 Though tuition-fees now make-up the majority of operating revenues at US universities 
(both public and private), this was not always the case.  In any event, though government 
transfers for operating purposes have declined, as both Moody’s and the College Board make 
clear, student aid from state and federal agencies has increased. Thus, the state continues to 
support higher education in the US, albeit in a manner than has students bear ultimate 
responsibility for those costs. 
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detail below, the American system of accreditation emerged in the closing 
decades of the 19th century (Brittingham 2009).  The motive forces behind the 
emergence of accreditation are not comprehensively discussed anywhere.  
Mainstream accounts describe the emergence of accreditation as a by-product of, 
on the one hand, an intensely competitive higher education market that was 
plagued by the emergence of myriad “diploma mills”, and, on the other hand, a 
pantheon of “great” institutions intent on proving their value (Brittingham 2009; 
CHEA 2013).  In what is essentially a story about consumer protection, reputable 
institutions are said to have pursued accreditation as a means by which to assure 
the general public of the quality of the product that they were going to purchase, 
or which they had previously purchased.  The corollary is that the sector itself 
sought to preserve and promote excellence and to develop some consensus 
around what constituted a university or college level education. As the state 
became increasingly involved in the financing of higher education, it too 
apparently benefitted from the process of accreditation, and in precisely the 
manner as did/do individual consumers and the institutions they attend 
(Brittingham 2009).   
 One such example of this line of argument is provided by Barbara 
Brittingham, the Director of the New England Association of Schools and 
Colleges’, Committee of Institutions of Higher Education.  In her trenchant 
defense of accreditation, Brittingham begins not with an historical account, but 
rather with an outline of the apparent advantages of the American system of 
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accreditation, which is then read into the history she subsequently provides.  For 
Brittinghan, the American system of accreditation is unique in that: 
1) Accreditation is a nongovernmental, self-regulatory, peer review system.  
2) Nearly all of the work is done by volunteers. 
3) Accreditation relies on the candor of institutions to assess themselves 
against a set of standards, viewed in the light of their mission, and identify 
their strengths and concerns, using the process itself for 
improvement.(Brittingham 2009, 10) 
 
Accordingly, Brittingham argues that the pattern of self-regulatory governance 
that describes American accreditation is derivative of, first, the U.S. constitution, 
which made education a matter of state authority, and secondly, two Supreme 
Court decisions, which subsequently had the effect of limiting the authority of 
state governments in respect of the administration of US colleges and 
universities.  Thus,  
 …while the federal government has become more prominent in matters of 
education, the early development of the education system in this country 
was left free of government control, allowing the establishment of a 
diverse array of colleges and universities. The lack of government 
regulation also meant there was no clear and uniform floor on the 
minimum expectations for a college or a college education, leaving a 
vacuum that accreditation grew to fill. Thus, the social interest in having a 
sense of minimum standards was in part responsible for the development 
of accreditation. (Brittingham 2009: p.10) 
 
While the relative absence of the state set the stage for the development of 
accreditation, what for Brittingham really drove the development of that process 
was what she describes as the unique nature of “American values”.  Apparently, 
and unlike other jurisdictions,  
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 American’s value problem-solving and entrepreneurship…Americans also 
believe in the ability of the individual to achieve a self-identified 
goal…Volunteering is, of course, a great American tradition: Americans 
volunteer in schools, hospitals, fire departments, and settlement 
houses…Americans also believe in self-improvement, an activity requiring 
self-evaluation and identification of areas that could benefit from 
enhancement.(Brittingham 2009: p.10-12) 
 
It follows that, as higher education became increasingly important and the 
market more varied, institutions – though generally those occupying positions of 
pre-eminence in each region - grouped together and developed standards of 
accreditation that relied on peer review.  Brittingham notes that the review 
processes evolved over-time: they became less quantitative and more qualitative; 
they became less prescriptive and more “mission centred”; and, they become 
increasingly aspirational and “focused on the future”.  In fact, as the number and 
type of institutions expanded, the enforcement of prescriptive standards did shift 
towards a more “mission-centred” approach, wherein accrediting agencies 
evaluated an institution’s performance relative to its own mission and purpose 
statement.99   As I clarify below, it is unlikely that the motive forces behind the 
development of this “qualitative” and “mission centred” approach were related to 
what Brittingham would presumably describe as American’s unique craving for, 
and defense of, freedom.   
                                                   
99 As is outlined in more detail below, the 6 regional accrediting bodies, all of which 
publish some version of a “principles of accreditation” document tend to describe quality as a 
balance between what are always vaguely defined “normal” or “generally accepted collegiate 
standards” with an evaluation of how well taught courses and research reflect an institution’s 
mission.     
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Critical accounts of the development of accreditation in the US simply do not 
exist.  But critical accounts of the development of the American system of higher 
education do exist, and they hint at the process through which accreditation 
actually came to be.100   Noble (1977), for example, highlights the role played by 
people such as Charles Mann in a huge variety of efforts that were designed to 
push the universities closer to industry and turn them into would-be production 
facilities for corporate America.  Mann, who trained as a physicist, quickly went 
on to win favour with corporate America and with the captains of the corporation 
school movement after becoming a champion of “practical” higher education.  In 
this regard, Mann’s story is typical of many others who emerged as “educational 
engineers” (Barrow 1990, 111) in and around the first few decades of the 20th 
century, when corporate America undertook to re-engineer American higher 
education.101    
 In a similar vein, Clyde Barrow (1990) and Barbara Ann Scott (1983) have 
separately documented how the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
                                                   
100 In what follows I rely heavily on David Noble’s (1977) book, America by Design, 
Slaughter’s and Da Silva’s (1984) work, Serving Power: The Making of the Academic Science 
Expert, Clyde Barrow’s (1990) book, Higher Education and the Capitalist State, and Barbara Ann 
Scott’s (1983). Crisis Management in American Higher Education 
101 Among other notable roles that he played, Mann sat on the board of the very same 
accrediting agency that Barbara Brittingham now directs, the New England Association of Schools 
and Colleges.  He was also instrumental in the development of the military take-over of American 
higher education during WWI, which he subsequently spun into a program of testing that built 
upon and extended similar such programs in the corporation schools.  He also authored the first 
national report on the state of engineering education, which, as is discussed below, he was clear 
about wanting to make more industry oriented.  Mann was outspoken when it came to the content 
and direction of higher education and it defies belief that he would ever have championed a 
regulatory program that was not designed to press the university closer to the private sector. 
(Noble 1977) 
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Teaching (CFAT), and Rockefeller’s, General Education Board (GEB), along with 
numerous and densely related corporately endowed philanthropic organizations, 
operated both in conjunction with, and under the auspices of, the US Bureau of 
Education, to place first states’ and then the nation’s entire system of higher 
education under the thumb of corporate America.  Herein, both Barrow and Scott 
highlight that, in the early 1920s the Bureau of Education took-up the CFAT’s 
plan for a streamlined and rationalized national system of higher education, and, 
with resources from the CFAT, created the capacity to conduct surveys 
(assessments/audits) of both individual higher education institutions as well as 
whole state systems (Barrow 1990, Chap 4; Scott 1983, Chap. 2).  On the basis of 
Taylorist principles and the measurement of, among other things, “student clock-
hours” (Barrow 1990, 70), the Bureau of Education subjected myriad institutions 
and state systems of higher education to value-for-money type assessments 
aimed at increasing the productive efficiency of American higher education.  In 
the process, the Bureau of Education not only become what Barrow describes as a 
kind of intellectual centre of gravity for educational policy, it also set in motion 
processes that took dead-aim at those progressive and socialist academics that 
stood in the way of the Bureau’s efforts to rationalize higher education (Barrow 
1990, 122).  In other words, corporate America and the American state 
cooperated closely to create not just an integrated and efficient system of higher 
education, but also, and just as significantly, a particular kind of academic, one 
disposed to the “manufacture” in response to the needs of American capitalism.   
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 It also bears keeping in mind that the American social sciences were 
consciously constructed to “serve power” such that the academy organized to 
circumscribe academic freedom (E. Silva and Slaughter 1984).  Not only did this 
bolster the aspirations of corporate America with respect to the structure and 
operation of higher education, it also meant that peer review could hardly have 
operated only as a measure of the degree to which curricular standards had and 
would continue to be met.  For Silva and Slaughter, the scope of academic 
freedom in America was limited in primarily, though not exclusively, two ways: 1) 
the social scientists either directly sanctioned some of their more radically 
minded colleagues, or else they allowed such colleagues to be sanctioned by 
university managers and trustees; and, 2) by defining – and narrowing – the 
scope of what became increasingly segmented and specialized areas of study so as 
to aid in the reproduction of industrial capitalism (again leaving aside radical 
ideas).  Such efforts and allowances were undertaken by social scientists in a bid 
to professionalize the academy and, thereby, to position social scientists as 
“experts” able to provide sound guidance to the public and decision makers on all 
manner of issues.  In short, the social scientists cultivated popular notions of 
expertise in a manner that guaranteed them the on-going financial support of the 
corporate elite (who were often key benefactors of the institutions where they 
worked or else trustees at the same), and the managers of their institutions, who 
were either similarly concerned or else were dedicated to the principles of higher 
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education championed by corporate America.102 Though their work did not 
extend to the present, Silva and Slaughter, writing in 1984, make clear that the 
legacy of these efforts still remains intact. (Silva and Slaughter 1984)   
 In sum then, the history of the American academy suggests that 
accreditation and peer review can hardly be conceived of as relatively benign 
mechanisms of self-regulation and consumer protection. Accreditation is rooted 
in both the ambitions of corporate America, which saw in that process the 
promise of an almost mechanized program of human capital (re)production, and 
in the ambitions of an academy intent on controlling both access to the ivory 
tower and the status that is conferred by such access. In this light, the processes 
employed by the accrediting agencies – which rely heavily on peer review – 
appear as something of a sideshow.   
 While it would undoubtedly be useful in the context of this examination to 
look more deeply at how it is the accrediting agencies actually use peer review, 
such is not possible.103   None of the accrediting agencies provide much in the way 
                                                   
102 In many cases the presidents and vice-chancellors of the most prestigious universities 
were the very engineers who, as Noble has outlined, built American higher education “by design.”   
103 Clyde Barrow’s (1990) does a spectacular job of outlining how it is peer review used to 
work.  He notes that,  
 
In 1918, only forty-four universities, or about 8 percent of all four-year higher 
institutions, awarded Ph.D’s in the United States.  Sixty one percent of these forty-four 
were private universities located mainly in the industrial Northeast and consisting 
precisely of those universities most closely and directly attached to the major 
northeastern financial groups.  These private universities awarded 74 percent of all 
Ph.D.’s granted in the United States in 1918.  Moreover, of the Ph.D.’s awarded by this 
group of private universities, two-thirds were granted by only five institutions: Harvard, 
Yale, Columbia, Cornell, and the University of Chicago. (Barrow 1990, 122) 
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of detail with respect to their assessment and accreditation procedures and 
protocols.  For example, the so-called “public disclosure statements” issued by 
the accrediting bodies following accreditation reviews lack any kind of 
substantive detail.  By way of a more specific example, the Southern Association 
of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC) in its public 
disclosure statement regarding the decision of SACSOC assessors to place the 
Birmingham-Southern College on “continued warning”, and thus in potential 
jeopardy of losing their accreditation, the SACSCOC rather vaguely explained: 
Why was Birmingham-Southern College continued on 
Warning? Birmingham-Southern College was continued on Warning 
because the Commission’s Board of Trustees determined that the 
institution had failed to demonstrate compliance with Core Requirement 
2.11.1 (Financial Resources) and Comprehensive Standard 3.10.1 
(Financial Stability) of the Principles of Accreditation. These standards 
expect an institution to provide evidence that it has a sound financial base 
and demonstrated financial stability. (SACS Commission on Colleges 2012 
emphasis in original)104 
 
The “Principles of Accreditation” to which this explanation refers are de rigueur 
for all of the regional accreditation bodies.  In fact, each of the six regional 
accreditors makes publicly available an outline of what standards an institution 
must meet in order to become and remain accredited.  Such statements, however, 
provide little of the kind of detail made public by the by the UK’s Quality Audit 
Agency, subsequent to its institutional reviews (these reviews are described in 
                                                   
In other words, the development of the American intelligentsia was, at least, initially, something 
of a family affair.   
104 To read the full statement for the standards cited above, access the Principles of 
Accreditation at http://www.sacscoc.org/principles.asp. 
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Chapter 6).  This, of course, is entirely intentional.  Statements regarding the 
principles of accreditation are left vague and open because accreditation is 
related first and foremost to an institution’s self-expressed “mission and 
purpose”, which, as the statement above suggests, universities and colleges fulfill 
by being financially stable and viable. In other words, accrediting agencies are 
not able to say anything substantive about the maintenance of high academic 
standards at any institution because high academic standards are ultimately 
reduced to “prudent” financial management; by establishing financial viability as 
a core concern within an evaluative procedure that claims to focus on an 
institutions’ own mission statement, the accrediting agencies assert a respect for 
institutional autonomy that defines such autonomy strictly in terms of success at 
market.  This is not to suggest that an institution will have as its mission the 
maintenance of low academic standards.  Rather, because some accredited 
institutions look to achieve high standards in, for example, vocational forms of 
training, which have an obvious utility in a highly “differentiated” system, 
“academic excellence” must take on an entirely different meaning and relevance 
if the accreditation procedure is to reproduce that differentiation.  Of course, and 
as was alluded to earlier, institutional “differentiation” has not developed in the 
United States on the basis of what could aptly be described as a “free” or 
“natural” expression of market logic.  On the contrary, corporate America, 
through the CFAT and the GEB, and in close cooperation with the American 
state, channeled resources to a handful of private and public institutions 
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specifically so as to facilitate such “differentiation”, notably on the basis of what 
were held to be qualitative assessments of individual students, of particular 
faculty, and indeed entire institutions (Barrow 1990; Scott 1983, 34).   In ignoring 
both the history of “selective philanthropy” (Scott 1983, 34), and the significance 
of contemporary forms of conditional finance, while emphasizing an institution’s 
“self-defined” mission statement, accreditation processes by-pass any 
consideration of the hierarchical nature of American higher education while 
simultaneously laying claim to the idea that accreditation fuels “differentiation” 
and quality.  In other words, accreditation in the US is a disciplinary form of 
valuation.  What are described as qualitative assessments of institutions’ taught 
programs merely assess how well or how poorly an institution is able to produce 
exchange value.     
 Again, all of this is done via an initial, and all important obfuscation: the 
apparent respect for institutional autonomy via an evaluative process that 
measures excellence relative to an institution’s own definition of such (i.e. its 
mission statement).  For a sense of how much emphasis is placed on a 
university’s mission statement relative to academic standards, I have quoted 
below from the New England Association of Schools and Colleges (NEASC) 
accreditation manual.  Of the eleven standards that institutions must meet in 
order to obtain and maintain accreditation, the “Mission and Purposes” is 
outlined as the first: 
 STANDARD ONE:  MISSION AND PURPOSES 
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 The institution’s mission and purposes are appropriate to higher 
education, consistent with its charter or other operating authority, and 
implemented in a manner that complies with the Standards of the 
Commission on Institutions of Higher Education.   The institution’s 
mission gives direction to its activities and provides a basis for the 
assessment and enhancement of the institution’s effectiveness.  
  
 1.1   The mission of the institution defines its distinctive character, 
addresses the needs of society and identifies the students the institution 
seeks to serve, and reflects both the institution's traditions and its vision 
for the future.   The institution’s mission provides the basis upon which 
the institution identifies its priorities, plans its future and evaluates its 
endeavors; it provides a basis for the evaluation of the institution against 
the Commission’s Standards. 
  
 1.2   The institution's mission is set forth in a concise statement that is 
formally adopted by the governing board and appears in appropriate 
institutional publications.   
  
 1.3   The institution's purposes are concrete and realistic and further 
define its educational and other dimensions, including scholarship, 
research, and public service.  Consistent with its mission, the institution 
endeavors to enhance the communities it serves. 
  
 1.4   The mission and purposes of the institution are accepted and widely 
understood by its governing board, administration, faculty, staff, and 
students. They provide direction to the curricula and other activities and 
form the basis on which expectations for student learning are developed.  
Specific objectives, reflective of the institution's overall mission and 
purposes, are developed by the institution's individual units. 
  
  Institutional Effectiveness 
 1.5   The institution periodically re-evaluates the content and pertinence of 
its mission and purposes, assessing their usefulness in providing overall 
direction in planning and resource allocation.  The results of this 
evaluation are used to enhance institutional effectiveness. (NEASC 2011) 
 
As is clear from the above, the first ‘standard’ outlined in the NEASC’s ‘Standards 
for Accreditation’ is one to which most of the 10 other standards refer. For 
example, in outlining, “Standard Four: The Academic Program” the NEACS 
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document begins with this: “The institution’s academic programs are consistent 
with and serve to fulfill its mission and purposes” (NEASC 2011). Where the 
principles do refer to a more, “general academic or collegiate standard or level of 
achievement” (NEASC 2011), the NEACS document is entirely unclear about 
what constitutes such a ‘general academic or collegiate standard or level of 
achievement’.  At best, the document refers to a standard that is, “in keeping with 
generally accepted practice” (NEASC 2011).  
 It is also noteworthy that the actual review process appears to be less a 
process of peer review than it is a review process performed by a select group of 
volunteers, whose skills as evaluators/auditors are cultivated in training 
programs operated by the accrediting agencies. Generally speaking, the data used 
assessments are mimetic of the system as a whole in so far as the data revolves 
around things like bibliometric indices, research dollars awarded, average 
student scores on standardized tests etc.  And again, any curricular evaluation is 
performed, as was just outlined, with reference to an institution’s mission 
statement, and with reference to something akin to “collegiate-level skill”, a 
euphemism that should by now provoke readers to recall the results of the 
International Adult Literacy and Life Skills Survey (outlined in Chapter 3).  
 Ultimately, the American system of accreditation hardly offers the kind of 
assurance that proponents like Brittingham claim it offers.  Instead, what the 
description above suggests is that the process of accreditation in the US is at best 
reproductive of the American system of higher education, irrespective of what 
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that might mean in terms of quality.  Indeed, in so far as the system of 
accreditation is mimetic of QA in general, it operates to further embed and 
normalize the program of measurement with which this dissertation is most 
concerned.  In this regard, it is perhaps the case that accreditation is best 
understood as a kind of research and development / labour market policy that 
has been packaged and sold as evidence of excellence.  To inquire as to the 
accuracy of this assertion, we turn now to examine more closely the history of 
accreditation and QA in the US.  
5.2 The Political Economy of American of Higher Education 
and QA 
 As is the case in the other jurisdictions under investigation, most excurses 
on American higher education begin in similar manner, with a few statements 
that allegedly describe the American system as a whole.  Accordingly, we find that 
America’s system of higher education is large, varied, and dynamic.  As one 
source puts it: “The system lacks formal, structural elegance, but it more than 
compensates with its comprehensive scope and its remarkable resilience and 
dynamism” (Lombardi et al. 2001, 2).  In what follows, I argue that such 
descriptions are not just inaccurate, for reasons I’ve outlined above (which are 
more developed below), they are also incomplete.  What has been left out of most 
mainstream accounts of higher education in America is any indication of how 
fundamentally it has reflected and supported the development of capitalism, 
arguably to a greater extent than has any other system of higher education in any 
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other jurisdiction.  In fact, from the beginning of the second industrial revolution, 
the temper and pace of higher education has been tied to the development of first 
an industrially based political economy, and more recently, a political economy 
built upon the pillars of American-cum-global finance.  Throughout its history, 
the American academy has been consistently and effectively marshalled in the 
production of commercializable research or military hardware and “human 
capital”.  More than this, scholarly inquiry has been plagued by and reproductive 
of a kind of instrumental scientism that a-historically seeks to obtain scientific 
rigour and elegance, which it does only in form, but never in substance.  In other 
words, modern American higher education has effectively reproduced both the 
material and the ideological conditions for capitalist accumulation both at home 
and abroad.  And within that system, QA, generally in the form of testing and 
accreditation, but in ways that were also – and increasingly - linked to research 
“productivity” and the measurement thereof, have functioned with increasing 
centrality in mediating, maintaining, and reinforcing the relationship between 
knowledge production, research, higher education and the marketplace.  As a 
result of that long-standing relationship between higher education, QA, and 
American capitalism, the American case is utterly central to this dissertation for 
it suggests that QA is effective at helping to reproduce the kind of knowledge and 
labour-power that are fundamental to capitalist accumulation.  The economic 
and political pre-eminence of America coupled with the pre-eminence of 
America’s research intensive universities on every global ranking exercise, lends 
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further credence to my argument that systems of QA benchmark against the 
“achievements” of American institutions, and are furthermore designed to 
replicate the dynamism and reproductive power of the American system as a 
whole.   
 In documenting the history and development of higher education and QA 
in America, one finds that mainstream analyses are radically incomplete not just 
because they leave out key facts, but because they tend to employ ontological and 
epistemological devices that obscure more than they reveal.  Similar to the 
mainstream literatures on QA in general (discussed in Chapters 2 & 3), and on 
the history of QA in both the UK and Ontario (discussed in Chapters 6&7), 
mainstream analyses have tended to focus exclusively on the development and 
evolution of “institutions” writ large, and therein on long-standing conventions of 
self-regulation and governance, institutional autonomy, and systemic 
variegation.  This focus on institutions is used as a means to prove the long-
standing tradition of independence and systemic dynamism, which is generally 
held-up as evidence of ideological independence / the university as a centre of 
Truth (Thelin 2004; Cohen 2010; Rudolph 1990).  As I indicated above, such 
‘independence’ and ‘autonomy’ are illusory.   
 The American system of higher education developed initially under the 
guidance of corporate America.  As corporate America came by the 1920s to 
understand the efficacy of using the state’s authority to, in a limited way, compel 
particular patterns of behaviour, the state’s capacity to manage higher education 
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was developed and used (Noble 1977; Barrow 1990, 102). But because the levers 
of corporate control were so deeply inscribed in the design and operation of the 
system itself, there was never a need for the American state to establish the kind 
of powers governments in both the UK and Ontario developed.  It was simply not 
necessary for the state to do much more than create a particular kind of juridical 
backdrop and aid in patterns of research funding established by corporate 
America. 
 Levels of government control were also moderated because the academy 
itself cultivated a popular identity that forestalled any meaningful notion of 
academic freedom, particularly when that identity crystallized institutionally.  
With a helping hand from corporate donors the academy sentenced itself to a 
regime of reproduction, (Silva and Slaughter 1984; Barrow 1990, Chapter 4).  
Indeed, what I mean to argue is that the mechanisms of reproduction developed 
apparently within America’s heavily decentralized and variegated system of 
higher education, (and allegedly not under the auspices of the American state), 
such that America’s system of higher education was and remains the envy of 
capitalist states and capitalists the world over.  Again, this is why so many 
attempts to mimic the efficiency of the American system have looked to impose, 
frequently through QA, the kind of market-based logic that is often seen as the 
source of America’s dynamism.   
 It is useful to think of the history of American higher education – and 
within that of QA – as having moved through four broad phases, each of which 
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are described by obvious continuities and equally obvious discontinuities.  For 
present purposes, what notably distinguishes one phase from the next is the 
degree to which the academic enterprise is commodified and subject to 
measurement.  Indeed, while, as Barrow (1990) points out, the “captains of 
industry and erudition” began the last century with great ambitions concerning 
the rationalization of American higher education, it was not until the 1980s and 
1990s that their ambitions were all but fully realized.    
 The first phase, between the 1890’s and the 1930’s, was one during which 
the primary conventions of American science took-shape first within corporate 
laboratories before moving into the natural and managerial sciences in America’s 
leading colleges and universities.  Similarly, many of the pedagogical conventions 
of contemporary higher education, as much for the social as the natural sciences, 
were transplanted from the corporation schools that corporate America formed 
in and around the turn of the last century.  The measurement of students in 
myriad ways played a fundamental role during this phase, as did the program of 
accreditation.  Both were seen as fundamental tools in the development of what 
was always understood as a kind of industrial exercise, where the manufacture 
was a particular kind of student and a particular form of research (Noble 1977; 
Mirowski 2011a; Barrow 1990; Scott 1983).   
 The crisis of the 1930s proved something of an interregnum. Popular and 
student dissent through the course of the Great Depression highlighted the 
contradictions in American capitalism.  Through the Great Deperssion, colleges 
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and universities, where they had previously been regarded as gatekeepers to 
upper and upper-middle class privilege, proved unable to deliver on the promise 
of upward mobility.  Students, in other words, objected to the promise they were 
paying for, but which they appeared unlikely to receive. The Great Depression 
also placed higher education out of reach for many who had prospered during the 
1920s.  The ferment that these conditions created fizzled however in the run-up 
to World War Two.  Arguably, things rapidly settled down by the late 1930s in 
part because of internal fissures that emerged within oppositional movements 
over the anti-war positions that many took, and in part because of the degree to 
which both the so-called “first” and “second” New Deals took the wind out of 
working class and student movement sails (Gindin and Panitch 2012, 55).  The 
demobilization of the students’ movement was also helped along by organizations 
such as the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), which in 
effect allowed institutional managers and administrators to discipline would be 
critics of American capitalism (Silva and Slaughter 1984).  As a result, the 
students’ movement was left without a foothold in the academy.  In terms of 
testing and the extension of measurement as a mechanism of “quality control”, 
the 1930s was similarly a period of relative quiet.  While key changes did happen 
in the 1930s, as with Harvard’s decision to make the SAT a mandatory 
requirement for applicants, such did not involve larger, system changing events, 
as would happen in subsequent phases. 
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 World War Two marked the beginning of another notable transition.  Both 
during and following the War the conventions of corporate science were 
transformed under the auspices of a massively expanded state, albeit in a manner 
that hardly separated university-based science from industrial interests.  Instead, 
WWII and immediately thereafter the Cold War, prompted the development of a 
science regime that involved the conflation of the interests of industry, those of 
the American state, and those of America’s most prestigious and trend-setting 
universities.105   The result was the massive outgrowth of the state’s role in 
directing the research programs at America’s universities, albeit in fits and starts.  
The first step in this direction happened with massive increases to the military’s 
R&D budget, which it channeled first and foremost to the private sector, but also 
to the universities (Mirowski 2011, location 1449–1461).  Until the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, however, private sector interests and/or institutions continued to 
play determinative roles, and not just in terms of the proportion of the available 
private and public sector funding envelopes that were directed to particular 
“research intensive” institutions, but also in terms of the overall research agenda 
(Scott 1983, 34–43). As Noble has outlined, the capacity of the state to direct a 
national R&D program was initially developed under the auspices of quasi-
                                                   
105 Notably, this should not be taken to mean that the interests of industry were always 
the interests of particular industrial firms/players.  As Mirowski describes, the regime that 
emerged during and following WWII, created considerable distance between particular industrial 
interests and the academy, the later having been slated to the performance of “basic” or “pure” 
research, which the state then pressed into the commons or into its procurement protocols that 
had the effect of spreading government funded IP to at least two military contractors. In other 
words, the state funded university research that it then pressed into the service of American 
capitalism in general. (Mirowski 2011a, location 1442)   
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governmental organizations, such as the National Research Council, which had 
relied entirely on corporate based managers – and funding - right up until the 
post-WWII moment (Noble 1977, location 3363).  Through the 1950s the state 
made a series of legislative moves that pushed corporate America to change-up 
their R&D practices.106   At the same time, the state developed the bureaucratic 
capacity to provide peak-level guidance to their corporate partners and therein to 
operate what has since been described as a “national developmental program by 
stealth” (discussed below) (Mirowski 2011a, location 1498–1535). The outgrowth 
of the state’s capacity to regulate the universities’ research program was matched 
by the further outgrowth of the philanthropic organizations and private-sector 
players who had always played a decisive role in American higher education 
(Scott 1983).  For instance, a collection of eastern colleges formed the 
Educational Testing Service in 1947, and several of the most prominent and 
important foundations in the sector’s history, (ex. The Carnegie and Ford 
Foundations) began operating abroad with the specific aim of securing American 
interests around the globe (Nairn 1980).  
 At around the same time, in 1949, the primary accrediting agencies 
organized under a couple of national banners, the National Commission on 
Accrediting (NCA) and the National Committee of Regional Accrediting Agencies 
                                                   
106 While I discuss this in more detail below, Mirowski (2011) outlines how the 
Department of Defence directed corporate America to establish their R&D facilities as separate 
profit centres.  As such, firms in-house R&D facilities operated as contractors to both a firm's 
other arms as well as to the DoD.  See Mirowski (2011). 
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(NCRAA).  On the one hand, such organizations played a largely assistive role in 
respect of the state’s efforts to direct America’s R&D program.  On the other 
hand, they played, along with the institutions themselves, a relatively larger role 
in terms of the management and direction of the universities’ taught programs.  
This was partly an effect of the GI Bill.  Because the GI Bill was taken up with 
such enthusiasm, the state had little choice but to make the funds portable to 
both public and private institutions.  Demand for spaces also outstripped the 
capacity of the state to regulate and/or manage the expansion of the system.  As 
such, the GI Bill had the effect of empowering the sector to direct its own 
expansion without much interference from the state (Thelin 2004, location 
5929).  No doubt, the institutions were also permitted a relatively wide berth in 
this regard because such expansion was being managed through the use of 
standardized testing and processes of accreditation pioneered and sanctioned by 
corporate America.  As was outlined above, the increasing ubiquity of 
standardized testing and the expansion and organization of accreditation were 
being driven by people with myriad links to the state, and in a manner that fit 
perfectly with the military’s program of personnel management and the state’s 
program of industrial expansion.  Indeed, the state’s familiarity with and use of 
standardized testing, which it borrowed from the private sector prior to WWI, 
was a technology that it had come to understand well and invest in considerably, 
particularly during and following WWII (Lehman 1999; Frontline 1999).   
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 Thus, this third period was one during which the state’s capacity grew, as 
did the size of its bureaucracy.  The state’s new found capacities were more 
focused on the management of university based research however, than they were 
on the management of other areas of the university. In managing university 
based research, the state simply extended patterns of conditional finance 
established earlier on.  Thus, although the state was arguably far more willing to 
fund “basic” research than corporate America had been in the 1920s and 1930s, 
concerns over national security meant that “basic” research was not framed so 
much less instrumentally as it did that such research was framed according to a 
different kind of instrumental logic. And that logic was arguably no less 
disciplinary and functional to the reproduction of capitalism in early post-war 
America than was the ‘strategic philanthropy’ used by corporate leaders slightly 
earlier.  In terms of taught programs, the state sponsored the terrific expansion of 
America’s system of higher education.  However, and unlike the direction of state 
funds for research, it did so without a concomitant commitment to the regulation 
of that process.  Rather, the sector’s long-standing practice of self-regulation 
remained largely untouched, particularly since the sector expanded its ability to 
self-regulate.  Indeed, during this period, the phalanx of NGO’s that had acted as 
the benefactors of higher education expanded their reach, and central and/or 
national bodies were created to aid in organizing and standardizing self-
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regulatory practices and/or support the on-going extension of standardized 
testing. (Mirowski 2011; Noble 1977; C. W. Barrow 1990)107   
 By the late 1960s and early 1970s, when America’s system of higher 
education appeared to be in crisis, the fourth era in the development of QA 
began.  During this period the American state made a series of regulatory forays 
into the management of more than just the universities’ research programs.  Such 
regulations revolved primarily around hiring and admissions policies (Thelin 
2004, 347–350; Bok 1980).  The new regulatory environment also ushered in a 
new era of bureaucratic management.  For example, with an eye towards 
ensuring greater equality of access, the state began to require that the universities 
and colleges measure and profile their student bodies.  Consequently, the 
universities and colleges added enough bureaucratic capacity to manage census 
type data for each applicant and potential new hire.  At the same time, the federal 
government also developed capacities with respect to the tracking of the goings 
on in higher education.  In 1965 the federal government established the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).  The emergence of the 
IPEDS had the effect of prompting the Carnegie Foundation to develop its 
                                                   
107 The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) certainly stands as a 
significant example of state interventionism.  As is outlined in more detail below, however, the 
initial success of McCarthy’s inquiries rested, in part, on a complicit academy.  And relative to the 
sophistication of the technologies (like QA) that the state would come to endorse, the methods of 
the HUAC were rather blunt, if effective.  Again, however, what the HUAC ultimately did in 
prompting a backlash that one could plausibly link to the heyday of American pluralism (and 
radicalism), at least within the academy, is precisely what QA has not done.  To manufacture 
consent so effectively would require the further development of state capacities, which is precisely 
what was underway during this period.   
240 
famous system of institutional categorization and differentiation. However, 
concern over how integrated was the IPEDS data led the Carnegie Foundation in 
1973 to develop and release its own classificatory system.  Because the IPEDS 
grouped together what were seen to be fundamentally different institutions into 
just a couple of categories (public and private), the IPEDS apparently made it 
impossible to distinguish the relative performance of different institutional types 
in categories that the Carnegie Foundation wanted desperately to highlight.  
Simply, the IPEDS made it impossible to outline an on-going rationale for the 
uneven delivery of funding, research and otherwise, which had been at the core of 
government and private-sector ‘strategic philanthropy’.108      
 A cacophony of issues drove the outgrowth of the governmental efforts 
mentioned above that aimed at ensuring universities were managed with 
sufficient fiscal prudence and that both faculty and the student population were 
appropriately diverse.  First, the state was forced to confront the contradictions 
that the first wave of massification had highlighted, namely the fact that women 
and visible minorities had not as yet been able to access the university (Thelin 
                                                   
108 While for Thelin, the introduction of the Carnegie classificatory system had the 
“unintended consequence” (Thelin 2004, 320) of creating intense competition between 
institutions intent of meeting the criteria necessary to obtain what came to be viewed as the 
pinnacle of the Carnegie system – the research intensive university - both Barrow (1990) and 
Scott (1983) suggest exactly the opposite (i.e. that the competition that ensued both followed 
established patterns and drove the hierarchical rationalization of America’s system of higher 
education).According to Barrow, in the 1920s, the Bureau of Education surveys of higher 
education institutions, which it performed with financial backing and personnel from Carnegie, 
the General Education Board and other philanthropic organizations, were precisely intended to 
facilitate both institutional differentiation (rationalization) and competition on an inter-regional 
basis. See (Barrow 1990, Chap. 4) 
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2004).  At the same time, and second, the universities faced serious financial 
pressures, to which the state needed to respond, given the role it had staked out 
following WWII as the largest benefactor of higher education.  This financial 
crisis did of course relate to a much larger and well documented crisis of 
capitalism, (O’Connor 2002; Offe 1984).  The ending of the GI Bill in 1973 
appeared to herald the end of the federal transfer program that had financed the 
massive expansion of America’s system of higher education.  This was 
compounded by the first declines in enrollment since the end of WWII.  
Moderate rates of inflation and an initial wave of faculty unionization also 
exacerbated the problem, as did the fact that the universities had not yet 
developed the bureaucratic and managerial apparatus necessary to see their way 
through such troubled times.  Third, the first wave of massification had also 
failed to deliver the kind of sectoral variegation that would ultimately help to 
both differentiate institutions and thereby to stream students into particular 
career paths.  As the Trilateral Commission (Crozier et al. 1975) argued, higher 
rates of participation threatened the stability of Western liberal democracies 
unless the universities could be leveraged to both produce as well as contain and 
direct the aspirations of human capital.  In other words, further institutional 
“differentiation” was understood by both the state and the sector as something 
that was still required in order to placate popular demands for access to higher 
education and dispel the mythology that higher education was a gateway to the 
American dream.  Fourth, the emergence of the New Social Movements and the 
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New Left during the 1960s and 1970s further suggested to both state officials and 
the ruling class what might be the potential problems if the state were not able to 
organize the sector more “efficiently”.  More significant than the state’s new 
regulatory program, however, were the changes that it triggered within the 
university.  Governmental regulation in effect prompted the sector to re-
invigorate their myriad efforts at self-regulation.  But such efforts, which 
reflected the sector’s desire to avoid further regulation, were not taken up either 
willingly or enthusiastically.   
 Still, through the 1980s, the self-regulatory efforts of the universities 
became normalized and regular, more an accepted part of the management of the 
university than was the case previously (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter and 
Rhodes 2004).  The 1980s also marked the emergence of a new consensus 
around government policy for R&D.  Accordingly, military R&D budgets were cut 
and procurement processes more closely monitored.  At the same time, more 
money was directed into the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and thereby to 
more “commercializable” areas of research.  As a result, the NIH grew into the 
primary source of government R&D funding in the universities, as well as a key 
proponent for channeling government funds via conditional arrangements that 
pressed the university R&D programs closer to those of industry (Mirowski 2011; 
Slaughter and Rhoades 1996)  The phalanx of new administrators that had 
moved into – and taken over – the university during the crisis of the 1970s – both 
continued to grow and to respond favourably to the challenge of lean 
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management.  With memes borrowed directly from the private sector, the 
university was recreated as a customer oriented R&D corporation within which 
QA was seen as a means of assessing bottom line results, which were 
simultaneously conflated with the public interest (Birnbaum 2000).  The state’s 
concern for “competitiveness” which was piqued by the catch-up of Japan and 
Germany, was thus also reflected in the tone and behaviour of university 
administrations.  (Mirowski 2011; Sheila Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Sheila 
Slaughter and Rhodes 2004) 
 Other than on the research front, the state’s presence in higher education 
was less obvious through the 1980s.  In part, the federal government was 
hamstrung because then-President Reagan proved unable to pass the kind of 
legislation he had hoped to pass (Kosar 2011).  Of course, it is debatable whether 
or not more direct forms of intervention were really necessary, given that the 
universities had already undertaken to restructure themselves in response to the 
financial incentives created by restructured IP and patent law, which the Reagan 
administration proved more than capable of transforming (Sheila Slaughter and 
Leslie 1997; Mirowski 2011; Polster 2001).  The efforts of the universities were 
also aided immeasurably by the context in which this was happening.  Crucial to 
informing what emerged as the “new” approach to higher education was: the 
historic defeat of working class movements; the popular success of Reaganomics 
and anti-inflationary policy coupled, shortly thereafter, with strong incentives for 
successive rounds of debt-based consumption; and, the increasingly obvious 
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intersection between “everyday life” and global finance.  To the extent that 
Reagan’s educational policies did impact the sector it was with respect to his 
program of decentralization that empowered state and local governments to 
pursue “educational excellence” on their own terms, which most frequently 
involved the still more widespread use of standardized tests at the elementary 
and secondary level than had been the case before Reagan came to power (Kosar 
2011; McNeil 2000). It also bears mentioning that it was during this phase that 
private sector organizations launched the myriad rankings exercises that have 
since become a staple of American higher education. 
 In the 1990s this program of neoliberalization intensified.  Most notable 
among the changes ushered in during this era were the multitude of legislative 
moves that transformed global intellectual property and patent law in a manner 
that mimicked American policy through the 1980s. (Mirowski 2011; C. Polster 
2001)  Clinton also ushered in a new phase of development in the state’s 
bureaucratic and managerial capacity.  For example, early on in Clinton’s tenure, 
the federal government passed legislation that required all federal departments, 
including the Department of Education, to prepare performance plans and 
budgets against which central governmental authorities could in turn evaluate 
future performance.  At the secondary and elementary school levels, Clinton 
picked-up where Reagan had left off, and authored a full scale attack on 
unionized educational workers, part of which also involved a host of new 
performance requirements linked to standardized tests, as well as unprecedented 
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support for so-called “contract schools”, which became increasingly common. 
(Brainard, Burd, and Gose 2000; White House 2013)   
 The universities became, during the 1990s, not just big producers of IP 
and Patent, not just aggressive vendors of the same, but also big players in global 
financial markets, to a degree unparalleled in American history.  All at once their 
financial viability was tied to a regime of accumulation based upon the endless 
securitization of consumer debt, of which tuition-fees made-up an ever-
increasing amount. The institutions, the largest Foundations, as well as state and 
federal governments pressed the logic of education as an investment to its 
extremes just as they did tuition-fees and levels of student debt, which in turn led 
to the explosion of private-sector student credit markets (Mezzanotte et al. 1997; 
Weisbrod 2008).  If rankings exercises and standardized test scores mattered 
through the 1980s, their importance only grew through the 1990s.   
 While Bush’s efforts to institute a new national and performance related 
regulatory program for American higher education was met with strong 
opposition from the sector, such opposition amounted to little more than an on-
going bid for self-regulation.  The government’s attempts to encroach on self-
regulatory regimes, namely on the program of accreditation, saw the accrediting 
agencies clarify the extent to which their operations – and the institutions 
themselves - already performed those QA functions that the federal government 
was want to demand.  If it had ever been necessary, the sector clarified that the 
further encroachment of the federal government was no longer required because 
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the universities had been and would continue to be usefully reproductive of 
neoliberalism. (Ruben 2008; Branch-Brioso et al. 2008)  
5.2.1 The Early Political Economy of American Higher Education 
 As Panitch and Gindin outline, the particularities of American capitalist 
development were such that, relatively early on, “a high wage proletariat,” 
became, “compatible with and actually functional to industrial capitalism” 
(Gindin and Panitch 2012, 84).  And while higher education and QA do not 
feature prominently in their narrative, both featured prominently in the history 
of such development.  In short, the advent of intensely competitive and thus 
highly productive family-based farming in the middle of the 19th century, and 
particularly after the Civil War, not only generated huge surpluses, able to 
support urban development, but also led to the revolution of productive methods 
and technologies. This pattern was reinforced by labour shortages that not only 
meant higher average wages, but further intensified already terrifically high rates 
of capital investment.  Such rates of capital investment in turn fueled the 
tremendous concentration of wealth without dampening the competitive 
pressures that continued to drive such investment.  If anything, competition 
intensified: where firms were not taken to the wall, they were bought-up by 
increasingly diversified corporate behemoths that rapidly expanded their 
operational scope both nationally and internationally, particularly after the 
closure of the frontier and the development of the telecommunications 
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technologies necessary to support the new program of accumulation. (Gindin and 
Panitch 2012, 27–30)  
 Of course, such competition and concentration, coupled as it was with the 
legal expansion of the corporate form and the transformation of IP in a manner 
that heavily favoured corporations, only inflamed, “what was then the most 
militant industrial working class in the world,” as well as a “radicalized farmers’ 
movement” (Gindin and Panitch 2012, 30).  But again these, “many-sided human 
problems (Nicolar Murray Butler 1916 as quoted in Noble 1977, location 3156)”, 
did little to dampen the dynamic process then underway.  Instead the rate of 
capital investment only increased as did the drive to alleviate class conflict 
through the development of the social technologies, such as Taylorism and 
Fordism, that quickly became (and remained) central to the dynamism of 
American capitalism.  In both cases (capital-investment and the management 
sciences), higher education featured with increasing prominence.  Between the 
turn of the century and WWI, the universities, though not as central to the 
program of accumulation as they would become, were nonetheless the subject of 
increasing scrutiny and concern to corporate leaders who saw in those 
institutions a potentially fecund source of both commercializable research and 
human capital (Noble 1977; Barrow 1990).  Until that time, the universities had 
been decidedly less productive of both commercially oriented knowledge and 
managerial talent.  And so, corporate America undertook the task of first 
transforming and then leveraging the universities in the service of just those 
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things.  Accordingly corporate America channeled money and programmatic 
support to either existing or newly minted engineering programs.  Senior 
businessman helped create informal mentoring programs in the universities, and 
also worked to develop and put in place the staff necessary to measure students’ 
attitudes towards, and aptitudes for, particular kinds of work.  And corporate 
America also worked concertedly to raise the status and stature of engineers-
cum-businessmen within the context of the liberal-arts dominated universities 
and colleges. (Noble 1977)       
 Of course, the first exemplars of American science were the huge corporate 
labs that dominated the American industrial landscape at the turn of the century. 
(Noble 1977; Mirowski 2011)  With those laboratories came the “corporation 
schools”, which from their inception were concerned to produce the kind of 
workers that understood how to manage men, how to drive the R&D process and 
be constantly mindful of the bottom-line.  Indeed, the corporate labs and the 
corporation schools were understood as but different sides of the same coin.  As 
corporate America became increasingly concerned with higher education, which 
it did in and around the 1910s and 1920s, and particularly during WWI, it was 
these examples of efficiency – the corporate lab and the corporation school – to 
which they turned when overhauling America’s universities.  As is outlined below, 
such efforts ultimately led to the bifurcation of both the processes and 
understanding that have been foundational to what ultimately turned into QA. In 
other words, considerations related to research and the design of the university 
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laboratory separated from those that dealt with teaching and evaluation.  But the 
over-arching trajectory of both endeavors was very much the same, as it remains 
today. (Noble 1977, Chapter 7)    
5.2.2 From Corporate Lab to Corporation School to Engineering 
Education to Engineered Education 
 Between 1890 and 1920, corporate labs, first in the electrical and chemical 
industries and then in most other large industries, formed because it was the 
corporations who could afford to build them (Noble 1977; Mirowski 2011). The 
aforementioned phase of agglomeration and heated competition drove not only 
the evolution of IP, but also the competition to generate more IP.  Because 
neither the government nor the universities could yet corral the resources 
necessary to undertake large-scale research, corporations undertook the job 
themselves.  Thus did organized science from its earliest forms in America have a 
commercial bent.  Mirowski describes the forces that fueled that commercial 
“bent”:  
The prime directives behind many of the innovations growing out of the 
large corporations were the drive to control markets, render unforeseen 
events manageable, and stifle external competition.  As the government 
began to block direct attempts at market control such as explicit cartels, 
pools and other tied arrangements through its antitrust prosecutions, the 
locus of corporate control began to shift to indirect arenas such as IP, the 
imposition of technical standards, and the like.  One primary reason that 
large corporations turned their attention to bringing scientific research 
within their walls in this period is that “invention and innovation were 
effective defenses against antitrust suits” (Hart 2001, 926) and that 
patents in particular but IP in general were conceived as the best and most 
effective means of controlling competition in the early twentieth century. 
(Mirowski 2011, 100) 
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As Noble explains, the concentration of research capacity created other problems, 
ones that the state and industry quickly recognized.  First, the corporate need for 
team-based work posed problems in terms of both authorship and ownership, 
given that long-standing conventions dictated a high degree of independent 
attribution and/or ownership of IP.  Second, corporate laboratories tended to 
perform less basic research than was necessary for the on-going generation of 
“commercializable” research downstream.  Third, smaller corporations simply 
could not afford large laboratories, and as a result needed access to a 
laboratory/research infrastructure without the huge overhead expenses that only 
the big corporations could afford to bear.  The result was a series of responses: 
efforts to inculcate a team-based, “corporation man” identity and the revision of 
IP law; trade association labs; an industrial fellowship program that linked 
individual, often university based researchers, to corporate research programs 
and protocols; a series of private and semi-private contracts, again often with 
universities; a generous support program developed under the aegis of research 
foundations such as the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations; and also the 
development of government laboratories, all under the authorship of America’s 
leading engineers.  In other words, almost as soon as the universities began 
researching and teaching in the “useful arts”, the university laboratory was linked 
to and modelled after the corporate lab. (Noble 1977, chapter 7)   
 This was no accident, but was instead very carefully and intentionally 
crafted.  The university lab was modelled after its industrial counterpart in order 
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that it might produce to spec so much “research manpower”, for which corporate 
America had developed an almost insatiable thirst in and around the turn of the 
century.  Again, the pattern was initially set within the fold of corporate America:   
 …the expensive equipment necessary for “state of the art” instruction was 
available at only a few of the larger schools, and this situation restricted 
most instruction to blackboard fundamentals. The industries, rather than 
the schools, were at the forefront of discovery in the field, and the 
corporation schools thus served the purpose of updating theoretical 
training in addition to linking the fundamentals to the exigencies of 
engineering practice. For these reasons, the majority of electrical-
engineering graduates flowed into corporation school programs to 
complete their professional training. Providing the crucial preparation for 
careers in designing, manufacturing, construction, consulting, research, 
education, and management, the corporation schools were a necessary 
part of the training of professional electrical engineers in the United 
States.(Noble 1977, location 3737) 
 
While the progenitors of the corporation school movement were firms such as GE 
and Westinghouse, both giant players in the electrical industry, their programs 
were quickly picked-up and copied by corporations in other sectors and 
organized under the banner of the National Association of Corporation Schools 
(NACS) (Noble 1977, location 3118).  And the value of the corporation school 
hardly resided in students’ opportunity to work with cutting edge laboratory 
equipment. On the contrary, the corporation schools were designed to produce 
not just technically proficient human capital, but adept and loyal managers.  The 
graduates of the corporation schools would demonstrate: corporate loyalty; an 
understanding of the centrality of business principles to scientific research; an 
ability to manage men; and a sense of filial devotion to the class of corporate 
252 
leaders to which the corporation schools were designed to provide entrance.  In 
each aspect such human capital was measured:  
 Elaborate methods of recruiting and evaluating college graduates were 
devised, and, within the company, personnel files were kept on all testmen 
in order to chart their progress and determine their potential usefulness. 
Graduates were tested periodically and rated in terms of technical 
proficiency, willingness to learn, loyalty, dependability, appearance, tact, 
efficiency, cooperativeness, and ability to handle men. They were then 
classified according to job requirements within the organization and the 
industry. Such techniques of evaluation and selection were constantly 
refined as more effective means of fitting the individual to the job were 
developed. In effect, the programs like these within GE and the other large 
corporations were the pilot programs in personnel development and 
management which would transform American higher education in the 
decades to follow.(Noble 1977, location 3791) 
 
From the moment of its inception the NACS was concerned with the nature of 
education both in and outside of the corporate schools. Noble quotes at length a 
speech by Lee Galloway, then temporary chairman of the NACS’s organizing 
meeting, which is usefully reproduced here: 
We have associations formed for the consideration of various features of 
manufacturing, we have associations formed for technical work, we have 
efficiency societies, associations for the advancement of scientific 
management, etc., but in the last analysis…we find that the whole thing 
rests finally on some educational feature that must be evolved. I wonder 
how long we intend to leave the education of the workmen in the hands of 
the trades unions, in the hands of the I.W.W., and the Socialistic Party?…If 
a school is organized…within the corporation itself, to bring out the strong, 
practical purposes of the institution, and to show the art, ability and skill 
which is necessary to carry on a great industrial institution— if the 
dissemination of knowledge is carried on in an ordinary educational way 
within the corporation itself…it would tend greatly to change the attitude 
of the employees, and more than that, it would tend to change the attitude 
of the public, because it is the employee…who comes in contact with the 
public.…That seems to be the highest kind of insurance that any industrial 
corporation can have— to insure itself by creating a strong educational 
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system among its own industrial forces, and if big industries are to assume 
the proportions of states, they must assume some of the responsibilities of 
states, and one of these responsibilities is to educate the people, and the 
welfare of these big corporations will be insured more safely by the 
education of their employees than in any other way.…(Galloway 1913; as 
quoted in Noble 1977, location 3924–3927) 
 
The NACS spearheaded the development of cooperative education, initially with 
university engineering departments, but progressively with other programs – 
including the liberal arts – at universities across the US.  And as cooperative 
education programs evolved so too did the “technics of evaluation and selection,” 
that the schools used.  A dense set of records were kept on each student cum 
employee cum manager, with the express aim of evaluating not just their 
technical skills, but also their attitude and disposition to the kind of work that 
corporate America wanted them to undertake (Noble 1977, 3791).   In addition, 
the NACS, along with the Society for the Promotion of Engineering Education 
(SPEE), which had formed in 1893 specifically so as to correct for the perceived 
deficiency in higher education, commissioned a physicist, Charles Mann, to 
conduct a report on the state of engineering education in the US.  In preparing 
the report, which was ultimately published in 1918, Mann turned first to industry 
and to the corporation schools.  As Noble notes, Mann wanted to better 
understand what corporate America was demanding, as well as how the 
corporation schools were compensating for the quality of engineering education 
inside the universities, so that he could then make recommendations to re-
engineer education appropriately.  Mann had already proved himself disposed to 
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such a task – he was the chairman of the North Central Association of Colleges 
and Secondary Schools, one of the US’s first accrediting agencies, and, “the leader 
of a national movement among physics teachers to correlate the teaching of 
science with the realities of industry (Noble 1977, location 4403).”  And as Noble 
usefully highlights, what Mann was “shocked” to find in his consultations with 
industry was the utility and effect of measurement.  The passage quoted by Noble 
is usefully reproduced at length: 
 The principal point derived from these records— a point that was quite a 
shock to me as a schoolman— was that the efficiency of the students who 
went to those firms from the engineering schools was measured and 
estimated in terms of initiative, tact, honesty, accuracy, industry, 
personality, and other qualities of this kind. No schoolman ever thought of 
rating the students in this way. The question was raised how you are going 
to make the professional, industrial point of view clear to the schoolman. 
And, there is only one way to do it, and that is for the industrial 
professional class to define clearly what it means. This can best be done by 
means of tests which must be successfully passed by applicants for 
positions. The answer to your question  …  “ How are the industrial men 
going to help the schools to understand what industry wants and needs?” 
is the same as the answer to your question “What sort of tests are we going 
to use for vocational guidance?” If you will devise and put into practice as 
a condition of admission to each occupation tests which really test the 
ability of the applicant for that occupation, the school will rapidly modify 
its instruction so that the pupils will be able to meet those tests, and you 
will make progress in vocational guidance. The one point that I want to 
bring out clearly to you is that definite objective tests which define the type 
of ability which you wish to have developed are most valuable, not only to 
yourselves as employers in selecting your help, but also as your most 
powerful means of controlling what is done in the school. (Mann 1915 as 
quoted in Noble 1977, location 4421–4422) 
 
As it happens, Mann would go on to work with E.F. Lindquist, an “educational 
leader, scholar, inventor, and teacher,” at the University of Iowa, which bills itself 
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as the US’s first “dedicated college-level department of education” (University of 
Iowa 2013).  Lindquist was an early pioneer of standardized testing.  In 1936, 
along with Mann and the then dean at Columbia, Herbert Hawkes, Lindquist 
penned, The Construction and Use of Achievement Examinations: A 
Manual for Secondary School Teachers. Subsequently, in 1940, Lindquist 
wrote, Statistical Analysis in Educational Research, and then in 1951 he 
published the much heralded, Education Measurement. Lindquist is also 
credited with having invented, at IBM laboratories, the first optical scanner that 
quickly became the bedrock of standardized testing.  According to the University 
of Iowa’s website, the optical technology Lindquist developed remains to this day 
as the University’s, “largest technology transfer” (University of Iowa 2013).  
Lindquist’s Iowa Testing Programs was later spun-off as a private for-profit 
company, Pearson Education, today a subsidiary of Pearson PLC, which is now 
the largest publishing house in the world.  Before spinning off the Iowa Testing 
Programs to Pearson, however, Lindquist also developed the Academic College 
Test (ACT), which is today one of the two standardized entrance exams on which 
college hopefuls must score highly in order to go on to a highly ranked college or 
university.  Lindquist’s legacy at the University of Iowa continues to loom large in 
other ways too.  In 1975, George D. Kuh, the founder of the National Survey of 
Student Engagement (NSSE), graduated with his PhD from the University of 
Iowa program where Lindquist had taught. (University of Iowa 2013; Kuh 2007) 
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 When Mann’s report landed in 1918, the SPEE along with the NACS were 
already rather involved in the extension of standardized testing and 
measurement beyond the confines of engineering education.  Mann’s report, in 
other words, merely echoed and reinforced the processes that were already 
underway, many of which Mann was either involved in or familiar with.  Under 
the auspices of first the US’s preparations for entry into WWI and then its 
participation in it, the US government set about adapting the personnel testing 
that had been pioneered within the corporation schools to the army’s purposes.  
The government’s efforts to repurpose the personnel testing technologies 
developed in the corporation schools, involved efforts that were coordinated 
through specific defense related bureaucracies at the pinnacles of which sat 
numerous representatives from the NACS, the SPEE, and the National Research 
Council.  Notably, the organization of the National Research Council, was also 
spearheaded by corporate based engineers and the Carnegie Institute of 
Technology’s Bureau of Salesmanship Research.  For instance, the formation of 
the US Army’s, Committee on the Classification of Personnel (CCP) happened 
under the stewardship of the German trained industrial psychologist, Walter Dill 
Scott, other leading behaviour psychologists of the day, and the leadership of the 
NACS as well.  Perhaps the most imminent of the psychologists was Walter 
Yerkes, a one-time president of the American Psychological Association, whose 
“Alpha and Beta Tests” became the core of the Army’s personnel management 
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system, and who was also teacher to Carl Brigham, the eventual inventor of the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). (Noble 1977; Spring 1972) 
 By the time the US entered the war, the same players, along with a host of 
highly positioned university administrators (who were organized by the engineers 
in 1918 under the banner of the “Emergency Council on Education”), had 
developed not just a vigorous system of personnel testing, but also a related 
program, the Student Army Training Corps (SATC), which was initially intended 
to ensure that talented college students would not be brought into the line of fire 
if they chose to enlist, as many subsequently did.  While the core of such 
personnel testing systems was consistently Yerkes’ alpha and beta tests, they also 
relied heavily upon the earlier work done either within the personnel and testing 
departments of the corporation schools, under the auspices of the NACS, under 
the umbrella of the Carnegie Institute, and often with help from the Rockefeller 
Foundation.109  When the US instituted the draft, the War Department 
Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST), which was devised and 
operated by Mann and others for the purposes just mentioned, again mobilized 
the support of the federal government, this time to make the SATC mandatory, in 
effect forcing every college student not just into the Army, but into university and 
                                                   
109 Here, it is important to note the Carnegie Institute’s system for the classification of 
vocational and higher education institutions, which is still used today, as well as the development 
of detailed job descriptions, which were early precursors to the Standard Occupational 
Classification system that is also still in use today, and College Survey data, which included 
statistics on the financing and administration of the university (i.e. the very stuff of current 
accreditation programs) 
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college based educational programs that operated under the direction of the 
Army:   
Since the CEST was the War Department agency for educational matters, 
it now actually took charge of all colleges of liberal arts, technology, 
business, agriculture, medicine, law, pharmacy, dentistry, veterinary 
medicine, all graduate schools, and all technical institutes in the United 
States. American education was placed under the military authority of the 
educational and personnel directors of corporate industry and the leaders 
of the new corporate brand of engineering education. (Noble 1977, location 
4744) 
 
 After the war, the efforts or the CEST, the NACS, the SPEE, as well as the 
host of private foundations and government agencies, not least the Department 
of War, – hardly even paused.  As Noble notes, “the reformers proceeded under 
the auspices of four major national agencies: the United States Army, the 
permanent Emergency Council on Education – renamed the American Council 
on Education (ACE) -  and the SPEE (Noble 1977, location 4901),” with the 
specific intent of transforming education in America so as to better fit the needs 
and exigencies of industry.  What they meant by this was simple enough: they 
needed a means by which to reproduce industrial capitalism and therein pliant 
and sufficiently well-trained workers, a highly trained and effective managerial 
class, and research that was of value to industrial firms.  Among the agencies 
mentioned above, Noble emphasizes the role played by the ACE as the quasi-
governmental body with both a national scope and the clear intent of tying 
America’s universities to industry.   
The work of the ACE proceeded along three interwoven lines of activity. 
The first of these was directed toward a perpetuation of the centralized 
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authority achieved during the war, and entailed the extension of both 
governmental and corporate industrial authority over education; the 
second involved the standardization of American educational procedures 
and institutional classification, and constituted a continuation of the 
prewar survey activities undertaken by Capen at the Bureau of Education; 
the third aimed toward the extension, within the educational institutions, 
of the testing, rating, and guidance procedures developed by the science-
based industries before the war. Brought up to an unprecedented level of 
sophistication by the CEST, the CCP in the Army, and the various 
psychology committees during the war, this work on the “personnel 
problem” became the basis of a new “science of education,” the hallmark of 
the ACE. (Noble 1977, location 5352)  
 
In each of these three areas the work of the ACE advanced rather rapidly through 
the 1920s and right-up until the on-set of World War II, when the government 
agencies picked-up the mantle of testing to a greater degree than they had before, 
thereby speeding-up the processes that the ACE and corporate America began. 
Through the 1920s the ACE spearheaded efforts to develop more detailed job 
specifications with the express intent of outlining for educational institutions 
what it was industry expected of their graduates.  The ACE also developed new 
and more vigorous testing programs.  And the ACE undertook an effort to 
standardize the accreditation process (and bring it under the ACE umbrella). 
Finally, the ACE set about working to increase the density of the linkages between 
industry, education, and the state, not least through the inclusion of corporations 
and the US Chamber of Commerce as full members of the ACE. (Noble 1977, 
location 5323–5400)  
 The 1920s were also an era of unprecedented levels of consumption and 
productivity.  Indeed, successive rounds of debt-based consumption drove 
260 
America’s still uneven economy forward, ultimately to the Great Depression.  In 
as much as the US had become incredibly productive, economic activity and 
growth were spread unevenly, and real wages remained low relative to the 
productivity growth rate.  To soak-up the fruits of such productivity increases, 
consumption was fueled by “installment selling”, which Panitch and Gindin 
(2012, 50) highlight, also had the benefit of providing some degree of labour 
discipline.  However, without any income support programs – or a meaningful 
capacity to contain the crisis when it emerged after the stock market crash in 
1929, such discipline gave way to mass unrest and labour militancy during the 
Great Depression. In as much as they did significantly advance the rights of 
workers, the various responses to such unrest, which ultimately culminated in the 
so-called “second New Deal”, are necessarily understood as relatively tepid and 
temporary working class victories, ones that had the effect of building-up the 
state’s ability to manage subsequent crises and secure the basis for capital 
accumulation.  It is in this light that Panitch and Gindin describe FDR’s “sane 
radicalism” as exemplary of a concerted effort to “reform if you would 
preserve.”(FDR as quoted in Rudge 1959, 53, 146–7, 153 and reproduced in 
Gindin and Panitch 2012, 55) And it is also in this light that the drive to enhance 
and promote standardized testing, particularly the SAT, must be viewed. 
 By the 1930s the industrial psychologists who had pioneered the Alpha 
and Beta tests and the SAT had renounced eugenics, which they had previously 
advocated.  Their earlier advocacy of eugenics was based on the results of the 
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Army’s early forays into “psychometric” and IQ testing, which had been based on 
the personnel testing programs of the corporation schools.  In renouncing their 
call for a program of genetic manipulation, however, psychologists like Carl 
Brigham took-up the cause of social manipulation consistently under the mantle 
of an American meritocracy (Lehman 1999; Frontline 1999).  This gelled perfectly 
with the program long advocated for by the engineers, university administrators, 
as well as government and army bureaucrats who had all coalesced under the 
ACE banner for precisely the same kind of reason.  And so it was that in 1933 
James Conant, then president at Harvard, made the SAT a mandatory entrance 
requirement. At the time, Conant, was operating under the guidance of Henry 
Chauncey, the eventual president of the Educational Testing Service (outlined 
below), and according to a firm belief in the potential of standardized testing to 
effect the complete transformation of America along more meritocratic lines 
(Lehman 1999).  Indeed, in 1943 the Atlantic Monthly published an essay by 
Conant, “Wanted: American Radicals”, in which Conant outlined a vision of an 
American meritocracy that, if nothing else, spoke to the degree to which he, like 
those around him, leveraged the ideal of meritocracy to specific ends.  Indeed, in 
"Wanted," Conant speaks about “equality of opportunity, not equality of rewards” 
as well as “…public education, truly universal educational opportunity at every 
level (Conant 1943)”.  Of course, there was good reason to question his sincerity: 
in “Wanted,” Conant as much associates himself with such a vision, as he does 
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distance himself it.110   Furthermore, one must remember that the white 
establishment had hardly distanced itself entirely from the kind of racism that 
underlay earlier support amongst people like Conant for the use of eugenics. 
While it may well have been that Conant had envisioned a racially and ethnically 
diverse meritocracy, it was a simple fact that white men, not women and not men 
of colour, were the outstanding individuals who attended Harvard with any 
regularity during his tenure at that University. 
 It is also noteworthy that Conant, who also served as the chair of the US 
Army’s National Defence Research Committee, called for the creation of a 
national testing body as early as 1937 (Nairn 1980, 194).  Not until after the war, 
however, in 1947, did the ACE, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching, and the College Entrance Board Exam, cooperatively form the 
Educational Testing Service (ETS), which from that point on sold and 
administered the suite of tests that had been developed under other corporate or 
quasi-governmental umbrellas (or by the military).  As Nairn also notes, there 
was ample evidence – both within and outside of ETS - that standardized testing 
of the sort ETS was flogging merely helped to reproduce the status-quo, albeit in 
a revolutionary and industrially efficient manner.  According to Nairn, this was 
                                                   
110 In his 1940 article, “Wanted: American Radicals” Conant writes, “The reader will 
undoubtedly derive the impression that I am sympathetic in my own personal views with the 
hypothetical gentleman I have just portrayed. That is true. But I should like to make it clear that I 
am arguing for his introduction into the American scene not because I believe all his aims should 
be achieved, but because I believe his type of thinking would prove a most beneficial leaven. I 
urge the need of the American radical not because I wish to give a blanket endorsement to his 
views, but because I see the necessity for reinvigorating a neglected aspect of our historic pattern 
of development.”(Conant 1943page) 
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precisely the point.  Quoting Henry Chauncey, the first president of the ETS and 
former dean at Harvard, where he had previously studied psychology and 
philosophy (with a keen interest in testing) and become a close affiliate of 
Conant, Nairn makes clear that the purpose of the SAT was always well 
understood: 
 To many the prospect of measuring in quantitative terms what have 
previously been considered intangible qualities is frightening, if not 
downright objectionable. Yet, I venture to predict that we will become 
accustomed to it and will find ourselves better off for it.  In no instance 
that I can think of has the advance of accurate knowledge been 
detrimental to society, unless it was misused. And with respect to 
knowledge of individuals, the possibilities of constructive use are far 
greater than those of misuse.  Educational and vocational guidance, 
personal and social adjustment most certainly should be greatly benefited.  
Life may have less mystery, but it will also have less disillusionment and 
disappointment. Hope will not be a lost source of strength, but it will be 
kept within reasonable bounds.(Nairn 1980, 4)  
 
In saying this, Chauncey was hardly speaking to the general public, but rather to 
the Board of Trustees of the ETS.  What Chauncey and his immediate audience 
might have considered “constructive use” was likely rather different from how 
others outside the ETS might have, and might still, conceive of it.  Regardless, 
Chauncey aggressively launched the ETS forward.  In the year that it opened he 
established an ETS field office in California with the express intent of getting the 
University of California system on-board, an accomplishment that he then 
understood would make the ETS a national operation and also fundamental to 
higher education in both the private and public sectors.  Almost immediately 
Chauncey cultivated a relationship with Clark Kerr, the veritable father of the 
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University of California system, and ETS board member, who championed the 
SAT in the face of significant opposition.  In 1967, the SAT was made a 
mandatory requirement for all applicants to the University of California system. 
(Lehman 1999)  
 As Lehman has it, the decision of the Board of Regents of the University of 
California system to make participation on the test mandatory for all applicants 
was simply ground-breaking. The UC system was key because until ETS gained a 
foothold there, the ETS and the SAT were largely linked to small, elite, east-coast 
institutions.  In other words, making the SAT mandatory in the UC system, which 
in the 1950s looked to be becoming the largest public system in the US, was 
fundamental to lending the ETS and the SAT a national identity and reputation.  
Such national scope and identity was furthered bolstered by the UC decision 
because it meant that the SAT had finally crossed the public-private divide. The 
speed with which the SAT subsequently became ubiquitous in the US after the UC 
decision in 1967 was terrific.  Whereas in 1950, fewer than 80 000 high school 
seniors took the test, by 1975 nearly a million, or about 1/3 of all high school 
seniors, did.  And by 2004, just under 50% of all high-school seniors took the 
SAT, which accounted for more than the number of high school graduates who 
went on to an accredited degree granting institution. (Lehman 1999)  
 The arch of testing’s history in the US was not, of course, so linear.  There 
was much more at play in the development of testing in the US than just the 
intent of corporate America to leverage testing as a means to reproduce its brand 
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of capitalism.  Two other factors – both of which reinforced and extended the 
program of measurement first developed under the guidance of corporate 
America - were decisive: first was the need to manage the contradictions of 
massification in the immediate post-war era; second was the financial crisis in 
which both the sector and the state found themselves in the 1970s. There was 
both and simultaneously a crisis of legitimacy and one of “overloaded 
government”, the outgrowth of which was the contemporary program of and 
approach to management and measurement and the normalization thereof.   
5.2.3 Massification, Overloaded Government, and the Extension of 
Measurement 
 The massification of the university in the immediate post-war era was a 
process riddled with contradictions, most having to do with the degree to which 
women and visible minorities were permitted access.  Just as the benefits of 
America’s welfare state were spread unevenly, so too were the spots in America’s 
universities and colleges (Thelin 2004; Rudolph 1990).  Demands for access 
resulted in myriad new state and federal regulations with respect to affirmative 
action and gender equality, both in terms of admissions policy and the hiring of 
new faculty.  As the SAT became ubiquitous, so too did the complaints associated 
with it.  Because hispanics and black Americans tended to score poorly relative to 
their white counterparts such that the SAT was cast by some as a culturally 
loaded and thus discriminatory barrier (Nairn 1980).  In response, the state’s 
regulation of university and college admissions policies hardly amounted to any 
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kind of a rejection of testing. On the contrary, by not restricting the use of the 
SAT as an admissions tool, federal and state affirmative action guidelines 
arguably increased the use of the SAT as a means by which to determine which 
applicants from designated backgrounds would be admitted.  While the response 
from the white men of privilege then in charge of America’s colleges and 
universities immediately hit an astonishingly revanchist tone, the extension of 
the state hardly stopped.111   While opposition to affirmative action did eventually 
diminish, it has never gone away entirely and is likely to be challenged at the 
Supreme Court again soon.  What did die down, however, was the sector’s initial 
opposition to the bureaucratic measures that went along with the states expanded 
regulatory scope.  Arguably, this is because the administrators of American 
higher education became wedded to the measurement of students and faculty in 
myriad ways, as did the subjects of those efforts.    
 The problems of access and equity that emerged in the 1970s were coupled 
with what Thelin (2004) describes as a pervasive sense of the sector being in 
crisis early on in that same decade.  In part, this sense of crisis was itself the by-
product of several Carnegie Foundation sponsored reports which questioned the 
financial stability/viability of institutions in the sector (CFAT 1972; CFAT 1973b).  
                                                   
111 Derek Bok, for example, the former president of Harvard, opined in 1980 that, “Rules 
condemning the dismissal of married pregnant women may frustrate the efforts of conservative 
colleges to impose strict standards of behaviour on their faculty.”  Such was a problem for Bok 
because it struck a fatal blow to the, “very essence of diversity,” and to, “the freedom to 
experiment, to make mistakes, to cling to values not commonly shared with society” (Bok 1980, 
93).   
267 
In fact, the universities had expanded terrifically since the GI Bill was first 
introduced and they had continued to expand alongside increasing enrollments, 
all without fundamentally changing the way in which classes were taught or the 
manner in which the universities were managed.  As enrolments declined in the 
mid-1970s for the first time in 30 odd years, the financial position of the 
universities weakened considerably. Coupled with the oil shocks and moderate 
levels of inflation, the apparent “crisis of higher education” loomed large (Thelin 
2004; Rudolph 1990).  In response, the universities became “better” managers.  
Not only did the ranks of university bureaucracies swell, so too did the number of 
managerial tools and fads that were borrowed from the private sector and used to 
“prudent” ends (Weisbrod 2008; Birnbaum 2000a).  In every case such 
managerial tools involved the quantitative measurement and monitoring of 
faculty and students.  The SAT went from being an admissions test to an artifact 
of “excellence” used to attract applicants by ostensibly proving the quality of 
peers.   
 As was mentioned, alongside issues of finance and management, issues of 
equity also surfaced throughout the 1970s.  In fact a series of governmental and 
non-governmental reports from the early 1970s raised both issues and, in seeking 
to resolve them, attempted to walk an awkward line between the need for 
“academic freedom” and “institutional autonomy” and the utility of some 
government regulation in rationalizing the system, particularly given almost 
uniform calls for additional public subsidy.  Notable among such reports were the 
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“Newman Reports”, which sparked national interest and debate (Thelin 2004, 
320).  In response to the apparent crisis, and with funding from the Ford 
Foundation, the Department of Health, Welfare and Education, twice (in 1971 
and 1974) commissioned a task-force headed by Frank Newman, a former 
engineer, corporation man, MBA, and two time Republican congressional 
candidate, to investigate the condition of America’s system of higher education.  
In the Reports, Newman’s chief complaints all pointed in the same direction: 
more government regulation of the higher education marketplace.  Newman was 
particularly concerned with the degree to which the unregulated market had 
yielded little in the way of institutional differentiation.  On the contrary, Newman 
saw evidence of institutional and curricular convergence, which he felt was going 
to lead to serious skills gaps in America’s labour markets.  He argued that state 
regulation was needed in order to ensure that the market would become more 
varied.  Newman’s other persistent concern had to do with diversity.  As he saw it 
the colleges and universities simply did not reflect the diversity of America.  As an 
antidote to these tendencies, Newman suggested that, among other things, the 
government needed to regulate the process of accreditation.(Newman et al. 1971; 
United States 1973) 
 The response from the universities was telling of how it was the crisis 
would ultimately be settled.  While roundly critical of Newman’s 
recommendations concerning the regulation of things like accreditation, the 
sector leaned towards some form of state regulation related to things like equity 
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and admissions apparently in exchange for additional state and federal funding.  
Perhaps because the Newman Reports did accurately signal considerable 
frustration over the degree to which America’s system of higher education had 
apparently departed from corporate America’s long-held plan for a streamlined, 
rationalized, and national system of higher education, the universities, through 
the CFAT, argued that in addition to some regulatory incursions around 
admissions, both state and federal government needed to plough more money 
into the system through a system of portable grants and loans.  In was argued 
that while additional subsidies would lower any financial barriers to access, 
particularly coupled with government regulation of such things, the avoidance of 
larger block grants to the institutions via a system of portable grants and loans 
would empower students/customers to effect greater institutional differentiation 
by choosing with their feet (CFAT 1973b).  Thus, while the Newman Reports were 
perhaps indicative of the degree to which capital – and the government - was 
beginning to re-articulate a desire for a more Taylorized system of higher 
education, the sector’s response was to deepen the self-regulatory and “market-
based” logic that had long described the sector.    
 Critically, the CFAT’s compromise position was struck first by casting 
issues of equity as issues of finance (i.e. black people were poor and therefore had 
been unable to go to university), and second by distinguishing between financial 
issues and non-financial issues, wherein the government had a role to play in the 
former but not the later.  Indeed, so long as the institutions could demonstrate 
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their on-going financial stability given more inclusive access/admissions policies, 
which the government could monitor, the rest was appropriately left up to the 
institutions themselves.  Peer review and accreditation were thus repositioned as 
the mechanisms for assuring academic quality in a context where “proper” 
financial management was established as both a non-academic issue and the 
precondition to success in a marketplace described by portable grants and loans 
and conditional forms of research funding (which it was argued would affect 
institutional differentiation). (CFAT 1972; CFAT 1973b; CFAT 1970).  Rather than 
address or resolve this contradiction, the Carnegie Foundation took up the cause 
of cataloguing and classifying the 2500 odd institutions within the American 
system in a manner that sparked intense competition for what was seen to be the 
best – and most lucrative – classificatory status: that of the research intensive 
university.  While this may not have immediately eliminated the kind of 
duplication that Newman saw as so problematic, it did nonetheless prove rather 
effective and functional as a mechanism of rationalization, if not of reproduction. 
(CFAT 1973a)     
 In the end, if there had been a desire on the part of federal government to 
become more involved in the regulation of higher education than it did in the 
1970s, that willingness dissipated after 1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan.  
 Reagan’s approach to higher education, outside of research, was relatively 
"hands-off”.  After initial cutbacks to student aid programs, funding levels were 
brought back up to levels comparable to those reached under Carter (Kosar 2011).  
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Reagan did however chart a new course for America’s public elementary and 
secondary school system through a series of moves that embedded testing ever 
more deeply at that level of education.  Under Reagan, the promotion of 
educational “excellence” as verified by scores on standardized test scores became 
the sin qua non of educational achievement (McNeil 2000; Kosar 2011).  On the 
other hand, Reagan added new eligibility requirements to the federal 
government’s student loan program, thereby trimming the number of students 
who qualified for access to government loans. But this merely forced more 
students to borrow from private-sector lenders, often at higher rates of interest 
(Mezzanotte et al. 1997). 
 Reagan’s reforms were much more keenly felt on the research front.  
Beginning in 1980 with the Bayh-Dole Act, Reagan unleashed a legislative 
tsunami that transformed intellectual property and patent law, and the way in 
which public funds for university based research could and would be used.  The 
knock-on effects were terrific.  In what Slaughter and Leslie (1997) came to 
describe as “academic capitalism”, the changes that Reagan made to research 
funding led universities to champion “commercializable” research.  Such efforts 
were reflected in the very shape of the university.  In response to the changed IP 
landscape, universities opened offices of technology transfer or of “research and 
innovation”. Universities also added large numbers of in-house legal counsel to 
their payrolls, and created and new positions, ones often associated with QA 
practices and compliance.  All of this happened following Reagan’s election in 
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1980, when Carter’s appointee to the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker hiked up 
interest rates, in turn providing the financial backdrop against which working 
class militancy was thoroughly defeated.  Such defeats were hardly only the by-
product of full-scale financialization, however.  As much as the Volcker Shocks 
played a critical role in re-channeling inflation into financial asset prices, driving 
wave after wave of financial innovation, regulation, and “regulatory arbitrage”, 
the various efforts undertaken by Reagan to more directly defeat, discipline, or 
domesticate organized labour were also critical to smashing labour and creating 
the conditions of labour market flexibility that have described the neoliberal 
program of accumulation.112   Again, 1980 was also the year when the Bayh-Dole 
Act marked the legislative epicentre of the tsunami of national – and global – 
legislative changes that have since acted as the cornerstone of neoliberal IP and 
patent law, and therein the progressive privatization of the commons, not least in 
the shape of publicly funded university-based research. (Mirowski 2011a; Polster 
2001).  All of this was backstopped by huge jumps in demand, as applications to 
university and college rose markedly through the early 1980s, particularly during 
the deep recession that the Volcker Shocks triggered.  At the very moment when 
the logic of austerity was finding root, university administrators and even the 
public at large all but agreed that there was a need to separate intellectual wheat 
from chaff (Thelin 2004; Rudolph 1990).  Ralph Nader’s valiant efforts to call 
                                                   
112 A longer discussion of this is provided below. The links between the Volcker Shocks, 
financialization, and the defeat of organized labour are discussed at length by Panitch and Gindin 
(2012) 
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into question the basis upon which much of this culling was happening did not 
just land on deaf ears – it landed amidst a cacophony of noise about “excellence” 
and “standards” that was quickly reaching a fever pitch.  If the state did not 
pointedly require the use of the SAT, it did nonetheless advocate such, if only by 
supporting the then dominant memes around inflation, unionization, and the 
kind of boot-strap meritocracy Reagan was advancing.   
 Clinton, far more than his predecessors, lent tremendous support to the 
program of QA.  Indeed, shortly into his first term, President Clinton tipped Vice 
President Gore to head the Administration’s “National Performance Review”, 
which led ultimately to the Government Performance and Results Act (1993).  
That Act set out requirements for performance review and measurement for 
every agency and department of the federal government.  The intent of the Act 
was allegedly to “streamline” government by “cutting out red-tape”.  But the 
effect of the Act was to link public expenditures to particular kinds of measurable 
outcomes and to thereby commodify public services. (Radin 1998; Kravchuk and 
Schack 1996)113    
 In 2005, and following passage of the Bush Administration’s “No Child 
Left Behind” legislation, the federal government commissioned a study of higher 
education, the so-called “Spellings Commission”, (after then Secretary of 
                                                   
113 In as much as Clinton’s efforts fell short of mandating specific performance 
requirements or measures for the sector, the legislation did require the DOE to provide an 
annually updated “strategic plan”, which did in turn rely on the use of many of the KPIs discussed 
in chapter 3 as well as the results from standardized tests (Kravchuk and Schack 1996; Radin 
1998). 
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Education Margaret Spellings), on the “Future of Higher Education”.  The 
Commission’s 19 member panel, which included six representatives from 
multinational corporations, published its final report in 2006 (US Dept. of 
Education 2006).  All but one of the commissioners signed off on the report, 
signaling the controversy that quickly followed. In a widely publicized display, 
David Ward from the ACE opted to denounce large sections of the Report, saying 
that it created a “false sense of crisis”, that complex problems were blamed on 
single factors (such as the pay of the professoriate), and that the Report’s findings 
on accreditation seemed to herald a “one size fits all” approach to accreditation 
(Spiegel 2008).  A follow-up report by the National Association of College and 
University Business Officers (2008) offered a similar assessment:  
 The higher education community seemed to reach a consensus that the 
Report offered too much of a “one-size-fits-all” approach to the challenges 
identified, and did not take into account or value the diversity of missions 
within the community. National associations, accrediting agencies, and 
institutional leaders were particularly concerned about this approach to 
the complexities of assessment. The Commission Report and Department 
statements suggested that outcomes should receive greater emphasis—that 
assessment should shift from a primary emphasis on reputation, input, 
and resource measures to a focus on measures of performance, impact, 
and outcomes. Higher education leaders expressed fear that if a single 
approach were put in place, standardized methods and measures would be 
applied across all types of higher education institutions without regard to 
their differences, especially differences associated with mission. Further, 
they feared that simplistic and potentially damaging comparisons would 
be broadly publicized, in the name of transparency. These reactions were 
immediate and intense, and served to galvanize resistance to the 
Commission, the Report, and the Department of Education.(Ruben 
2008)(emphasis added) 
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As Ward himself made clear, the sector’s objections were not to measurement per 
se, but to the “one size fits all” approach that the Commission seemed to support 
in the Spellings Report.  Rather than have the government develop and impose a 
system of QA, the sector held strong to the idea that it could design something 
better.  In a tale about a boat that had long since sailed, then president of the 
American Historical Association recounts a panel discussion about the Spelling 
Report:  
 The panelists at the AHA annual meeting and other knowledgeable people 
agree, and caution that if we don't craft the instruments of assessment, 
then the state or federal government surely will, and those instruments are 
likely to insist on standardized measurements of learning outcomes. 
Should that occur, the study of history might well be among the principal 
casualties, especially if the test is aimed at tracking "domain-specific 
knowledge" as well as more generalized analytical skills. In a broader 
sense, the long-term consequences for higher education in the United 
States from the mounting pressure to measure performance do not 
portend a happy prospect. As Adam Falk, dean of arts and sciences at 
Johns Hopkins University, remarked to the Baltimore Sun, "the more we 
rely on standardized testing as our bellwether for the quality of education, 
the more we will value in education only those things that can be 
measured on standardized tests."(Spiegel 2008) 
 
5.2.4 The Political Economy of University Based Research in America 
 As was outlined earlier, the particular histories of testing and of university 
based research, while not the same, are linked in a multiplicity of ways: both 
begin with private sector/corporate efforts to reproduce capitalist accumulation 
in their own image; the suite of players, from the corporate engineers, to the 
university administrators, to the great American philanthropic associations, to 
the host of quasi-governmental organizations and self-regulatory bodies that are 
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implicated in the reproduction of American higher education throughout its 
history, have been and remain ever-present; both histories are deeply imbricated 
by the same discourses at the same time; and, both histories involve the 
development of so many mechanisms of measurement, that, since the 1980s, 
have coalesced into a dominant discourse around performance, competitiveness, 
and ‘quality’.  It is also important to bear in mind that the proliferation of 
standardized testing as a means of social reproduction has had an on-going 
impact on the nature of university research.  Simply, standardized testing is, just 
as it was intended to be, mimetic of a particular world-view.  And since 
promotion through the ranks necessarily involves high scores on standardized 
tests, the program works to reproduce a particular kind of academy, one disposed 
to the kind of quality assessment and commercially oriented research that are 
typical of the contemporary university.114  Given the long-term reproduction of 
‘expertise’ by the AAUP and the faculty (Silva and Slaughter 1984), and the more 
recent history of economics imperialism (Fine and Milonakis 2009), it is even 
reasonable to suggest that university-based research has tracked so closely the 
program of accumulation because of the extensive and expansive nature of 
America’s regime of standardized testing. Of course, the commercialization 
                                                   
114 Interestingly, Mirowski’s book, Science-mart (2011), is framed as a discussion with 
“Viridiana Jones”, a fictitious “intrepid academic researcher,” who is depressed by the state of the 
contemporary university, but not able to find any comprehensive outline of where things went 
wrong.  In other words, Mirowski seeks to address the ‘intrepid’ academics whose lives and work 
have been remade with the turn to neoliberalism post-1980, but who lack any knowledge of the 
history of their own context and of the history of thought in the social sciences and public policy 
that have so shaped that context.  The depth of disciplinary divisions which have created such 
ignorance is precisely exemplary of the larger arguments I make in this dissertation. 
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agenda has also transformed the professoriate, or at least segments of it.  In 
making it possible for publicly funded research to be “spun-out” and 
commercialized, the Reagan administration opened the door to levels of 
remuneration that were previously unheard of for faculty and administrators 
alike.  While the returns to investment in the commercialization agenda have 
flowed no more equally through the university than have the returns to the 
neoliberal enterprise overall, the commercialization program has created a 
hierarchy of vested faculty who have in turn become very active proponents of the 
neoliberal program.  
 For Noble, the development of engineering as a scientific discipline and of 
engineering education as a significant concern for corporate America during the 
first couple of decades of the 20th century was all but fundamental to the 
transposition/relocation of the corporate laboratory to the university campus.  
 During the first three decades of the twentieth century, therefore, the 
corporate engineers undertook to organize and harness science to 
industry. Their work evolved in three overlapping phases. The first 
involved the establishment of organized research laboratories within the 
industrial corporations, as integral parts of the enterprise. The second 
concerned the active support of, and cooperation with, research agencies 
outside of the corporations: trade-association laboratories, research 
foundations, government bureaus, and, most important, the science and 
engineering departments of the universities. The third saw the national 
coordination of these myriad research activities, primarily through the 
National Research Council, in support of corporate industry. The first two 
developments began roughly around the turn of the century; the third 
surfaced during World War I. (Noble 1977, location 2480) 
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In his analysis, Noble also consistently clarifies the significant contributions of 
the federal government in bolstering the efforts of corporate America.115   And he 
also points out that the state’s authority was what key elements within the 
academy jealously courted after it was awarded to the engineers, and then 
carefully cultivated when it was in turn offered to them as well.  As the above 
quotation indicates, all such efforts ultimately manifest in the National Research 
Council, which, from its earliest beginnings, pressed science into the service of 
industry.  More than this, the NRC was hardly operated by federal government 
bureaucrats.  On the contrary, the NRC’s key agencies were filled with 
representatives from corporate America and by the academics who found their 
way in to the organization, having already established a track-record of 
strengthening ties between the academy and industry, not least through the 
aforementioned program of ‘strategic philanthropy’ they pursued assiduously 
from around 1910 on (Scott 1983, 36).  The federal government was also not, at 
least initially, the primary sources of funds for NRC funded research.  On the 
contrary, the bulk of NRC’s money, right up until WWII, came from the private 
sector, and significantly from the various research foundations, namely the 
Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations that also funded the various efforts 
associated with standardized testing. (Noble 1977, location 3361)   
                                                   
115 For example, the military provided critical support to the ambitions of corporate 
America in terms of the expansion of America’s testing program, as it was in providing the legal 
framework necessary for corporate control of IP and Patent.   
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 Thus, while during the Cold War, the organization of American science 
was massively impacted by the outgrowth of the American state, which quickly 
became by far the largest funder of US R&D, both in the university and the 
corporate sector, such expansion was predicated on the work already done by the 
NRC, which by the on-set of WWII had already centralized and coordinated the 
shape of university based science to a remarkably significant extent.  For 
Mirowski, the emergence of the Department of Defence (DoD) as the primary 
patron of American science melded with the “M-form” or multi-divisional 
corporation, which had proven its mettle during the war, when mature 
corporations diversified in order to profit from the State’s demand for war-
related manufacture.  In this context, corporate laboratories once tasked with the 
development and testing of new products for the productive arms of their 
diversified firms, became, with the healthy support of the US military, stand-
alone divisional profit-centres, whose largest customer was the DoD.  
Accordingly, the DoD used its research funding/buying power as a kind of 
“industrial policy by stealth”.  Based on the conventions of research contracting 
that developed during WWII, the DoD, “did not mind funding what would be 
dubbed ‘basic research’…because its regulations concerning overhead would 
putatively allow it to control the mix of basic and applied as needed (Phillip 
Mirowski 2011, location 1487)”.  At the same time, the military was “skeptical 
concerning the virtues of strong protection of IP in frontier science” (Mirowski 
2011, location 1530).  This view, which was also held by many mainstream 
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economists (at the time) and apparently by the Department of Justice as well116, 
led the military to flex both its funding and juridical muscle to keep industry from 
protecting and patenting whatever non-military and/or “basic” research was 
performed in the corporate labs with government funds.  While the military was 
careful to protect whatever research it deemed to be of immediate military 
importance (an inestimably large amount of data) it was equally careful to press 
all other forms of IP into the commons.  The military did this by imposing 
royalty-free licensing requirements on their corporate R&D partners.  In this way, 
the DoD enabled American corporations to pick-up IP on the cheap, which is of 
course what the DoD wanted.  In fact, the funding conditions stipulated by the 
DoD were intended to make corporate America, “better suited to withstand the 
chill wind of the Cold War” (Mirowski 2011a, 112).  Thus, “under the banner of 
national security [and the military as science manager], was an oxymoronic 
regime of relatively open science hedged round by classification and secrecy” 
(Mirowski 2011: p.112).   
 For America’s universities, the Cold War was a kind of Golden Era.  State 
and federal governments, with the DoD again playing the largest role, offered the 
universities unprecedented levels of funding and therein a wide berth for 
academic science, all as an “exercise in American nation building” (Mirowski 
2011, 111). Accordingly, America’s network of colleges and universities was 
                                                   
116 The Department of Justice successfully argued for the extension of the military’s 
control over government funded IP that was not deemed a matter of national security. 
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massively expanded. While the Ivy League institutions benefited terrifically, as 
they had previously when corporate America was more in control of the levers of 
research funding, public subsidy was hardly focussed on such institutions. 
Instead, government funding was spread throughout the sector in a deliberate 
exercise in mass education and acculturation, as well as in ‘basic’ research.  
Another out-growth of this ‘oxymoronic regime’ was the widespread and rather 
dogmatic belief that scientists were best left to their own devices, free from the 
exigencies of markets and market forces.  Indeed, the emergence of the state as 
the biggest benefactor of university-based research (and private-sector research 
as well) temporarily moderated, if not entirely severed, the then long-standing 
relationship between the university and industry, replacing it with the idea that 
scientists owed their loyalty to their discipline if they were to, in turn, 
demonstrate their loyalty to the state (Mirowski 2011b, location 1446).  As such, 
the university lab was re-oriented and leveraged in the service of “basic” or “pure” 
research, which the state then pushed either into the commons or else to 
corporate America, where it channeled the vast majority of its research-funding 
(Mirowski 2011, location 1451–1530).  This program of state sponsorship meant 
that the universities and the state could afford to tolerate and even accept some 
of the demands made by campus activists who, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
demanded that the military industrial complex be kicked-out of university labs.117  
                                                   
117 Sears (2003) offers a slightly different perspective on the significance of campus 
activism through the 1960s and 1970s.  For him, the expansion of higher education under the 
auspices of the Welfare State needs to be understood as a process that involved the domestication 
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But it hardly meant that “basic” or “pure” research was viewed in non-utilitarian 
terms.  “Utility” was just defined differently, and with reference to the welfare of 
the American state then under pressure from Cold War competitors. “Basic” 
research was hardly severed from the dominant program of accumulation, even if 
the long-standing links between corporate America and university-based 
researchers were temporarily allowed to wither.  And though the role of the 
philanthropic organizations became less important to the ability of universities to 
undertake research, it hardly stopped playing an important role (Scott 1983, 164).  
And the entire system continued to operate on the basis of conditional forms of 
finance delivered through systems of peer review, which was conducted under 
government umbrellas (ex. National Science Foundation).  Block grants for either 
teaching or research were simply never part of the American system.     
  The Golden Era ended, in fits and starts, through the turbulence of the 
1970s, but more obviously and consistently after 1980, when what Mirowski 
                                                   
of the working class.  In other words, the massification of higher education involved contradictory 
processes: on the one hand, individual’s rights were expanded as higher education was likewise 
expanded and made (temporarily) more accessible; on the other hand, schooling involved (as it 
still does) a process of acculturation and discipline.  Without understating the significance, 
achievements, and potential of the oppositional movements that rocked American campuses 
through the 1960s, Sears argues that they were beset by contradictions, like that just mentioned, 
which effectively limited both their scope and the possibility of a more lasting form of success.  
Though he focuses on the development of higher education in Ontario, Sears’ comments are aptly 
applied to the situation in the US following WWII. He writes, 
 
The broad welfare state captured social struggles, absorbing some of the impact of 
resistance and providing space to address (in some limited and displaced forms) the 
claims of people in motion. The university played an important part in this process, 
providing a space for dissent while teaching forms of self-discipline that contributed to 
the enhancement of self-regulating citizenship…The university thus served as a site for 
the deep internalization of discipline in a situation of minimal supervision (Sears 2003, 
54) 
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describes as a “cascade” of legislative and other changes saw the principles and 
practices around R&D utterly transformed.  The cascade of transformations after 
1980 relates to the apparent waning of America’s dominance in the global 
economy, when both the American state and American corporations began to 
operate according to a fundamentally different set of dictates. Here Mirowski 
highlights the rapid transformation of the M-form Corporation.  In response to 
apparently more agile Japanese and German competitors, American firms began 
to outsource production and, eventually, R&D as well.  In outsourcing their R&D, 
American firms channeled their monies into either publicly subsidized, but 
corporately controlled, American research labs located both in- and out-side of 
the university sector, or, on a contract basis, to private research labs located in 
low-wage, low-regulation environments.  This process of institutional reform saw 
American pharmaceutical, agribusiness, and other high-tech firms spearhead 
efforts to re-write first American and then international law so as to better 
protect their IP and patent rights.  The same firms also worked collectively to 
take the teeth out of American anti-trust legislation, which until the 1980s, 
prevented firms from intensifying their operations within a single sector and 
from establishing the kind of monopoly rights that were necessary for them to do 
so. (Mirowski 2011, 114–128)   All of this was underscored by the hegemony of 
neoliberal theory, which had made an end-run around classical liberal 
conceptions of competition (the theoretical back-bone of anti-trust legislation) 
such that monopoly came to be seen as anything but an obstacle to innovation 
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and economic growth (Mirowski 2009).  In this way, the state was caught-up in a 
program of re-regulating the management of IP and patent so as to support the 
efforts of corporate America.  Such transformations in effect amounted to the re-
direction of state and federal research money away from protocols that would see 
new knowledge placed in the commons, and towards protocols that would 
generate new, and protectable, IP.118  
 Slaughter and Rhoades (1996a) tell a similar story. They see what they 
describe as a new “competitiveness agenda”, as having emerged in the 1970s and 
1980s, as a response to: a widespread crisis of corporate profitability; post-
Vietnam dips in government funding for R&D (both in and outside of 
universities); the subsequent ending of the Cold War, which entailed further cuts 
to defense related R&D; and, the large-scale transition in the US from not-for-
profit, to for-profit healthcare. Accordingly, the military industrial complex, 
American pharmaceutical companies, and American agribusiness all looked to 
have state and federal governments channel funds into the commercialization of 
science and technology.  The apparent aim in so pressing the state was “to 
increase US shares of global markets and to increase the numbers of high-
technology, high-salaried jobs in the domestic economy” (Slaughter and Rhoades 
                                                   
118 The US Patent Office was transformed into a customer-friendly organization that came 
quickly to approve an increasingly large proportion of the ever-growing number of patent filings; 
in 1982, federal government created the special Court of Appeal in the Federal Circuit dedicated 
to hearing cases related to patent.  And of course, the state actively promoted the privatization of 
state-subsidized research programs (in universities, in national laboratories, and in the host of 
“interstitial organizations”, like research parks, that hosted new quasi-public, quasi-private 
research initiatives.)      
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1996, 304).  And like Mirowski, Slaughter and Rhoades also note the significance 
of changes to the corporate form, and therein to the development of more 
industry-focused, less diversified corporate operators.   
 There is also general agreement as to what have been the key legislative 
changes.  Outside of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, which Mirowski notes was 
quietly extended to private corporations in 1983, there was the Stevenson-Wydler 
Act, also passed in 1980, which allowed research performed in federally funded 
national research labs to be protected and privatized.  In 1986, the Technology 
Transfer Act allowed federally funded research once considered classified to be 
sold-off to private firms.  The 1984 National Cooperative Research Act, allowed 
firms in the same sector to escape anti-trust prosecution when they undertook 
research jointly.  All of this was reinforced by the decisions coming out of the 
Court of Appeals in the Federal Circuit, which Mirowski, following Jaffe and 
Lerner, notes, has, “due to its special composition…tilted the entire system [of IP] 
in favor of patent holders and against the defense in infringement suits.” 
(Mirowski 2011, 148)  Such changes have hardly remained specific to the US.  
Where countries did not of their own accord follow-suit with similar such 
legislation, the changes made to international law with the passage of agreements 
such as the TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property) at the 
Uruguay round of GATT negotiations in 1993, had the effect of extending 
American IP and Patent legislation throughout the world (Polster 2001; May 
2006; Coriat 2002).   
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 The complete re-making of IP and Patent law has, in turn, created 
incentives to new patterns of behaviour and new forms of organization (Polster 
2001; Polster 2007).  Recall that in the post-war era, R&D was heavily funded by 
the state in ways that pressed huge amounts of new knowledge into the 
commons.  In other words, on the basis of huge state subsidies, the nature of 
competition was fundamentally different than it would become through the 
1980s.  Instead of leveraging control over huge libraries of IP, as became the case 
after 1980, firms competed by taking knowledge from the commons and making 
use of it in new, novel, and protectable ways.  Once defence spending was cut-
back and made increasingly focused, however, firms both had less cash on-hand 
to fund research not directly related to the generation of profit, and less reason to 
place whatever knowledge they did generate into the commons.  On the contrary, 
the progressive retraction and redirection of state R&D subsidies made it both 
possible and necessary for firms to commoditize every step in the knowledge 
production process. Simply, without either the state’s prohibition of such 
behaviour or the states’ subsidization of their R&D activities, firms sought to 
compete by focusing their research efforts and by protecting the results of those 
efforts.  At the same time, firms also looked to outsource their R&D activities.  
Rather than assume the expensive overheads related to the maintenance of in-
house R&D laboratories, firms began to outsource such activities via discrete, 
task-related contracts. Such behaviour, was part of the reason why American 
firms looked to have the juridical landscape remade.  To ensure the security of 
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whatever IP was generated abroad in such contract research organizations, 
American, (and other multi-national) firms pressed the state to shore-up, re-
write, and spread globally the kind of IP legislation that would provide them the 
security they required to outsource their R&D. (Mirowski 2011) 
 Increasingly, therefore, firms acted to protect and license both the 
downstream technologies that emerged out of research activities and the 
elemental pieces of knowledge necessary for research.  As such, the costs 
associated with research increased substantially.  At the same time, the potential 
returns from licensing IP also skyrocketed.  As a result, all firms were forced into 
the IP protection game. In order to afford the costs of R&D, firms needed either 
to access the returns that could be generated by licensing IP, or else resource-
poor firms needed to partner with resource-rich firms, generally on terms that 
further instantiated these patterns.  This program of enclosure also opened up 
new fields for accumulation in that firms looked increasingly to leverage 
whatever IP they owned competitively, via patent infringement litigation, for 
which the aforementioned Federal Appeals Court was established.  In this way, 
resource poor firms were either taken-over or taken to the wall.  Also, and as I 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the potential returns available through litigation in fact 
led to the emergence of a new kind of firm, the so-called “patent troll” (Glass 
2011; Mirowski 2011b; Polster 2001; Coriat 2002; Sheila Slaughter and Rhodes 
2004).   
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 In this context, universities rapidly found themselves in something of a 
bind.  Cash-strapped from government cut-backs and declining enrolments (after 
1975 when enrolments dipped temporarily), and with research costs quickly 
rising, they needed to play ball.  Necessarily, this meant industry partnerships, 
the development of technology transfer offices, in-house legal capacity able to 
navigate the increasingly tricky waters of IP and patent, a whole new 
administrative/managerial agenda.  All of this was bolstered in myriad ways by 
the long-standing relationship between industry and faculty working in the 
applied sciences, like engineering (see above).  The pressure to conform to the 
new regime of science by enclosure came increasingly from within the university 
too, not least after Reagan opened the IP floodgates in 1980.  Furthermore, as the 
lines between “basic” and “applied” science were blurred, as they were, for 
example, with the science around biotech, levels of support for the 
commercialization of university-based research coming from within the 
university grew stronger still (and all but merged with the advent of the “new” 
social sciences, itself a by-product of economics imperialism (see chapter 4).  The 
everyday life of university based research thus changed deeply.  Today, “Material 
Transfer Agreements” (MTAs) regulate the flow of knowledge between university 
based researchers at different institutions as well as between university-based 
researchers and private laboratories; in conducting research, scientists need to 
navigate a world of contracts that regulate access to both the materials and the 
bits of knowledge necessary to the conduct of any new research (Mirowski 2011, 
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Chap. 4).  University-based scientists are also increasingly apt to keep new 
discoveries secret (so as to protect IP), and to take measures intended to provide 
evidence of the originality of their work and thereby some insurance against 
potential future litigation.  And the availability of funds means that researchers 
will tend to either prefer – or be forced to prefer – those avenues of research that 
hold the promise of profit over those that do not (Polster 2007; Polster 2001).   
 In this light, the functionality of QA with respect to research is clearly 
available: QA functions as a relative measure of the returns available via 
investment in specific kinds of research as specific universities, with specific 
researchers.  It is a price-type signaling system intended to reflect the exchange-
value of commoditized knowledge.  Of course, and as was made clear at the 
outset, the US does not have a “system” of QA as such.  Rather, what constitutes 
the American “system” of QA is an array of private sector ranking exercises, built 
primarily around KPIs, and anchored in processes of accreditation.  Collectively 
these seemingly disparate endeavors make-up a surprisingly seamless system 
capable of efficiency channeling government and private sector money to 
institutions that operate according to the dictates of neoliberal policy.  The 
historical coincidence of the legislation just described (i.e. around IP and patent) 
and the emergence of mainly private-sector rankings exercises based on the crude 
and instrumental logic outlined in Chapter 3 is hardly coincidental.  On the 
contrary, the timing suggests that the primary impetus behind the development 
of this ‘system’ had to do with the drive to make the universities attractive to 
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private sector “partners”, given that state’s endorsement in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s of the neoliberal program.  Whereas the state had previously been 
more willing to fund “basic” research, it was now intent on funneling money to 
those institutions that linked to industry.  Mechanisms of measurement and 
valuation, while they already existed and long been in use, could now (again) 
serve industrial interests more directly than they had in the early post-war era.  
And as such amounted to a form of industrial subsidy (where the state would 
carry the costs of industrially oriented and owned research), the corporate 
America clearly also had cause to revive, and popularize, ways of measuring the 
“quality” of university-based research, particularly given the sums involved and 
the massively expanded size of the higher education system (i.e. the publication 
KPI’s enabled capital to track value in a massively increased system of higher 
education)     
5.3 Crisis, Resolution, and Intensification: Examining the 
Left in the making of American Higher Education 
 Before leaving this case-study, it bears examining, if only in brief, the role 
played (or not played) by political and forces on the Left in terms of the histories 
just recounted; the “competitiveness agenda”, like the history of QA in the US, 
has been contested, and it is important to discuss how progressive social forces 
were defeated or overwhelmed, or rather naively supportive of the developments 
just recounted.     
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 In as much as the emergence of New Social Movements did pose 
something of a challenge to these dominant modes of thought, there are several 
considerations. First, in 1973 the AAUP effectively re-affirmed the position on 
academic freedom that it had first laid out in 1911. Slaughter and Silva indicate 
that within the university progressive social forces no less than revanchist ones 
have been want to preserve the ‘expert’ status of academics (E. Silva and 
Slaughter 1984).  Second, as was discussed above, the organization of science 
during the Cold War, entailed, “an oxymoronic regime of relatively open science 
hedged round by classification and secrecy (Mirowski 2011: p.112).” Not only did 
“basic” science receive considerably more funding than it would through the 
1980s and 90s, but such facts preserved the edifice of academic freedom and 
“basic science”, which had the effect of moderating the fervour with which any 
sizeable segment of the academy pursued transformative change during the era 
when an opening for such emerged. Third, the nature of American radicalism was 
in and of itself somewhat problematic in that notions of “monopoly capitalism” 
alluded to a set of structural dynamics that subverted agency and arguably 
polluted much radical thinking during the era.  More than this, the crude 
structuralisms of American Marxism in the 1950s and 1960s, which related in 
large part to the dynamics of the Cold War, entailed a sharp move away from 
careful consideration of working class capacities.  Seen as having been caught in 
the structural dynamics of capitalist accumulation workers were too frequently 
ascribed a “false consciousness” that discounted the potential for change.  
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Ironically, this was the case almost immediately before the potential for mass 
mobilization rapidly re-emerged.  Fourth, and relatedly, much of the discontent 
that surfaced within the ranks of the students organizing through the late 1960s 
under the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) banner(s), were ultimately 
crippled by a fervent belief in the need for a student-cum-vanguard led revolution 
that never bothered to build a viable labour movement.  Elsewhere, students 
organized in ways that hindsight paints as deeply ironic.  For example, the 
decision by students at both Harvard and Yale to, in the 1960s, mark their 
displeasure with the confined nature of analysis in the American social sciences, 
took-up the cause of Student Evaluation Questionnaires, a rather consumerist 
approach to dissent within a consumerist society.  Also related was the fact that 
more than just radicalism took shape in America’s universities: 
 To understand the 1960s properly, and the role of the “baby-boomers” in 
it, it must not be forgotten that matching the rise of the radical new Left in 
sociology and history departments of US universities was a new generation 
of MBA’s, “bright and ambitious students…paying more attention to 
business strategy, product development, marketing, and costs, the stuff of 
business-school curricula.”  The members of the 1960s generation who 
were recruited into the expanding financial sector were also oriented to 
“changing the system,” albeit in a very different way from their more 
radical counterparts – and as it turned out there were rather more 
successful at it. Some of them also went into the regulatory agencies, 
adding to the agencies’ preside and confidence…The new breed of 
regulators did not necessarily call for greater public control, since “the 
essential feature of the American regulatory system…its fusion of the 
public and private spheres” ensured that not only the financial institutions 
but also the regulatory agencies themselves became subject to the 
contradictory pressures that had emerged in the 1960s.(Gindin and 
Panitch 2012, 121–122) 
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But by far the most significant factor in the historic defeat of the Left in the late 
1970s and 1980s however was the concerted attack that capital – aided and 
abetted by the American state – aggressively undertook in its effort to tilt the 
balance of class forces more durably in its favour.  In this regard, the 
development of an increasingly conscious and aligned business lobby through the 
early part of the 1970s factored prominently.  Propelled to act concertedly by 
declining corporate balance sheets, capital quickly found an ally in key agencies 
of the American state, which, by virtue of capital’s declining fortunes (and the 
“strike” of capital), were also in the midst of a deep crisis.  For Panitch and 
Gindin, the most notable of the American state’s various anti-labour efforts were 
the Volcker Shocks, which they assert amounted to a program of structural 
adjustment.  That said, Panitch and Gindin are also careful to point out that the 
Volker Shocks were hardly the first or only efforts on the part of the American 
state to revive corporate profitability through austerity and labour-market 
discipline rather than Keynesian-style efforts to manage aggregate demand.  For 
instance, the efforts of the US Treasury under both Nixon and Carter to bolster 
corporate support for free-trade, given declining support for such in key 
industrial sectors, proved crucial to the on-going development of the “New 
International Division of Labour”, and therein the ability of corporate America to 
move huge swathes of America’s manufacturing base to low-wage, low-regulation 
jurisdictions, or else to negotiate for huge concessions from labour.  Also 
significant were the efforts of the US Treasury and the New York Fed, when in 
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1975 they worked alongside Wall St. banks to make an example out of New York 
City through the imposition of structural adjustment and austerity measures as a 
“resolution” to the City’s financial crisis. Also of significance were the 
government’s more direct and equally successful efforts to break the “pattern of 
wage push” through direct intervention in labour negotiations, first when 
Chrysler teetered on the brink of bankruptcy in 1979, and then in 1981, when 
Reagan ended the strike by air traffic controllers by firing them, hiring scabs to 
do (some) of their jobs, and then by having a stacked Federal Labour Relations 
Authority decertify the union.  All of this was also supported by a massive 
bulwark of cuts to social spending and taxes that Reagan used to simultaneously 
curry favour with and discipline the working classes. The longer history of police 
repression and incarceration were also fundamental to first undermining the 
potential of the Black Power movement, which emerged in the 1960s as a potent 
political force, and subsequently to the use of incarceration as a means of social 
control.   
5.4 Conclusion 
 As is made clear in the subsequent two chapters, the long history of QA in 
America is unique and indicates something equally unique about the nature of 
American liberal democratic capitalism.  For Dorothy Ross, the distinctive and 
long history of QA in America would not come as much of a surprise.  She 
describes the character and effect of American social science: 
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 The distinctive character of American social science has necessarily had a 
profound effect on social practice and social thought in the United States.  
A historical world is a humanly created one.  It is composed of people, 
institutions, practices, and languages that are created by the circumstance 
of human experience and sustained by structures of power.  History can be 
used to achieve a critical understanding of historical experience and allows 
us to change the social structures that shape it.  In contrast, the models of 
the social world that have dominated American social science in the 
twentieth century invite us to look through history to a presumably natural 
process beneath.  Here the social world is composed of individual 
behaviors responding to natural stimuli, and the capitalist market and 
modern urban society are understood, in effect, as part of nature.  We are 
led toward quantitative and technocratic manipulation of nature and an 
idealized liberal vision of American society. (Ross 1991, xiv) 
 
Of course, where Ross goes on to argue that that the tendency ‘toward [the] 
quantitative and technocratic manipulation of nature’ is a by-product of the 
ideology of American exceptionalism, I have argued otherwise.  Far from an 
ideology of exceptionalism, the distinctive nature of American social science is 
rooted in the particular history of American capitalism.  This does not mean that 
the most influential social scientists did not completely and utterly believe that in 
America they had found the formula to a liberal democratic panacea, but rather 
that those apprehensions flourished and gave American social science its unique 
characteristic because of the particular nature and history of class relations in the 
US.  What was relatively more important than the ideology of exceptionalism, in 
other words, was the way in which huge corporate agglomerations formed, the 
way in which those agglomerations were and remained linked to the state, and 
the particular form that the American state took as a result.  America was – and 
remains – exceptional, no more so than any other state, but exceptional 
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nonetheless.  But if the ideology of American exceptionalism informed a greater 
social scientific project, which it most certainly did, then it did so because of the 
dynamics of power that were set in motion with the advent of capitalism in 
America.   
 Of course, this dissertation is not so much about the exceptional nature of 
the American social sciences, as it is about the exceptional nature of America’s 
system of QA.  Long-standing and ubiquitous, the American system of QA seems 
almost organic, and as a true testament to the power and logic of the market.  
What today seems a normal, useful, and inevitable part of the America’s system 
of higher education is the result of careful and coherent planning, aided and 
abetted by the state.  What today appears as so many autonomous and non-
governmental efforts at QA, is in fact, a dense web of operations at the pinnacles 
of which sit the six regional accrediting agencies whose independence is 
ultimately financed by the state and maintained (if not encouraged) because of an 
on-going confluence between the interests of the American state and of American 
capital and the on-going cooperation of the administrators and bureaucrats that 
operate America’s institutions of higher education.  As I outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter, the champions of accreditation highlight the 
efficiency with which accreditation processes have helped to develop a highly 
“differentiated” system of higher education that is, in turn, able to put-out highly 
skilled labour able to meet every labour market demand as well as more world-
leading and commercially oriented research than is any other system.  As I have 
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outlined, such arguments are in some senses wholly accurate.  America’s system 
of higher education is more productive.  Where I part with such conventional 
analyses however, is in my evaluation of the “quality” of that out-put.  Contra the 
conventional line, I would argue that the American system of higher education 
has long been intensely (re)productive, no so much of high quality research and 
teaching outputs, but rather of a low and common level of literacy and 
monopolizable forms of knowledge.  In fact, the level of (re)productivity has been 
so great that America’s “system” of QA appears as a testament to the potential of 
QA and “the market” to integrate the knowledge necessary to efficiently allocate 
resources, as Hayek would presumably put it.  One can well understand that in 
places like the UK and Ontario, the state and capital would both look to establish 
more coherent systems of QA with the express intent of moth mimicking and 
improving upon not only the procedural aspects of QA in America, but more 
importantly, the outcomes is has helped to achieve.  Indeed, where the 
confluence of the state’s and of capital’s interests did not manifest quite as early 
as they did in the US as either a concern for the operation of a national 
educational system or a program of measurement and conditional finance, the 
state and capital seem to have concluded that decisive state action is required if 
the kind of systematic coherence (i.e. stratification) and efficiency (i.e. 
reproductivity) achieved in the US is to be reproduced elsewhere and in any 
reasonable amount of time.   
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 Of course, the state and capital have hardly been the only key players, 
either in the US or elsewhere.  What was created “by design” when the American 
system of QA first emerged, again via programs of measurement and conditional 
finance that subjected the universities to the law of value almost from their 
inception, was a kind of market-based vortex that the universities have since 
further developed and cultivated, sometimes intentionally, and other times under 
the apprehension of “autonomy”.  The re-emergence of global of finance and the 
globalization of particular (American) forms of IP and Patent legislation, both 
under the aegis of an America empire, has widened that vortex and turned the 
universities and huge swathes of the academy and the student body outside the 
US, into boosters of the neoliberal university, reluctant supporters of the same, or 
else unwitting accomplices whose desire to research requires that they prove and 
improve “quality” in ways that are inescapably linked to capitalist value.        
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Chapter 6: Catch-up, Discipline, and Acculturation: 
QA in the United Kingdom 
The UK’s system of QA is arguably the most codified and bureaucratic in 
the world. More than this, the UK’s system of assessment and performance audit, 
where they have not been path-breaking, have certainly been trend-setting.  
Governments in jurisdiction after jurisdiction, including in Ontario, have looked 
to replicate and emulate the UK’s model.  In what follows I argue that the 
apparent popularity of the UK’s model of QA has to do with its apparent success, 
not so much in qualitative terms (i.e. of research and graduates), which I have 
already suggested has diminished since 1980, but rather because the UK’s system 
has appeared to provide an effective means via which to rationalize and 
transform higher education.  More than this, the UK’s system has developed 
rapidly.  Thatcher and her government took-up the cause of rationalizing 
research funding with a ferocity that simply belies any kind of structural analysis.  
Subsequently, her disciples, in both the Conservative and Labour Parties, have 
picked up and extended the program of QA with similar vigour and enthusiasm. 
The British system of higher education now allegedly operates both more 
efficiently and more in-keeping with the operational norms of the American 
system, which as I have already argued, have been judged to be more efficient 
and effective. In developing the UK’s system of QA, successive governments have 
faced-down and overcome what can at best be described as piecemeal opposition 
from both the academy and students.  Where the American system of QA 
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emerged and developed over the better part of a century, and apparently without 
the kind of state direction and support seen elsewhere, the British one is seen as 
having been created to great and virtuous effect almost overnight and without 
having to overcome, until perhaps quite recently, over much opposition.  For 
governments and policy-makers wishing to rapidly reproduce the kind of 
differentiated and market-based environment that mainstream thinkers identify 
with the US (and with economic prowess) then, the British system of QA is like a 
veritable “how-to”.  
Perhaps this is why the UK’s system of QA and audit has been more 
studied than have other jurisdictions’ systems.  Even highly developed systems 
such as Australia’s and New Zealand’s have simply not been subject to the same 
amount of critical analysis as has the UK’s.  In fact, the UK’s system is, on the one 
hand, relatively new, and, on the other hand, an obviously useful tool in the 
effective reproduction of neoliberal capitalism.  Even despite the obvious and on-
going dislocations and inefficiencies it has caused, the UK’s system of QA has 
proven to be remarkably durable. I argue that such durability relates to the fact 
that “the logic of the market, left to itself, necessarily tends to be cumulative 
rather than corrective (Anderson 1987, 72 emphasis in original)”.  In other words, 
QA in the UK has become so deeply embedded that its cumulative impacts, 
however negative, are also reproductive, even despite the fact that outside of 
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mainstream circles, the system has been subject to often vicious critique.119   
What most critiques miss, however, is the history of QA understood in broader 
political economic terms.  Indeed, I argue that it is vital to situate the 
development of QA in the context of: Britain’s long-term industrial decline; the 
relatively early arrival of neoliberalism in the mid-1970s; the sizeable failure of 
the Country’s parliamentary Left over that same period; and the subsequent 
ascendency and hegemony of finance capital within the British political economy 
(and the manifestations of such in terms of “everyday life”).   
6.1 The UK’s System of Quality Assessment  
The QA infrastructure in the UK operates in two parts: one part is focused 
on research and revolves mainly around the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE), which has recently been renamed the Research Excellence Framework 
(REF); and, the second part focuses around “service provision” (teaching) and 
operates through the Quality Audit Agency (QAA).  The QAA operates at the 
pinnacles of the UK’s teaching assessment program via a series of indirect 
institutional meta-assessments. These meta-assessments are in turn built, and 
thus dependent upon, the myriad particular forms of QA employed by each and 
every university. Thus, while the assessment of research is undertaken nationally, 
in a heavily prescribed and detailed manner, the assessment of teaching is said to 
be more “open”, at least in so far as universities are permitted to develop their 
                                                   
119 As I highlight below, some of the most cogent critiques have been provided by Willmott 
(2003; 1995) as well as by DeAngelis and Harvie (2009), among others (noted below).   
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own QA processes, which are then subject to assessment.  This approach, 
described by proponents as “steering not rowing” (Barlow and Röber 1996) or, 
“lighter touch” (Wright 2003, 1) type regulation, means that systematic study of 
QA processes is daunting.  Each university tracks and evaluates its teachers in a 
slightly different manner and according to a slightly different set of criteria.  Of 
course, this belies the point: the “quality” of each institution’s QA regime is itself 
subject to assessment according to a voluminous set of criteria that are made 
clear by the QAA (QAA 2013a).  As a result, the seemingly endless list of 
procedural particularities that may exist at the institutional level should not be 
taken to mean that QA has not become a significant pre-occupation in most 
institutions, or that the broader meta-assessments of the QAA have not 
encouraged a high degree of procedural convergence, at least in terms of the 
degree to which academics’ teaching practices are subject to an extensive and 
broadly similar array of assessment mechanisms. This is precisely the point made 
by De Angelis and Harvie (2009), in their invaluable discussion of value and 
measurement in UK higher education. As they see it, the drive towards both the 
quantification of higher education and thereby its standardization is indelible and 
ubiquitous.  
It is also worth highlighting at the outset that the “war over measure” (De 
Angelis and Harvie 2009, 5) that De Angelis and Harvie describe has been, and 
continues to, be very fluid.  Both the RAE/REF and the methods of QA employed 
by the QAA have changed considerably since they were first introduced. 
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Generally speaking, and as I outline below, such changes have come in response 
to changes in government, to pressure from within the sector to change-up the 
manner in which it is regulated, and/or to the latest fad in the on-going evolution 
of QA.  
6.1.1 The Assessment of Quality in Teaching 
Since its inception, the QAA, has evaluated and assured quality via two 
related mechanisms: 1) an extensive literature identifying the requisite standards 
that institutions must meet in terms of their own internal QA measures and 
mechanisms, as well as in terms of the learning outcomes/standards that 
graduates must verifiably meet in order to obtain credits/diplomas/degrees; and, 
2) the periodic audit of institutions’ internal QA mechanisms by a panel of 
“experts” external to an institution or program.  Both mechanisms operate in 
respect of an over-arching code of conduct currently referred to as the “Quality 
Code”.  The QAA describes the code like this: 
The Quality Code gives all higher education providers a shared starting 
point for setting, describing and assuring the academic standards of their 
higher education awards and programmes and the quality of the learning 
opportunities they provide. Providers use it to design their respective 
policies for maintaining academic standards and quality. (QAA 2013a) 
The Code itself is made up of three parts: “Part A”, which describes the 
academic standards that students, at each level of study, must meet; “Part B”, 
which outlines the kinds of processes via which institutions are supposed to set 
and measure standards; and, “Part C”, which involves the communication of the 
information gleaned through QA to the general public.  Considered as a whole, 
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the Code is an obvious effort to ensure consistency in terms of the overall 
standard that a graduate at each level should be able to obtain and/or 
demonstrate, without being too prescriptive in terms of content. For example, in 
outlining the academic standards that students are expected to meet (Part A), the 
QAA offers “descriptors” of key competencies at the program level (as in what a 
baccalaureate degree in Geography must mean in terms of a student’s particular, 
subject-specific competencies), at the degree/diploma level (i.e. in terms of the 
competencies expected of baccalaureates in general), and at the institutional, 
national, and international levels (i.e. so that a student at any given university 
can be assured, in getting a baccalaureate degree, that their degree is, in some 
basic way, comparable to a baccalaureate degree at other institutions both in and 
out-side of the UK).  The Code is thus a massive set of self-referential documents 
intended to make-up a comprehensive and logically consistent approach to QA. 
(QAA 2012a) 
The development of the Code was an intensive operation, as was the 
development of the “Academic Infrastructure”, which the Code replaced in 2013.  
For example, the development of “subject benchmark statements” (i.e. the 
discipline specific standards that students are expected to reach upon graduating 
at the Baccalaureate or Masters level) is today undertaken in accordance with the 
QAA’s, “Recognition Scheme for Subject Benchmark Statements” (QAA 2012b).  
Accordingly, subject benchmark statements are revised when the QAA’s Quality 
Code Steering Group receives a submission from a particular academic subject 
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association, or a “professional, statutory, or regulatory body (PSRB)”, indicating 
the need for either an entirely new subject benchmark statement, or the revision 
of an existing one, in accordance with the principles set out in the Recognition 
Scheme (which sets-out when a new or a revised statement would be considered). 
If the QAA’s Steering Committee decides to support a request, the QAA then 
works in conjunction with the relevant subject group or PSRB to convene an 
appropriate and “balanced” team of experts who develop a draft statement.  The 
QAA then shops the draft subject benchmark statement around to relevant 
stakeholders, in a process that is not outlined in the Recognition Scheme, and 
collects relevant comments from such stakeholders before finally leaving the 
expert working group to the task of finalizing the Statement (QAA 2012b, 6–9). 
In addition to this process, the QAA conducts regular (initially after five years, 
and then every seven years) reviews of the Statements, a process similar to that 
just outlined (QAA 2012b, 9).     
The Statements themselves are inoffensive.  Typically, over around ten 
pages, the particular domain of a subject is defined, the nature of an 
undergraduate or graduate program in that subject is described, and certain 
“threshold” (QAA 2007, 1) standards are identified.  For example, the benchmark 
statement for Politics and International Relations clarifies that, upon being 
granted an honours undergraduate degree, 
4.14 Graduates in politics should be able to: 
• understand the nature and significance of politics as a human activity 
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• apply concepts, theories and methods used in the study of politics to 
the analysis of political ideas, institutions and practices 
• demonstrate knowledge and understanding of different political 
systems, the nature and distribution of power in them; the social, 
economic, historical and cultural contexts within which they operate, 
and the relationships between them 
• evaluate different interpretations of political issues and events.(QAA 
2007, 4–5) 
 
 The clear and express intent in outlining subject benchmark statements is 
to inform the various QA processes that the QAA ultimately oversees.  In other 
words, individual academics, the departments of which they are a part, the over-
arching faculty to which they belong, the entire institution, and the teams of 
external reviewers are all intended to use the Statements as a kind of a guide. The 
QAA puts it this way: 
Subject benchmark statements do not represent a national curriculum in a 
subject area. Rather, they allow for flexibility and innovation in 
programme design within an overall conceptual framework established by 
an academic subject community. They are intended to assist those 
involved in programme design, delivery and review and may also be of 
interest to prospective students and employers, seeking information about 
the nature and standards of awards in a subject area. (QAA 2013b) 
The same is true for all of the other “descriptors” provided by the QAA – they are 
intended to inform QA processes up and down the proverbial “line” and to 
thereby ensure consistency throughout the sector.  Of course, the QAA does also 
provide an outline of how and when the full suite of their descriptors are to be 
used, as well as what a vigorous program of QA looks like at the institutional 
level. Here, the QAA makes no outright mention of any kind of standardized test, 
such as the National Survey of Student Engagement.  Rather, institutions are 
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provided a relatively wide berth when it comes to the processes each follows in 
order to ensure the maintenance of standards.  The QAA requires only that each 
and every aspect of the QA process be somehow codified, made publicly available, 
and meet the broad criteria that the QAA has outlined in terms of things such as, 
for example, “student engagement”. Indeed, the QAA’s Quality Code though 
procedurally burdensome, is also at pains to ensure that it is not too prescriptive 
(QAA 2013a).  As I have already suggested, the result is a great swathe of 
generalities, such as this one: “Institutions ensure that their responsibilities for 
standards and quality are discharged effectively through their procedures for the 
monitoring and review of programmes” (QAA 2011, 1). Taken from Chapter B8 of 
the Code, the above is offered as the first of eight “indicators of sound practice” 
with respect to monitoring and program review (1).  Similar such indicators are 
offered with respect to ten other areas of practice, including, external examining, 
admissions, learning and teaching, enabling student learning and development, 
etc.  This, ‘light touch’ (Wright 2003) approach is thus linked to still another set 
of guidelines and rules.  Summarizing the myriad measures to which the British 
academy is today subject (in terms of teaching), Harvie and DeAngelis offer this 
point form outline, which is usefully reproduced at length:  
•For each module, the ‘module leader’ (ML, i.e., lecturer) must complete 
various paperwork, in particular a ‘module specification’ (at the module’s 
start) which lists the module’s ‘aims and objectives’, ILOs, ‘modes and 
methods of assessment’, amongst other information; and a ‘module 
review’ document (at the end of the module), in which the ML reports 
their own assessment of the module’s strengths and weaknesses and their 
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suggested changes for the following year; a summary of student feedback; 
and average marks and their dispersion.  
• Across a degree programme as a whole (say BA (Hons) Economics) this 
information is collated into two important documents with similar 
structures. First, a ‘programme specification’, which will include the 
module specs for all of a programme’s constituent modules, plus rationale 
for the degree as a whole, its overall ‘aims and objectives’ and learning 
outcomes, and an inventory of the resources (academic staff, library and 
other facilities, etc.) available to ‘deliver’ the programme, Second, annual 
programme reports, which collate module reviews and summarise overall 
performance of a cohort of students, in terms of ‘progression rates’, 
‘withdrawal rates’, location and spread of marks, etc.  
• To ensure ‘fairness,' students’ assessed work – particularly for longer 
pieces such as a dissertation – should be graded against a ‘matrix’, with 
the various degree ‘classes’ (First, Upper Second, etc.) along one axis and a 
list of categories (e.g., structure, grasp of ‘key concepts’, ability to critically 
analysis, referencing) along the other. Within each cell is a description of 
the standard that must be achieved in that category in order to warrant 
that class of degree. Markers must complete the matrix for each individual 
assignment.  
• This documentation may be scrutinized in a number of ways, both 
internal and external to the institution.  
• Before any degree programme can be offered, it must be ‘validated’. The 
validation process involves scrutiny of the ‘programme specification’ 
and/or a ‘validation document’ by both committees internal to the 
university and, at a final validation meeting, a panel which will include two 
or three external validators. These scrutineers will judge the proposed 
degree on the basis on its internal consistency, the extent to which its 
learning outcomes correspond to the subject benchmark and so on. All 
degree programmes must be periodically (approx every four years) 
revalidated.  
• Annually, module and programme documentation is examined by 
various ‘quality’ committees, overseen by institution-level bodies with such 
names as Centre of Academic Standards and Quality.  
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• Marks and degree classifications awarded by universities are monitored 
by ‘external examiners’, whose role it is to ensure consistency across the 
sector.  
• Departments are subject to periodic visits – lasting three or four days – 
by the QAA, which sends in a team of inspectors. Such inspectors spend 
most of their time in a ‘base room’, examining and comparing programme 
documentation: module and programme specifications and reports, 
external examiners’ reports, examples of student work, examples of 
academics’ feedback on student work, documentary evidence of 
‘excellence’ in various areas. Of course, preparing, collating and 
cataloguing this documentation involves an immense amount of work, 
which must start up to 18 months before the visit.  
• Transparency review: an attempt by the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE) to discover the amount of time that 
academics spend on various activities – teaching funding by HEFCE (EU 
undergraduate students); teaching funded by other sources; HEFCE-
funded research; etc. English universities were required to supply this 
information: some required their academic employees to complete diaries 
for sample weeks.  
• Teaching observation: lecturers observed by one of their peers. Before 
observation, observed required to complete form stating information 
regarding group of students and ILOs for the session. Observer required to 
complete feedback form following the observation. (De Angelis and Harvie 
2009, 11–14) 
6.1.2 The Assessment of Quality in Research 
Having already outlined in Chapter 3, (section 3.4.3) the operation of the 
Research Excellence Framework (REF) (formerly known as the Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE), I will only provide a brief review here.  Like its 
predecessor, the RAE, the REF is a program of peer review that requires 
individual researchers deemed “active” by their departments (“research units”) to 
submit four published papers (1 for each of the previous four years) for 
310 
evaluation by an expert panel according to a set of criteria established and 
outlined by the UK’s Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE).  
The scores awarded to an individual researcher’s research are assembled into a 
composite score for each ‘research unit’, each of which operates in one of 36 
research areas designated as such by the HEFCE (Willmott 2003).  In terms of 
the review process itself, the REF operates through a series of four main panels 
(A-D) and 36 sub-panels.  Both main and sub-panels vary in terms of their overall 
size.  Panel membership is determined via a nomination process to which both 
the universities and other “end-users” of university research have access.  
Generally, the majority of members on each panel are active and university-based 
researchers.  It is also the norm, however, for private sector (industry) partners to 
occupy at least a couple of seats on any one assessment sub- or main panel. 
(HEFCE 2013) 
Each sub-panel assesses each of the four submissions of each individual 
researcher on a weighted 4-point scale.  The weightings reflect the government’s 
(via HEFCE) definition of quality.  Accordingly, quality is defined in respect of 
three “sub-profiles”: the overall quality of a research “output” (accounting for 
65% of the overall score); the impact that a given research output can be 
demonstrated to have had over the preceding four-year period (accounting for 
20% of the overall score); and, the degree to which a research output impacts 
positively on the “research environment” within/around a particular discipline 
(accounting for 15% of the overall score).  Once assessed, 100% of each 
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institution’s research budget is allocated based on the score of each research unit 
and the number of active researchers therein. (HEFCE 2013)  
The key difference between the RAE and the REF is the inclusion of the 
second, “impact” category.  After some debate and study (by a HEFCE working 
group and subsequent to a pilot study), the HEFCE has determined that impact 
scores will be based on “case-study” submissions provided by each research unit 
for each active researcher.  Ostensibly, this means that the definition of “impact” 
has been left for each individual institution or research unit to define, particularly 
given that the HEFCE has only gone so far as to outline that judgments around 
impact must relate to the, “reach and significance on the economy, society and/or 
culture”(HEFCE 2012, 48) of particular research outputs. On the other hand, and 
as others have noted, this does not mean that the universities have been given 
carte blanche either.  Lacking a more vigorous set of standards or direction, 
institutions have indicated a willingness to rely heavily on bibliometric indices, 
informed by various weightings of “key” journals, as a basis for their case studies 
(Martin 2011; Yates 2005).   
6.2 Political Economy of Quality Assessment in the United 
Kingdom 
Relative to the decentred and almost anarchic nature of the American 
system of higher education and QA, the UK’s system is highly centralized and 
coordinated.  In fact, since the end of the Second World War, the federal 
government has been the primary source of funding for the universities, which 
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only began charging tuition-fees to domestic students in 1998, when the Blair 
government first introduced them (Walford 1988, 48–49).  And although the 
bureaucratic apparatus in and around the management of the sector has 
massively expanded since the 1980s, and particularly since the sector’s main 
buffer/administrative body, the University Grants Committee (UGC), was 
formally wound-up and replaced by funding councils that were made directly 
accountable to parliament, where the UGC had not been, the sector’s 
administration has remained relatively centralized (Shattock and Berdahl 1984; 
Walford 1988, 56–58).  The British system is decidedly different from the US’s in 
other ways too: though Britain is home to some of the oldest universities in the 
West, the story of massification is of a relatively recent vintage (Trow 1979).  
Furthermore, industrial capital in Britain never coalesced into a cohesive social 
force the way that it did in the US, let alone a cohesive social force that avidly 
supported a developmental program that aimed to leverage the universities to 
particular ends.  Not until the 1980s, some 70 years after corporate America 
became fundamental to the development of American higher education, did 
finance and industrial capital in Britain cohere around a program that made the 
UK’s universities an obvious part of an economic development model (see below 
and Chapter 5).  It was also not until the 1980s that the administrative 
arrangements between the universities and the state changed dramatically in the 
UK.  Until that time, state authorities permitted the universities a terrific degree 
of independence from both the scrutiny of the state and the machinations of 
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capital, not least through the provision of a block grant for both teaching and 
research (Shattock and Berdahl 1984). In other words, where American capital 
and then the American state had long rationed research and operational funding 
(through, among other things, ‘strategic philanthropy’ and the portability of the 
GI Bill) the British state paid for the massification of Britain’s universities more 
equitably.    
Thus, while the groundwork for neoliberalism had long-been set in the US, 
the kind of reproductive machinery necessary to support a services-based 
neoliberal political economy was, in the UK, something that needed - and got - 
substantially more attention and stewardship when in the 1980s, the Government 
set-about attempting to construct just that.120   As a result, the evolution of QA in 
the UK is a short tale about a highly concerted and concentrated effort to 
transform the British political economy (and within it the universities) that 
begins with the election of Thatcher in 1979.   
As I indicated in the introduction to this chapter, however, there is a 
longer “tail” to the UK’s neoliberal turn under Thatcher.  That ‘tail’ relates to four 
things: 1) the long-run decline and neglect of British manufacturing (Anderson 
                                                   
120 As I immediately mention, Thatcher did not come from thin air.  After the lengthy 
post-war tenure of the Conservatives, (starting with Churchill’s return in 1951), the labour party 
did little to effect the kind of change that might have extended Labour’s stay in power.  Indeed, 
during Labour’s brief stints in power prior to Thatcher’s victory in 1979, Wilson only set the 
ground for Labour’s wholesale turn to the right and to Blair’s more consistently neoliberal 
program.(Panitch and Leys 2001)  When Thatcher later offered her, “there is no alternative” fait 
accompli, she was largely correct – in the face of economic crisis in the 1970’s, Wilson’s Labour 
government had accomplished little that might have enabled the working class to marshal the 
forces and resources necessary to both weather the turbulence of the 1970s, and mount a 
meaningful challenge to the neoliberal onslaught that later came with Thatcher.        
314 
1987; Leys 1985); 2) a period of intense economic dislocation and adjustment 
through the 1970s, which was capped off by the imposition of structural 
adjustment programs at the behest of the International Monetary Fund (Hickson 
2005); 3) the inability of Britain’s social democratic Left to offer an alternative 
(Panitch and Leys 2001); and, 4) the relative position of finance capital, and of 
global finance, within the British political economy such that the ability of left-
forces to marshal an alternative was hamstrung (Leys 1990; Anderson 1987).  
6.2.1 Towards Thatcherism: From Empire to Financial Centre  
By the end of the 1970s, British industry had been languishing for the 
better part of the previous hundred years.  For Leys (1985; 1990), the slow 
decline of British industry through the twentieth century, and right up until its 
virtual elimination through the 1980s and 1990s, is partly linked to the political 
weakness of industrial capital in the British political economy.  Accordingly, the 
early emergence of capitalism in the UK and thereby the construction of Britain’s 
industrial advantage never involved the coalescence of industrial capital into a 
cohesive social force with a clear developmental program, simply because such 
was not necessary, at least not until other states had had caught up, by which 
time other social forces had assembled at the centre of the capitalist power bloc.  
In other words, British leadership was such that there was not a pressing need to 
establish consonance between, for example, large and small industrial firms, or 
those more oriented to the domestic market relative to those more involved in 
international trade. So long as Britain remained the predominant imperial power, 
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and the institution of private property was sufficiently protected, there was no 
need for industrial capital to take on the task of managing the affairs of state or of 
organizing politically for a developmental program that might have provided 
sufficient protection and support when competitors did emerge.121  Even through 
the hey-day of corporatism, British industry never emerged as a cohesive fraction 
of capital or a hegemonic political force within either the ruling power bloc or the 
UK political economy. (Leys 1985, 14–16) 
The story of finance capital in the UK is quite different.  Not only did the 
operation of the Empire lead to the creation of a strong – and unified – group of 
merchant bankers and financiers, that faction of capital also took on a powerful 
institutional form, the Bank of England, which was hardly reformed when it was 
nationalized in 1946 (Anderson 1987; Leys 1986, 15; Baker 1999).  Indeed, the 
relationship between Whitehall and the City was and remained strong 
throughout the post-war era, even when the establishment of capital controls and 
fixed exchange rates temporarily left finance capital with less room for 
manoeuvre (Leys 1990; Anderson 1987).122   And to the extent that Thatcher’s 
program of liberalization and privatization did ultimately require the substantial 
                                                   
121 By “developmental agenda” I mean a nationalist developmental program traditionally 
associated with strategies around import substitution (tariff protection), capital controls, state 
subsidy and direction, and the like. 
122 Even through the post-war era, finance capital stood impatiently in-line behind labour 
– not productive or industrial capital – for primacy within the British state.  Indeed, in as much as 
finance capital was temporarily brought to heel by Keynes in the post-war reconstruction, 
corporatism did not, in the UK, denote the hegemony of a productive program, as it did 
elsewhere.  Again, corporatism in the UK was more about peak-level bargaining and the 
amelioration and management of class conflict, than it was about peak-level planning. 
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reform of the sector, that reform did little to weaken the relative power of finance 
capital, even if it did spell the end of British finance defined in terms of bank 
ownership.  On the contrary, Thatcher’s move to liberalize financial markets, 
which was capped off in 1986 with the abolition of fixed charges on the sale of 
stocks and bonds, (known as the “Big Bang” because of its massive effect on sales’ 
volume) was arguably the fin de siècle in in terms of the ascension of global 
finance within the British political economy.  Simply, the Big Bang meant that the 
interests of British finance were identical to those of global finance.123   Of course, 
the relative position of finance capital within the British political economy was 
arguably on display in the early 1980s too, when finance capital was able to corral 
the support of British industry for a policy program that was destined to lead to 
the full-scale deindustrialization of the UK (Baker 1999; Anderson 1987, 68–
70).124    
In the run-up to and following the emergence of QA in the UK then, finance 
capital was arguably the single-most powerful faction within the capitalist power-
bloc, and moreover, was also clearly represented both in- and out-side of the 
                                                   
123 The ‘Big Bang’ prompted the sale of Britain’s banking sector to so many increasingly 
“global banks”, coming out of the US, Germany, and Japan.   
124 The Confederation of Business Industry (CBI) (the main business lobby in the UK) 
emerged as a cohesive force in the early 1980s when industrial capital fell in line behind finance 
capital and supported Thatcher’s economic reforms, the great bulk of which involved forms of de- 
and re-regulation that thoroughly liberalized Britain’s political economy, making British industry 
more, not less, susceptible to competition from abroad.  In other words, the CBI established – and 
then proved – its mettle in support of a program (Thatcherism) that promised what it ultimately 
delivered: de-industrialization.  Sparked by fears of an insurgency by organized labour itself 
operating under the auspices of a Labour government that was hardly capable of such, industrial 
capital proved willing to cut off its nose to spite its face.  Based on interviews with several 
industrial captains, Leys notes that what motivated industrialists to so act, was not a sense of 
sectoral self-interest, but rather the fear that the alternative to Thatcher was Stalin! 
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British state.  In fact, Alex Jarratt, who chaired the committee that produced the 
infamous “Jarratt Report” (discussed below), which is widely regarded as the first 
stage in the development of QA in the UK, came to the civil service after heading 
up the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), a long-standing, relatively 
inclusive, but traditionally ineffective, business lobby that became decidedly 
more effective at the very moment when finance capital asserted itself within the 
organization, then under Jarratt’s stewardship, and came out strongly in support 
of Thatcher (Leys 1985, 17). In its ascent within the political economy, and in its 
efforts in support of Thatcher, finance capital received a great deal of help by way 
of Britain’s Labour party.  Indeed, for Panitch and Leys (Panitch and Leys 2001), 
as well as for Anderson (Anderson 1987), Thatcher’s utterly transformative 
program was presaged by an anemic and all-too conventional program on the 
part of Britain`s Labour Party under both Wilson and then Callaghan.  Unwilling 
to take-on the task of mobilizing a working class movement in the manner 
advocated for by people such as Tony Benn, Labour found itself beholden to 
global financial interests during the 1976 Sterling Crisis as well as during the 
subsequent “Winter of Discontent”.  Labour’s massive electoral defeat in 1979 did 
little to trigger the kind of re-evaluation that might have led Labour to endorse a 
more traditionally social-democratic program or to reign-in the emergent power 
of the British cum global banks.  On the contrary, in the wake of Labour’s 1979 
defeat, the Party elite organized to transform Labour into an electoral machine 
increasingly distanced from the trade-unions and closer to business.  By the time 
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John Major’s bid for re-election finally ended the nearly two decades long run of 
consecutive Conservative administrations, New Labour’s anti-inflationary, anti-
union, privatization program was entrenched.  Rather than repudiate 
Thatcherism, Tony Blair, in part under the guidance of Gordon Brown’s penchant 
for “post-neoclassical endogenous growth theory”, embraced neoliberalism in 
precisely the same manner as had the Keynesian economists in the early 1980s 
(see Chapter 2).  To the extent that there were any notable differences between 
Labour’s brand of neoliberal policy and that of the Conservatives, such marked 
the relatively small gap between “roll-out” and “roll-back” neoliberalism.  And as 
Leys points out, having adopted the mantle of low-inflation, independent central 
banking, and market-led growth, New Labour found that “it could not reverse 
itself on privatisation however abysmal the consequences (Leys 2001, 78)”.  In 
1998, but a year after being elected to office for the first time, Tony Blair’s 
government introduced tuition-fees for university students. (Panitch and Leys 
2001; Leys 2001)  
The inability of New Labour to distance itself from the Conservative 
program of privatization was more than just a result of ideological commitments 
to the market. During the Conservative’s tenure in power, government had been 
completely restructured: 
The Conservatives set in hand a radical reform of the civil service, driving 
through a separation between policy-making, to be done by a small central 
elite, and implementation, to be carried out by independent executive 
agencies organised on business lines, with chief executives on short-term 
contracts and performance-related pay, ‘profit centres’ charging other 
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branches of the state for their services, and annual budget cuts to 
encourage productivity ‘savings’.  They also imposed a quasi-market 
system of organisation on the National Health Services and the 
organisation of personal social services, and ensured that the nominally 
independent BBC followed suit…The Conservatives also expanded 
dramatically the number and scope of unelected ‘quangos’ until those 
organisations were responsible for a third of all public spending, almost as 
much as elected local government.  (Leys 2001, 69–70) 
In so transforming the state, the Thatcherites were thus able to affect the 
complete restructuring of the British political economy such that to contemplate 
a turn away from neoliberalism, should Labour have seriously considered it, 
would have been a monumental task.  The labour movement had been neutered, 
the British political economy tightly linked to the machinations of global capital, 
and popular sentiment carefully manipulated and managed in the creation of an 
“enterprise culture”.  On this last point, it is worth highlighting that the 
ideological transformation Thatcherism was able to affect in the UK was such 
that it became the subject of fevered debate amongst radical academics in the 
1990s.  The concern of many left leaning scholars was to explain the apparent 
rootedness of neoliberalism, even despite its obvious failings in a variety of 
regards (growing inequality; the growth of state expenditures; the diminution of 
public services).  
For Perry Anderson (Anderson 1987, 67–68), the ‘rootedness’ of 
neoliberalism in the UK has had to do with both the factors identified above, and 
just as crucially, the expansion of Britain’s military and the government’s 
willingness and capacity to crush dissent.  In respect of the former, Anderson 
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highlights Thatcher’s exploits in Argentina in 1982, while in respect of the latter 
he highlights Thatcher’s sanctioning of police brutality in breaking the long-
winded coal-miners’ strike in 1984/85.  Anderson also notes that Thatcher’s 
program of privatization created,   
…a popular clientele for the regime from a mass impropriation of public 
assets—a calculation [that] lent a certain persuasive force by the social 
tone of Thatcherite ideology itself. Petty-bourgeois, like the Premier 
herself, the new Conservative rhetoric could now appeal more readily than 
the patrician style of traditional Toryism to upper layers of the working 
class not always that distant now in residence and outlook from the lower-
middle class itself. (Anderson 1987, 68) 
Leys makes a similar point, albeit with reference to the Labour Party and its turn 
to Third Way Neoliberalism.  For him, the ambitions of Labour’s leadership in 
the run-up to the 1997 election meant that Labour built a business-friendly 
fundraising machine that promised to cater to the needs of the very clientele 
whose loyalty Thatcher has similarly been able to purchase (Leys 2001, 67).  For 
Larner, the durability of neoliberalism has less to do with global market forces 
and policies of patronage than it does with policies that are transformative of the 
ideological milieu:  
Neo-liberal strategies of rule, found in diverse realms including 
workplaces, educational institutions and health and welfare agencies, 
encourage people to see themselves as individualized and active subjects 
responsible for enhancing their own well-being. This conception of the 
"active society" can also be linked to a particular politics of self in which 
we are all encouraged to ''work on ourselves" in a range of domains, 
including the "counter cultural movements" outside the purview of 
traditional conceptions of the political…Welfare agencies are now to be 
governed, not directly from above, but through technologies such as 
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budget disciplines, accountancy and audit. In association with this 
"degovernmentalization" of the welfare state, competition and consumer 
demand have supplanted the norms of "public service." Correspondingly, 
the citizen is re-specified as an active agent both able and obliged to 
exercise autonomous choices. (Larner 2000, 12) 
Of course, one need hardly abandon the present focus on the machinations of 
global capital and the more material bases of British neoliberalism in order to 
obtain a sense of the popular appeal of neoliberalism in Britain (and elsewhere).  
Indeed, as Leys points out immediately after outlining the nature of institutional 
reform of the British state under Thatcher (i.e. the advent of quango 
government)125, he too turns to the issue of audit:  
The counterpart to the quasi-commercialisation of central and local 
government was the proliferation of auditing, i.e. the use of business 
derived concepts of independent supervision to measure and evaluate 
performance by public agencies and public employees, from civil servants 
and school teachers to university lecturers and doctors: ’environmental 
audit, value for money audit, management audit, forensic audit, data 
audit, intellectual property audit, medical audit, teaching audit, and 
technology audit emerged and, to varying degrees, acquired a degree of 
institutional stability and acceptance…very few people have been left 
untouched by these developments…’ In place of a society of citizens with 
the democratic power to ensure the effective and proper use of collective 
resources, and relying on a large measure of trust in the public sector, 
there emerged a society of ‘auditees’, anxiously preparing for audits and 
inspections.  A punitive culture of ‘league tables’ developed (purporting to 
show the relative efficiency and inefficiency of universities or schools or 
hospitals).  Inspection agencies were charged with ‘naming and shaming’ 
‘failing’ individual teachers, schools, social work departments, and so on: 
                                                   
125 Thatcher, and subsequently Blair, pursued a program of privatization which saw 
myriad government services transferred to private organizations that had some kind of arms-
length tie to the government. As such, Thatcher’s government was described as a kind of, “quasi 
autonomous non-governmental organization”, or “QUANGO” Government.    
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private firms were invited to take over and run ‘failing’ institutions. (Leys 
2001, 70)   
It is no doubt also relevant that aside from the transformation of the British state 
and the dominance of finance capital within the British political economy (which 
again involved the parallel annihilation of British manufacturing) the nature of 
most people’s work also changed.  As data from the OECD makes clear, finance 
capital came through the 1980s to account for a remarkable amount of domestic 
wealth in the UK.  More than this, the proportion of workers in the services 
sectors soared from the 1970s on, and today accounts for some 80% of 
employment.126  As was discussed in Chapter 2, the production of services 
presented capital with a problem in terms of the measurement of productivity 
(the productivity paradox), which was and remains vital to the reproduction of 
the capital relationship.  Though there was something of a lag, albeit a relatively 
short one in the case of the UK, the emergence of QA in and around the British 
state and the British universities paralleled the advent of not just Thatcherism 
and the re-emergence of global finance, but the adaptation of managerial 
technologies from the shop floor to the new corporate, services based 
environments that came to dominate the British political economy.  To put it in 
terms an institutionalist might appreciate, there was a significant degree of 
“overdetermination” in the emergence and evolution of QA in the UK’s system of 
higher education.   
                                                   
126 OECD Stan Structural Analysis Database v.2011.  I have used here the OECD’s proxy 
for finance capital: “FIRE”, finance (i.e. banking and related services), insurance, and real estate.  
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6.2.2 The Development of QA in the UK after 1980 
Before we can begin to consider the specific nature of QA in UK it is worth 
pointing out that there are in fact two separate literatures that tell the story of QA 
in the UK, one which deals with the development of the Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) (i.e. the assessment of research), and one which deals with the 
development of QA and audit processes around teaching.  This division likely 
reflects the fact that the assessment of research and that of teaching are managed 
by different institutions and via entirely different processes.  In a number of 
ways, however, the division within the literature must itself be made part of any 
political economy of QA in British higher education.  At a high level of analysis, it 
is important to recognize that the bureaucratic apparatus of the capitalist state 
tends to impose and institutionalize what are often artificial divisions between 
different “sectors” or policy areas.  By obscuring from view the common logic 
underlying the overall program and system of QA such divisions, make it difficult 
to stitch together a coherent picture of public policy around higher education or 
of neoliberalism.  As a result, the narrative split between the story of QA in terms 
of both research and teaching functions to maintain the status-quo.127   
Nonetheless, it bears keeping in mind that the institutional and narrative 
separation of the two QA tracks has been functional in terms of the degree to 
                                                   
127 I do not mean to suggest that such artifices as the division between portfolios within 
the capitalist state were designed to be functional (i.e. I am not arguing for a crudely functionalist 
history of the development of the capitalist state). I am however, arguing that it is possible to both 
understand the particular nature of any capitalist state and to examine the consequent 
functionality that any state-form might take-on.   
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which opposition to the broad sweep of changes was divided, muted, and 
contained.   
The separation between two QA tracks is also significant in that it speaks 
clearly to another artifact of massified and neoliberalized higher education: the 
apparent separation of teaching and research.  In fact, it has become common to 
find scholars who argue, contra the allegedly “traditional” view, that teaching and 
research are not usefully related (Qamar uz Zaman 2004).  Of course, that 
literature and the neoliberal mythology upon which it is based, it itself a by-
product of diminished quality, wherein undergraduate teaching has become so 
debased and rudimentary that the argument becomes a kind of self-fulfilling 
prophesy. Undergraduate students, in other words, have become ill-equipped to 
read, understand, and usefully comment on the work of their teachers. 
Perhaps most important to note is the fact that the process of commodification 
has arguably been greatly enhanced via the division between separate assessment 
tracks, as it arguably has been in the US.  Both processes can be broken down 
more effectively into their constituent parts, measured, and ultimately managed.  
This is why, for instance, the use in the 2008 RAE, of a “continuous grading-
scale”, wherein each department (unit of analysis/cost centre) was given a score 
based on the accumulated scores of each individual research-active participant, 
whose work was individually graded on a three-point scale is so significant: it is 
evidence of efforts to improve the accuracy of measurement and the unity of the 
overall system.  Such forms of division and measurement have parallels in the 
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UK’s teaching assessment processes, which track and measure things like: 
contact hours, the use of visual and audio communications technologies etc.  
Simply, such measures are essentially identical to Taylor’s time and motion 
studies.   
All this said, there are striking similarities between the narrative accounts 
of how QA developed in each track: both literatures tend to discuss, though only 
passingly, Thatcherism and/or neoliberalism; both literatures tend to highlight 
successive governments’ concern to promote closer links between the universities 
and industry; both narratives suggest that the nature and operation of the QA 
institutions are causatively linked to tensions between the universities, which 
wanted autonomy, and the government, which looked to promote efficiency and 
economic utility.  In other words, the universities are generally cast as either 
victims or as proactive but reluctant “partners” that were constantly responding 
to intense and ever-intensifying governmental pressure.128    
6.2.3 Cutting Research out of Base Funding: Thatcher and the 
Establishment of the RAE 
Though there were some programmatic antecedents to the system of QA 
that developed in the 1980s and 90s, they were nowhere near as comprehensive, 
as bureaucratically involved and complex, as what began to take shape after the 
election of Thatcher’s Conservatives in 1979.  According to Desmond Ryan 
(1998), almost immediately upon its election, the Conservative Government 
                                                   
128 For the reasons outlined above, I have attempted to stitch together a single narrative 
account of the UK’s overall system of QA. 
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constantly and effectively beat a populist drum with the aim of building popular 
support for cuts to higher education.  Ryan notes,  
...There came with the cuts in resources a demoralizing and politically 
disabling message which was to become a Tory refrain: ‘higher education 
had only itself to blame for the cuts.’ Expenditure on higher education had 
all along been investment in industry—‘where were the dividends? (Ryan 
1998, 15)  
When combined with the rhetoric of privatization and efficiency, the case for 
targeting funds for the purposes of research and otherwise cutting transfers for 
higher education seemed imminently reasonable.  Of course, this populist 
rhetoric was not just rhetoric. Thatcher’s brand of neoliberalism was rooted in a 
belief in the virtue of the market as the best mechanism for the allocation of 
funding. Not only did the Thatcherites conflate quality with utility, they also 
understood the market as the most efficient means by which to evaluate that 
utility.129   In the absence of a market-type allocation mechanism (i.e. when 
funding was allocated equitably, as had been the case prior to 1981), knowledge, 
at least of any meaningful/useful form, would according to Thatcher and her 
acolytes, wither and die.   
Neither Thatcher’s rhetoric nor her Government’s decision in 1981 to cut 
higher education expenditures by 10% ignited much in the way of opposition.  
For Willmott (2003), the muted nature of the opposition to the 1981 cuts related 
                                                   
129 As I outlined in Chapter 2, the neoliberal conception of utility involves the conflation 
of “market utility” (i.e. what is profitable), with use-value (i.e. real utility).  In Hayek’s world, the 
market operates as a kind of super-computer, rationally coordinating investment and purchasing 
such that the best, most useful technologies/knowledge are/is produced.  He saw this 
coordinative power as utterly eclipsing that of humans (Mirowski 2011). 
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to the way in which the overall reduction was selectively and unevenly imposed.  
While the size of the overall funding envelope was set-down by the Government, 
each institutions’ individual allocation was decided by the sector’s “buffer” 
institution, the University Grants Committee (UGC), which was anxious to revive 
its relevance within the sector, it having suffered seriously through the 1970s.130  
Though the presumption by some was that the UGC was careful in its selection 
process such that more capital intensive programs were spared while others bore 
the brunt of the cuts, this was never made clear – the decision-making process 
was completely opaque (Butler 1982, 266–267).  That said, the UGC had 
previously outlined some interest in a research selectivity exercise and was by all 
accounts careful to cultivate a relationship with the Conservatives, particularly 
given fears of government incursions into the sector (Butler 1982; Shattock and 
Berdahl 1984).  Whatever its intent, the UGC’s system of selective allocation had 
the effect of dividing the universities.  The universities that survived the 
Conservative axe were loath to question why they had survived.  Where the cuts 
were significant but not disastrously so, opposition was present, but muted.  And 
where the cuts were massive, opposition was still more muted, though only 
because administrators were pressed into damage control (Butler 1982; Jones 
                                                   
130Butler (1982) is also careful to note that the UGC had, by the late 70’s become 
increasingly irrelevant. The UGC’s refrain, which involved annual demands for ever-more money, 
had become both predictable and frustrating for Whitehall, which wanted the UGC to deliver 
ways to lower unit-costs and create efficiencies.  In as much as the UGC finally stepped up to the 
proverbial plate in selectively administering the 1981 cuts, the Government and Whitehall had 
already begun looking for an alternative and presumably more cooperative organization through 
which to transform the universities into “efficient” operations.  That the UGC had so bungled the 
administration of the 1981 cuts, likely only served to hasten its demise.    
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1991; Willmott 2003).  Opposition also focused (and was arguably misdirected) 
not just on the opacity of the UGC’s selectivity exercise, but on the UGC’s obvious 
mismanagement.  According to Butler (1982), who nonetheless expressed 
admiration for the UGC: 
First, they imposed cuts of widely varying degrees of severity (from 30 or 
40% at places like Bradford, Aston and Salford to actual increases in 
budget at places like York and Bath); they did this without publishing the 
criteria on which they had based their judgments, or the procedures by 
which the criteria had been applied, or the objectives which they were 
designed to serve. And in announcing their results they got some of their 
figures wrong, they issued advice which was contradictory, or impossible 
to reconcile with advice issued in other directions, they asked universities 
to preserve some subjects they did not have and, shortly after it was all 
over, they discovered they had made an £8m mistake, which required 
some of the universities which had been hardest hit the first time round to 
lose further sums of several hundreds of thousands of pounds. (Butler 
1982: p.266-267) 
In the wake of the 1981 cuts and the opposition it engendered, the Committee of 
Vice-Chacellors and Principals (CVCP), in close cooperation with the 
Government and less-so the UGC, created two subcommittee’s within the CVCP.  
The first committee, the “Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in 
Universities”, was tasked with examining,  
whether management structures and systems [within the universities] 
were effective in ensuring that decisions are fully informed, that optimum 
value is obtained from the use of resources, that policy objectives are clear, 
and that accountabilities are clear and monitored. (CVCP and Jarratt 1985, 
sec. 1.2)  
The second committee, the “Academic Standards Group”, when it reported in 
1986, discussed, 
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three formal codes of practice (on external examiners, postgraduate 
training and research, and research degree examination appeals), as well 
as two papers on the maintenance and monitoring of standards, which 
offered universities ‘points of reference’ for self-comparison. (Brown 2004, 
36) 
According to Jones (1991), the CVCP in forming these committees was 
motivated by a desire to keep the Government at bay and the UGC in check 
following the 1981 cuts.  In other words, “it was a means of averting further 
intervention by the Government, whether directly or through the UGC, by 
demonstrating that the universities took seriously the pursuit of internal 
efficiency” (Jones 1991, 148).  To put this still another way, the Committees were 
the CVCP’s attempt to resurrect some autonomy!  Neither of the committees 
challenged however, the basic idea underlying the 1981 cuts, which had been 
made according to a set of criteria that were undoubtedly related to the issue of 
research, given the different “overhead” costs of which the UGC was mindful in 
making decisions about how the overall funding envelope was to be apportioned.  
Furthermore, the CVCP, in setting up separate Committees arguably pressed the 
issue somewhat further than had the UGC in establishing separate research-
assessment and teaching assessment tracks.  Either way, the points that need to 
be highlighted with respect to the 1981 cuts are: 1) that cuts were made selectively 
on the basis of research, thereby separating funding for research and teaching; 2) 
the fact that this program of selective funding was not challenged by the 
universities; and, 3) the fact that whatever consternation the universities did 
voice related exclusively to the opaque process via which funds were rationed.   
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The first committee, which was chaired by none other than the former 
chair of the Confederation of British Industry, Alex Jarratt, delivered its report in 
1985, to the resounding approval of the Conservative Government (Jones 1991, 
149).  For Jones, the Committee’s purview suggested that it was to be concerned 
with what he calls, “accounting and control structures (ACS)” (Jones 1991, 143), 
which were already an on-going concern for Thatcher’s government.  In fact, the 
Government had used similar such efficiency studies to affect change in the 
National Health Service.  For Jones therefore, the idea that Jarratt would not 
extend “to issues of academic judgment nor be concerned with the academic and 
educational policies, practices or methods of universities” (CVCP and Jarratt 
1985, sec. 1.1), is preposterous (Jones 1991, 146).  But this does not mean that the 
Committee’s work or the Report itself intentionally obscured the nonsensical 
divide between matters that were putatively financial and those that were 
putatively just academic.  Again, Hayek’s belief in the efficiency of a marketplace 
of ideas was similarly trusted by the Thatcherites, of which Jarratt was most 
certainly one.  There was no need to adjudicate on ‘the academic and educational 
policies, practices or methods of universities’, so as to ensure that, ‘optimum 
value is obtained from the use of resources,’ if and when decisions around the 
allocation of resources were, ‘fully informed’ as to the competitive (i.e. market) 
potential of particular undertakings.  
Overall, the Jarratt Report was a bold argument and blueprint for the 
transformation of the sector into a kind of industrial enterprise both in form and 
331 
content.  University Vice Chancellors were to become CEO’s, department heads 
were to administer funds strategically, and the whole enterprise was to operate 
on the basis of metrics and measures that were to flow to the centre (i.e. to the 
Government) rapidly and constantly.  So as to make the university more 
responsive to the needs of industry, Jarratt also recommended the restructuring 
of governing boards.  Here the Report stressed the importance of involving “lay” 
people from outside of the academy (but from inside the upper-echelons of 
business), into the decision-making process (Jones 1991).  In essence, Jarratt 
proposed a formula that would protect the autonomy of the universities by having 
the universities both adopt the kind of private-sector managerial practices that 
the Government so admired and by inviting inside the university, the key private-
sector interests that the Government appeared so intent on forcing the 
universities to address.  Notably, at more or less the same time, in 1986, the 
Council for Industry and Higher Education (CIHE), a lobby group made-up of the 
largest and most powerful corporations in the UK, was formed and began 
pressing a policy program that drew very generously from the spirit and content 
of the Jarratt Report.  In other words, Jarratt was followed by the emergence of a 
powerful and cohesive lobby made-up of the leadership from within the capitalist 
power-bloc and which focussed on the issue of higher education exclusively.131   
                                                   
131 As I outline in the next chapter, the development of the CIHE in Britain had a notable 
parallel in Canada, where capital organized under the Business University Forum in 1979 and the 
Corporate University Forum in 1983.   
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Also in 1986, the CVCP’s second committee delivered the “Reynolds 
Report”, which, as was mentioned, had looked to establish a basis upon which to 
assess “teaching quality”.  Despite these efforts on the part of the universities, the 
Government remained skeptical, particularly with respect to the idea in focusing 
on the assessment of “teaching quality” the universities would be able to operate 
efficiently with respect to the best practices set-out by both Reynolds and Jarratt.  
In terms of the assessment of teaching quality, follow-up on the part of the 
Government was not immediate however, apparently because the issue of 
research selectivity was then of primary importance (Kogan and Hanney 2000: p. 
104-105).  In 1988, fully two years after the CVCP re-established its Academic 
Standards Group and following the Group’s second report, the CVCP formed the 
Academic Audit Unit as a permanent group within the CVCP responsible for 
auditing institutions’ internal QA processes and communicating best practices in 
this regard.   
Meanwhile, research selectivity remained front and centre following the 
Jarratt Report, particularly given that both the Report and the CIHE had 
supported the idea of a research selectivity exercise on the basis of clearly 
established (i.e. transparent) criteria.  Neither the Jarratt Report nor the CIHE 
were, however, much more detailed in their recommendations.  As such, the 
selectivity process was left for the UGC to set-out, which it rushed to do. Indeed, 
in response to the Jarratt Report, continued pressure from Government and the 
CIHE, as well as the criticisms that had been levied against it in the wake of the 
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first selectivity exercise, the UGC administered, in 1986, a selectivity exercise 
differently than it had the 1981 cuts.  The now formally named, “Research 
Assessment Exercise” was not much better managed than the 1981 cuts had been, 
however: 
Relevant information was hastily assembled and assessed by committees 
of three experts sitting in judgment over university ‘cost centres’ that were 
evaluated as outstanding, above average, average or below average.  The 
information comprised a two page description of the achievements of the 
‘cost centre’ plus a list of its five best publications during the past five 
years; the number of research grants, studentships and ‘new blood’ posts; 
income from industry and other sources, and fellowships, etc. awarded 
(Willmott 2003, 135) 
The response from the universities to the 1986 exercise was much the same as it 
was to the 1981 exercise.  Accordingly, the loudest voices from within the 
universities’ administrative ranks complained that the UGC had failed to make 
the process transparent or the consequences clear.  According to Willmott 
(2003), the recommended corrective was a program of peer-review.  In saying 
this, it is important not to overlook the fact that both the 1981 and 1986 exercises 
had in fact operated on the basis of peer review, albeit via a process that was 
largely informal, ad hoc, opaque, and thereby unsatisfactory to the universities.  
For Tapper (2007) this point is crucial: the reliance on peer review as the basis of 
assessment reflected the degree to which the process enjoyed then, as it does 
now, terrific legitimacy within the academy, from which the upper ranks within 
the UGC were drawn (Tapper 2007, 193).  The UGC’s use of peer review in ’81 
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and ’86 therefore reflected a kind of consensus that only deepened in subsequent 
rounds of the RAE, especially as the process and evaluative criteria were clarified. 
6.2.4 Deepening QA: The Further Normalization of Research 
Selectivity and Teaching Quality Assessment 
Well ahead of the third RAE in 1989, the Government, in 1987, released its 
White Paper, “Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge”, in which it clarified 
that the aims and purposes of higher education were: “to serve the economy more 
efficiently,” and “to have close links with industry and commerce, and to promote 
enterprise” (DFES 1987).  “Meeting the Challenge” also laid the groundwork for 
the government’s Education Reform Act (ERA) (1988) that followed the next 
year.  The ERA made several significant changes to the governance of higher 
education in the UK.  First, the ERA abolished both the UGC and the colleges’ 
and polytechnics’ own “buffer” institution, the National Advisory Board (NAB).  
Both buffers were replaced with funding councils, the Universities Funding 
Council (UFC) and the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC). 132,133   
Unlike their predecessors, the Funding Councils were statutory bodies and thus 
formally part of government.  Whereas the UGC was staffed by sector insiders 
that often operated on the basis of custom and tradition, the Funding Councils 
would be staffed by career bureaucrats and administrators and were to operate 
                                                   
132 The NAB and the PCFC were responsible for the UK`s numerous colleges and 
polytechnics.   
133 In 1996, the Government of Ontario, which was then controlled by the Progressive 
Conservative Party, eliminated the Province’s “buffer” body, the Ontario Council on University 
Affairs.  The move was wholly reminiscent of what Thatcher’s government did in 1988. 
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according to codified rules and regulations.  Tapper (Tapper 2007, 31–34)  sees 
this kind of formalism as intentional – the Thatcherites wanted to engineer a 
cultural brake with, and even a rebuke of, the academy and its customary modus 
operandi.  The formation of the Funding Councils also meant that policy 
development and administration was centralized.  This centralization meant that 
the Government would have a direct line to affect the structure of the system 
(34).  For the Thatcherites, this centralization was seen as useful in terms of the 
creation of a quasi-market in higher education and university based research (34-
38).   
While QA can operate through myriad different and competing 
organizations, as it does in the US, the absence of long-standing traditions 
around this kind of regulation in the UK meant that there was no system external 
to the state which could usefully be relied upon to facilitate the kind of 
transformation that had already taken place in the US.  As such, there was no 
private-sector means by which to make both the comparison and rationalization 
of taught-programs and research possible.  It was vital therefore that the British 
state establish a system of QA in order to administer the progressive privatization 
of higher education. In this regard, the Funding Councils operated as do central 
banks, to establish and maintain the “value” not of a currency, but of university 
research and educated labour.134  
                                                   
134 Given that the ERA did not outline the specifics of how future RAE’s should be 
conducted it remains an open question whether or not the Government was then concerned to 
have the process operate more publicly than it had under the stewardship of the UGC.  Of course, 
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Notably, the ERA did not actually enshrine the RAE, or any such 
selectivity exercise.  The UFC and the PCFC were however, empowered to 
perform whatever exercise they deemed necessary in order to allocate funding 
optimally.  Of course, the UGC had already performed two selectivity exercises 
and started planning for the next.  Moreover, as the first chair of the UFC was 
also the last chair of the UGC, it came as no surprise that the UFC stuck with the 
research assessment program started by the UGC in administering the 1989 RAE.  
Indeed, while it used a slightly more transparent methodology, the 1989 RAE was 
strikingly similar to the 1981 and 1986 exercises.(Willmott 2003)135   
The government’s 1991 White Paper, “Higher Education: A New 
Framework”, went decidedly further than had the 1988 Education Reform Act in 
establishing the framework for the assessment of teaching, thereby bringing this 
side of the QA program more or less up to speed with developments on the 
research side.  As Brown has described, the 1991 White Paper set-out the 
Government’s plan to increase participation rates and thereby increase the size of 
the higher education sector (Brown 2004, 37).  The Government was 
                                                   
the Government was concerned to establish quasi-markets as well the centralization and 
formalization of the process.  It bears keeping in mind as well that the opacity of the 1981 and 
1986 exercises was therefore anathema to the task at hand.   
135 The Councils were also able to do this because the enabling legislation required that 
the universities surrender to the Councils whatever information the Councils requested.  More 
than this, the power of academics to direct the Councils was circumscribed. The ERA required 
that only six and no more than nine of the Council’s fifteen member board be drawn from the 
sector.  The remaining members (between nine and six) were to be appointed by the Secretary of 
State who, the ERA directed, “shall have regard to the desirability of including persons who 
appear to him to have experience of, and to have shown capacity in, industrial, commercial or 
financial matters or the practice of any profession” (ERA 1988: sec131(3)b). 
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simultaneously concerned to keep costs down, ensure that the universities were 
more responsive to the needs of business and industry, and generally more 
efficient in their operation.  The White Paper clarified that the path to such 
efficiency was to be found through competition, which the Government further 
held could only happen within a unitary sector (market), of higher education.  In 
other words, the Government planned to abolish the so-called “binary divide” 
between the universities on the one hand, and the polytechnics and colleges on 
the other.  The two separate funding councils that had been legislated into 
existence in the 1988 ERA were therefore to be folded into a single body, the 
Higher Education Funding Council of England (there was one such body for each 
of Scotland and Wales as well), which would in turn oversee funding throughout 
the unified system, both in terms of the RAE, which was to continue, and now in 
terms of teaching quality assessment. (Brown 2004, 37–40) 
The assessment and assurance of teaching quality was to be performed via 
two bodies: an assessment unit within the new HEFCE, and a separate body, 
collectively owned by the universities (i.e. through their administrations), which 
would be concerned not with actually assessing outcomes, but with auditing 
institutions’ internal QA programs and policies.  This obviously confusing 
arrangement emerged out of negotiations both within the sector (between the 
universities and the colleges and polytechnics), as well as between the sector and 
government; while there was total accord in terms of the need for a 
unified/unitary system of assessment and audit, there was decidedly less 
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agreement over what kind of a process was to be employed and to what extent the 
Government would be able to intervene in and/or direct that process.  For Brown 
the key point of contention between the Government and the universities had to 
do with the difference between assessment and audit.  As audit reports contain 
“what is at most a threshold judgement, and have no financial consequences for 
the institution involved” while, assessment reports “contain a ranking or grading, 
or a series of grading and do have financial consequences for the institution” 
(Brown 2004, 40).  
As was mentioned, the Government’s plan created division within and 
between the institutions too.  Where the colleges and polytechnics were eager to 
see a vigorous system of assessment and ranking, the universities were somewhat 
more reticent.  Brown relates this to the fact that the colleges and polytechnics 
had long been subject to various forms of assessment and were confident of their 
ability to score relatively better than were the universities when it came to the 
assessment of teaching (they ultimately scored much worse).  This division was 
apparently somewhat less animated than it might have been, however, because 
all parties were concerned to press back against the Government’s suggestion in 
the White Paper that legislation would enable the government to side-step any 
QA arrangements and intervene directly whenever it felt such was necessary.  
Again, the universities, as well as the colleges and polytechnics, wanted full and 
complete “ownership” of what they agreed would be a unitary body concerned 
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with quality assurance.  The particular methodologies were, at that point, less 
examined. (Brown 2004, 41–43) 
Discussions between and within the sector following the 1991 White Paper 
led ultimately to a settlement formalized in the Government`s 1992 Further and 
Higher Education Act.  Accordingly, the Government abolished the binary divide 
and offered university status to any college or polytechnic that wished to take it 
up, which most immediately did.  The system of teaching quality assessment 
outlined in the legislation was bifurcated: the CVCP’s Academic Audit Unit was to 
become the Higher Education Quality Council, a sector owned “arm” of the 
CVCP, which would audit institutions’ internal QA programs, advise the Funding 
Council accordingly, and publish its findings annually.  At the same time, the 
HEFCE would oversee the “assessment” of universities via its own internal 
“assessment unit”, which was to conduct subject level assessments that would 
ultimately feed into allocation decisions by the HEFCE.  Thus, the institutions 
were allowed to maintain some control over the quality audit process, albeit less 
than they would have liked, and the Funding Council had direct access to 
assessments which could in turn be used as the basis of funding decisions.  But, 
as Brown notes, the bifurcated model was never very satisfactory to anyone.  The 
universities, both “new” and “old”, HEFCE, and the Government began 
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discussions concerning a more unified system almost immediately upon the 
passage of the 1992 legislation (Brown 2004, 44–48).136    
In terms of the RAE, the end of the binary divide meant that the 1992 
exercise was the first time that both the colleges and polytechnics and the 
universities were forced to compete against one another for access to the same 
level of funding as had been previously given to the UFC (Willmott 2003, 134).  
The 1992 exercise also introduced the distinction between “research-active” and 
“research in-active” workers, wherein departments (units of assessment) were 
forced to submit four publications from “research-active” employees and to list 
the number of “research in-active” people that were on the payroll.  According to 
Willmott, this had at least a few significant consequences (134).  First, the 
active/inactive distinction invoked “a model of personal ownership of 
publications” (134) which thoroughly undermined the process in which 
intellectual work was (and is) actually developed.  In fact, ‘research in-active’ 
academics can and do contribute significantly to the development of ideas and 
new knowledge.  In the natural sciences, where the number of multi-authored 
works, sometimes with over 50 authors, is increasingly the norm, the RAE’s focus 
on an author’s ability to demonstrate ownership, is simply a call to unethical 
behaviour (Mirowski 2011, location 3884).  The active/inactive distinction was 
also easily read as a distinction between relatively valuable academics and those 
                                                   
136 By “new” universities, I am referring to the colleges and polytechnics, which were 
turned into degree granting universities by the 1992 Act.   
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of less apparent value and importance.  As such, the division between active and 
in-active researchers “directly violated the ethic of collegiality” (Willmott 2003, 
134).  The HEFCE did not, however, stop there.  In 1996 the HEFCE outlined 
further changes to the RAE and again indicated its intent to direct the research 
activities of the universities.  Willmott highlights three changes to the 1996 
exercise that are significant in this regard:   
1.Units of assessment were forced to describe how internal research plans 
were responsive to the Government`s two commercialization initiatives, 
the Technology Foresight Program, and the Forward Look program. 
2.The HEFCE directed assessment panels to conduct their assessment on 
the basis of a revised definition of research, which expressly sought to 
recognize the `work of direct relevance to the needs of commerce and 
industry, as well as to the public and voluntary sectors.  
3.The HEFCE announced new ratings categories, thereby expanding the 5 
level system into a seven level system.  Accordingly, the third tier was 
broken up into 3a and 3b and to the highest level was added a 5*. 
(Willmott 2003, 135–137) 
Following the 1996 Review and in-spite of concerns being expressed by a 
growing number within the academy, the HEFCE subsequently announced that 
units that scored 3b or lower in the 2001 exercise would not receive any funding.  
The disciplinary line was being reinforced.  Willmott, following McNay (1998), 
suggests that by de-funding certain programs, neither the HEFCE nor the 
Treasury were looking to close those departments that didn’t receive any funding.  
On the contrary, the hope was that un-funded programs would become 
entrepreneurial and thereby find alternative sources of finance by way of industry 
partners (136). Willmott also argues that this hope was subsequently clarified in 
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the Government’s 1998 White Paper, “Our Competitive Future: building the 
knowledge driven economy” (Department of Trade and Industry 1998), as well as 
the by CVCP’s 1999 report on the issue (CVCP 1999).    
6.2.4 Establishing Unitary Control for Quality Assessment of Teaching 
Five years after the Government introduced its bifurcated model of teaching 
quality assessment, in 1997, plans were announced for the creation of the Quality 
Assurance Agency (QAA), as a unified and sector-owned body that was 
responsible for both “assessment” and “audit” and as such, for supplying the 
HEFCE with information regarding its findings (Brown 2004, 122).  As Brown 
has outlined, the lengthy discussions that presaged the creation of the QAA 
related mainly to the reluctance on the part of various parties (the “old” 
universities, HEQC) to consent to assessment processes at all similar to the ones 
with which the “new” universities were long familiar, the colleges and 
polytechnics having been subject to such forms of assessment under the pre-1988 
regime.  To internal divisions within the sector (between “new” and “old”) was 
added the initial reluctance on the part of the HEFCE to either or both allow the 
universities to collectively control whatever institution would in turn control a 
unified quality assurance system and to relent on the issue of assessment, which 
the ‘old’ universities were reluctant to embrace to any significant degree (Brown 
2004, 105–115).   
Again, and more substantively, the various disagreements which Brown 
(2004), Watson (2006), and others have documented relate to the 
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aforementioned distinction between “audit” and “assessment”: whereas audit was 
seen as a means by which to review internal – and thereby more autonomous – 
quality assurance and improvement practices, assessment was conceived of as a 
heavy-handed and pecuniary approach “from above”.  Rather than respect the 
autonomy of academics, assessment entailed definitive judgments in respect of 
academic outcomes and the evaluation of such outcomes upon a single – and 
imposed – set of criteria, which was understood as a serious threat to academic 
freedom, particularly given the links between assessments and funding.  Concern, 
in other words, was not just with the way in which the results of assessment could 
be used to rationalize space, but also the nature of what was taught and how.  
Wrapped up in this were some additional concerns over not just standardization, 
but the way in which standards provided incentive to meet, not exceed, low and 
minimum levels of achievement.  For critics like Brown, there were concerns 
about how “fitness-for-purpose” type standards would limit the drive for 
“enhancement” (Brown 2004, 74–99).   
Though agreement was ultimately reached by way of the QAA, the balance 
between assessment and audit was not finally reached until just before the QAA 
actually began operating, when the so-called “Dearing Report”(1997) was 
released following over a year of consultation (Brown 2004, 116).  The Report 
maintained that teaching quality assessment was to operate in part on the basis 
of a “framework of qualifications” (Dearing 1997, para. 42) and alongside 
“benchmark statements about standards” (para. 50).  Of course, in as much as 
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Dearing was directive, it remained for the QAA to work-out with the universities, 
the HEFCE, and the Government, how and what such evaluations were to be 
performed. Brown does a reasonably useful job of documenting the problems that 
were encountered: the timing of “academic review”, as the audit/assessment 
process was to be called, had to be negotiated; the nature of summative reports, 
and whether or not they were to include summative grades was at issue; and the 
precise nature of both the national qualifications framework and subject 
benchmark statements needed to be developed.  Of the nature and extent of the 
wrangling that went on between the various parties it is only necessary for 
present purposes to note that the HEFCE’s trenchant demand that evaluations 
end with the award of a summative grade won-out (Brown 2004, 99).   
The contests and deliberations that went into the making of Academic 
Review, and indeed its predecessors, illustrate quite clearly, one of the primary 
arguments advanced in this thesis concerning the nature of QA, namely, that it is 
essentially about the renegotiation of capital, understood as a social relationship.  
Brown’s (2004) account of the development of quality assurance in the UK, and 
indeed the intensely personal critiques it engendered,137 offer but a mild 
indication of the degree to which the most concerned critics within the 
mainstream were not fearful of audit per se, so much as they were concerned to 
develop a system of audit that could help to improve higher education, provide 
for institutional autonomy, and satisfy the Government’s demands for 
                                                   
137 See for instance (Watson 2006) 
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“accountability” and “transparency”.   In other words, those that championed the 
cause of audit over assessment saw in such the potential to save higher education 
in the UK from its wholesale commercialization.  Audit, however, was ultimately 
hardly different from assessment, at least in so far as it too was always to be 
evaluated relative to the kinds of criteria set-out by Thatcher in the early 1980’s.  
In other words, the sharp edge of “practicality” and “value” were not dulled 
merely by conducting audits of institution level QA processes, which were 
themselves to be evaluated against primarily these (practicality related) 
criteria.138  If the hopes, dreams, and (mis)apprehensions of QA’s mainstream 
critics/developers were not in and of themselves naive, it is hard to imagine what 
they were exactly.  Brown, for instance, begins his account of the development of 
QA in the UK with a discussion of neoliberalism and the faith that neoliberals 
(mis)place in the market (Brown 2004).  At any rate, audit did not triumph over 
assessment.139  The QAA’s reports have been (i.e. since 1997/1998), and still are, 
“crystallized” into summative grades on a three point scale.  
In terms of timing, then, the entire oeuvre of QA’s two “tracks” also 
seemed more settled by around 1998.  The earlier emergence and development of 
the RAE suggests that it operated as a kind of lever via which the rationalization 
                                                   
138 Tapper (2007, 163) highlights and critiques Brown’s arguments for self-regulation in 
precisely this way.    
139 In fact, it is reasonable to suggest that individuals like Brown were much more than 
just ‘naïve’. I would argue that their naiveté speaks both to the kind of theoretical deficiencies 
found in their analyses (discussed in Chapter 2), and to a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
relationship between use-value and exchange-value under capitalism.   
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of funding according to neoliberal logic was normalized.  More than this, the RAE 
also provided an example of how the development of QA was progressively 
deepened and used to affect the kind of cultural shift that Thatcher had intended.  
The development of teaching assessment procedures followed the RAE model 
closely. Each progressive stage in the development of QA on this track led, as had 
been the case with the RAE, to a program that, by linking funding to ever-more 
detailed kinds of “product specifications”, pressed the process of 
commodification forward, not seamlessly, but forward nonetheless.      
6.2.5 “Unexpected Outcomes” and the Cumulative, not Corrective 
Impacts of the Quasi-Market 
Between 1996 and the 2001 Exercise, the RAE process remained relatively 
unchanged.  However, the results of the 2001 Exercise produced what Tapper 
(2007) refers to as a “crisis”.  Without re-producing Tapper’s account, the upshot 
is that a higher than anticipated number of programs received a 5 or a 5* rating, 
thereby producing concern on the part of both the Government and the HEFCE 
that the institutions were either gaming the system, or that the system had 
become subject to significant grade inflation (42).  What followed was a series of 
reviews that ultimately led to the further deepening of the trajectory established 
in 1981, when the UGC first imposed selective cuts.  According to Tapper, the 
HEFCE ultimately found cause to revise the RAE more mildly than was suggested 
in their internal, but public, review.  On the other hand, the Government was 
stalwart in its calls for a more substantial revision.  In 2003, the Government 
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made clear its frustration with the results of the 2001 RAE.  In its 2003 White 
Paper, “The Future of Higher Education”, the Government clarified that HEFCE 
needed to “distinguish between the strong and the strongest” (Department for 
Education and Skills 2003, 23).  The White Paper also outlined the Government’s 
intention to provide additional monies to the best research intensive institutions 
before the 2008 RAE, when the next exercise was scheduled to take place.  
Accordingly, particular 5* institutions were singled out for a 6* rating, and 
provided additional money (30).  Additionally, the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Science and Technology published two reports, one in 2002 and 
one in 2003, following the HEFCE’s release of its Report on the 2001 RAE.  In 
those reports, the Select Committee voiced its desire to see several of the 
suggestions that had been made in the HEFCE report but not taken up by 
HEFCE, actually implemented.  Most notably, these included the use of “metrics” 
(such as bibliometric indices) in the selective process and the development of a 
multi-track evaluative process that would force under-performing institutions to 
forgo participation in the RAE, in favour of other, less vigorous evaluative 
mechanisms, which would in turn be linked with smaller and sequestered pots of 
funding. (Tapper 2007, 231–232)    
Again, as Tapper notes, the HEFCE resisted and carried out the 2008 RAE 
in more or less the same way that it had the 2001 Exercise (232).  For Tapper, the 
HEFCE’s intransigence reflects the degree to which it is beholden to interests 
within the Academy, which uniformly rejected the proposed use of metrics and a 
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multi-track funding solution.  At the same time, Tapper does draw attention to 
the one key change that was made in the 2008 Exercise: departments were 
graded on a “continuous grading scale derived from individual ratings rather 
than a more sharply defined hierarchy derived from fitting (shoehorning) 
departments into a predetermined scale” (Tapper 2007, 200).  In other words, 
the work of each individual researcher was graded on a three point scale and 
departmental scores were based on the accumulated scores of all of their 
research-active participants.  Unfortunately, Tapper never focuses much 
attention on peer-review, the way in which it has been implemented in the RAE 
since 1992, and the fact that the 2008 Exercise, in reducing the evaluator’s 
analysis of work to a grade, was in fact only shades different from the use of 
metrics in making decisions about funding.  
Of course, the fact that the research selectivity process has been an on-
going power struggle between successive neoliberal governments and an academy 
intent on protecting some greater level of autonomy and pluralism than the 
Government would choose to do, is hardly the whole story.  The Government, 
often with a great deal of support from both university administrators and 
faculty, have operated in concert in several other ways so as to press the 
university closer to industry.  In this regard, the Government has long provided 
support for commercially oriented research outside of the normal RAE/REF 
channel, and without much opposition from the universities. In fact, from the 
late-1990s to the present day, successive governments in the UK have spent tens 
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of billions expanding the breadth and depth of the various programs and 
supports available to those involved in so-called “third-stream”140  or  
“collaborative research”141 (HEFCE 2010). Such programs, which include the 
Higher Education Innovation Fund (£1 billion over 10 years)(HEFCE 2010, 20), 
the Technology Strategy Board (£19.9 billion over 10 years), and the Regional 
Development Agencies (£711 million over 10 years), have entailed everything 
from the expansion of the physical infrastructure devoted to collaborative 
research to extra and competitively based grant funding for university-business 
research.  More than this, the Government is overhauling Britain’s IP and patent 
legislation, thereby signaling that it will provide additional protection to IP and 
patent generated through publicly funded university-based “collaborative” 
research.  And the Government is also acting to change the revenue structure for 
such IP by lowering the effective tax-rate on university research that is 
subsequently turned into profitable enterprise.142  The Government has also 
                                                   
140 ‘Third-stream’ funding refers to: a, “trend among many universities toward a third 
function, which has been described using a range of terms such as knowledge transfer, 
community service, community engagement  
and the third stream” (HEFCE 2010) 
141 By ‘collaborative research’, the HEFCE means that universities will collaborate with 
private sector partners. (HEFCE 2010) 
142 Since 1985 universities have been allowed to claim ownership over IP generated on-
campus with public money.  And faculty have long been able to do the same thing.  As such, the 
UK’s copyright and patent law has, since the mid-1980’s, been made to more closely resemble the 
US’s (i.e. in terms of the Bayh-Dole suite of legislative changes, among them the ability to 
privatize the results of publicly funded research protocols).  Since 2001 the Government has also 
offered monetary support for so-called “third-stream” research (which brings the universities 
together with business) through the “Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF). Through the 
first ten years of its operation, the HEIF has funneled over £1 billion (in 2003 £’s), to support 
commercialization activities at individual universities.  In 2004 the Government established the 
Technology Strategy Board (TSB), which, in 2007subsumed all of the powers of the Department 
of Innovation, which was in turn folded-up.  With a three-year budget of £711 million (between 
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looked to address some of the hiccups involved in the process, namely by starting 
a working group whose aim is to address the sky-rocketing costs associated with 
the charges universities are imposing on each other for access to patented 
technologies fundamental to the development of other new technologies.143   The 
RAE, in other words, is perhaps the most direct, but only one of a number of ways 
in which the government and the HEFCE have separately and together pressed 
the commercialization agenda forward.  Of course, the RAE has helped to send 
clear signals throughout the academy and British society as well.  The prized 
position of “practical” research and researchers has ripple effects that work to 
                                                   
2008-2011), the TSB has operated a competitive grant program for collaborative university-
business research, as well as a series of Technology Transfer Networks in 24 specific subject areas. 
The UK Research Councils (there are seven such Councils), have also looked to channel funding to 
collaborative research by making available specific and competitively awarded grants for such 
endeavors. As well, with spending of approximately £19.9 billion between 1999 and 2009, the 
Government’s “Regional Development Agencies”, have also provided significant financial support 
for university-industry partnerships.  As Currie notes, it is not possible to know precisely how 
much of the £19.9B was channeled directly to university–business partnerships (the RDA’s 
funded various things, including physical infrastructure), there is good reason to believe that a 
sizeable portion of the RDA’s funding went directly to collaborative programs, if not to 
collaborative research as such; not only can infrastructure spending also operate as an indirect 
subsidy of collaborative research, but as Currie points out, a review by PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
in 2009 highlighted that the physical infrastructure undertaken by the RDA’s  often related to 
things like research parks, which have traditionally been a breeding ground for university-
business research links. The Government has also offered “innovation vouchers” to SME’s 
interested in contracting with university researchers for short periods.  Public monies have also 
been channeled to commercialization through the University Challenge Seed Fund (since 1999), 
which has since been renamed the University Enterprise Capital Fund.  This Fund has, offered 
support directly to researchers who look to take their innovations directly to market.  The 
Government has also supported the commercialization of research by lowering the effective tax 
rate on certain areas of IP, such as pharmaceutical patents.  And in 2010, the coalition 
government began signaling that further revision of IP and Patent protection laws were in 
process, again with an eye to enhancing the ability of both researchers and businesses to 
monopolize the results of research, even that which is publicly funded.   
143 This phenomenon, which revolves around the use of so-called, “Material Transfer 
Agreements”, is discussed at length by Mirowski (2011).  Accordingly, Mirowski sees the advents 
of “MTA’s” as evidence of the way in which the regulation of university research a la neoliberalism 
is creating new opportunities for accumulation and profit, none of which bear any relationship to 
the putative “quality” of research.   
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undermine the desire of incoming students to pursue interests in basic or 
curiosity driven areas, particularly when the practitioners of such sub-disciplines 
eke out a relatively impoverished existence relative to their more practically and 
profit minded colleagues.   
The announcement by the HEFCE in the run-up to the 2008 RAE 
concerning the Government’s plans to revise the exercise are also necessarily 
understood as little more than the extension and consolidation of that which 
Thatcher put in place nearly thirty years earlier.  Coming on the heels of a series 
of reports outlining the need for more collaboration between universities and 
business, the HEFCE’s announcement included plans for the inclusion of 
“impact” as one of the variables to be considered by peer-review panels in 
assessing the “quality” of work under review.  Following the Government’s 
announcement, the HEFCE conducted an “impact pilot study”, so as to gauge the 
viability of including ‘impact’ as part of the REF.  In March of 2011, the HEFCE 
announced that ‘impact’ would in fact be included as an evaluative variable in the 
2014 round of the new REF.  Accordingly, in 2014, panels will score the degree of 
impact OF a researcher’s work on a 4-point scale.  This impact score will 
constitute 20% of the overall score awarded to individual work.  The HEFCE has 
also indicated that this 20% weighting will be raised in subsequent REF’s.  In 
order to measure the impact of research, institutions will be required to submit 
case study outlines and other forms of documentary evidence detailing how 
particular pieces of research have had a clear impact on activities outside of the 
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academy and the higher education sector.  While the HEFCE has sought to make 
room for such case studies to include things such as social activism, it has also 
clearly prohibited the inclusion of the transformative impact research might have 
on students’ ideology and actions as a measure of impact.  On the other hand, 
certain – but not all – disciplines have been allowed to use bibliometric and other 
citation related data as evidence of impact.       
6.3 Whither the Left? NUS and the UCU 
Perhaps the clearest testament of how embedded audit and QA have 
become in the UK is that neither have been opposed with any coherence or 
consistency by the University and College Union (UCU), the faculty’s main 
representative body, or by the National Union of Students (NUS).  In terms of 
faculty, support for QA has likely been garnered in the same manner that it has 
been in the other jurisdictions under investigation, via mechanisms that reward 
some faculty and discipline others.   Also, and alongside the process of economics 
imperialism, QA has left the academy divided as to its overall benefit and effect.  
Thus, to the extent that leadership within the UCU may have wanted to voice 
more strident opposition than they have, their ability to do so is compromised.  
The UCU has therefore taken up the cause of equality, wherein QA is conceived of 
as acceptable so long as everyone gets a piece of the funding pie.  As a result, the 
UCU has opposed the use of things like bibliometric measures in the doling out of 
government funds, as well as to any measure that would privilege certain 
disciplines and academics over others.  As such, the UCU has championed a kind 
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of “fitness-for-purpose” model which would look to ensure that research and 
teaching meet minimum standards.  Whether or not such a program could, in the 
context of neoliberalism, allow the university to escape privatization, which the 
UCU more doggedly opposes, is not so much an open question as it is a symbol of 
the UCU’s obviously compromised position. (University and College Union 2011; 
University and College Union 2010; University and College Union 2009)  
The crest of student union activism in the mid-1970s was followed by a 
long period of decline right-up until the 2010 election, when the re-emergence of 
student radicalism blew open huge gaps between the students’ national 
leadership in the form of the National Union of Students (NUS), and certain of 
their local affiliates.  What became clear was that the NUS had been transformed 
into a business-oriented and politically impotent bull-pen for New Labour, while 
an increasing proportion of students, beset by three decades of neoliberal 
restructuring, looked to change-up tactics and again take to the streets.  The 
process of the NUS’s decline related, on the one hand, to the secret of its earlier 
success and, on the other hand, to the stiff opposition provided by both the 
Conservatives and Labour. Student radicalism in the 1970s, which as Callinicos 
and Turner (1977) note fomented into a “Broad Left” coalition with serious 
political capacity, faced-off against both major cut-backs both by taking to the 
street and by developing the capacity of the NUS to provide services.  The 
subsequent massification of the university thereby entailed a parallel process 
whereby the services offered by both the NUS and some of their local affiliates 
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grew into massive on-going concerns.  Over time, and in the context of neoliberal 
restructuring, such services morphed into customer-focused concerns of central 
importance to the financing and thus survival of the unions.  The ideological 
consequences of this transformation were such that the NUS lost touch with 
democratic organizational principles.  In the place of concern about internal 
democracy, emerged an ever-greater concern for prudent management and “good 
governance”.  At the same time, the Conservatives, under both Thatcher and then 
Major, waged wave after wave of legislative attack against the student unions’ 
ability to organize around “political issues”, or around their ability to maintain 
mandatory, “closed-shop”, membership policies.  In 1994 and then in 2006, the 
Government passed legislation that heavily circumscribed the operating 
parameters of the NUS and its affiliates. (Swain 2011)144    
On QA, the NUS’s raison d’etre has been inclusion.  The NUS lobbied 
aggressively, though not via mass tactics, for the inclusion of both students and 
measures of student engagement in QA processes.  But in this the NUS never 
really faced much in the way of stiff opposition.  The QAA quickly relented to the 
NUS’ demands.  Since the first review of its audit process, QAA guidelines for 
institutional reviews/audits have mandated that one student sit on any audit 
committee and, furthermore, that the review/audit include examination of those 
                                                   
144 Swain (2011) highlights the manner in which successive rounds of legislation have 
hemmed in unions’ activities by designating them as “charities”, whose activities must relate to 
the needs of students. Similarly, the legislation also prescribes limits to the kinds of campaigning 
that can be done during elections. 
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efforts that a university has undertaken to engage students in QA.  Similarly, the 
NUS has come-out in support of the RAE, championing the Exercise as evidence 
of the degree to which high-quality research is being done at UK universities.  
The NUS, it would seem, has been anxious to do good by improving the relative 
value of its member’s degrees and diplomas. (NUS 2006)  
To the extent that the NUS cannot be used to gauge the state of the 
students’ movement more broadly, it is worth noting that QA has not received 
any kind of lasting attention outside of the NUS and within emerging and radical 
student-based organizations such as Globalise Resistance, the Student Broad 
Left, and the Education Activists Network.  On the other hand, opposition to 
austerity is rooted in a critique of neoliberalism and in arguments that look to 
press back against neoliberal conceptions of higher education as a form of 
investment.  Opposition to austerity is also widespread and emerging as the basis 
upon which some of the UK’s largest unions in and around the higher education 
sector are working together (UNISON 2013).  Whether or not students’ resistance 
to austerity will ultimately morph into a more broad-sided attack against both 
austerity and neoliberal “governmentality” is an open question. To date, however, 
it is clear that the links between QA and austerity have not been so well made.    
6.4 Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the efforts of a select few academics and policy-makers 
who have tried to draw attention to the core issues involved in and around the 
UK’s system of QA, there is an obvious disconnect between the frustrations and 
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concerns of many academics and their understanding of the purpose and intent 
of the UK’s system.  Yet perhaps more obviously than in any other jurisdiction QA 
was introduced as a political project aimed at thoroughly transforming the 
intellectual climate of, and purposes served by, the UK’s system of higher 
education.  The subsequent development of a byzantine bureaucracy that some 
have likened to the operation of COCOM in Soviet era Russia (Amann 2003; 
Radice 2008), has done little if anything to either undermine or mitigate the 
purposes to which QA was created to serve.  On the contrary, attempts to reform 
the UK’s system of QA, and to thereby institute processes more focused in 
“enhancement” than on simply “audit”, have arguably just embedded the logic of 
value ever more deeply intp the UK’s system of higher education. 
To a degree, insiders like Lee Harvey and Roger Brown, are aware of this.  
Lee Harvey, another former QAA insider, has for his part, taken to writing 
scathing critiques of the UK’s system (for example see, Harvey 1999).  Arguably it 
is here that one finds evidence of the degree to which the logic of QA and the logic 
of value have become both fundamental and somehow obscure, even to those 
most intimately familiar with the operation of the UK’s system.  Harvey is want to 
distinguish between “quality” and the processes that are created to assure it: 
Quality and quality assurance are not homogeneous and, for example, a 
fitness-for‐purpose approach is not adequate, nor even appropriate, for 
evaluating many quality issues. What an epistemological analysis does, as 
hinted at by the examples, is to draw attention to the way that we 
construct quality as knowledge. It differentiates reductionist causal 
explanations from interpretation of meanings of actors from socio-
historically specific deconstructed and reconstructed alternative 
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understandings.  In this drive to create a “quality culture”, which we can 
take to mean a reflective, gracious, and considerate academy within which 
critique (including self-critique) are appropriately prized and used to 
facilitate constant improvement, Harvey argues that it is possible, within a 
system of QA, to create the conditions necessary to, in turn, create a 
quality culture.  The obstacle to quality, is, in other words, not the 
systematization and bureaucratization of QA, but its rendering by political 
forces into something else. (Harvey 2009, 8) 
 
Arguably, Harvey is correct.  In theory, as in fact, there is an important 
distinction to be made between “quality” and QA.  For Harvey the conflation of 
the two is an obstacle to the achievement of the kind of quality that he envisions 
as being potentially achievable.  But in so far as QA has been construed as quality 
within the context of particular social and power dynamics, what this dissertation 
suggests is that little change or reform is possible unless those power dynamics 
are first transformed.  In practice, QA is synonymous with quality, and the 
discursive reconstruction of ‘quality’ so as to affect the creation and operation of a 
“quality culture” is only possible if we address the power-relations at root in the 
initial conflation.  If anything, this is precisely what the preceding has 
demonstrated: the UK’s system of QA has developed and deepened as 
oppositional currents have focused on the apparent fairness or transparency of 
assessment and audit procedures instead of on the issue of value (and 
commodification).  Of course, one can hardly be surprised that the managers and 
administrators of Britain’s universities and colleges did not take-up the kind of 
critique that might have tempered if not turned back the kind of instrumental 
rationality that informs neoliberal policy.  If nothing else, the UGC’s efforts in 
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1981 and 1986 were indicative of how bureaucrats in that organization were just 
as dedicated to the rationalization of higher education in the UK as were 
Thatcher’s Conservatives.  Where the UGC and the Conservative Government 
parted company, to the extent that they did at all, had only to do with which, and 
to what extent, programs were to be cut.  This kind of issue remained at the very 
core of debates within and between the universities and successive governments.  
In other words, none of the players involved in the negotiation and extension of 
QA in the UK have ever appeared to reject neoliberal assertions as to the relative 
efficiency of markets and therein of price-signaling.  On the contrary, they have 
spent most of their time simply bartering over price.  To be fair, players-cum-
critics like Roger Brown and Lee Harvey would likely bristle at this description.  
What this dissertation suggests is that their failing is more epistemological and 
methodological than it was ideological, to the extent that such things can be 
usefully parsed.145      
This chapter also argues that the kind of bartering that took place within 
the higher education sector, primarily between institutional managers and 
government agents/agencies, took place in a context where neoliberal 
restructuring happened rapidly and under the auspices of a newly cohered ruling 
class based in The City, whose interests Thatcher, Major, Blair, Brown, and 
indeed Cameron have all looked to serve.  The so-called “death of parliamentary 
                                                   
145 Harvey and Brown both construct the higher education sector as somehow separate 
and apart from neoliberal globalization.  Thus, they believe that by designing the appropriate kind 
of procedures, the problems with what they might describe as “neoliberal QA”, can be avoided.    
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socialism”, which, as I pointed out, involved the wholesale abandonment of social 
democratic and Universalist principles by the UK’s Labour Party, meant that the 
Left was without a political/organizational anchor, particularly given the degree 
to which Thatcher savaged the unions, not least during the long Miners’ Strike in 
1984/1985.  That such savagery was presaged by the earlier arrival of structural 
adjustment in 1976, the failures and contradictions of Labourism in the post-war 
era and the complete restructuring of the British political economy, only further 
served to incapacitate the Left.  Oppositional movements within the universities 
were also effectively turned back.  In this regard, QA functioned not only to split 
the academy, but also to affect the development of a punishing work-regime that 
makes oppositional organizing difficult and increasingly risky.  Students’ 
opposition was also muted, not least as a result of the massification of the 
university in the context of austerity.  Pressed into the provision of a wider array 
of services and out of ‘political’ organizing via legal redefinitions of their purview, 
the main student organizations have failed to find a firm oppositional footing.  
Relative to the other two jurisdictions under analysis, what stands out 
about the UK’s system of QA is not just its byzantine complexity, but the speed 
with which it developed.  As I have argued, measurement was, in the US, a 
longer-term program that was reasserted after a very temporary interregnum in 
the late 1960s and 1970s, during which time instrumentalism hardly died.  As we 
shall now see, Ontario’s system of QA developed somewhat later than did the 
UK’s.  Indeed, in Ontario, QA emerged and evolved somewhat more slowly and 
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has yet to develop into the kind of extensive bureaucratic morass that now 
describes the UK’s system.  Nonetheless, there are clear similarities too, not the 
least of which is the imposition of “value” as the central organizing principle.  
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Chapter 7: Privileged Dependence, Policy 
Borrowing, and the Political Economy of QA in 
Ontario 
Where the development of UK’s system of QA is a story of so many 
stalwart attempts on the part of successive governments to transform the 
universities a la neoliberalism, the development of QA in Ontario is more a story 
of both policy borrowing and of privileged dependence.  In essence, because of its 
position as a privileged dependent of the US, the arrival of both the neoliberal 
research program as well as the development of QA in Ontario was forestalled 
right up until the 1990s. This should not be taken to mean that Ontario’s 
universities did not face stern pressure to reform along what could be described 
as neoliberal lines starting in the 1970s, when budgets were slashed amidst falling 
enrolment and the fiscal crisis of the state.  Rather, what I mean to argue is that 
Ontario’s system of QA was, at best, a piecemeal compendium of policies and 
programs that were not galvanized into a vigorous system of QA until long after 
such systems were in place in both the UK and the US.  What this suggests is that 
QA is not so deeply rooted in Ontario as it is in the other jurisdictions under 
investigation.  Although the “rootedness” of QA in Ontario in turn suggests the 
possibility that oppositional forces in the Province might be better positioned to 
articulate – and mobilize around - an alternative to QA than they are in other 
parts of the world, the foregoing warns against too much optimism.   
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Though of a relatively recent vintage, Ontario’s system of QA has been 
advanced with the enthusiasm of the newly converted and in a context where the 
back of organized labour has been broken, the students’ movement neutered, and 
faculty, and faculty unions have likewise been divided and dissembled.  While 
there are certainly glimmers of hope, albeit more outside of Ontario than in it, it 
is also necessary to recognize that Ontario has long been tied into international 
and global circuits of capital and finance that have remade ‘everyday life’ in a 
manner strikingly similar to the kind of “financialized” existence lived in other 
advanced industrial/post-industrial jurisdictions.  Thus, where I would argue 
that QA was instrumental in establishing the hegemonic position of global 
finance and an American led neo-liberal capitalism in places like the UK and the 
US, I would suggest that QA in Ontario is better understood as a residual effect of 
that hegemony, and thus testimony to it.    
7.1 Ontario’s System of QA 
Currently, the quality of education provided in Ontario’s universities is 
regulated by the Council on Quality Assurance (COQA), which is an institutional 
subsidiary of the Council of Ontario Universities (COU).  The COQA is a recent 
outgrowth of, and replacement for, the COU’s longer-standing Ontario Council of 
Graduate Studies (OCGS) review process, which started in 1982, and of the more 
recently minted, Undergraduate Program Review Audit Committee (UPRAC), 
which began operating in 1999 (it was first announced in 1996).  The COQA 
administers four main processes: a protocol for the approval of new courses; an 
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expedited protocol for the approval of new courses; a protocol for the cyclical 
review of existing courses; and an audit process, which examines an institution’s 
own QA framework, standards, and processes (Council of Ontario Universities 
2010).   
Each of the four processes that the COQA administers operate around 
statements outlining what is expected of students in terms of their understanding 
and competence at each degree level.  At the undergraduate level, such 
statements are referred to as, “University Undergraduate Degree Level 
Expectations (UUDLES)” (Council of Ontario Universities 2012, 1).  At the 
graduate level, the COQA does not specify a specific acronym, though it is 
reasonable to assume that the COQA would identify them using the no less 
awkward moniker, “UGDLES”.  In addition, each institution is required to 
prepare its own statements with respect to whatever undergraduate and graduate 
programs it offers, irrespective of whether or not such programs receive public 
funding (Council of Ontario Universities 2010, 3).  
As is the case in the UK, the primary mode of QA for the COQA is its audit 
process, which is what the COQA describes as a “desk audit”(Council of Ontario 
Universities 2010, 11).  Herein a panel of auditors examines the various artifacts 
(documentation, scores etc.) that each institution assembles for the purposes of 
the audit and which testify to the institution having followed both its own 
Institution Quality Assurance Plan (IQAP) (as ratified by the COQA), and the 
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COQA’s requirements for IQAPs in general 26).146  As such, the COQA’s ‘desk 
audit’ is a capstone to the other audit processes that the COQA requires 
institutions to perform.  In this regard, the COQA requires that an institution’s 
IQAP involve: a self-study process; the periodic audit of each program by external 
experts; the combination of both the self-study and external audit into a final 
review; and the preparation of a manual outlining both the schedule for and 
processes involved in the full audit/review process.  The COQA also specifies 
specific evaluative criteria to be used in institutional self-study assessments and 
those performed by external auditors: 
4.3.6 Quality indicators 
While there are several widely used quality indicators or proxies for 
reflecting program quality, institutions are encouraged to include available 
measures of their own which they see as best achieving that goal. Outcome 
measures of student performance and achievement are of particular 
interest, but there are also important input and process measures which 
are known to have a strong association with quality outcomes. It is 
expected that many of the following listed examples will be widely used. 
The Guide makes reference to further sources and measures that might be 
considered. 
a) Faculty: qualifications, research and scholarly record; class sizes; 
percentage of classes taught by permanent or non-permanent 
                                                   
146 Accordingly, and as the QC’s “Framework” document describes, an institution’s IQAP must be ratified by 
the QC before it can be implemented by the institution.  As part of the ratification process, the QC evaluates 
the degree to which an institution’s IQAP is consistent with the “substance and principles set out in the 
respective Quality Council Protocols.”  What the QC means by such ‘consistently’, could perhaps be made a 
bit clearer.  In outlining this process the QC writes, 
 
Before implementing its IQAP for New Program Approvals, Expedited Approvals, and Cyclical  
Program Reviews, each university must first submit it to the Quality Council for ratification. The 
Council will test their consistency (sic) with the substance and principles set out in the respective 
Quality Council Protocols.  
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(contractual) faculty; numbers, assignments and qualifications of parttime 
or temporary faculty; 
b) Students: applications and registrations; attrition rates; time-to-
completion; final-year academic achievement; graduation rates; academic 
awards; student in-course reports on teaching; and 
c) Graduates: rates of graduation, employment six months and two years 
after graduation, postgraduate study, "skills match" and alumni reports on 
program quality when available and when permitted by the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA). Auditors will be 
instructed that these items may not be available and applicable to all 
programs. (Council of Ontario Universities 2012, 23–24) 
In terms of reporting, the COQA also requires that institutions publish 
certain components of their QA processes on-line (any part of the audit/reporting 
process that does not contain, “confidential information” (Council of Ontario 
Universities 2010, 22), which is not further defined).  At the time of writing, the 
COU has not completed or published any ‘desk audits’.  However, it would appear 
that such audits will not involve the awarding of a letter or numerical grade.147  
Instead, the COQA desk audit reports will merely highlight whether or not the QA 
processes performed by each institution are sufficiently up to snuff.  As such, the 
universities themselves are productive of the measures discussed throughout this 
dissertation.  For example, in meeting the reporting requirements of the COQA, 
the University of Toronto publishes its “comprehensive inventory,” of 
performance measures, a list of some 109 different measures that begins with the 
                                                   
 147 The COQA provides a template for external reviewers reports here: 
http://www.cou.on.ca/links/other-links/the-ontario-universities-council-on-quality-
assura/resources/templates 
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University’s ranking on both national and international rankings exercises 
(University of Toronto 2012).    
7.2 The Political Economy of QA in Ontario 
Whereas in the US, QA is usefully seen as the long-term outgrowth of the 
myriad triangulations and calculations of corporate America intent on 
constructing a national system of higher education to better serve a program of 
capitalist accumulation, such is certainly not the case in Ontario.  And whereas in 
the UK, QA is usefully seen as fundamental to the initial waves of neoliberal 
restructuring aimed at reproducing the putative benefits of the American system, 
such is also not the case in Ontario.  Rather, the political economy of QA in 
Ontario is more a story about the consolidation of neoliberalism and the need for 
institutions to demonstrate the relative value of their manufacture so as to both 
maintain a foundation for on-going state support and also to access increasingly 
global circuits of capital (money for research and development and tuition-fees).   
7.2.1 System Expansion and the Post-war Compromise 
As a branch-plant and resources based political economy, Ontario’s 
universities were not heavily involved in research until after WWII.  And until the 
1970s the value of that research was modest, particularly compared to the level of 
expenditure in the US. In 1967-8 total federal outlays for university based 
research reached $71 million, a sum then equivalent to about 13% of provincial 
grants and tuition-fees (Trick 2005a, 320).  To put this in perspective, the US 
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Department of Defence was pouring billions of dollars into research and 
development from the 1950s on (Mirowski 2011, location 1452).  While the 
universities only saw a fraction of those amounts, it is important to also 
remember that the US’s National Science Foundation was then also directing 
fully $84 million just to universities, which were also getting hundreds of 
millions more in research money from the private philanthropic organizations 
through their coordinated program of “strategic philanthropy”(Scott 1983, 36; 
Mirowski 2011, location 1452).  While it is true that America’s system was, in the 
1950s and 1960s, populated by many more universities and colleges than was 
Ontario’s system (as it does today), it is also true that the great bulk of research 
funding was then being channeled to a select few institutions, which utterly 
dominated the research landscape in the US, (and which continue to so dominate 
the American higher education landscape today) (Scott 1983; C. W. Barrow 1990, 
89).   
The upshot is that Ontario’s system of higher education was not nearly as 
research-intensive as it would, through the 1980s and 1990s become.148  Again, 
                                                   
148 According to their websites, the University of Toronto today boasts a $1.2 billion dollar 
research budget, from all sources of funding.  While in absolute terms this places the UofT in 
league with the cream of the American research-intensive crop (i.e. like Harvard), when evaluated 
relative to the size of the faculty complement, the picture changes.  In 2010-2011 Harvard’s 
faculty complement, on an FTE basis was 2275.  The UofT has a complement of over 11000 
faculty.  In 2010-2011 Harvard received over $600 000.00 in federal research dollars alone.  That 
means faculty at Harvard brought in more than double the $104 000.00 in total research revenue 
brought in by the faculty at the UofT. I do not mean to suggest that research income was spread 
evenly across any university.  OECD data, which only starts in 1981, tells a similar story. In that 
year, all Canadian universities spent approximately $1.6B on research and development, where 
the US spent just under $12B and the UK well over $3B.  By 2004 the US was spending some 
$39B on university based R&D, where Canada was spending just under $7B.  In other words, the 
total value of university R&D in the US was about five and a half times greater than in Canada.  
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this was compounded by the fact that branch-planting involved neither high 
levels of corporate R&D nor any sense of urgency on the part of largely American 
corporations operating in Ontario to leverage the Canadian universities as was 
done in the US.  And as Carroll and Beaton (2000), following Axelrod (1982) 
argue, the early involvement of corporate Canada on university boards of 
directors, simply did not involve the kind of programmatic design, either in terms 
of research or teaching, that it did much earlier in the US.  Coupled with the 
largess of the Provincial government right up until the late 1960s, which paid 
universities a generous per-student subsidy intended to cover all operating costs, 
including research, there was, on the research front, simply not any kind of a 
drive to measure and assess.  While at least a couple of Ontario’s universities may 
have by that time already developed some ‘research-intensity’, the absolute size 
and significance of such research in terms of Ontario’s political economy was 
small and there was little urgency to rationalize research funding. 
As a system largely dedicated to teaching under-graduates, Ontario’s 
system was also not immediately subject to the kind of rationalization evident 
much earlier in the US.  The massive expansion of Ontario’s system of higher 
education, which, as in the UK, happened through the late 1950s and 1960s, was 
based firmly in the logic of the post-war compromise.  While state investment in 
                                                   
Assuming a distributional pattern similar to the one established through the 1920s and 1930s, 
which was still very present in the 1970s and 80s, that means that approx. 25 institutions split a 
R&D kitty that is worth more than five times that split between Canada’s self-described “research-
intensive” universities.      
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higher education was seen as a functional means to deal with returning war 
veterans and therein with unemployment, and as means by which to produce the 
human capital necessary for economic growth, this was counter-balanced by very 
different, more humanist notions.   In fact, higher education was seen as vital to 
the defence of the Canadian state and the West, and to the full experience and 
development of human being (Sears 2003).  The much referenced Massey Report 
of Arts and Letters captured this very well in warning against the idea of higher 
education as a purely practical endeavour: 
Under contemporary demands the modern university is urged to provide 
expanding facilities for technical training. The urge "to speed up 
production" and to emphasize technology in the university's curricula has 
led to a growing stress on purely utilitarian subjects in academic courses. 
The practical result has been what one witness called "conspiracies to 
prevent people from being educated". It is certainly neither our right nor 
our wish to tell the universities how to do their work, but, if financial 
stringency prevents these great institutions from being, as they have said, 
"nurseries of a truly Canadian civilization and culture", we are convinced 
that this is a matter of national concern. (Massey et al. 1951) 
In policy and programmatic terms, what this meant was that university 
accountability was judged relative to the willingness and ability of the university 
to accommodate additional students and to operate in service of the kind of 
national vision that the Massey Commission had imagined.  Again, this did not 
mean that the university was to be divorced either partially or entirely from 
“practical” and “technical” forms of education, or from pressure to perform more 
plainly “economic” type roles (Axelrod 2008).  What it did mean however, was 
that the drive for such forms of education was embedded within and conjoined to 
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post-war visions of liberal-capitalist-humanism (Sears 2003; Newson 1998).  
Indeed, in as much as the Massey Report reads like a document concerned about 
the cultural life of the universities, it also devotes clearly demarcated sections to 
discussion of the economic and technical contributions of the universities 
(Massey et al. 1951).  It is in this light, then, that we must view William Davis’ 
remarks to Ontario’s university community offered at York University in 1966, 
right in the midst of the massive expansion of the province’s university system: 
In so far as I can ascertain, the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the 
provincially assisted universities of Ontario is equivalent to, if not greater 
than, that known by publicly supported universities anywhere – including 
the United Kingdom.  There is, moreover, much evidence to indicate that 
provided the universities can meet the responsibilities of our times we 
should undoubtedly be better off if they were allowed to continue to 
operate with such autonomy.  On the other hand, if they cannot or will not 
accept those responsibilities, and if, for example, large numbers of able 
students must be turned away because the university is not prepared to 
accept them, or if, as another example, some of the less glamorous 
disciplines are ignored, despite pressing demands for graduates in those 
areas, or if costly duplication of effort is evident, I cannot imagine that any 
society, especially one bearing large expense for higher education, will 
want to stand idly by.  For there will inevitably be a demand – there have 
been indications of this in other jurisdiction – that government move in 
and take over.  In saying this I am not attempting to act as an alarmist or 
to use alarmist tactics, but it is important that we realize what the 
possibilities are.  I have already stressed that I am in favour of free and 
independent universities, but this belief will not take away the question as 
to whether our institutions of higher learning can meet the challenge.  
Only our universities will be able to answer that.(Davis 1966 as quoted in 
Royce 1998, 101) 
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However much the university was, at times, viewed instrumentally during the 
initial wave of massification through the 1950s and 1960s, the calibration of value 
via a system of QA was nowhere on the agenda.   
7.2.2 Muddling Through Crisis: From the Welfare State to the Seeds of 
Managerial Reform  
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the crisis of the post-war order saw the 
government cut-back on levels of per-student subsidy, which the universities 
quickly began to understand posed a threat to their ability to operate, especially 
given enrollment declines, which were, rather incorrectly, expected to continue.  
Having added capacity, both in terms of the faculty complement and their 
physical infrastructure, the universities, like the government, wanted things to 
change, albeit in a decidedly different manner (i.e. the universities wanted an 
expansion of the per student subsidy, while the government wanted to cut and/or 
rationalize the subsidy, in part by severing funding for research and teaching). 
(Royce 1998, 100–105)    
The crisis of Keynesianism thus ushered in a period of intense uncertainty, 
relative upheaval, and debate.  Indeed, the larger crisis of capitalism was 
mirrored in efforts to understand and manage the massified university, and 
therein to find some rationale within an entirely unsettled political economy to 
prompt public and governmental support for the universities.  Notably, such 
discussions began, early on in this era, to look to the US, and therein to specific 
state systems, as paragons of virtue to be emulated in Ontario (Royce 1998, 116).  
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It is in this context that we can place all of the major governmental and sector-
led/sponsored reports of the late 1960s and 1970s.149  In this regard, what 
seemed to emerge through the 1970s was a pattern of negotiation between the 
state and the universities over the extent to which the government would 
continue to respect the apparent autonomy of the universities in exchange for 
some greater effort at self-regulation and coordination rather than directly 
intervene in the sector (as the reports of Government commissions 
recommended).  For mainstream scholars, the fact that Ontario’s government did 
not undertake to direct the rationalization of the system, is seen as evidence of 
the degree to which Ontario’s universities were and remain autonomous (Trick 
2005a; Gesink-Walsh 2007; G. Jones 1991; Royce 1998).   
For example, in reading the significance of the Report of the Wright 
Commission (1972) Trick (2005a), Royce (1998) and Jones (1991) all conclude 
along similar lines.  As they have it, Wright’s call for the creation of a “buffer” 
body to administer the system with full executive control was perceived by the 
universities as a serious threat to their autonomy.  Although the ‘buffer’ was 
pitched as a kind of third party able to navigate between the universities’ need for 
autonomy and academic freedom and the government’s more instrumental logic, 
the universities thought otherwise.  Through the Council of Ontario Universities 
                                                   
149 The various reports to which I am referring are the Government of Ontario’s Spinks 
Commission (1966), the AUCC’s, Duff Berdahl Commission, the Government of Ontario’s, Wright 
Commission (1972), the OCUA’s “System on the Brink Report” (1979). For a full list of 
government and sector reports see (Royce 1998, 353)   
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(COU) the universities both pushed-back against the “buffer” idea (initially with a 
proposal for a “double buffer”) and also undertook to improve their ability to self-
regulate.  In so far as the government took the proverbial teeth out of Wright’s 
recommendations and made the Ontario Council on University Affairs (OCUA) a 
purely advisory body, the episode is seen as the institution and extension of the 
pattern described above.  Indeed, because the Government regularly accepted the 
universities promises of self-regulation and coordination, Trick (2005a) 
concludes that, in Ontario, higher education policy has not departed very much 
from founding principles.  On the contrary, he argues that decision-making has 
remained within the dominant “paradigm”, and Ontario’s universities exercise 
considerably more autonomy than they do in places like the UK (Trick 2005a).  
In a similar fashion, Gesink-Welsh (2007) concludes that although the 
government did signal, through the 1970s (and indeed the 1980s and early 1990s) 
a desire for more direct forms of control over Ontario’s system of higher 
education, it was not until the, “strong political leadership” of the Progressive 
Conservatives (for whom she worked) was brought to bear in 1995, that the 
rhythms of negotiation within the dominant “policy network” really changed 
(Gesink-Walsh 2007, 229).   
In fact, though sector relations did settle into a routine through the 1970s, 
where governmental concern over economy and efficiency triggered successive, if 
mild, rounds of self-regulation (or the attempt thereof), they did not settle in that 
manner just because of institutional rigidities that left the dominant paradigm or 
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policy network intact.  In fact, the OCUA and the COU were, as Royce (1998, 
148–152) points out, largely in agreement about the need for some form of 
rationalization, particularly in terms of graduate education, where the on-going 
decline of government transfers were felt would most threaten program quality.  
But neither the government nor the institutions themselves would commit to any 
kind of a plan.  Not only did the per-student funding formula create incentive for 
institutions to grow, but the Government appeared unwilling to back away from 
its promise to pay for universal access.  On both counts, (i.e. the unwillingness of 
the universities to strike a deal amongst themselves around rationalization and 
the government’s unwillingness to give-up on its promise of universal access) 
positions were likely taken more as a political calculation than as a result of firm 
ideological commitments.  According to Newson (2013), negotiations between the 
OCUA and the COU around the adjustment to the per-student funding formula 
(the “basic income unit”(BIU)), were roundly criticized by faculty, who were, 
through the 70’s, actively organizing (Horn 1994; Savage 1994).  The possibility 
of dramatically shifting the nature of taught programs, or of severing the 
relationship between teaching and research was limited, in other words, because 
the massification of the university at the end of the 1960s had meant the hiring of 
large numbers of young academics trained in that heady and radical moment. 
The fact that the wave of faculty unionization was manifest as an attempt by 
young faculty to protect themselves against the ravages of both government 
cutbacks and the established hierarchies within their institutions (i.e. the COU), 
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only served to hem-in the universities’ ability to rationalize without some 
external intervention (Horn 1994).  More than this, because the rationalization of 
graduate programs were to see some institutions downsized and turned into 
teaching-only universities, internal divisions began to ferment within the COU. 
The government was also in something of a bind, and not just because of 
faculty opposition.  Ontario did not see the level of university-based protest that 
rolled through the US in the 1960s and 1970s, where the ruling classes were 
prompted to think according to the logic of the Trilateral Commission (as 
outlined in Chapter 2).  Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that the Government, 
given both the proximity to the US and examples such as Rochdale College, was 
hoping to find an approach to the fiscal crisis which would neither ignite nor fuel 
further opposition.  In this regard, it is vital to note that the 1970s were an era of 
terrific labour unrest outside of the universities.  This was particularly the case in 
Ontario, where the autoworkers, which Panitch and Swartz (2003) describe as 
the “weathervane” of labour politics in the Province, were able to mount a 
stalwart opposition to the Trudeau government’s introduction in 1975 of wage 
and price controls (Panitch and Swartz 2003; Gindin 1995).  The rationalization 
of Ontario’s universities simply did not and arguably could not rank highly-
enough on the government’s agenda so as to disturb the conventions of the 
“policy network” that developed through the 1970s.  Thus were the 1970s 
described by little more than heated debate over the Province’s funding formula 
and the universities more earnest efforts to realize internal economies and to 
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coordinate through the Council of Ontario Universities (COU) some more 
“rationally” organized system.  Herein the significance of the Government’s 
various reports appears most clearly: the universities needed to manage 
themselves in a manner both more befitting the times and more reflective of the 
best American institutions.  In this limited way were the first seeds of 
neoliberalism and QA sewn.   
7.2.3 Elite Cohesion, the Emergence of the Neoliberal Agenda, and 
Managerial Reform of the Universities 
The 1980s, and particularly the recession in 1981-1982, which was 
preceded by the Bank of Canada’s turn towards monetarism, marks a significant 
turning point, though as with the 1970s, not because the provincial government 
appeared able to mount anything approaching a comprehensive political 
economic program (Drainville 1995; Newstadt 2008).  Though, as Newson and 
Buchbinder (1988) note, fiscal cutbacks became, by the 1980s, increasingly 
accepted as part of the political economic landscape, the full-scale attack on 
organized labour had only just begun to take shape.  In other words, the neo-
liberal orthodoxy was then just establishing a foothold in Ontario and the 
financialization of the Canadian economy, and of everyday life, was also just 
beginning (LeBaron 2010).  Thus, Ontarians, like all Canadians were inundated 
by anti-inflationary rhetoric from both the state and capital.  Federally, the 
government – and such measures were mimicked in Ontario - developed so-
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called “temporary” coercive measures to control labour and thus inflation.  
Panitch and Swartz put it this way:  
...the federal government’s 1982, “6 and 5” program was not a “bolt out of 
the blue” – an isolated blemish on an otherwise impeccable record of 
liberal reformism.  Its significance lay in the fact that it served as the 
opening shot in a broad-based assault on trade union freedoms by federal 
and provincial governments in the 1980’s.  It made explicit the ad hoc, 
selective, “temporary” use of coercion, not merely directed at the 
particular groups of workers affected or at the particular issue of 
“emergency” at hand, but rather designed to set an example for what was 
considered to be appropriate behaviour throughout the industrial relations 
system.  The suspension, in 1982, of public sector workers’ rights was not 
proclaimed or defended in terms of what it would directly accomplish to 
stem inflation and re-invigorate Canadian capitalism; rather, it was an 
example of what other workers had to voluntarily do if these objectives 
were to be attained. (Panitch and Swartz 2003, 26) 
In saying this Panitch and Swartz highlight that the wage freezes put in 
place both federally and provincially in 1982 were at least as much, if not more, 
about bringing private sector unions to heel as they were about reigning in public 
sector workers and state expenditures.  Nonetheless, organized labour in Ontario 
remained buoyant, particularly in the wake of the 1981/82 recession when the 
auto-sector benefitted from favourable exchange-rate differentials and finance 
capital enjoyed dividends earned via links to US markets (Gindin 1995, 205–
227).  Not only did governmental and private-sector efforts to squash and/or 
transform organized labour temporarily abate, but key unions found and 
leveraged space to maneuver where their American counterparts could not 
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(207).150  Ontario’s branch-plant economy, in other words, showed significant 
signs of life in the period immediate following the 1980-82/3 recession. What 
this meant is that the wage freeze levelled against public-sector workers did not 
have the desired effect in the private sector. Furthermore, the public-sector 
mobilized in opposition, arguably stalling the Government’s efforts, if only 
temporarily.  To the extent that the neoliberal program was based upon reviving 
corporate balance sheets and rates of investment (by quashing labour and 
making labour markets more flexible), the government has simply not yet 
succeeded. Again, the program of neoliberal restructuring was just beginning to 
take shape.   
In is in this light that we need to consider developments in and around 
Ontario’s universities after 1980.  As Trick (2005a, 322) points out, one of the 
notable and early manifestations of an emergent new orthodoxy (what he calls a 
new “paradigm”), was the COU’s first articulation in 1980 of support for 
conditional forms of research funding that would reward universities for linking 
with private sector partners. In this, the COU actually anticipated some of what 
was contained in the 1981 report of the Government’s commission into the 
structure of Ontario’s system of higher education.  In fact, the Government’s 
“Fisher Report” (1981) also suggested that the universities be encouraged to 
create links with private-sector partners.  But the Report went much further and 
                                                   
150 The most obvious manifestation of this was the formal split between the UAW and the 
CAW in 1985, which enabled the CAW to negotiate a better Agreement with the Big Three 
American auto-makers, than had the UAW.   
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struck a far more revanchist note than had the COU’s earlier call for the 
government to increase funding for commercially oriented research.  Indeed, the 
Report arguably went beyond either the universities’ or the government’s pale in 
recommending as it did that either the government significantly increase base-
level funding to all of the universities or else more directly administer a 
University of Ontario system with the aim of thoroughly rationalizing it (i.e. by 
tasking different institutions with different and discrete functions).  In forcing a 
choice between more money or more intervention (less autonomy), the Fisher 
Report pleased no one and was effectively, “dead in the water” (Royce 1998, 372).  
In so failing to satisfy anyone, the Fisher Report also failed to deliver on its 
primary mandate, which was to settle the still on-going debate over the province’s 
funding formula.  In the wake of the Fisher Report, the government was merely 
able to revise the BIU formula so as to make it slightly less sensitive than it had 
been to fluctuations in enrollment, which temporarily declined.  In doing so the 
government provided the universities with some of what they were seeking, 
namely a promise that declining enrolments would not rapidly undermine their 
ability to operate, given a massively expanded faculty complement.  Of course, 
this hardly settled the issue, particularly given the expectation that enrolments 
would continue to decline, thereby intensifying the fiscal bind that the 
universities were facing.  As such, negotiations between the COU and the OCUA 
again picked-up, as did the controversy such negotiations triggered from within 
the universities.  The government, therefore, looked for another out, and, in 1983 
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appointed another commission (the Bovey Commission) to navigate the troubled 
waters of university finance. (Royce 1998, 160–164) 
Before considering that Report, however, it is necessary to give the Fisher 
Report slightly more consideration.  The Fisher Report actually spoke 
meaningfully to the issues of the day and thereby foreshadowed subsequent 
changes.  In wanting the universities to take-on more differentiated roles so as to 
avoid unnecessary and wasteful duplication, Fisher hardly sounded so different 
from either previous commissions, or the Government of the day.  And again, 
Fisher’s suggestion that the universities expand their connections with industry 
was hardly different from what the COU was itself calling for, albeit not through 
an adjustment to the BIU as Fisher recommended. Furthermore, in 
recommending that the government set clear objectives for the universities, 
including more vigorous accounting standards, Fisher was also not so far from 
previous articulations of the government’s desire for “better” and more visible 
forms of accountability.  The Report also provided some direction to both OCUA 
and the COU: the OCUA would appropriately develop system-level monitoring 
capacities, while the COU should begin conducting periodic reviews of graduate 
programs and thereby make the quality of such programs an over-arching 
objective (Royce 1998, 161).  The Report even suggested that information be 
made available to the public concerning the vital economic role that the 
universities played in helping to meet important labour market requirements 
(Ministry of Colleges and Universities 1981).  But for the mechanism via which 
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such changes were to be implemented, the Fisher Report reads as more prophecy 
than heresy.  Indeed, in calling for the COU to begin the periodic review of 
graduate programs outside of any calls for the rationalization of the BIU, Fisher 
suggested, if only unintentionally, how it was the universities might prove their 
utility without having the evidence of such tied to a program that rationalized 
funding and tiered institutions.  This is precisely how the universities then 
understood the utility of program review.  In other words, from the universities’ 
perspective Fisher signaled that QA could be undertaken as a means via which to 
both argue against cuts to the BIU and to pre-empt the Government from directly 
intervening in the rationalization of the system.  More than this, and given the 
lack of any serious opposition to the earlier introduction of program review at the 
graduate level, the universities presumably saw in QA an effective means via 
which to engender some support for system rationalization from the academy.151   
Where Fisher had failed, the Bovey Commission, which was officially 
labeled the, Commission on the Future Development of the Universities of 
Ontario (Trick 2005, 200), succeeded, though not in a manner that was 
                                                   
151 Writing in 1981, Grant Clarke, then the Deputy to the Executive Director of the COU, 
noted what he saw as the critical difference between summative and formative evaluations: the 
former were tied to decisions about resource allocation and the latter to on-going efforts at 
improvement.  Clarke goes on to argue for a system of programme review that has as its, 
…first consideration that the quality of academic offerings should be at the heart of the 
process.  This orientation is indispensable to real accountability, ensuring the 
preservation and enhancement of the central value of the university.  Focusing on quality 
will help us avoid the danger of confusing efficiency with educational effectiveness.  From 
the practical point of view, it will also help with the acceptance of the process by the 
academic community.  (G. Clarke 1981, 108) 
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immediately clear.152  Where the Fisher Committee had seen a need for either a 
large amount of new government funding or a complete overhaul of Ontario’s 
university system, Bovey maintained that government funding needed to increase 
only mildly and that the university system could be effectively transformed via 
conditional funding programs intended to encourage greater “differentiation” 
between “resource-intensive research universities” and those that could usefully 
be classified as “instruction intensive” schools (Bovey 1984, 5).  Conditional 
financing arrangements were preferred by the Commission apparently as a nod to 
university autonomy, which the Report noted, “had been a major factor in their 
[the universities] vitality and achievement (13)”; instead of bar universities from 
participating in certain areas/functions, the Report sought to create a market-like 
competitive environment where ambitious universities and those already in the 
“resource-intensive research” category could be more generously funded. 
The Commission holds that such differentiation ought to be recognized in 
funding principles and in planning and coordinating structures, and that 
it’s appropriate further evolution should be encouraged.  However, we 
reject the notion that universities should be formally designated by a 
central body as to their type, or placed in rigid categories.  Emphasis 
should rather be placed upon a competitive system within which 
institutions are rewarded for the distinctive functions they perform and 
the quality of their activities and in addition are provided with the capacity 
to be flexible and innovative. (Bovey 1984, 14) 
                                                   
 152 The official title of the Bovey Commission is strikingly familiar to that of the Fisher 
Committee, which was called the Commission on the Future Role of the Universities of Ontario. 
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The Commission did recognize that this kind of ‘competitive system’ would 
undoubtedly generate “winners” and “losers” and pose a challenge to wider 
accessibility. However, for Bovey and the other commissioners, globalization 
meant that broad accessibility was necessarily sacrificed at the altar of economic 
growth and global competitiveness: 
The third element in the proposed strategy is a greater emphasis in the 
period ahead upon excellence and adaptability.  The urgency of reaching 
an internationally competitive level of excellence in higher education and 
research, together with adaptability to facilitate responsiveness to the 
needs of a rapidly changing society, set against the relatively broad access 
already achieved, requires a strategy which in the immediate future gives 
priority to quality and adaptability over the further enhancement of 
accessibility.  When priorities are related to the availability of resources 
this emphasis is especially important. (Bovey 1984, 5) 
In this regard, and as Trick (2005a, 323–324) describes, the Bovey Report 
triggered some considerable consternation and discord, not least within the COU.  
In recommending that the government adjust the BIU formula so as to 
distinguish between research- and teaching-intensive institutions, Bovey 
threatened the ambitions of several universities which saw that they would 
quickly become ghettoized at the bottom of Ontario’s more “differentiated” 
system.  At the same time, those institutions that had already achieved some level 
of research-intensity, apparently favoured the Report (Newson 2013).  But 
whether or not the universities were divided over Bovey’s recommendation for 
the development of research-related adjustments to the BIU, they found the 
Report’s call for higher tuition-fees and more money for operating and research-
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related expenditures generally agreeable (Royce 1998, 172).  Given the COU’s 
aforementioned annunciation of support for the development of conditional 
forms of finance outside the BIU formula, it stands to reason that the government 
saw a way to finally move beyond the BIU related debates, particularly given the 
opposition mounted by both faculty and students’ associations, which simply 
rejected Bovey’s call to sacrifice access for quality (Royce 1998, 173).153 
Ultimately, the Bovey Report amounted to little in the way of immediate 
changes.  Because the release of the Bovey Report was preceded by the retirement 
of then Premier Bill Davis, a cabinet shuffle that saw the long-serving Bette 
Stephenson relocated, and the very temporary designation of a Premier believed 
to be less interested in the universities than Davis had been, few of the changes 
Bovey recommended were immediately taken-up.  The significance of the Report 
cannot be under-estimated, however. First, in recommending the institution of 
market-like adjustment processes, the Report helped to pave a path between 
direct intervention and total self-regulation. Second, the Report constructed 
university autonomy not so much in a new way, but in a manner that further laid 
                                                   
153 While for Royce examines only the opposition to Bovey mounted by the OCUFA, an 
email exchange with Newson (2013) has clarified that in fact faculty unions and associations 
which had previously been able to maintain some level of solidarity on the BIU issue,  became 
split after Bovey in precisely the way the Report appeared to split the universities.  Accordingly, 
faculty at research-intensive universities who stood to reap the rewards of a research-linked BIU, 
supported Bovey, while the rest were roundly critical.  As Newson has also clarified, more than 
split the faculty, this also put something of a brake on the on-going process of faculty 
unionization, which stopped when faculty at research intensive universities split from other 
faculty unions over the BIU issue.  Of course, this just highlights my larger point, that the 
opposition and splits created by Bovey were ameliorated by the Government’s subsequent 
decision to maintain BIU funding and grow the envelope of research funding available on a 
conditional basis outside of the BIU formula.      
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the groundwork for a program of systematic valuation (i.e. QA).  Accordingly, 
universities were to draft detailed mission statements, a beefed-up and revived 
OCUA was to monitor and assess the universities, to advise the government on all 
issues related to post-secondary education, and the government was to act, 
wherever necessary, to steer universities in specific directions if they refused to 
do so of their own accord.  Finally, the Report, in so far as it was roundly rejected 
by both students and faculty, not least because it recommended higher-tuition 
fees and an income-indexed loan repayment program, reflected what were at the 
time the popular limits of the neoliberal program.   
With the election of a Liberal-led coalition government in 1985, the Bovey 
Report, a product of the preceding Progressive Conservative government, was 
more formally sidelined.154 However, this should not lead one to conclude, as 
Trick (Trick 2005a, 272) has, that the Liberal tenure marked a period of “relative 
calm,” even if one assumes that is was relative to, “to the years of retrenchment” 
that were to follow. On the contrary, though the sector was not marked by the 
kind of disagreements typical of the era immediately preceding and following the 
Liberal’s five-year stint in office, it was nonetheless a period of fundamental 
restructuring within the sector.  In fact, while levels of per-student funding via 
government transfers and tuition-fees rose at a rate generally in-line with 
                                                   
 154 The historical defeat of the Progressive Conservatives, initially by a Liberal led 
minority which subsequently cemented into a Liberal majority, also tempered the speed of the 
transformative program – in a period of five years, the Ministry of Colleges and Universities saw 
the appointment of three different ministers, none of which was able to amass the experience and 
expertise necessary to undertake much in the way of significant policy departures.   
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inflation, the government’s introduction of the Ontario Centre’s of Excellence, 
which were subsequently copied by the federal government, and of other forms of 
conditional finance intended to encourage university-corporate links, were 
significant, not least because such programs did not upset the ‘relative calm’ 
Trick describes.155   
It is also necessary to remember that the 1980s were a period of significant 
change in the universities themselves.  The tide of economics imperialism began 
to crash throughout economics departments all over North America (Milonakis 
and Fine 2009).  By the mid-to-late 1980s governments had firmly refocused on 
economic growth over-full employment, reflecting to a significant degree the 
perceived theoretical superiority of Hayek and Freidman (Gindin and Panitch 
2012; Harvey 2005).  Also, in 1985 the OCGS committed to conduct periodic 
reviews of all graduate programs, thereby expanding their longer-standing 
practice of reviewing only new graduate programs.  In other words, the extension 
of QA was well underway.  The fact that the extension of OCGS review hardly 
kicked-up any opposition, speaks, on the one hand, to the degree to which 
managerialism was already embedded within Ontario’s universities, and, on the 
other hand, to the ease with which QA was allowed to develop when not 
                                                   
155 In fact, Trick hints at this.  He notes that the emergence of conditional forms of 
research funding, by way of the Ontario Centre’s of Excellence, did mark an important turning 
point in what he conceives of as a wholly separate area of government-university relations.  Of 
course, as I suggest above, this conception of research as a separate area because it did not 
immediately impact the BIU formula is precisely why it is so terrifically important, not least 
because the imposition of conditional forms of finance based on peer review had the effect of 
normalizing both university-corporate links.   
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connected to issues of funding.  In subsequently making periodic reviews a 
condition of eligibility for provincial funding, the government subsequently made 
the formal link between audit and value. But this was hardly threatening, if only 
because the OCGS reviews operated through the accepted doctrine of peer review 
and were not linked to graduated outcomes and rationalized funding.  The 1980s 
were also the decade of four major “management fads” in higher education: zero-
based budgeting, strategic planning, benchmarking, and, towards the end of the 
1980s, Total Quality Management (Birnbaum 2000).  The 
administrative/bureaucratic apparatus was being completely transformed, even if 
formalized systems of measurement and ranking were not yet in place. 
Also critical to the development of what would emerge as the foundations 
of QA through the 1980s, was the increasing interest of corporate Canada in the 
country’s (and Ontario’s) system of higher education. For example, the formation 
in 1983 of the Corporate Higher Education Forum, which followed but seven 
years after the formation of the Business Council on National Issues in 1976, is 
indicative of the degree to which the capitalist class was beginning to constitute 
itself as a cohesive social, political, and economic force with an interest in higher 
education.  In this regard, Carroll and Beaton (2000) note several trends of 
significance. Between 1976 and 1996: 1) the number of corporate-industry links 
widened to include firms operating in hi-tech and “knowledge intensive” sectors; 
2) a greater number of links between senior university bureaucrats and corporate 
Canada took shape; and, 3) more university administrators came to play roles in 
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the affairs of corporate Canada (Carroll and Beaton 2000, 89–92).  Carroll and 
Beaton read this precisely as do Newson and Buchbinder (1988), and therein as 
evidence of the degree to which neoliberalism was, through the 1980s, becoming 
embedded within higher education.   
7.2.4 Roll-back Neoliberalism and the Death of Parliamentary 
Socialism in Ontario: From the NDP to Mike Harris 
In so far as the development of ideological and programmatic cohesion 
and extension (to the universities) within Canada’s capitalist class, had delivered 
something of a revolution in the management of Ontario’s universities, it was not 
yet clear just how far that program could progress.  Indeed, the degree to which 
Canada’s working classes had not yet accepted the neoliberal orthodoxy was 
evident in the 1988 election, largely fought over the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 
and was on display again in 1990, when Ontario’s New Democratic Party (NDP) 
was able to capitalize on widespread discontent with the dictates of 
neoliberalism.  Indeed, elected on the promise of breaking sharply with the 
neoliberal trajectory that the Liberals and Conservatives were both advocating, 
the election of the NDP was clearly an indication of both real dissatisfaction (not 
yet completely turned to disaffection) and potential.  Notably, organized labour 
factored centrally in the election of the NDP. The CAW’s separation from the 
UAW in 1985, had provided room for the union to organize and mobilize in a 
manner that undoubtedly aided the NDP in their electoral bid.  The strength of 
the CAW through the early 1990s is also significant in so far as it both suggests 
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the continued importance of Ontario’s manufacturing sector and the urgency 
with which capital – and the Government – then wanted to defeat the unions. 
The changes that the NDP government made to higher education and QA, 
suggests that higher education policy was at least one of the levers through which 
labour was to be disciplined.  In expanding the suite of programs designed to 
promote university-industry links at the very moment when they cut direct 
transfers to the universities and colleges via the BIU and hiked tuition-fees, the 
NDP government looked to fuel the Province’s transition to a “knowledge-based” 
and “global” economy, a transition that would weaken the manufacturing sector 
by making it a relatively smaller piece of the Province’s economic pie.  In hiking 
tuition-fees and founding an alternative to the Ontario arm of the Canadian 
Federation of Students, the NDP also advanced arguments about the “value” of 
higher education.  More than this, in simultaneously calling for University boards 
to be made more representative and inclusive (not least of students and faculty), 
and for those boards to be directed in their efforts by the use of KPI’s, the NDP 
looked to further instantiate neoliberal concepts of value.       
Without question, the policy constraints which the NDP encountered 
immediately upon their election in 1990 were significant.  At the time, Ontario 
was in the midst of a remarkably deep and painful recession, one that saw the 
unemployment rate top that of any other advanced industrial country.  And the 
immediate reaction of financial markets to the election of the NDP, clearly posed 
a significant barrier to the imposition, if not the development, of a truly 
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progressive program.   Of course, however binding were the constraints that it 
then faced, the NDP government did little other than accommodate, and rather 
rapidly.  In remarkably short order, the NDP came to accept and promote a very 
conventional line: 
Rather than treating the deficit as a symptom of the economic crisis, they 
asserted, with increasing insistence, that it was the problem, and adopted 
the conventional business view-point that advances towards lowering 
unemployment and reducing socio-economic inequality were dependent 
upon its solution.  Before long the Ontario NDP government began to look 
like every other federal and provincial government.(Panitch and Swartz 
2003, 162) 
What this meant was that reforms of the Province’s labour laws, long 
promised by the NDP while in opposition, were limited not so much because of 
the constraints faced by the Government early on during its tenure, but because 
of the ideological disposition to which the NDP leadership was arguably attached 
for a long time.  Of course, both Panitch and Swartz (2003), and Rachlis and 
Wolfe (1997) note that the Government’s departure from a more radical line was 
taken in the face of a highly coordinated and almost continuous attack on the 
NDP government by business.  But what Rachlis and Wolfe never broach is the 
degree to which such attacks intensified only after the Government capitulated to 
business demands in respect of the NDP’s amendments for the aforementioned 
reform of the Ontario Labour Relations Act (ORLA).  And they simply never 
discuss the NDP’s rapid uptake and advocacy of competitiveness through 
restructuring (i.e. the human capital/knowledge based economy thesis) as a kind 
of ideological transformation (perhaps because it wasn’t?).  Moreover, events in 
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the higher education sector suggest that the ideological turn so clearly reflected in 
the “Social Contract” was foreshadowed in legislative moves that pre-dated that 
legislation.  Indeed, before offering up the Social Contract, with the Government 
under pressure from the COU to raise tuition-fees and to consider the 
introduction of an income indexed loan repayment program (ICLRP), the NDP 
not only helped found and fund the Ontario University Student Alliance (OUSA), 
a breeding ground for young Liberals that was intended as a counterweight to the 
Ontario Federation of Students, but it also announced a 10% increase in tuition-
fees, the abolition of up-front grants, and a pilot ICLRP program run jointly with 
the federal government.  These steps mirrored moves by the then Liberal-led 
government at the federal level, which, frustrated by the opposition mounted by 
the Canadian Federation of Students (the national organization of which the 
Ontario Federation is an affiliate), had helped found and fund the Canadian 
Alliance of Student Associations, an organization which shared the political 
disposition of the OUSA.   
The NDP tenure was also coloured with the rhetoric of university 
accountability, though not clearly as a result of a desire to direct universities to 
specific ends, which would become more evident with subsequent 
administrations.  The delivery of the auditor general’s report in 1987 in respect of 
the Trent, Waterloo, and the University of Toronto, more or less forced the NDP 
to, once in power, undertake some kind of review of university spending and 
accountability.  In what Trick describes as a deal with the universities, the 
392 
government, rather than amend the Audit Act in a manner that might impinge on 
university autonomy, struck the Task Force on University Accountability, 
subsequently dubbed the Broadhurst Commission for its chair, William 
Broadhurst (Trick 2005, 241). During its deliberations a report delivered by 
Stephen Lewis on race relations in Ontario led then Minister of Education 
Richard Allen to broaden the mandate of the Task Force to include consideration 
of the make-up of universities’ governing boards (242).  This issue became a 
principal thrust of the Report, which recommended that faculty and student 
involvement in university governance be expanded (Broadhurst 1993).  However, 
the Report also made recommendations regarding the use of indices and 
measures to help transformed boards effectively monitor university performance.   
– “indices whose prime purpose would be to establish norms to be applied 
uniformly to all universities and used to rank them,” were also recommended 
(Broadhurst 1993 as quoted in; Trick 2005, 242).  Allen also asked OCUA to 
make recommendations about a quality and accountability framework for the 
university system.  The OCUA’s recommendations reflected perfectly neoliberal 
rhetoric fundamental to the neoliberal program discussed in Chapter 2. 
Accordingly, QA was to be undertaken through a program of “monitored self-
regulation” (“steering not rowing”), ultimately answerable to an Academic Audit 
Committee made up of government-appointed members (Trick 2005, 243).  The 
NDP also introduced the Education Quality and Accountability Office (the 
EQAO), which was resisted successfully by the universities, but which became a 
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key part of the secondary school program and of the Progressive Conservative’s 
approach to elementary education after 1995.  As well, the government’s activities 
triggered discussion within the COU that ultimately led in 1996, when additional 
pressure was being applied by the new Progressive Conservative government, to 
form the Undergraduate Program Review Audit Committee (244), thereby 
making period audits and reviews a part of all taught programs in the Province’s 
universities.   
What is fascinating here is the degree to which accountability and quality 
had become, and very rapidly, synonymous with measurement.  Again, such 
developments cannot be viewed in abstraction.  The discussion in Ontario 
regarding quality and accountability happened not long after moves in the UK, 
first under Thatcher and Major and then Blair, to use measurement as a 
mechanism of control and direction. Of course, such moves were excused and 
explained by appeal to the “realities of governing” (Rachlis and Wolfe 1997), as 
two NDP insiders would have it.  As much as the NDP tenure also involved 
certain progressive changes to labour laws and the like, the NDP stint in power, 
brief as it was, saw cutbacks increasingly described as more than just a 
competitive necessity in the new global economic landscape, but as absolutely 
inevitable.  Bob Rae’s “pragmatism” meant that progressive social policy was a 
moral obligation only in respect of the poorest of the poor and the most 
disenfranchised.  Otherwise, social policy became a potential source of 
competitive advantage, a means of supporting markets that, as the neoliberal 
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economists might have put it, were only inefficient periodically and/or under 
exceptional circumstances. In what Rachlis and Wolfe describe as the search for 
policy coherence during the NDP tenure the government’s 1991 budget paper, 
“Ontario in the 1990’s”,  
...recognized that competitiveness was important to attaining this 
objective [sustainable stability and prosperity], but argued that it could 
best be realized through the creation of high-value-added, high-wage jobs 
and strategic partnerships.  The most important adjustment challenge in 
the 1990’s was to increase the overall productivity of Ontario’s economy.  
The key to increased productivity did not lie in minimizing cost levels for 
the existing mix of product and processes, but in fostering productive 
systems that promote continuous improvement in products and processes 
across the networks of firms and sectors in the provincial economy.  The 
budget paper also argued that any successful high-wage, high-value-added 
economic strategy must be based on a defence, and extension, of social 
equity to generate the required degree of social cohesion. (Rachlis and 
Wolfe 1997, 349) 156 
The Social Contract then was merely an extension of that which was 
started in earnest in specific sectors and grew out of the panicked recognition on 
the part of the government that early projections concerning the depth of the 
economic crisis then underway had been grossly under-estimated, to the point of 
                                                   
 156 In a recent critique of the CAW’s 2008 deal with Chrysler, Sam Gindin had this to say 
about the logic of “competitiveness”: “The problem, it seems, is that once the union accepts the 
argument that competitiveness is a goal workers must conform to - rather than as a constraint 
that must be stretched through broader policies and challenges to corporate power – the union 
ends up dependent on the corporations. Mobilizing the workers to fight the corporations is then 
largely irrelevant (in fact, it might even be seen as a potential problem).” Gindin, Sam, The CAW 
and Panic Bargaining: Early Opening at the Big Three, Socialist Project Bullet, May 1, 2008 
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negligence.157   Having promised business that the Province’s deficit would not 
exceed a $10 billion dollar ceiling, the Government used dire projections 
concerning the imminent erosion of its revenue base to leverage support for 
legislation that did away with the right of public sector workers to strike and 
which cut public sector wages most famously through the imposition of 12 days of 
unpaid leave that came to be called “Rae Days”.  In terms of funding for the 
universities, the NDP government largely froze levels of spending there too, 
alongside aforementioned increases to tuition-fees, the abolition of up-front 
grants, and the expansion of student debt programs.  How the universities 
worked through the Social Contract was, however, left entirely up to the 
universities.  Rather than impose agreements on the system,   
...each university was left to negotiate with its own employees on how to 
manage the funding reductions (which as we saw in Table 5.1, averaged 
about 5 per cent per student in 1993-1994 once inflation and higher 
tuition-fees were taken into account)...All universities introduced a salary 
freeze for at least part of the three years (with one agreement silent).  The 
second most common way of finding the necessary savings was to reduce 
contributions to university pension plans.(Trick 2005, 146) 
In the end, the NDP government successfully imposed a level of fiscal 
discipline and austerity of which any conservatively minded economist could be 
                                                   
 157 Rachlis and Wolfe attempt to applaud Rae for helping Ontario to weather a global 
economic crisis, without imposing drastic cuts to public sector payrolls. In so applauding Rae, and 
their own efforts of course, they fail to recognize that: 1) the fact that the bulk of adjustment was 
borne by workers, via tax reforms and wage cuts, and other directly coercive measures (like the 
temporary suspension of collective bargaining rights); 2) the degree to which the logic of NDP 
policy was exemplary of the logic fundamental to the exercise of neo-liberalism; 3) a fundamental 
redefinition of the public good; and, 4) premised in part on the very obfuscation that this 
dissertation has outlined: the idea that measurement can be an objective means by which to 
assess success and quality.     
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proud.  Critically, this did not mean across the board cuts, but rather a program 
of cut-backs alongside funding increases to programs that were intended to press 
the university closer to industry.  When the austerity program encountered 
political blocks, the NDP turned both to the rhetoric of “value”, “efficiency” and 
“accountability” as well as to the development of QA as a mechanism through 
which to justify either or both on-going support for government expenditures or 
the imposition of austerity (the EQAO being an important case in point).  In this 
the NDP had managed to engender relative disgust on the part of both labour and 
capital.  For its part, organized labour watched as a social democratic government 
“temporarily” suspended collective bargaining rights.  Meanwhile, capital, having 
taken-up a public relations attack almost as a kind of pre-emptory challenge to 
the possibility that the allegedly progressive NDP might advance a social-
democratic politic, proved unwilling to relent when the NDP supported the 
neoliberal program, perhaps because capital recognized that more support was 
available elsewhere.  Nonetheless, from the perspective of capital, the NDP 
government was something of a success.  As was mentioned, the manufacturing 
sector took-off, if only briefly, after the recession of the early 1990s, and the NDP 
had provided a basis upon which more obviously neoliberal programs of 
accumulation could be implemented, not least through the expansion of 
programs designed to support commercialization and the province’s transition to 
a knowledge based economy.  In other words, the intellectual transformation that 
the Social Contract allegedly reflected, signaled the on-set of what Peck and 
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Tickell usefully describe as “roll-back neo-liberalism (Peck and Tickell 2002)” 
that is the wholesale de- or re-regulation of the political economy, the 
dismantling, generally through privatization, of state institutions, and a stalwart 
attack on the institutions and capacities of organized labour.  The massive defeat 
of the NDP in the 1995 election then did not happen because the NDP failed to 
provide, as Rachlis and Wolfe argue, a “positive vision of good times to come, 
(Rachlis and Wolfe 1997, 357)” but rather because in trying to please two masters 
(one to a far greater extent than the other), the NDP lacked not just direction, but 
any kind of identity whatsoever, particularly in a political economic climate 
within which neoliberal globalization had taken on a flavour of inevitability.   
By contrast, the PC manifesto, the “Common Sense Revolution (CSR)” was 
direct, comprehensive, and understandable. In promising a program of 
“revolution” based on the near simultaneous reduction of personal income taxes 
and the province’s deficit, the PC’s program spoke the lingua franca of the 
moment: less taxation and regulation, the inexorable efficiency of the market, 
and the virtues of individual freedom.  Thus, the Tories did not just commit to 
what the NDP described as the realities of governing, they embraced it 
wholeheartedly.   
7.2.5 The Harris Eves Government – Organized Labour in the 
Crosshairs   
The ellipsis of the PC government is exemplary of how ‘roll-back neo-
liberalism’ has tended to become exhausted and is suggestive of why QA has 
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become such an attractive regulative technology – their legislative agenda 
triggered high levels of social unrest in turn triggered by increasingly obvious 
forms of social inequity and eventually generated a series of outcomes that 
sacrificed public safety thereby ending (temporarily) the government’s ability to 
conflate notions of the public interest with market de- and/or re-regulation.  
Indeed, the limits of roll-back neo-liberalism in Ontario were such that the Tories 
were forced to experiment with different forms of “roll-out neo-liberalism,” in 
some sectors, including higher education.158  As such, the Tories did construct 
and expand certain state institutions or quasi-state institutions159 so as to further 
normalize and cement market-based regulation and neoliberal forms of hyper-
individualism (what Peck and Tickell (2002) call, “new social subjectivities” 
(390)).  But the Tories proved totally unable to consciously marry the 
contradictory impulses fundamental to neoliberal forms of statecraft.  So 
brazenly ideological was the leadership of the PC Party that they appeared unable 
to understand well-enough the degree to which public investment in “social” 
programs was necessary to support and perfect the neoliberal enterprise.  The 
consequence, in terms of higher education, was that the Government under Mike 
Harris and Ernie Eves was not able to establish the political capital necessary to 
                                                   
158 I am thinking here of both the University Ontario Institute of Technology, which the 
Conservative Government founded, as well as the Superbuild program.  “Ontario Works” also 
entailed significant expenditures, not least through the hiring of Anderson Consulting, which 
helped the Governnent develop this program and associated cutbacks.  See (Herd 2002) 
159 Among other things, the Conservatives built the University of Ontario Institute of 
Technology,  
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consolidate a system of QA, at least not as much as their successors would prove 
able to do.   
As was mentioned, the Conservative program centred around fiscal cut-
backs and tax reform that were in turn leveraged to support an aggressive 
legislative agenda intended to deconstruct and destroy what neo-classical 
economists refer to as “negative externalities”, so called “barriers” to competition 
and free-enterprise, that were blamed for the Province’s lacklustre performance 
in the new global, and allegedly knowledge-based, economy. Consistently 
justified in terms of competitiveness and cost-effectiveness, the Tories sought to 
thoroughly restructure the Ontario Public Service, and the larger political 
economy (Kozolanka 2007).  To that end, the Province’s major municipalities 
were each amalgamated into a series of “mega-cities”, by far the largest of which 
was and remains Toronto (Keil 2002).  The elementary school system was 
similarly amalgamated and subject to a series of legislative moves that massively 
decreased the number of elected officials, curtailed municipalities’ ability to 
impose property taxes to support education while simultaneously adding to their 
slate of responsibilities, regulated teachers’ work, imposed new managerial 
relationships within public schools, attacked unionized labour in the sector, and 
subjected the system to intensified forms of QA and community “participation” 
(Keil 2002; Bedard and Lawion 2000a) .  As well, the Tories scrapped the NDP’s 
labour legislation (which included equal opportunity and anti-scab provisions); 
welfare transfers were cut and tied to work requirements; infrastructure 
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development and renewal work was progressively farmed out to private industrial 
“partners”; various state-run forms of regulatory supervision were similarly 
privatized and/or outsourced.  Where governments maintained “ownership” over 
policy development they did so subject to the imposition of new rules (drawn 
from the New Public Management) which sought to have the government operate 
like a private corporation (Cohen 2001).   
The response of organized labour, which crystallized in the “Days of 
Action” was, for a time, fevered.  But after organizing the ‘Days of Action’ in 1995, 
the leadership of the OFL and its affiliated unions became increasingly unwilling 
to offer either organizational or financial support to the broader social 
movements then pressing back in unprecedentedly large numbers against the 
onslaught of neoliberal restructuring being pursued by the government (Munro 
1997).  There are at least a few explanations for this lack of support. First, 
Ontario’s economy had, initially via the FTA and subsequently via the NAFTA, 
been made more dependent on the rhythms of accumulation in the US.  This was 
complicated by the fact that the same agreements also made the 1965 Auto Pact 
largely irrelevant.  While the ability of the automakers to divest from the 
Canadian market was limited, the massive de-industrialization of significant 
chunks of the US, and the fact that production guarantees outlined in the Auto 
Pact were made irrelevant under NAFTA, meant that the CAW and indeed the 
OFL was increasingly beholden to the logic of ‘competitiveness’, if only on the 
basis of a series of fallacious assumptions.  Paramount among such assumptions 
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was that capital mobility and free trade enabled massive and almost 
instantaneous divestment from jurisdictions fraught with labour unrest.  The 
second key issue was the about-face of the NDP.  That party’s “pragmatism” 
under Bob Rae meant that the labour movement at large had no natural 
parliamentary allies.  As a consequence, direct action was progressively replaced 
by a firm belief in the utility of meetings with parliamentary committees and 
lobbying through formal networks.  Though the rhetoric of the CAW would 
remain focused on mobilizing the rank and file, little such activity was actually 
undertaken, unless it was impossible to avoid.  And finally, one can also not 
underestimate the force with which the logic of globalization and financialization 
had taken hold in the province and in the country.  Household finances had been 
fundamentally reshaped through the 1980s and 1990s in a manner which not 
only prompted critical scholars to begin focusing on global finance as 
fundamental to understanding the emerging order, but which also had the effect 
of reshaping capital and its everyday manifestation.  The CAW’s embracing of the 
apparent inevitability of global finance, though by no means also inevitable, was 
nonetheless indicative of the transformed political economy and the defeat of 
organized labour under neoliberalism. 
Whatever the explanation, the transformation of the unions became 
publicly visible most poignantly during the 1999 provincial election, when the 
CAW made the decision to back NDP candidates in only those ridings where they 
had a chance of winning.  Elsewhere, the logic of “strategic voting”, saw the CAW 
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support liberal candidates against Progressive Conservative ones.  Though the 
tactic didn’t work in 1999, it did generate significant media attention and 
arguably triggered not only the formal divorce of the NDP from the CAW, but also 
the on-rush of suitors at the Federal level, namely Paul Martin and Belinda 
Stronach, the former being the first sitting Prime Minister to be invited to speak 
at a CAW general meeting and the latter being the daughter of auto-parts 
magnate Frank Stronach, a staunchly anti-union industrialist (Gindin 2008; 
Allen 2006; CAW 1999).   
In terms of the higher education sector, the Conservative agenda was 
similarly extensive, even though it was frustrated at several turns160: tuition-fees 
for most undergraduate programs were raised by over 55% during the Tory 
tenure and were deregulated entirely for certain professional programs; massive 
cutbacks were made to the Ontario Student Loan Program, including lower 
annual borrowing limits and higher expected parent contributions (Doucet 2004; 
Johanna-Young 1997). The pioneering efforts of the Liberal government to press 
the universities closer to industry through conditional financing arrangements, 
which had been expanded by the NDP, were further expanded by the Tories 
(Trick 2005b, 339).161  The government also extended degree granting powers to 
                                                   
160 The frustrations to which I am referring: 1) planned attacks on tenure were turned 
back or not attempted (Trick 2005b, 245); 2) income indexed loan repayment programs proved a 
no-go (Johanna-Young 1997, 27–29), and the universities successfully opposed the government’s 
proposal to have them monitored by the Education Quality Assessment Office (Royce 1998, 208)   
161 As Trick notes, the Ontario Research and Development Challenge Fund saw the 
Provincial Government link provincial funding to the amount of support a university received 
from the Canadian Foundation for Innovation, one of the Federal Government’s main avenues 
through which commercialization has been encouraged. 
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Ontario’s 24 colleges, and opened the door to private degree-granting 
institutions, both with an eye towards generating competition for students and, 
through that competition, institutional differentiation (PEQAB 2013)(Trick 
2005b, 380).  The Tories also abolished the OCUA, thereby ending the period 
during which Ontario’s system operated with an institutional “buffer” between 
the universities and the Government. However much the OCUA had been 
sidelined through the 1970s and 1980s, when it proved unable to navigate a 
solution to the BIU controversy that had raged during that time, in abolishing the 
OCUA, the Tories clarified their desire for a more direct and interventionist 
approach to higher education. (Trick 2005b, 266) 
At the same time, the Tories did prove content to follow the spirit of the 
Bovey Report, at least in so far as competition was concerned.  Thus, rather than 
directly administer  tuition- and other ancillary-fees, the Tories downloaded that 
task to university boards, which had of course by that time also been thoroughly 
reconstituted as a juggernaut of neoliberalism (Carroll and Beaton 2000; Trick 
2005b, 258–261).  The abolition of the OCUA, must therefore be read as an effort 
to intervene more directly, not to abandon the “steer not row” approach entirely.  
In terms of their internal management, the colleges and universities were forced 
to prepare annual business plans and reviews and were barred from running 
deficits at the threat of being taken over by the province (Gov. of Ontario 1999).  
And the colleges were forced to prepare and publish various quality assessment 
data in the form of Key Performance Indicators (Doucet 2004; G. Jones 2004).  
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In as much as the universities allegedly escaped such requirements, they did so 
by proactively responding to the government’s direction: in 1996, under cover of 
the COU, the universities created the Undergraduate Program Review Audit 
Committee (UPRAC) (Council of Ontario Universities 2012, 1).162 As it had 
previously, program review and audit based on peer-review appealed to the 
universities more so than did what apparently still appeared as cruder and more 
instrumental forms of management, namely KPIs.    
Arguably, one of the reasons why the Government was prepared to allow 
the universities to extend/establish their own system of QA was the 
Government’s already troubled relationship with elementary and secondary 
school teachers, which boiled into a massive strike in 1997 (Greenberg 2004; 
Bedard and Lawion 2000a).  Coupled with the obvious tensions and opposition 
from both students the faculty associations in the higher education sector, most 
clearly demonstrated in the 1997 York University Faculty Association strike, the 
Government may well have opted to pick their battles.  The Tory era was also 
marked by significant tensions between the government and the universities, 
most poignantly exhibited in an exchange between the then Premier Harris and 
the COU.163  As tense as relations between the universities and the government 
may have become, however, they were not completely sour.   
                                                   
 162 This move was taken just as the Ontario Government was in the process of legislating 
requirements for the colleges that involved the periodic production of key performance indicators.   
163 Concerned that the government’s proposed “Superbuild” program did not include on-
going funds for the maintenance and operation of new buildings, the COU wrote to Harris asking 
for both a meeting and clarification on the matter.  As the then Minister of Education Diane 
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By the middle of the 1990’s, university administrators generally shared the 
Government’s vision of the sector. In fact, the COU came out in support of fully 
deregulating tuition-fees and income indexed loan repayment programs, marking 
a move from earlier efforts to have the government increase, but not fully 
deregulate fees.  The COU also began working on performance indicators and 
various other measures of accountability, initially at the behest of the Broadhurst 
Commission and subsequently of its own accord (Trick 2005a, 241).  At the same 
time, the Association of Universities and Colleges in Canada (AUCC) began to 
lobby in support of government programs that linked research funding to 
performance indicators and commercialization.  This pattern only intensified 
after 1995, following the formation of the so-called G10 “research intensive 
universities” as a working group within the AUCC, thereby enabling the AUCC’s 
most powerful members to collectively press for government funding for 
commercialization programs (Metcalfe 2010; Trick 2005b, 334).  And, as was just 
mentioned, the COU formed the UPRAC without government involvement.  Thus, 
while there were unquestionably key differences between the Tories and the 
universities, most notably around levels of core operating funds, such differences 
should not be exaggerated.164  The sometimes tense communications between the 
                                                   
Cunningham subsequently noted, “the government’s reply challenged them [the universities] to 
name the universities in this position [of concern] so their funding could be given to others 
instead (Gesink-Walsh 2007, 221)”.   
164 On the one hand, the universities wanted either more funding or for tuition-fees to be 
allowed to increase, by at least as much as government funding was cut-back.  On the other hand, 
the government was looking to trim operating grants by more than it was prepared to allow 
tuition-fees to rise.  And there were frequently rhetorical flourishes from Mike Harris sounding 
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Government and the universities merely glossed over remarkable similarities, 
even if they did add tension to relations within the “policy network”.     
Nowhere are such similarities clearer than in the report of the Report of 
the Government’s, “Task Force on the Future Role of Postsecondary Education”, 
which it commissioned in 1996.  The Chair of that task force, David C. Smith, had 
recently ended a 10-year run as the Principal and Vice-Chancellor of Queens 
University where he had previously sat as chair of the economics department.  As 
an economist, Smith published with, among others, the likes of Thomas 
Corcherane, a highly touted avatar of fiscal federalism and of neoliberal 
economics more generally.  The four other members of the panel included former 
Tory Minister of Colleges and Universities, Bette Stephenson; David Cameron, a 
much noted institutionalist from the UofT; Fred Gorbet, a now private consultant 
and long-time member of the right-wing think tank, the C.D. Howe Institute; 
and, Catherine Henderson, who would eventually become a contractor to the 
Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario, the institutional brainchild of Bob 
Rae, but who at the time the Task Force was formed was in the middle of a stint 
as the President of Centennial College.  That the members of the taskforce were 
stalwart Conservatives was hardly something the universities noted.  Indeed, 
when the Report was released, the COU and its members were quite supportive 
(Trick 2005a, 221).  The Task Force made 18 recommendations in all, including: 
                                                   
like a right-wing neophyte determined to instrumentalize and commodify everything that the 
universities and colleges did. (Gesink-Walsh 2007, 221–223)  
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the total deregulation of tuition fees; higher levels of provincial funding; income 
indexed loan repayment programs; performance based pay for faculty; and more 
public-private partnerships to finance research (D. C. Smith 1996).   
Several hallmarks of neoliberal approaches to governance also jump out of 
that Report.  First, in terms of private research sponsorship, the Task Force 
concluded that universities and colleges should “more actively” seek-out private 
research dollars subject to internally developed “guidelines that preserve the 
integrity of their institutions in such partnerships (D. C. Smith 1996, 
recommendation 9)”.  In other words, the Task Force was happy to have 
universities decide for themselves how, or if, to regulate private research monies.  
Second, the Task Force encouraged the government to make individualized 
savings programs specific to higher education (Registered Education Savings 
Plans or ‘RESPs’) tax deductible. Similarly, interest paid on student loans was to 
be made tax deductible.  Here the report likened students to individual 
businesses: 
It is a clear principle of income taxation that interest paid on money 
borrowed to earn income should be tax deductible, and taking out a loan 
to make an investment in education is analogous to taking out a loan to 
make a business investment. This measure should be implemented by the 
Government of Canada, and we urge the Government of Ontario to 
indicate to the federal government that it supports such a change and is 
prepared to forego the provincial tax revenue involved. (D. C. Smith 1996, 
recommendation 5)  
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The Task Force also does a fantastic job of conflating, as no previous report had 
done, a student’s responsibility to participate actively in learning, with an 
apparent responsibility to pay ever-higher tuition-fees: 
Postsecondary education is not a constitutional right. Education cannot be 
given, nor received on demand. It must be acquired through active 
learning, and for most it is achieved only by dint of very hard work. We 
speak, therefore, not of rights but of shared responsibilities – of 
government, institutions, students, families, and private business. This is 
not without financial consequences. Within the framework of shared 
responsibilities, we think it falls to government to ensure that the public 
colleges and universities of this province have an adequate and stable base 
of operating support. This is not now the case. In the current situation, the 
contribution of students and their parents, through tuition fees, will 
increase in some circumstances, if we are to escape the slippery slope to 
mediocrity. We accept this as necessary, but only on the condition that 
those qualified but in need are not barred from admission. (D. C. Smith 
1996) 
Also suggestive of a fundamentally new doctrine is the absence in the Report of 
any mention of manpower forecasting.  Present in virtually every other report 
concerned with higher education, concern over rationalization is now replaced 
with a call for ‘differentiation’ and ‘deregulaton’ without reference to the kind of 
centralized market forecasts that even Bovey had mentioned.  On the contrary, 
the Report indicates that human capital requirements are best met by institutions 
that stay close and responsive to the needs of industry (D. C. Smith 1996).   
In response to the Task Force’s recommendations, the Government 
immediately did very little.  Tuition-fees were allowed to rise, but were only 
deregulated in particular programs.  Anticipated cuts to operating budgets were 
stopped, if only temporarily.  The Government made it possible for private 
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universities to open, ostensibly so as to increase competition within the higher 
education marketplace.  Competition was also encouraged via programs that 
matched private-sector donations for research and operating purposes, 
compelling the universities to aggressively market themselves to corporate 
Canada, alumni, and the general public.  The Government also licensed Ontario’s 
colleges to offer applied baccalaureate degrees, again with an eye towards 
creating competition and institutional differentiation.  A new university, the 
awkwardly named, University Ontario Institute of Technology was built, 
apparently so as to provide an MIT-like competitor to the ever-more densely 
populated marketplace.  The Government was not able to set-up, however, an 
ICLRP program.  It also proved unwilling to form a new advisory body, which 
Smith had recommended.  As for the Report’s other recommendations, very little 
was really required of the government in terms of legislative action.  Instead, the 
government needed simply to support universities’ efforts to differentiate 
themselves via market-like mechanisms (i.e. conditional forms of research-
funding, and the progressive de-regulation of tuition-fee ceilings).     
To the extent that the government’s apparent appetite for the use of KPIs 
was placated via the COU’s move to self-regulate, the Tories program was 
perhaps somewhat less developed than might have ideally been liked.  On the 
other hand, the publication of Maclean’s Magazine’s annual ranking of 
universities had since 1991 been mimicking the US News and World Report 
exercise in relying heavily on the use of KPIs.  While the Maclean’s exercise was 
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initially criticized by a couple of institutions, such criticism quickly faded (Doucet 
2004).  The rapid abatement of any opposition to the Maclean’s exercise is 
exemplary of how QA works to regulate value. Because data was assembled 
irrespective of whether or not an institution chose to participate, those 
institutions that decided to forgo participation in the Maclean’s exercise were 
likely concerned about the enthusiasm with which certain institutions did 
participate.  Furthermore, the popularity of the annual issue made it clear that 
resistance was futile and counter-productive; unless institutions undertook to 
control the production of the data Maclean’s relied upon, institutional managers 
appeared to understand that they were sacrificing what could usefully be thought 
of as “reputational capital”.  Indeed, Maclean’s ranking became an obvious boon 
to highly ranked institutions which used results to fundraise, attract prospective 
students, boost their profile in policy-making circles, and attract corporate 
research partners.  A decade after the Maclean’s rankings began in 1991, 
“RE$EARCH INFOSOURCE”, a division of “The Impact Group Inc., a private 
consulting firm, began publishing its own widely distributed annual ranking of 
Canadian universities based exclusively on research-related KPIs.  The 
Government, in other words, hardly needed to enforce that which the “market” 
already had.   
It also bears repeating that program review was – and had long been – less 
controversial, and was in fact seen by the universities as an effective way in which 
to side-step government intervention without creating overly much debate with 
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faculty.  Not only did the COU’s system of periodic review rely on peer 
assessments, and thus on a widely accepted practice, the results of COU reviews 
were not linked to core funding, at least outside of programs that failed to obtain 
a basic standard, which has not happened with any frequency (see note 5).  
Though it does not appear to have occurred to the government (or to faculty, or to 
administrators), there was nonetheless an important inter-connectedness to the 
Province’s system of program review and the more plainly quantitative efforts of 
private-sector rankings exercises.  As I argued in Chapter 4, once subject to a 
system of valuation, as is the case with private-sector rankings exercises, the 
qualitative aspects of higher education become relevant only in so far as they are 
productive of exchange value.  This is because, “quality”, even on a peer reviewed 
basis, is necessarily adjusted to reflect the exigencies of accumulation, at least if 
the program or institution that “produced” such “quality” is to remain financially 
viable.  In other words, program reviews are for naught unless they aid programs 
in either developing or maintaining a curriculum that responds to students’ and 
administrators demands, which have been shaped by the call to instrumental 
logic reflected in both rankings exercises and programs designed to press the 
university closer to industry.  In this latter respect, the efforts of the provincial 
government during the Tories’ tenure were aggressively supplemented by the 
policies of the federal government.  Herein, I would point to the Federal 
government’s creation of the Canadian Foundations for Innovation in 1997.  Not 
only have the sums delivered through the CFI become massive, effectively 
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overwhelming the funding available through Industry Canada’s three research 
granting councils, but, as Polster describes, the operation of the CFI has shifted 
the focus of research (C. Polster 2007).             
Tracking the degree to which the universities were transformed during the 
Tories’ tenure is a difficult endeavor, not least because of the paucity of data that 
is available.  Statistics Canada, which has been subject to vicious spending cuts 
over the last several years, indicates that between 1998 and 2008 the value of 
private sector research contracts grew fully ten-fold, from $288 million to just 
under $3 billion.  While this would imply that the commercialization program 
was not fully mature in the early 2000s, it is important to remember that this 
figure hardly represents all of the money spent on commercially oriented 
research, or any of the money spent either federally or provincially on their 
respective Centre’s for Excellence programs, which operate outside of the 
university sector, strictly defined.  In terms of the taught programs at Ontario 
universities, levels of enrolment by program have held rather steady over the last 
40 years.  But such gross data pays little attention to the evolution of thought 
within different programs, or to the emphasis placed on, for example, the study of 
the classical texts of political science or more contemporary works related to 
public administration.  What is clear is that participation rates climbed 
throughout the 1990s, suggesting that the alleged value of a university degree 
(the credential more than the education) was understood ever more widely.  
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Another indication of what was happening “on the ground” in the universities, 
was the faculty strike in 1997 at York University.   
According to Newson (Newson 1998b, 295–296), the 1997 YUFA strike, 
though initially about salary increases, pay equity for female faculty, retirement 
packages, and the like, quickly evolved into a strike about the neoliberal 
university itself.  And it bears keeping in mind that the late 1990s was the 
moment that the anti-globalization movement peaked, with protests in Seattle in 
1999 and in Quebec City in 2001.  With the benefit of hindsight, however, the 
potential of then turning back the tide of commercialization, managerialism, and 
of QA seems limited.   
Perhaps more than anything else, the vibrancy of the anti-globalization 
movement, needs to be evaluated relative to the position of organized labour, 
which was not, at the time, nearly as vibrant.  It is also important to recognize the 
speed and depth of the cuts that the Tories imposed under first Mike Harris and 
then Ernie Eves.  Student opposition to the Tories’ agenda, which was fevered, 
was nonetheless a kind of rear-guard action that aimed to stop the cuts and 
restore levels of government funding, which had of course also been cut under the 
previous NDP government.  At the same time, faculty had been rapidly subjected 
to an intensified work-regime, in part via the system of conditional financing 
arrangements that had been created both federally and provincially, and in part 
via the new managerialism that was then firmly rooted in Ontario’s universities.  
No less important was the myriad ways in which the faculty ranks had become 
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fractured, particularly as the universities came through the Harris-Eves era to 
rely more heavily on contract faculty (Newson and Buchbinder 1988; Rajagopal 
2002a).  And as Bob Rae’s 2005 Report would subsequently testify, Ontario was 
seen, through the closing of the 1990s, as having to compete for foreign direct 
investment in a globalized and knowledge-based economy.  As such, the value of 
higher education in the province, like all those within it, was necessarily judged 
against the benchmark of virtue: the American research-intensive institution and 
its “manufacture”.  In the end, the limits faced by progressive forces were perhaps 
most clearly on display in 2003, when the Liberals rode to power on a platform 
inspired by Third Way Neoliberalism.  With the promise of a tuition freeze and 
more money for higher education, the Liberals were able to consolidate the 
neoliberal program and press the universities further than they had yet gone 
towards the creation of a QA system more and more akin to that in operation in 
the UK.      
7.2.6 The Education Premier: Roll-Out Neoliberalism and the Liberals 
in Ontario 
In 2003, the Liberal government was elected on a platform that promised 
to bring together the fiscal conservatism of the Progressive Conservatives under 
both Harris and Eves, and the progressive social spending plans generally 
associated with the New Democrats.  Specifically, Ontario’s Liberal party under 
Dalton McGuinty promised to roll-back Conservative tax cuts and to renew 
spending on social services without any additional tax increases.  The platform, 
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which relied heavily upon economic projections of a rather dubious nature, 
signaled that the Liberals would seek to mimic the politics of the Third Way 
(Evans 2007).  Of course, as I have argued, the arrival to Ontario of Third Way 
politics had taken place, if not with the Social Contract, then certainly during the 
Tories’ first term, when the labour movement was forced to reckon with the 
betrayal of the NDP, the program of roll-back neo-liberalism that was then being 
promoted by the Progressive Conservative party, and the after-effects of 
organized labour’s momentous defeat around first the FTA and subsequently the 
NAFTA (Panitch 1994, 76–79).  Again, by 2003 the CAW, that weathervane of 
industrial relations and working class politics in Ontario, had itself pitched firmly 
toward a Third Way politic wherein social spending on things such as education 
and healthcare had become a competitive advantage and subsidies targeted at the 
provinces largest industrial sectors, namely auto, became the sin qua non of the 
union (Stanford 2003).  The CAW also started to waver on the issue of free-trade.  
As the CAW had it, Japanese markets needed to be opened, the province needed 
to invest in innovation, and human capital was key to attracting and maintaining 
high levels of foreign direct investment. More than this, figures such as Ken 
Georgetti and Buzz Hargrove had helped make “life-long learning” synonymous 
with “re-training” and staunchly workforce and occupationally oriented forms of 
education (Georgetti 2002).  And the market, even in the midst of massive 
financial turmoil in the United States, was heralded by labour as most efficient 
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mechanism for the allocation of capital. 165  Public private partnerships, which the 
Liberals re-branded as “alternative finance proposals” were also warmly 
embraced, as were cap and trade type environmental regulatory programs 
(Gindin 1995; Gindin 2008).    
In this context, what the Liberals would prove able to accomplish in the 
Province’s higher education sector was the consolidation of the Province’s various 
QA mechanisms and processes.  As in the UK, this would not mean the complete 
integration of those mechanisms that had been used to assess and evaluate the 
quality of research and those that were used in the assessment of teaching.  But it 
did mean that the COU’s various audit programs were eventually placed under 
the banner of the COQA as described above, and that, as a consequence, a 
continuum of value (i.e. the specification of learning outcomes and degree level 
expectations within a seamless system of audit that thereby integrated graduate 
and undergraduate programs) was created such that Government could begin to 
contemplate the rationalization of base-level funding in a manner that it has, to 
                                                   
165 This statement requires some qualification.  The CAW does not talk directly about the 
relative efficiency of private sector investment decisions.  However, it has consistently supported 
a program of subsidies and incentives that reward private-sector players for investing – in 
particular ways and sectors - in the Canadian economy.  This is a far cry from advocating a 
development program that could forestall companies from being able to demand subsidies in 
exchange for jobs, (through things like targeted capital controls, meaningful forms of 
international solidarity through coordinated shut-downs and strikes).  Indeed, the CAW’s 
strategy, places it in the same camp as the left-wing neoliberals, who have, like Romer, made 
technological change and progress a potential by-product of wise and targeted government 
investment.  Notably, Jim Stanford, the CAW’s senior economist constructs this as something that 
fits within the limits of the possible (Stanford 2003).  Thus, but for his awareness of the problems 
in so doing, Stanford might have chosen to abandon the title of his talk, “Industrial Policy in the 
Era of Free Trade: What Isn’t and Is Possible” for a more apt title: “Industrial Policy in the Era of 
Free Trade: There is No Alternative Alternative”.   
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date, still avoided.  In doing this, the Government – with the full cooperation of 
the universities – has also been able to embed the commodity form ever more 
deeply in Ontario’s universities. Where the evaluative scale used in program 
reviews did not previously offer “product” specifications, the new system now 
does.   
The evolution of the Liberal program began with the 2004 budget speech, 
in which the Government announced the formation a seven member advisory 
panel on higher education (Sorbara 2004).  The announcement came in advance 
of the expiration of a 2-year freeze on tuition-fees, which the Liberals had 
promised during the 2003 election and delivered upon shortly after coming to 
power.  The freeze, which had been aggressively fought for by students and 
steadfastly opposed by the universities, was pitched by the government as a kind 
of cooling-off period during which the government could consult, plan, and 
develop a way forward.  Thus, neither the government nor its advisory panel felt 
bound by a promise of low tuition-fees, or of significantly increased public 
transfers.  On the contrary, the panel, which was chaired by former NDP Premier 
Bob Rae, who had come out publicly as a proponent of the Third Way, was given 
a broad mandate to make recommendations on everything from the design of the 
Province’s publicly funded system of post-secondary education to the funding of 
that system. In that mandate, as much as in Rae’s report itself, the discourse of 
“innovation, of “competitiveness” as well as of “shared responsibility” were all 
writ large (Rae 2005, 1).  Following this lead, Rae also made every effort to frame 
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the conversation both before and during the “consultations” that the Panel 
conducted in preparing the Report. Prior to the release of the Report, in the Fall 
of 2004, Rae released a “green paper” (reminiscent of the Labour government’s 
White Paper in the UK) as a backgrounder on higher education.  That 
backgrounder was accompanied by a questionnaire and a bibliography, the 
former as a way of having interested parties frame submissions in terms already 
decided by the panel, and the latter as a way of indicating what research the Panel 
was using in its deliberations (Rae 2004).  The Review panel, never as an 
entirety, subsequently attended a series of “town hall” and “round-table” 
meetings across the province.   
The final report of the Review, entitled, Ontario a Leader in Learning, 
made 28 recommendations, many of them strikingly similar to those found in the 
Report delivered by the 1996 Task Force on the Future of Postsecondary 
Education.  Accordingly: tuition-fees were to be deregulated in a regulated (i.e. 
staged way); an income-indexed loan repayment program was recommended; a 
new advisory body, focused on QA and sector-research was to be formed; more 
collaboration with industry was to be encouraged; new programs focused on 
lifelong learning and the validation of out-of-school work were to be developed; 
teaching and research excellence were to be rewarded.  To make all of this 
happen, the government was to increase transfers to the sector, though only by 
an amount that would, at the time of its announcement, see levels of government 
funding reach the national average. (Rae 2005) 
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The media along with several of the players in the sector focused almost 
entirely on the promise of new money.  Rae had apparently struck the perfect 
balance between individual responsibility and that of state.  He had also 
effectively balanced the need to maintain university autonomy and the need for 
institutional accountability.  In reality the Rae Report did precious little, if only 
cement the trajectory of the status-quo and simultaneously develop how such a 
program should best be presented to the public.166  The universities roundly 
supported the findings of the Report.  Indeed, even the OCUFA initially 
applauded Rae’s Report, though it moderated its stance when the CAUT was 
flatly critical of it. It was primarily only students who presented an opposition.  
Indeed, the Canadian Federation of Students and its provincial component, the 
Ontario Federation of Students fought feverishly, most notably following the 
release of the Committee’s initial “green paper” which foreshadowed the final 
report quite clearly (University of Saskatchewan 2005).  But the students’ 
opposition may have backfired.  By the end of the consultative process Rae had 
softened his message and begun to cloak his agenda in the language of the Left; 
even the language used in documents such as the UK’s White Paper, so clearly 
demonstrative of Third Way logics was perfected (Canadian Federation of 
Students 2005, 15).   
                                                   
 166 I have outlined how this is so in the introduction to Chapter 2. 
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 In its 2005 budget the government’s response to the Rae Review became 
formalized: a 6.2 billion dollar investment through 2009-2010, would see net 
transfers to universities increase to just below the national average by the end of 
the 2010 school year, assuming enrolment numbers were only as high as was 
projected (they have proven to be significantly higher).  The plan, which the 
government ironically called “Reaching Higher,” also earmarked significant 
envelopes of funding for the Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP), which 
is Ontario’s government funded student loans program, as well as for graduate 
education.  In terms of OSAP, the government’s new funding program re-
introduced some up-front grants, effectively re-creating the program of up-front 
grants that had been cut by the Rae government in 1992.  Notably, the threshold 
for qualification in that program of grants was set at a low level such that only a 
small fraction of students could hope to qualify. (Gov. of Ontario 2005a)   
In terms of graduate education, the government looked to more than 
double the number of student spaces during the life of the Reaching Higher plan.  
To do this, the government promised additional BIU funding to universities that 
could add capacity to their graduate programs.  Growth was to be negotiated both 
between the universities themselves and the government through what Rae had 
termed in his report “multi-year agreements (MYA),” and which the government 
later labeled, “multi-year accountability agreements”(Rae 2005; Gov. of Ontario 
2005a).  MYAA’s are three-year rolling agreements negotiated annually between 
each university and college and the government.  All of the agreements have 
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required that the universities each publish data on stipulated KPIs, that they 
participate in the NSSE (and its graduate counterpart), and that each university 
specify what quality-improvement efforts and targets it will make over the three-
year life of the agreement.  The MYAA’s also specify enrolment targets by faculty.  
In exchange for having concluded and abided by the terms of an MYAA, the 
government delivers two envelopes of funding to a university, the first, 
amounting to about 60% of the increased funding is delivered at the beginning of 
the year in which the agreed upon enrolment growth takes place.  The second 
envelope is delivered at the beginning of the second term (in January) when 
enrolment numbers can be finally proved (i.e. once attrition has taken place).  
What this means is that the universities have received funding to pay for the 
hiring of additional faculty needed to teach ever larger compliments of graduate 
students only after their programs have grown.   
The 2005 budget announcing Reaching Higher also saw the government 
form the Ministry of Research and Innovation (MRI), initially headed by the 
Premier himself, but subsequently taken over by John Wilkinson, a one-time paid 
advisor to the Liberal government and successful small business-man from small-
town Ontario.  The MRI, which was actually just a reformed version of the Tories 
Ministry of Enterprise, Opportunity and Innovation, was created with the intent 
of leveraging the universities in Ontario to very specific ends.  Accordingly, the 
Ministry looked to create new and deeper ties between industry and the 
university with the aim of generating more commercializable research, and of 
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teaching students throughout the university what were referred to as “commerce 
skills”.  The Government argued that such skills were fundamental to the creation 
of an entrepreneurial society attractive to investors, foreign and domestic alike.  
Accordingly, the MRI has been pushing the universities to do things like 
harmonize practices with respect to the management of intellectual property and 
patent rights, and to develop capacities to instruct students in every discipline 
within the university about the ways and means of commerce and business.  The 
MRI also houses the Ontario Research and Innovation Council, a thirteen 
member advisory panel made up of business leaders, a few academics and 
researchers, and university administrators, several of whom have significant 
private-sector experience. The Council’s stated purpose is to, “...look at how and 
where innovation happens in the province. It will advise the government on a 
strategy that keeps Ontario’s economy strong by capitalizing on our ability to 
transform creative, cutting-edge ideas into long-lasting economic advantages” 
(Gov. of Ontario 2006) 
Finally, the Reaching Higher program also led to the creation of the 
Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario (HEQCO), an arm’s length advisory 
body. The Act creating HEQCO, the, Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario 
Act (2005), mandates 6 different functions for the Council.  First among those 
function is the issue of targeting and performance: HEQCO is, “to develop and 
make recommendations to the Minister, 
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(i) on targets to be achieved in improving the quality of post-secondary 
education, on the methods of achieving those targets and on the time 
frame for doing so, and  
(ii) on performance measures to be used to evaluate the post-secondary 
education sector;”  
Functions two through five are less “ends” focused, and more “means” directed. 
The second function with which HEQCO has been tasked is to actually evaluate 
post-secondary education in Ontario, specifically in light of the first function (i.e. 
the degree to which institutions have “dependable” internal QA mechanisms in 
place.  The third function is to undertake research relevant to the management of 
the sector.  The fourth function keeps the door open for the Minister of Training 
Colleges and Universities and the Government to outline new functions on an as 
needed basis.  The final function asks HEQCO to evaluate the degree to which 
students without cash on hand are able to attend increasingly expensive colleges 
and universities. (Gov. of Ontario 2005b) 
It is not entirely clear to what extent the HEQCO has been actively 
involved in the policy process. In its advisory capacity the HEQCO has generated 
some 33 research papers between 2007 and 2013 (HEQCO 2013).   The quality of 
that research is questionable, as is the organization’s commitment to evidence 
based advice, which it claims to prize.167  In fact, the HEQCO’s positions have 
                                                   
 167 In its 6-year history, much of the HEQCO’s research has been performed by 
contractors to the organization.  Those contractors, like one-time collaborators and business 
partners Ross Finnie and Alex Usher, have tended to either share or be to the right of the HEQCO.  
This appears to not have been the case in 2012, however, when three Phd candidates at Queens 
University were contracted to write a research paper for the HEQCO.  Upon reading the 
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tended to reflect precisely those of the Liberal government that created the 
Council.  For example, in 2009, the HEQCO sponsored the publication of 
“Academic Transformations: The Forces Reshaping Higher Education in 
Ontario” (Clark 2009), a book that, among other things, mapped out a plan for 
the reform of Ontario’s system that was strikingly similar to that proposed by Rae 
in his 2005 Review. More recently still, and as if in anticipation of this thesis, the 
HEQCO itself has published, “Performance Indicators: a report on where we are 
and where we are going” (2013).  Under the heading “Big Picture” the HEQCO 
offers this:  
While none of these measures [all of the measures used in Ontario to date} 
has fully satisfied, they work together to inform the assessment of quality, 
albeit in an incomplete manner. Investments in measuring engagement 
(such as NSSE and student satisfaction surveys) and key performance 
indicators pay long‐term dividends in understanding the system, tracking 
trends and helping inform management decisions at the institutional level 
and policy direction at the provincial  level. There is a new generation of 
quality measures emerging in the form of learning outcomes and informed 
perspectives on employer needs. With new and Improved data, we Will 
know more Tomorrow than we Do today about Quality in Ontario’s 
Postsecondary system. (HEQCO 2013, 3) 
                                                   
conclusions and implications section of that paper, the HEQCO’s current president, Harvey 
Weingarten, demanded that Queens make changes, which it did, entirely without the consent or 
knowledge of the authors.  Those changes were made so that the paper better reflected the 
ideological disposition of both the Government and the HEQCO.  Investigation by the OCUFA 
subsequently led to the expression of concern about the HEQCO’s research practices as well as to 
the issuance of a warning to its members about working with/for the HEQCO.  The OCUFA also 
took the HEQCO to task for describing itself as an “arms-length” institution, which it is not.   
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7.2.7 Hitting the Wall: Global Economic Crisis and Austerity 
The global economic crisis that has rocked the global economy since 2008, 
initially saw governments throughout the developed world, introduce aggressive 
stimulus packages aimed at stabilizing their respective economies.  But after that 
initial wave of government spending, governments around the world looked to 
pare back government spending through another round of draconian cuts.  In 
Ontario, the Liberal government found itself with a ballooned deficit and 
pressure from a growing chorus of business elites to cut government spending.  
Popular opposition to austerity, however, made it difficult for the Government to 
simply impose cuts.  In an apparent effort to triangulate support for austerity, the 
Government therefore, hired the former chief economist of TD Price Waterhouse, 
Donald Drummond to review Ontario’s public services with an eye towards 
establishing a draconian baseline against which the Government could then 
impose a slightly less austere budget. (Drummond 2012, Chapter 3) 
The Government’s triangulation was obvious: in hiring a fiscal 
conservative with stalwartly Liberal credentials, the Liberals could depend on 
Drummond to produce a Report that would call for massive and politically 
unpopular cuts to provincial spending.  By positioning itself to the left of 
Drummond, the Government could appear as the lesser of evils.168 Using 
                                                   
168 Former insider at the federal finance department, Drummond has worked under then 
Finance Minister Paul Martin, to completely overhaul and dispense with Canada’s “nanny state”.  
And as the chief economist of at TD Bank, and a member of Rae’s advisory panel during the Rae 
Review process, Drummond had consistently positioned himself as a fiscal conservative. 
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economic projections of a questionable nature, Drummond’s Report indicated a 
looming crisis, and called for the Government to make massive and deep cuts.  
For the colleges and universities, the course, according to Drummond was also 
clear, and measurement factored largely:  
The government should provide grants to post-secondary institutions in a 
way that allows them to maintain best practices, pursue continuous 
improvement and improve quality across the board. Setting outcome 
targets based on the individual mandates of each institution is integral 
because it is unreasonable and potentially unproductive to expect all 
institutions to deliver the same results. For some institutions, government 
might bias the performance measures towards research output and 
productivity. For others, the performance matrix might be biased to 
excellence in undergraduate teaching. For still others, regional economic 
development would take on greater importance. (Drummond 2012) 
The sector’s response, by way of the COQA, has done little, if anything, to even 
mildly alter the direction of policy.  
7.3 Conclusion 
More than twenty-five years ago, with the certainty that comes from the 
pen of a freshly minted PdD graduate, I wrote that in the post-World War 
II period Ontario “universities were perceived, both by the individual and 
by society as a whole, as a critical element in the process of generating and 
accumulation wealth, and for this reason they were generously supported” 
(Axelrod, 1982, p.214).  Though now far less certain about most things, I 
have found little reason to alter my belief that the fate of higher education 
turns on the principle of perceived economic utility.  Any number of 
current references would support this claim, though perhaps none 
resonates quite as powerfully, or as crudely, as the declaration in 1971 by 
the Ontario minister of university affairs that higher education should 
generate “more scholar for the dollar” (cited in Axelrod, 1982, p147). 
(Axelrod 2008, 90) 
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In as much as Axelrod obtains something true about Ontario’s system of higher 
education through the post-war era, his insight simultaneously serves to obscure 
crucial issues from view.  Certainly Axelrod, both as a hubris-filled young Phd 
and a more tentative senior academic, would admit that the tactics used to 
‘generate more scholar for the dollar’ have changed in myriad ways between Frost 
and Harris.  However, the issue is not that the successive governments have used 
different tactics to ensure the same end, but rather that the transformation of the 
tactics reflects a transformation of the perceived purposes and beneficiaries of 
higher education in Ontario.  To say that, within capitalism, higher education is 
viewed instrumentally, is to offer very little more than that which, as Axelrod puts 
it, ‘any number of current references would support’.  In Ontario, as elsewhere, 
the drive to “productive efficiency” has involved, as Sears (2003) has outlined, a 
fundamental “retooling of the mind factory” and, therein, a fundamental 
redirection/redefinition of the purposes to which higher education is said to 
usefully be put.  While the creation of wealth and prosperity has always been at 
the forefront, what has changed is the purpose to which - and for whom - such 
wealth should accrue.  This said, the late arrival of Ontario to the QA party does 
suggest something potentially useful in Axelrod’s analysis that would allow us to 
distinguish as I claim it is essential to do, the transition to neoliberal forms of 
higher education.  Perhaps the relatively late decision by the government – and 
the sector itself - to develop a vigorous system of QA is indicative of the 
durability, in Ontario, of more egalitarian or nationalistic values around the 
428 
university (i.e. the durability of the early-post-war ethic associated with the 
massification of Ontario’s system)?169  History seems to indicate otherwise.  As I 
have argued above, several factors stalled the development of neoliberalism and 
of QA in Ontario’s universities.  The relative absence of the kind of social discord 
that rocked American and British universities through the 1960s and 1970s, 
coupled with a relatively more mobilized and militant working class during that 
same period, suggest that the government and the universities were anxious not 
to ignite further opposition at the very moment when Thatcher and Reagan were 
most concerned to crush it.  The history and economic significance of Ontario’s 
branch-plant economy meant that capital did not look to leverage the universities 
as it had in the US at least until the 1980s.  And when in the 1980s capital did 
organize to leverage the universities in service of the emerging finance and 
knowledge based economy, the militancy of organized labour, in both the private 
and public sectors, arguably limited capital’s room for maneuver.  By the mid-
1990s, however, by which time organized labour in the private sector was more 
clearly defeated, and when Ontario’s manufacturing sector was more obviously in 
                                                   
169 Later in the same paper, Axelrod himself suggests that the delayed use of QA in Ontario 
is not indicative of the degree to which Ontario’s system of higher education has always been 
viewed instrumentally.  In outlining the transformations effected by the Harris-Eves Tories, he 
writes that, “increasingly, market-based values were shaping higher education policy in Ontario” 
(Axelrod 2008, 99).  Unfortunately, Axelrod never outlines what he means by ‘market-based 
values’.  Likewise, he never (in any of his works on the subject) explores the apparent 
contradiction between the consistency he notes regarding the government’s instrumental 
understanding of higher education throughout the post-war era, and the emergence of the kind of 
‘market based values’, he associates with successive governments from 1995 on.   
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terminal decline, both capital and the state turned their attentions to the 
Province’s public sector and therein its schools.  Again, oppositional movements 
– and the maladroit calculations of the PC’s - stalled the progress of the 
neoliberal program, at least temporarily.  Through the late 1990s and early 2000s 
the floodgates of neoliberal policy – and of QA – opened: both federal and 
provincial commercialization programs grew and took effect; economics 
imperialism unfolded in the Province’s universities; the benefits of 
commercialization accrued unevenly in the professoriate, creating deep divisions 
amongst professors; the tide of managerialism that had grown in response to over 
20-years of “belt-tightening” were more firmly institutionalized, as were the 
socio-political cleavages that managerial strategies such as the increased use of 
contract faculty created; increased capital mobility and improved IP and patent 
protection fueled the development of a world market in higher education and in 
university-based research, all but pushing the universities to play ball; private-
sector rankings exercises became ever-more important to the competitive 
struggle that the government encouraged; the logic of finance became both a part 
of “everyday life”, and the root of students’ growing concern about the ‘value’ of 
their diplomas and degrees; and, the efforts of the universities to defend against 
direct forms of government intervention embedded the logic of neoliberalism and 
QA ever-more deeply into the fabric of their institutions.     
On this last point, it is of course important to recognize that the same 
trend is evident has been evident in both the US and the UK; administrators both 
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individually and collectively often created systems of QA as a way of keeping 
governmental authorities out of the universities business.  If anything, Ontario’s 
universities have, of late, appeared to support the QA enterprise more cohesively 
than have administrators in either the UK or the US.  Why is this the case?  What 
my analysis suggests is that there is a need to emphasize both the relative size 
and global significance of Ontario’s system of higher education and the popular 
appeal of QA as reasons why there has been a terrific degree of cohesion within 
organizations such as the COU around the development of the Province’s QA 
system.   With the development of a highly competitive – and rank-ordered - 
market in higher education, first in the US, and then internationally, Canadian 
universities have been forced to adopt the kind of practices that have long been 
used elsewhere, especially in the face of government cutbacks and planned 
austerity. In fact, the sums at stake in the global higher education and research 
marketplace are massive (see note 146 above), and the potential benefit to any 
institution or group of institutions in being able to attract even a small proportion 
of the monies that now flow to American research intensive institutions, would, 
for example, be equally large.  Since the price of admission to such “markets” is 
an institution’s willingness to produce prices (necessary to demonstrate the 
“value” of investment), systems of QA have proliferated in jurisdictions like 
Ontario.  The decision by Canada’s “research intensive” universities to organize 
separately within the fold of the larger Association of University and Colleges 
Canada, coupled with the support that group has received from both federal and 
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provincial governments, is no doubt exemplary of how Ontario’s adjustment to 
global flows has happened: as bigger more research intensive institutions have 
adjusted to the rhythms of accumulation both in and outside of Ontario and 
Canada, every other institution has been compelled to participate in the 
development of QA.   
Similarly, QA has proven to be an effective mechanism in the reproduction 
of popular consent for the neoliberal university, and therein for both government 
cutbacks and higher tuition-fees.  The now long-standing support of the COU for 
higher tuition-fees, which the universities presumably see as key to making-up 
for short-falls in government funding, has been supported by widespread concern 
with the ROI a university education provides.  As “quality” is putatively linked to 
post-graduation incomes, universities have been want to prove the advantages of 
investment as a means by which to rationalize higher-tuition fees.  
In the end, capital, the state and the universities in Ontario increasingly 
speak with a single voice, at least on the issue of QA.  Without much immediate 
potential for either popular or sector-based opposition, the universities and 
colleges in the Province are now subject to a system of QA that involves the full 
suite of measures and mechanisms discussed in chapter 3.  The law of value 
reigns.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion170 
However much the debate around QA has, in the UK, been more extensive 
than in other jurisdictions, nowhere within mainstream and policy-making 
circles has that debate transcended the apparent tension between autonomy 
(academic freedom) and accountability (QA). Indeed, mainstream accounts and 
analyses of QA in each of the three jurisdictions under investigation have tended 
to become mired in facile distinctions between university administrations and 
administrators intent on preserving institutional autonomy as a means of 
protecting academic freedom, and penny-pinching neo-liberal politicians and 
bureaucrats whose aim it is to cut costs and drive “innovation”.  Such distinctions 
are facile on several grounds.  First, whether or not university administrators – 
and many academics – have reluctantly submitted to government operated 
systems of QA, or, as has periodically been the case in all three of the jurisdictions 
under investigation, designed their own systems of QA so as to stave off 
government intervention, academics have been made obviously less free to 
research, investigate and understand as they see fit.  In Ontario, as in the UK, as 
in the US, academics are subject to the disciplinary forces of either/both 
commercialization policy or the market.  Indeed, the “publish or perish” 
orthodoxy is a potent force in everywhere, even in Ontario, whose system of QA is 
arguably the most under-developed of those I have investigated.  
                                                   
170 But for points not made previously, I will not cite sources in this conclusion. 
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Second, to pretend, as one must in order to argue the autonomy vs. 
efficiency / government vs. academy position, that university administrators and 
a huge swathe of the academy (and even the student body), have not actively 
promoted the kind of neoliberal forms of education of which QA is inextricably a 
part, is simply dishonest. Through myriad means, such as the Business Higher 
Education Forum in the US, or the Corporate-Higher Education Forum in 
Ontario, or via the development of offices of both technology transfer or research 
and innovation, university administrators have long advocated for closer ties with 
the private sector and “better” corporate-industrial type managerial practices 
within their institutions, generally to the detriment of more collegial forms of 
self-governance (Slaughter and Rhodes 2004; Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Newson 
and Buchbinder 1988).  Outside of the administrative ranks, many academics 
have likewise pressed forward the neoliberal program and avidly supported the 
development of QA. Not least among those who have supported the 
“neoliberalization” of the academy from inside its ranks are people like Gary 
Becker and his myriad acolytes, who have consciously sought to colonize and 
transform the social sciences according to the dictates of neo-classical economics 
and methodological individualism (Fine and Milonakis 2009).  In the natural 
sciences, ghost authorship could not have become as normalized as it has, 
without the complete cooperation of university based researchers and the willful 
ignorance of the academic journals that ostensibly police the publication of new 
knowledge (Sismondo 2007; Sismondo 2009). Of course, such blindness and 
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cooperation is belied the fact that many academics have both benefitted from and 
actively supported the commercialization of science (Feldman and Desrochers 
2004; Jain, George, and Maltarich 2009).  And the same is true of so many of the 
now mundane practices that regulate the academic program: the constant search 
for external funding; the protection of IP; closed doctoral defenses.  All are 
practices to which a large swathe of the academy has, at minimum, submitted, 
and thereby, committed.   
Students have similarly submitted to the QA game.  Indeed, in the US, 
students gave birth to the kind of satisfaction surveys that are linked to the 
development and ubiquity of SETs and, more recently, the NSSE (Gray and 
Bergmann 2003).171   In the UK, opposition from the “official” students’ 
movement to institutional audit was ended by the QAA’s decision to include one 
student on each audit committee (QAA 2013; University and College Union 
2010).  In Ontario, students have tended to be more concerned to talk about 
quality in terms that hardly question the logic of QA.  On the contrary, students 
have taken up the language of engagement and employment in a manner that will 
do little to foment a move away from QA (Canadian Federation of Students 
Ontario 2012, 31–33).  Indeed, all too ironically the student-as-consumer logic 
has been adopted by oppositional forces in an attempt to advance their demands 
                                                   
171 Though their efforts in so doing might have been linked to campaigns aimed at 
breaking the intellectual hold that liberal and conservative thinkers had long-maintained over the 
American academy, the fact that they sought to do so in a manner that has functioned to 
reproduce a more confined intellectual landscape is hardly ironic.  On the contrary, the fact that 
students used a tactic that was little more than a short-lived consumer boycott is tell-tale.     
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for affordable (free) access to higher education (i.e. because engagement (service) 
levels are low, tuition-fees should also be low).   
But for the interventions of mainstream social scientists, policy-makers, 
government officials, and even some oppositional groups, the history and 
evolution of QA is only superficially about autonomy and academic freedom.  In 
fact, it is arguably the case that the efforts of institutions and academics to 
develop vigorous, but allegedly autonomous, systems of QA, have only 
reproduced ever-more detailed QA programs that in effect circumscribe academic 
freedom to an ever-greater extent.  After all, the adumbration of increasingly 
detailed descriptions of learning outcomes or of research “impact” amount to an 
ever-more standardized and industrialized system of commodity production.172   
Here-in the application of the law of value to the “productive” activities of the 
university is advanced.    
8.1 Misreading QA: The Theory and Politics of “Quality” 
This misreading of QA by mainstream and some critical scholars is what 
has occupied a significant portion of this dissertation.  In Chapter 2, I outlined 
the theoretical foundations of mainstream analyses, which I see as being tied to 
neo-classical economics, methodological individualism, and the “New” social 
                                                   
172 While the QAA’s voluminous set of learning outcomes was developed under the 
auspices of the QAA, a government owned “quango”, the specific objectives were determined by a 
panel of academics.  Ontario’s recently adopted system of learning objectives was determined 
entirely by the sector, via the Council of Ontario Universities.  And to the extent that processes of 
accreditation use such “descriptors”, all are developed by university administrators and 
academics.   
436 
sciences.  In discussing the eclectic nature of the CIHE literature, I further argued 
that the field lacked a sense of its own disciplinary history.  The policy orientation 
of the field has meant that the CIHE tends towards the kind of problem-solving 
theories that, as Cox (1992) would have it, take the prevailing set of social, 
political, and economic institutions as the framework of analysis, without ever 
inquiring as to the utility or necessity or history of those institutions.  As such 
there is a degree to which the CIHE literature is largely unaware of the interests 
and purposes it serves.173        
Throughout this dissertation, I have also argued that the nature of the 
CIHE literature, and thus the scholarly roots of QA, is not just a-historical and 
derivative, it is so for specific reasons, some more immediate and others less so. 
In Chapter 5, I argued that the roots of QA lay in the history of American higher 
education. Specifically, I argued that accreditation emerged as a result of the 
                                                   
173 It should come as no surprise to anyone that the CIHE literature is derivative and a-
historical.  In the context of budget cuts and belt-tightening, it is understandable that academics 
and policy-wonks, university administrators, almost anyone interested in seeing university coffers 
topped-up, would take-up the cause of New Growth Theory (i.e. roll-out neo-liberalism), the 
history of that theory be damned.  Not coincidentally, the great bulk of today’s economists are 
totally unaware of the history of their own discipline.  By way of example:  
http://worthwhile.typepad.com/worthwhile_canadian_initi/2012/09/the-cambridge-capital-
debate-the-very-short-version.html.  The blog-post by Nick Rowe on his well-read if ironically 
titled blog, “Worthwhile Canadian Initiative” illustrates a complete misunderstanding of the 
Cambridge Capital Controversy and its consequences for the fate of Neo- and New-classical 
economics, of which Rowe is most certainly a practitioner.  In the comments that follow Rowe’s 
post, a few interlocutors highlight the real nature of the debate and what was really at stake.  
Rowe and friends obviously ignore, or else fail to understand these interventions, however.  Their 
response is consistently the same: they adjust the assumptions underlying the econometric 
models that they use, mixing static and flow variables like “time preferences”, for example, to 
shore-up the neo-classical parable.  In passing, Rowe mentions both his own lack of familiarity 
with the subject and the fact that students are not taught “capital theory”, as such, or at least the 
history of the debates surrounding capital theory.   
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concerted efforts of pioneering American industrialists and engineers to craft a 
system of higher education “by design” (Noble 1977).  No less important, 
however, was the role played by high-ranking and influential American social 
scientists cum policy experts who developed a particular kind of social science in 
the hopes of gaining status and power (Silva and Slaughter 1984). Packaged 
together in a dynamic political economy, the American research university and 
system of higher education developed and grew more rapidly than any other in 
the world.  In other words, the most significant antecedents to contemporary QA 
were developed in an academic and political economic setting that was almost 
ideal.  Indeed, in the context of what Dorothy Ross (1991) describes as a tendency 
towards a-historical forms of analysis, which again, Silva and Slaughter (1984) 
argue was consciously cultivated, standardized testing and accreditation could 
easily be paraded about as mechanisms of American meritocracy, particularly 
given the significant advantages that American industry developed in key 
industrial and manufacturing sectors early on in the 20th century (Noble 1977; 
Lehman 1999).  While the Great Depression might have triggered a shift away 
from such logics, it did not. The weight of a-historicism bore on American 
progressives too greatly, as did the impact and spread of right-to-work 
legislation, the bureaucratization of organized labour as unions shifted their focus 
from the labour process under capitalism to the wage packet and therein the 
ability of workers to consume.   
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Not until the outgrowth of the American state during and following the 
Second World War, however, did the American system of higher education – and 
within it QA – really become the paragon of virtue it is now seen to be and to 
which myriad league tables ranking universities globally now attest.  The growth 
and dynamism of America’s universities as well as its system of higher education 
was both supported, and in many ways authored, by the American state (in 
particular, the Department of Defence).  Also critical were the host of private-
sector not-for-profits, like the Ford and Carnegie Foundations, that worked 
assiduously to grow, both intensively (i.e. within the US) and extensively (i.e. 
outside of the US) American style higher education, inclusive of standardized 
testing and other mechanisms of American ‘meritocracy’, immediately following 
the end of World War Two (prior to the War, the same Foundations were critical 
to the design of American higher education) (Arnove 1982; Klees 2002).  The 
vigorous pace at which the post-war American economy grew lent additional and 
enormous weight and credibility of efforts that aimed to spread American-style 
higher education. By the time the post-war economy became exhausted, in the 
1970s and 1980s, accreditation and standardized testing were all but completely 
normalized, at least in the US.  Arguably, one of the most notable catalysts in the 
development of QA after 1980, both in the US and around the world, was the 
emergence of private-sector league tables ranking universities in 1983174, which 
of course happened in the midst of what was then the most severe recession since 
                                                   
174 The US News and World Report ranking of universities was first published in that year. 
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the Great Depression. The US News and World Report ranking of universities 
and colleges, fit neatly with the rhetoric of low inflation, economic growth, and 
value-for-money that reflected the orthodoxy of the time.  More than this, such 
ranking exercises seamlessly extended the logic that had underscored 
standardized testing and accreditation for decades.  Indeed, the idea that 
resources needed to be directed strategically and on the basis of “excellence” had 
come of age.   
In the UK and Ontario, QA is a by-product of more recent events and 
processes. As I indicated above, the logic of economics imperialism has had a 
decided impact on the social sciences throughout the developed world.  Of 
course, QA was taken up by governments and the academy, first in the UK and 
subsequently in Ontario, less as a by-product of economics imperialism (at least 
in the form I have used it in this dissertation), than as a program directed at 
changing the culture inside and around those jurisdictions’ systems of higher 
education.  The most glaring example of this was Thatcher’s efforts to rationalize 
funding for university-based research, both through the creation of the Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE), and by effectively ending traditional forms of tenure 
(Willmott 2003).  Of course, Thatcher’s legacy was carried forward, not just by 
John Major, who ended the binary divide and introduced institutional audits, but 
also by successive administrations under Tony Blair’s New Labour, which over 
and again, acted to beef-up the RAE and deepen the program of audits that the 
Conservatives had established.   
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Ontario’s system of QA has developed very much in the wake of the UK’s, 
often by way of policy-borrowing. The lag between the development of the UK’s 
system and that of Ontario’s relates to the Province’s economic position coupled 
with a relatively vigorous labour movement at the very moment when Thatcher’s 
program was hitting a fever-pitch. Simply, the militancy of Ontario’s labour 
movement through to the end of the early 1990s, meant that the government’s 
sights were set more firmly on breaking the back of organized labour, than they 
were on restructuring Ontario’s colleges and universities.  Ontario’s system of QA 
therefore evolved in dribs and drabs, only becoming meaningfully comparable to 
the UK’s system very recently. Of course, Ontario’s universities have been subject 
to private-sector ranking exercises since the mid-1990s, when Maclean’s began 
publishing its annual issue comparing Canadian universities in a manner 
modelled on the pioneering effort undertaken by US News and World Report. In 
other words, the ranking of universities using numerical representations of 
allegedly qualitative variables (i.e. the financial form), pre-dates the development 
of the intensely and expansively bureaucratic systems that today describe the 
UK’s and Ontario’s systems of QA.   
In fact, the development of such private-sector ranking was arguably a key 
catalysts to the development and extension of government- and sector-led 
systems of QA.  Given the popularity of and demand for rankings exercises, as 
well as the methodologies they employ, governments set about attempting to take 
ownership of such tools as exercises in “accountability” and “transparency”, 
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consistently defined in respect of government expenditures (i.e. value-for-
money).  As I have outlined, the universities in both the UK and Ontario reacted, 
but without really challenging the form or the logic underlying the programs of 
QA that they sometimes opposed.  The fact that the US’s system of QA followed 
precisely the opposite path (i.e. private-sector players with the financial 
endorsement of both federal and state authorities developed systems of 
accreditation and standardized testing before the emergence of private-sector 
rankings exercises), is an indication that the American system stands as both 
ground-zero in the globalization of QA, and the key to understanding the real 
purpose and effect of QA.                
8.2 From Critical Theory to Value Theory   
In outlining the theoretical position from which I view QA, I argued for a 
conceptual lens that could access the way in which QA endeavours to impose the 
law of value on all aspects of the university. I argued that the necessity of so 
measuring and managing value in and around the university related to: 1) the 
exhaustion of the post-war political economy and of Keynesianism; and, 2) the 
increased significance of the university in mainstream economic policy, (itself a 
by-product of both 1) and of massively increased participation rates and the 
transition to a finance-led, services-based political economy.175   
                                                   
175 To this point I have not spent overly much time challenging either conventional or 
critical accounts of what I have referred to as the “so-called” knowledge based economy.  This 
subject is arguably the basis for some future research.  I do not believe that the economies of the 
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Of the few critical theorizations of QA that do exist, only a few make reference to 
a Marxian value-theory as I do in this dissertation, and none do so on a 
comparative basis that suggests the emergence and development of a world-
market in higher education, which is ripe within this dissertation (for example 
see: De Angelis and Harvie 2009; D. Harvie 2006; David Harvie 2000). Other 
theorizations, particularly those which posit the emergence of an “audit society” 
(Power 2003; Power 1994) or an “audit culture” (Shore and Wright 1999), offer 
terrific insight into the disciplinary, coercive, and reproductive power of audit 
and QA. Moreover, such analyses correctly locate the “audit explosion” (Power 
1994) in the emergence of Thatcherism, and neo-liberalism.  Shore and Wright 
(1999, 58), even make mention of the transnational nature of these motive forces, 
where Power (1994) explicitly sees the “audit explosion” as a phenomenon 
peculiar to the UK (1994, 2–5), albeit to some subsequent regret (Power 2000, 
114).  Nonetheless, such analyses have a serious blind-spot: in missing the 
connective tissue (value) that binds such coercive technologies together, 
theorizations that link QA to the development of an “audit culture” preclude the 
kind of structural analysis that a value-theoretic opens up.  For however deep is 
our understanding of the policy-networks that enable the spread of QA, there 
remains a need to position the university within the neo-liberal program and 
pattern of accumulation, not least because in doing so we highlight both the 
                                                   
global North are any more “knowledge-based” that they were prior to 1980.  I do, however, think 
it fair to say that the political economies of the global North are more technology intensive.   
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potency of the financial form as a mode and mechanism of social, political and 
economic management and also suggest the class-based dynamics of such 
processes.176    
But for some additional exceptions,177 the critical literature on the 
commercialization and/or neoliberalization of the university, does a still less 
spectacular job of outlining either the sources or particularities of the neo-liberal 
university (a prime example is Marginson and Rhoades 2002).  Again, the 
theoretical failings of such analyses have less to do with the absence of a lens that 
is sensitive to the issue of value as I have framed it here, as it is to the particular 
nature of neoliberalism.  
8.3 Testing the Value Proposition 
As I made clear in the introduction of this dissertation, my research has 
demonstrated that QA needed to be understood as a price-type signaling system 
that endeavours to render all aspects of the university as commodities that are, in 
turn, subject to the law of value. Theoretically, this argument has been built upon 
the assertion that capital needs to be understood as a social relationship and that, 
                                                   
176 I have not taken up the issue of ‘class’ to any significant extent in this dissertation, as it 
too is beyond the scope of this project.  I have however, suggested how the boundaries of class are 
being redefined.  I have, for example, talked about the redistribution of income alongside 
discussion of the “proletarnianization” of the professoriate, or at least a large and growing 
segment thereof.  I would further submit that my discussion of alienation in Chapter 4, also 
suggests something about class and “class consciousness”, particularly in light of my discussion in 
Chapter 3, of literacy and the degree to which the university is today generative of a particular 
form of such.  But again, these are but suggestions that could usefully be given far more detail and 
attention. 
177 Though I mention and make use of these works in Chapter 4, (and other chapters), I 
should highlight again: (Sears 2003; C. Polster 2001; Claire Polster 2003; Newson and 
Buchbinder 1988; Newson 1998) 
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as such, “values”, defined as relative prices, are indicative of the socially 
necessary labour time required to produce a given commodity.   
The transformation of the university into a site of commodity production was 
evidenced, in the first instance, by reference to the myriad tools and techniques of 
QA.  In so doing, I sought to test the claims made by the proponents of QA with 
respect to the reliability of QA as a means by which to assess the “qualitative” 
aspects (i.e. use values) of the commodities being produced in the contemporary 
university. In so testing the claims of QA’s boosters, I found that the use-values 
being produced in the contemporary university are not, in fact, so useful.  
Qualitatively, the commodities being put-out by the university are of 
questionable “utility”, both in absolute and relative terms.  In other words, the 
research being generated by even the best and most research-intensive 
universities is not breathtakingly innovative, at least not in terms of such things 
as the development of new drugs or software.  And the graduates of the 
contemporary (neo-liberal) university are not, on average, highly literate, even by 
the impoverished standards of the OECD.   
I further demonstrated that, in each of the jurisdictions whose systems of 
QA I examined, the alleged battle over autonomy and academic freedom was 
something of a side-show; irrespective of whether or not QA was sector- or 
government-led, QA was always and everywhere about assessing the economic 
value of both research commodities and graduates (as potential workers, i.e. the 
labour-power commodity). Indeed, via reference to myriad government reports, 
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sector studies, and the like, I clarified that the entire QA enterprise was most 
clearly about pressing the university into the service of capitalist accumulation.     
I also discussed the way in which QA is reproductive of neo-liberalism.  QA 
functions as an increasingly important tool in the constant renegotiation of 
capital, by which I mean the socio-political and economic milieu within which 
decisions about production and distribution are made (i.e. the particular and 
prevailing form of capitalist accumulation in a given jurisdiction at a given point 
in time). This is not a correlation that can be tested directly.  The correlation 
between the advent of QA, and the deepening of labour market flexibility, 
understood here as the relative quiescence of labour within a context of stagnant 
or falling wages, rising profits (in relative terms) and a growing income gap, is 
neither strict nor directly testable. But it is, at minimum, notable that in each of 
the jurisdictions under investigation, the emergence of QA and the deepening of 
labour market flexibility appear to have emerged at more or less the same time.  
Indeed, as Fast (2013, 215–261) has demonstrated, since 1980, the Gini 
coefficients for Canada, the US, and the UK, (and, in fact, the entire G7), have 
consistently risen.178  More than this, it is almost impossible to avoid even 
mainstream analyses of public policy that do not pin-point a qualitative change in 
the orientation of public policy to the election of Thatcher, Reagan, and Mulroney 
                                                   
178 Fast does note that the late 1990’s does appear to mark a temporary departure from 
this trend for workers in the UK’s manufacturing sector.  However, Fast also notes that this blip 
relates not to workers’ share of value added rising, but to the sector’s declining profits alongside 
temporarily fixed labour costs. (Fast 2013, 224–225) 
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(Gesink-Walsh 2007, provides a stunningly conventional account of QA that 
asserts precisely these linkages).  In as much as there were clear precursors to the 
fundamental redirection of policy that the 1980s ushered in179, the almost 
simultaneous election of populist right-wing politicians whose programs were 
informed by Hayekian, neo-classical economics is unmistakable.  So too are the 
macro-economic trends that date to the same moment. The maintenance and/or 
acceleration of those trends (i.e. declines in union density, increase of Gini 
coefficients, workers’ declining share of value-added) through the 1990s is 
similarly coincident with the advent of the New Public Management, New Growth 
Theory, and New Labour.  Even the economic crisis that began in 2008 has not in 
any meaningful way disturbed either the centrality that neo-liberal theory has 
enjoyed in policy making circles or the on-going redistribution of wealth that 
such policy has facilitated.  Austerity is hardly a departure from the kind of 
orthodoxy of which QA is an outgrowth. Indeed, the neoliberal regime has proven 
to be remarkably durable. I would argue that such durability is at least partly 
related to QA. Indeed, therein lies the real value of QA.   
8.4 Wither Quality, Wither Power? 
As one reader has critically noted, the theorization and account of QA I 
have provided in this dissertation seems to indicate that the neoliberal university 
                                                   
179 The efforts of the Wilson and Callaghan governments to carry forward a left-of-centre 
program whilst side-lining more radical elements inside the Labour Party come immediately to 
mind (Panitch and Leys 2001). 
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is productive of so much mediocrity as to undermine neoliberalism. In so noting, 
it is alleged that I have perhaps failed to recognize the outstanding intellectual 
achievements of some students and scholars (with whom I might not agree), as 
well as some ground-breaking scientific innovations that have come out of 
American, British and Canadian universities in recent decades.  Is my account of 
the neo-liberal university and of QA and its effects perhaps too neat?  
First, there is much to suggest that the long-term stability of the current global 
political economic order will not be undermined by the efficiency with which the 
neoliberal university is productive of a populace that is only moderately literate, 
or a scientific base that is generative of so much junk science. We should not 
mistake the efficient production of either/both the moderately literate and/or 
innovative, for the absence of an ability to train a sufficiently large number of 
remarkably bright people capable of operating with stunning efficiency within the 
dominant paradigm.  Similarly, we should not mistake the degree to which neo-
liberalism imperils some more idyllic form of science, with the potential of 
neoliberal science to efficiently deliver more and more “false wants” or the 
technologies necessary for the maintenance and intensification of the current 
world order, or to efficiently produce a work force sensitive to the need for time 
discipline, team work, and a market-friendly disposition. 
It is also no longer useful to think of any single nation’s science base or 
labour pool as a source of competitive advantage necessary to underscore the 
durability of the neo-liberal program, particularly if that state happens to be 
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either prominent or pre-eminent within the prevailing world order.  Today, the 
owners of intellectual property are global corporations that enjoy considerable 
transnational mobility and remarkable levels of state-support. This should not be 
taken to mean that states do not – and will not - remain utterly central.  Rather, it 
is to say that the ability of any one state to dominate on the world stage will not 
necessarily be built on its ability to educate en masse a highly literate domestic 
labour-force or to generate meaningful forms of innovation exclusively within its 
territorial borders. Instead, the projection of power will arguably rest on the 
ability of key states to corral and control both brain power and intellectual 
property by leveraging existing economic and institutional advantages. For 
example, the US has been able to reproduce significant advantage by leveraging 
its power to develop and maintain a juridical environment favourable to 
American firms (Gindin and Panitch 2012, Chapter 9).   
I have also not at any point suggested that the tendencies evident within 
the neo-liberal university should be understood as any kind of teleology.  Indeed, 
what the preceding implores us to understand is that however theoretically and 
empirically weak is the evidence used to support the neo-liberal university, it 
remains incredibly potent politically, so much so that the forces supporting the 
development and deepening of QA have hardly abated even in the face of intense 
economic dislocation. But this does not at all mean that the potency of QA is 
absolute – there are cracks and fissures emerging all around which need to be 
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exploited if we are to get “somewhere else”.  Further, one can only guess at what 
spark will ignite change. 
8.5 Cracks in the Neo-liberal Program 
The first of the aforementioned cracks has to do with the persistent 
inability of neo-liberal forms of education to provide a fulfilling learning 
experience.  This inability stems from the logic that informs the neo-liberal 
enterprise wherein economic well-being is conflated with enlightenment, 
fulfilment, and happiness.180  On its face, this claim is false.  One does not have to 
be Plato to understand that enlightenment or fulfilment are not things that can 
be purchased.  The reform of universities and of taught programs in ways that 
look to enhance a graduate’s attractiveness in labour-markets are not likely to 
provide for a fulfilling learning experience. The preference for “useful” or 
commercializable research is not likely to feed the native curiosity of too many 
young minds, however much it might command their attention. And then there is 
the fact that, as has been demonstrated, the kind of instrumental approaches to 
human behaviour that are so rewarded in the neoliberal university do a 
remarkably terrible job of actually explaining anything. As was the case in Paris 
                                                   
180 Ryerson University in Toronto, Canada, has recently launched a new advertising 
campaign designed to attract new students to its continuing education program. Under the image 
of a smiling graduate of the program, the campaign’s tag line reads: “Be the employee that 
employers want.”  The image and the line together conflate employment (and docility), with 
happiness and satisfaction. 
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in 1968, the poverty of mainstream analyses will at some point trigger demands 
for a more powerful lens.    
Also, the neoliberal dream is increasingly out-of-reach, even for university 
and college graduates.  Indeed, it is crucial to bear in mind that the job prospects 
of recent graduates (and not so recent graduates) are not particularly bright.  Not 
only is unemployment high among recent graduates, but the “return” one earns 
on an “investment” in higher education is only high if income gains are evaluated 
relationally, relative to those who have no education (see Chapter 3).  Again, wage 
rates, in real terms, have been stagnant throughout the developed world over at 
least the last 30 years.  That said, work, throughout the developed world, has 
shifted to the services sector, where employers have begun to require that 
potential employees have a degree/diploma, thereby making the average wage 
available primarily to those that obtain such a credential. The neoliberal program 
cannot deliver on its promise, even when such is evaluated on its own terms.  A 
university degree guarantees access to neither a job nor a high-wage, which again 
are preconditions to the neo-liberal vision of bliss (for the masses)(Carrick 2013).  
As patterns of economic dislocation become more stated in unstable and 
stagnating economies, the neo-liberal university will perhaps become less 
effective in the reproduction of neoliberalism, or at least will become productive 
of social conditions that can be usefully exploited by oppositional movements.   
Though there has been some significant debate on the issue, it may well be that 
students’ appetite for higher education will decline in the face of rising tuition-
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fees and expanding levels of student debt.181  It goes without saying that the 
neoliberal university can only operate as an effective tool in the reproduction of 
neoliberalism if students are willing and able to attend.  The secular increase of 
tuition-fees in Canada, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, (to name a few), may 
emerge as obstacles in the reproduction of the neoliberal university. Presumably, 
neo-liberal governments around the world will look, as they have previously 
looked, to resolve such issues in one of two ways: 1) by introducing means-tested 
forms of subsidy; and, 2) by making credit more readily available to students. 
While the use of means-testing has been effective at reproducing a “kinder-
gentler” neoliberalism, the upward creep of tuition-fees amid persistent and high 
levels of unemployment suggest that means-tests will become near-universal and 
thus not sustainable within the neoliberal program, which is presently rooted in 
calls for austerity.  In the US and Canada, where levels of student debt have 
reached dizzying levels, oppositional movements are already finding a firmer 
footing in terms of their ability to both organize and mobilize around this very 
issue.  In other jurisdictions, debt is similarly becoming a hot-button issue 
generative of, in many cases, more discord than is present in the US.182    
                                                   
181 The debate is too lengthy to summarize here.  Conventional accounts tend to 
distinguish between “financial” and “non-financial” barriers to access, wherein a parent’s 
educational background is depicted as “non-financial”, while family income is declared to be 
“financial”.  Irrespective, there is broad consensus that high-school graduates from low- and 
middle-low income backgrounds are less likely to attend higher education than are students from 
middle- and middle-high income backgrounds.  For an overview see (Educational Policy Institute 
2008) 
182 The Canadian Federation of Students maintains a “debt-clock” which tracks the 
outstanding amount of student debt in Canada as it constantly rises by virtue of compound 
interest (http://www.cfs-fcee.ca/studentdebt/).  The CFS has used this and related materials to 
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The Quebec and Chilean student protests in 2012 and 2011-13 respectively 
provide important examples of how the neoliberal program can trigger mass 
opposition that starts with students. In both cases, students’ upset over tuition-
fee increases and levels of student debt triggered mass student protests. 
Critically, both movements benefited from widespread public support and, no 
less importantly, the support of organized labour, which quickly fell-in line 
behind students.  In gaining wider support, the students’ opposition to particular 
pieces of legislation snowballed, albeit temporarily, into a more fundamental 
critique of neoliberalism and austerity.  In Quebec, student opposition essentially 
brought the Government down and forced an election (Hallward 2012). And in 
Chile, though protests are on-going, students’ demands continue to weigh heavily 
on the government, which appears anxious to negotiate a solution to what it well 
understands is a volatile situation (Larrabure and Torchia 2011).  Notably, the 
Quebec protests were largely unexpected, even by the student organizers who 
started them. However much their organizing model built from the bottom-up in 
a manner that should be emulated, it did not appear to anyone that the 
                                                   
some effect in lobbying for lower tuition-fees (Newfoundland lowered tuition-fees, Ontario’s 
government set-up a temporary tuition-fee freeze in 2005, which the CFS was not able to build 
into a larger movement for a long-term policy.  In the US, student debt emerged as a major issue 
in the 2012 election, albeit within disappointing parameters (students wanted the interest rate 
charged on government guaranteed loans kept at around 6% instead of be raised as the 
Republicans proposed).  In the UK, and indeed around Europe, the introduction of raising of 
tuition-fees have set-off mass protests.  In Quebec, during the spring and summer of 2012, the 
Liberal Government’s announcement that tuition-fees would rise by just $76.00/year triggered 
widespread and mass protests that lasted for weeks.  The Government’s subsequent defeat was at 
least partly attributable to the student protests.  Unfortunately, the newly elected PQ government 
also decided to raise tuition-fees (by less than the Liberals had proposed).  The response from 
students has not been nearly as thunderous.   
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mobilizations would be as massive as they were, until they actually happened 
(Hallward 2012).  Indeed, at what point mass unrest will emerge is impossible to 
say.  That tuition-fee and interest rate increases will trigger widespread 
opposition seems almost inevitable.   
The neoliberal program has also subjected most academics to a work-
regime that is ever-more punishing, alienating, and insecure.  This process of 
“proletarianization” can be linked to more than just the diminution of the quality 
of research and teaching, as outlined above, it can also be linked to increasing 
levels of job dissatisfaction and workplace disruptions (Smith 2000; Schmidt 
2013).  While academic work has traditionally provided relatively high salaries, 
such rates of pay are miserably low when evaluated in terms of tuition-fees paid 
and overall years spent in school (the neoliberal tests of return on investment) 
(The Economist 2010).  In fact, those professions that also require lengthy 
periods of post-graduate study have considerably higher “yields”.  The trade-off 
for most academics has been the flexibility that academic work allows - time to 
think, explore, and create.  As the space for intellectual pursuit becomes more 
monitored, structured, and, limited, we can expect further discord within the 
professoriate.  Historically, universities and government agencies have been able 
to moderate such discord by effectively dividing the professoriate into myriad 
different tranches – prolific researchers who earn research awards (and 
corporate sponsorships) are separated from those that teach, from those that 
teach on contract, and from those that teach on contract at multiple universities 
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simultaneously. By rewarding the researchers who operate at the pinnacles of the 
system, both governments and universities have been able to leverage the 
precariousness of contract faculty to prevent the emergence of militancy within 
the whole academy.  While this has often worked, there are signs that such a 
divide and conquer strategy may be limited, particularly as the precariously 
employed begin to undertake the majority of teaching on many campuses, and 
therein find a potential basis for opposition and disruption (Smith 2012; Kovalik 
2013; Schmidt 2011).   
The last and most urgent set of contradictions I will highlight relate both 
to human health and the earth’s ecosystem.  The neoliberal program has and 
continues to place human health and the earth’s ecosystem in jeopardy, and in 
ways that are becoming increasingly clear.183  Such risks have emerged as a direct 
result of government’s efforts, avidly supported by the private-sector, to press the 
university ever closer to industry, all in an environment where public dollars can 
be leveraged for private gains. The universities increased reliance on industry as a 
gateway to on-going government support has meant that the universities are 
often unwilling to question in meaningful ways the efficacy of, for example, drug 
                                                   
183 This too is a topic for another volume.  Mirowski (2011) does an outstanding job of 
outlining the ways in which neoliberal science is undermining the American science-base.  This 
poses risks to human health and the environment in myriad ways.  For example, as Joel Lexchin 
(2004; 2003) has documented, drug trials co-sponsored by corporate interests are less reliable 
than those conducted exclusively with public money.  The dimensions of the issues surrounding 
this are immense.  By way of another example, Mirowski (2011) suggests that the proliferation of 
over-lapping patents and the decline in patent quality, are, in the US, related to government cut-
backs which have left the United States Patenting Office under-staffed, over-worked, and subject 
to a self-regulatory, customer-service oriented regime that provides little in the way of oversight. 
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treatments, or industrial processes. By way of a more specific example, the 
University of Toronto’s administration has appeared consistently unwilling to 
either investigate allegations of misconduct or to support the work of several 
whistleblowers who have highlighted the dangers to public health posed by the 
University’s and the federal government’s commercialization program.  In two 
widely publicized cases, the University simply failed to investigate, or to 
investigate properly, when it was alerted to the fact that researchers and/or 
corporate partners were manipulating and/or hiding data so as to prove the 
efficacy of, in the one case, a new drug, and in the other case, a chemical used to 
treat drinking water (Schafer 2007; Ugarkovic 2008).  In the US, the University 
of Pennsylvania has consistently appeared relatively unconcerned about the 
practice of  “fracking” (an industrial process used to access stores of natural gas 
in rock), apparently because the oil and gas industry provides considerable 
amounts of financial support for research at the university (Glass 2011). Such 
patterns, which have already produced serious public health and environmental 
crises, will most assuredly continue to do so, and in the process will provide 
important opportunities for oppositional movements to make significant gains.   
By way of some final thoughts it is necessary to turn ever so briefly to the 
issue of theory.  At times it seems unbelievable that in the face of cogent critique 
anyone could continue to believe in the virtues of the neoliberal line, at least in 
earnest.  Indeed, the poverty of the available evidence and the fact that neoliberal 
organizations like the Trilateral Commission have long sought to leverage higher 
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education to reproduce consent for a renewed and market-based form of 
authoritarianism seems to belie mainstream propaganda concerning notions of 
the relative efficiency of markets.  It would appear that “the evidence” is really 
nothing more than a sideshow intended to draw attention away from the 
processes that the neoliberalization of higher education and research have helped 
to facilitate, namely the wholesale revision of the post-war class compromise.  
Such a view seems more plausible still when one discovers the degree to which 
the work of key thinkers – like Friedman and Hayek – was developed and 
advanced as a conscious political project.184  The theoretical exaltation of the 
economist within neoliberal theory, which presents him as objective, rational, 
and exclusively able to judge which conceits are likely fatal, also seems to indicate 
that the outcomes of neoliberal policy could hardly be “unexpected”.    
Of course, in as much as organizations like the Mont Pelerin Society and 
the Trilateral Commission have been able to corral the loyalty of key decision-
makers around the world and foretell the direction of neoliberal policy rather 
accurately, they are still but expressions of the underlying system that they have 
nonetheless helped to create and reform.  The neoliberal university cannot be so 
                                                   
184 In the 1970’s, the Trilateral Commission, a transnational neo-liberal juggernaut, 
published, “The Crisis of Democracy”.  In that report, the Commission argued that the university 
was fundamental to resolving the root cause of the aforementioned crisis, which they argued was 
a surplus of democracy.  Accordingly the university was to be re-tooled; the educational 
programming was to be tied more closely to the rhythms and demands of the labour market, and 
simultaneously leveraged to lower what were held by the Commission to be the unrealistically 
high expectations of graduates. As with all forms of neo-liberalism, the masses were viewed, if not 
contemptuously, then as limited in their ability to transcend, as do the neo-liberals (and hence the 
Commission), the parameters of human existence, such that they too might see that markets are 
relatively benevolent mechanisms around which to organize all forms of human activity.   
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usefully understood as merely a by-product of, as it were, “intelligent design”.  
Rather, it must be seen as a part of the unfolding of a renewed global capitalism 
within which key segments of the ruling class have worked diligently to construct 
and maintain a political project and an underlying program of accumulation, 
always in the face of very particular forms of opposition and class conflict. Only in 
this way can we access and assess the various forms that neo-liberal policy has 
taken the world over.  And only in this way, can we excavate, examine, and seize, 
the roots and mechanisms of power that capital is presently able to leverage so 
well in its drive to use the university ever-more effectively in the recreation of 
neoliberalism.    
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